Lou Moore v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
Date FiledJuly 29, 2026
Docket06-26-00009-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-26-00009-CR
LOU MOORE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 202nd District Court
Bowie County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23F1027-202
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Bowie County jury convicted Lou Edward Moore of sexual assault of a child. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2). After Moore pled true to the State’s punishment-
enhancement allegation, the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, Moore
argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict of guilt. Because we find that
legally sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict of guilt, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict of Guilt
In his sole point of error on appeal, Moore argues that the evidence was legally
insufficient to show that he had sex with Jessica1 before her seventeenth birthday while in Bowie
County, Texas. The amended indictment alleged that “beginning on or about May 1, 2002, and
continuing until on or about June 13, 2002,” Moore “intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the
penetration of the sexual organ of Jessica Thompson (a pseudonym) . . . by [Moore’s] sexual
organ” when Jessica was a child under the age of seventeen and that Jessica “was then and there
a person with whom [Moore] was prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate
sexual intercourse” with. As applied to this case, a person commits an offense of sexual assault
if the person causes the penetration of the female sexual organ of a child by any means. See Act
of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1286, § 1, 1997 Tex. Gen Laws 4911, 4911 (amended
2003, 2017) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2)(A)). Here, “‘[c]hild’ means a
person younger than [seventeen] years of age.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(1).
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We use pseudonyms to protect the identity of any person who was a minor at the time of the offense. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.10.
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A. Standard of Review
“The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction be
supported by legally sufficient evidence.” Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 607 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring)). “In evaluating legal
sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to
determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912). “We examine legal sufficiency under the
direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly
resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007)).
“In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of
the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common
design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not required
that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the
cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.’”
Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are
equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by
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circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Even erroneously admitted evidence must be
considered when addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Moore v. State, 169
S.W.3d 467, 477 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d); see Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763,
767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined
by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Williamson, 589 S.W.3d at 298 (citing Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The offense here was sexual assault of a child,
which meant that the prosecution had the burden of proving the following essential elements:
(1) Moore intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Jessica’s sexual organ, and
(2) Jessica was younger than seventeen years of age at the time of the penetration. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A), (c)(1).
B. The Evidence at Trial
At trial, the State called Jessica as its first witness. At the time of trial, Jessica was forty
years old, married, and had three children. Jessica grew up in Arizona, where she lived with her
mother and stepfather. When Jessica was fifteen, she reached out to Moore, who lived in Fouke,
Arkansas. Jessica began corresponding with Moore. When her mother found out, Jessica and
her mother got into an argument. Jessica told her mother that she wanted to go live with Moore
in Fouke. Shortly thereafter, Jessica moved to Fouke to live with Moore. Jessica explained that
she was still fifteen when she moved to Arkansas.
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According to her testimony, about two weeks after arriving in Fouke, Jessica was
watching a movie with Moore one night in the living room of their home. Moore put his hand on
her thigh and then moved his hand to her crotch area. Moore then put his hand under her clothes.
Jessica said that “all the sudden [she] was laying down, and he was on top of [her] and inside of
[her].” She stated that Moore used no protection and ejaculated inside of her. Jessica testified
that Moore told her not “to worry about getting pregnant because he had a vasectomy.” At that
point, Jessica had never had any sexual intercourse with anyone else.
Jessica testified that the sexual abuse became a regular occurrence, explaining that it
happened “[a]bout three times a week.” She said that it always included touching, penetration,
and sometimes oral sex.
Jessica testified that when she was sixteen, she moved with Moore from Fouke to Mesa,
Arizona. The sexual abuse continued while she lived in Mesa. From Mesa, they moved back to
Fouke for a short time and lived with her grandparents. Then, in May of 2002, Jessica explained
that they moved to a house in Texarkana, Texas, which is in Bowie County, Texas. Moore
rented a house on 9th Street in Texarkana. Utility records admitted into evidence reflect that the
water to the home was activated on May 31, 2002. Jessica testified that she was sixteen years
old and a junior in high school when they moved into the house on 9th Street, before her
seventeenth birthday in mid-June 2002.
Jessica testified that Moore sexually abused her when she was sixteen years old in
Moore’s bedroom of the house in Texarkana. Jessica recalled “being on [Moore’s] bed and
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being raped.” On that occasion, she said that Moore penetrated her female-sexual organ with his
penis.
Jessica also explained that the last time Moore sexually abused her before she turned
seventeen was a few days before her birthday. She stated that Moore told her that he would no
longer face charges once she turned seventeen in Texas. She recalled, like the many other times
in the past, just lying there while he had sex with her.
After she turned seventeen in June, Jessica explained that the sexual abuse continued
“pretty much the same, about three times a week.” However, around the third week of June,
Moore was involved in a car accident, was charged with driving under the influence, and went to
jail. Jessica was with Moore when the wreck occurred. After the accident, Moore was away
from home for a couple of weeks. During the month of July, Jessica stated that she noticed her
body started to change and she suspected that she was pregnant. Jessica testified that between
the time of the wreck and the time Moore was released from jail, she did have sexual contact
with someone else.
Jessica ultimately realized she was pregnant. She testified that when Moore was released
from jail, he realized that she was no longer using her menstrual products and told her she
needed to get an abortion. Jessica stated that Moore took her to an abortion clinic in Shreveport,
Louisiana. At that point, she was “close to four months pregnant.” After talking to someone at
the clinic, Jessica decided that she did not want to go through with the abortion. She stated that
she made it clear to Moore that she was going to have the child. That strained her relationship
with Moore. She explained that times got pretty difficult.
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Jessica testified that, as a result, in January 2003, she moved to a maternity home in
Keller, Texas. She gave birth to her child in March. She stayed at the maternity home until May
2003, when she returned to Arkansas to live with Moore again. She recalled staying with Moore
for around one month. During that time frame, she had sexual contact with Moore. She
ultimately moved to North Richland Hills, Texas.
She testified that she met her husband in December of 2003 and was married six months
later. Jessica stated that her husband treated the child as his own child and helped raise the child.
However, she stayed in contact with Moore. Periodically, Moore would visit Jessica and her
child.
Jessica testified that in 2020, she went through a child-support enforcement action with
the attorney general’s office. She was trying to get child support from the person she thought
was her child’s biological father. However, when they conducted a paternity test, paternity was
not established for the person she thought was the child’s biological father. At that point, Jessica
explained that she knew Moore was the child’s father. Shortly thereafter, Jessica returned to
Texarkana and filed a police report against Moore.
Cliff Harris, an investigator with the Bowie County District Attorney’s Office, testified
that he was contacted by his supervisor to secure a search warrant for Moore’s DNA. He secured
buccal swabs from Moore. Sergeant John Thacker, with the Texarkana, Texas, Police
Department, testified that he secured buccal swabs from the child and Jessica. Officer Spencer
Price, with the Texarkana, Texas, Police Department, testified that he shipped the swabs to the
University of North Texas laboratory.
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Kendra Felipe-Ortega, a forensic scientist with the University of North Texas Health
Center for Human Identification in Fort Worth, testified that she received buccal samples for the
child, Jessica, and Moore. She was able to conduct a DNA analysis and develop a genetic profile
for each sample. The results of her testing were that Moore could not be excluded as the
biological father of the child. Based on the DNA analysis conducted, at least 99.99999998
percent of the male population is excluded as being a possible biological father of the child. As a
result, her conclusion was that Moore’s DNA profile is consistent with a biological parent/child
relationship with the child.
After hearing this evidence, the jury found Moore guilty of sexual assault of a child.
C. Analysis
According to Moore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the
jury would have been required to speculate whether Jessica and Moore had sexual intercourse in
Bowie County, Texas at a time before her seventeenth birthday. Specifically, Moore contends
that while the genetic testing proved that he is the father of Jessica’s child, the child’s “date of
birth indicates a date of conception after [Jessica’s seventeenth] birthday.”
The testimony shows that Jessica moved into a house with Moore on 9th Street in
Texarkana, Texas in May of 2002. That was corroborated by utility records which reflect that
the water to the home was activated on May 31, 2002. The testimony also shows that Jessica
was sixteen years old and a junior in high school when they moved into the house on 9th Street.
Jessica testified that Moore sexually abused her when she was sixteen years old in Moore’s
bedroom of the house in Texarkana. Jessica recalled being on his bed and that Moore penetrated
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her female-sexual organ with his penis. Jessica also testified as to the last time Moore sexually
abused her before she turned seventeen. Jessica said it was a few days before her birthday and
that Moore had referenced her upcoming birthday.
Moore argues that because of the child’s date of birth, the likely conception date was
after Jessica turned seventeen, and therefore a reasonable jury could not conclude that Moore
had sexual intercourse with Jessica before she was seventeen. However, the jury was not tasked
with the determination of whether the child was conceived after Jessica turned seventeen, but
rather the jury needed to determine whether Moore sexually assaulted Jessica prior to her turning
seventeen, regardless of her pregnancy. This was not a case where only one instance of sexual
assault was being alleged; rather, Jessica testified to numerous acts of sexual intercourse with
Moore from the time she was fifteen, including during the weeks before her seventeenth birthday
while living in Texarkana. As the fact-finders, “the jury was the sole judge of the credibility of
the witnesses at trial, and we defer to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve
conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts.” Wilson
v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319).
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a
rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Moore committed sexual
assault of a child under the age of seventeen in Bowie County, Texas. As a result, we overrule
Moore’s sole point of error.
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II. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: July 17, 2026
Date Decided: July 29, 2026
Do Not Publish
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