Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00119-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG JONATHAN TREVINO, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 28TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña Appellant Jonathan Trevino was convicted of the offenses of continuous violence against the family and obstruction or retaliation. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 25.11(e); 36.06(c). The trial court deferred adjudication and placed appellant on community supervision for six years. The State filed a motion to revoke community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to all but one violation of his community supervision. The trial court granted the motion to revoke, adjudicated appellant guilty, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We affirm. I. ANDERS BRIEF Counsel states in his brief that he has diligently reviewed the entire record and that “there are no non-frivolous issues in this case.” See id.; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a thorough, professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In compliance with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) notified appellant that he has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of these pleadings; (3) informed appellant of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; 2 Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20. Appellant has not filed a pro se response to the Anders brief. II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no arguable reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw (and a first amended motion to withdraw). See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.” (citations omitted))). We grant the motions to withdraw. Counsel is ordered to send a copy of this memorandum opinion and its accompanying judgment to appellant, and to advise him of his right to file a petition for 3 discretionary review, within five days of the date of this memorandum opinion. 1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 2 IV. CONCLUSION The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 6th day of August, 2026. 1 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see id. R. 68.3(a), and must comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. R. 68.4. 2 In his prayer for relief, counsel for appellant moved the Court to dismiss the appeal. The motion to dismiss is denied. 4