Ardwyn Dewayne Jones v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket05-24-01502-CR
JudgeBarbare
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-01502-CR
ARDWYN DEWAYNE JONES, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F20-75215
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare
Opinion by Justice Barbare
Ardwyn Dewayne Jones (Jones) was convicted by a jury of continuous sexual
abuse of a child younger than fourteen years old and sentenced to forty-five years’
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division.
He raises five issues on appeal complaining about the trial court’s failure to quash
the indictment, the admission of extraneous-offense evidence, and an expert’s
testimony regarding the victim’s truthfulness. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
T.S.’s mother (Mother) met Jones when she was in her early twenties. They
did not marry nor live together. After T.S. was born, Jones did not participate in their
lives. When T.S. was seven years old, a paternity test confirmed that Jones was her
father and she started spending every other weekend with Jones at his apartment.
T.S.1 testified that when she was about ten years old, Jones made her touch
his penis with her hand. The first incident occurred when they were getting ready for
bed. Jones wrapped his arm around her and pulled her closer. T.S. felt his hard penis
against her buttocks. She reached her hand back to push herself away and
accidentally touched his penis. A few weekends later during another visit, the same
thing happened while they were getting ready for bed. This time, however, Jones
took T.S.’s hand and made her touch his penis. He moved her hand up and down for
“like a minute.” Both times, his penis was inside his clothing and she touched him
over his clothing. She testified there were a few other times that he made her touch
his erect penis when it was outside his clothes, but she could not recall the specifics
of those instances but believed they had happened fewer than five times.
T.S. described the first time Jones touched her vagina when she was around
eleven years old. She and her older sister were in bed with him. T.S. was in the
middle. Jones pulled her closer to him and reached up her dress. His hand was on
the outside of her panties on the “low part” near her vagina. She testified that he
touched the “line in the middle.” He then moved his hand inside her panties and
moved his finger in a circular motion “on the line” of her vagina. T.S. said it felt
1
At the time of trial, T.S. was eighteen years old.
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“disgusting,” but she was “frozen with shock.”
Jones touched her vagina again about a month later when they were sleeping
in his bed. Her sister was not present at that time. T.S. stated that it happened in the
same way as before: “Getting ready for bed, wrapped his arm around me, pulled me
closer, I feel his penis on my butt, and then he reached his hand around and went
into my underwear.” This time, T.S. claimed Jones tried to put his finger inside her,
but she pushed his hand away because it hurt. Jones told her, “you can take it.” T.S.
testified that Jones did not touch her every time she stayed with him, but he did most
of the time. She believed that he touched her vagina between five and ten different
times.
When T.S. was eleven or twelve, she told Mother that “something
inappropriate happened” with Jones.2 Mother did not call the police immediately;
however, a school counselor learned about it after T.S. wrote about it on her school
computer. Authorities were notified and T.S. was forensically interviewed in
January 2020. She was physically examined in March 2020, and the exam was
“normal.” Her medical records noted: “Normal exams are common in cases of sexual
abuse. A normal exam does not contradict the allegations or rule out abuse.”
The jury also heard testimony from L.C.,3 another child whom Jones sexually
2
Mother believed this conversation happened sometime between February 2017 and February 2018.
3
L.C. was in seventh grade at the time of trial. The State introduced her testimony after an article 38.37
extraneous-offense hearing.
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abused. L.C. met Jones when she was a toddler, while he was dating her mother
(C.C.). She called Jones “Seven,” but C.C. told her to call him “Dad.” L.C. and T.S.
got to know each other, and they sometimes played together. T.S. ended up being
“like a big sister” to her.
L.C. testified about two instances when she was in the third or fourth grade
when Jones made her perform oral sex on him. She was asleep in her bedroom that
she shared with her younger brother, and Jones woke her up and told her to go to
C.C.’s bedroom.4 Jones instructed her to close and lock the door. While they were
sitting on the bed, he began kissing her neck, and “it felt weird.” He then told her to
sit on the floor. L.C. complied, and Jones removed his pants and she could see his
penis. He put it in her mouth and told her to move up and down. Jones told her she
was not doing it right so he then “moved [her] head up and down.” She said it lasted
for a long time and then it “just stopped.” Jones told her to brush her teeth and go
back to her bed. A couple of months later, it happened again. L.C. did not tell her
mother what happened because she had previously witnessed Jones hit C.C. and was
afraid that Jones would hit her mother again if he found out that she told.
Defense counsel challenged the credibility of T.S. and L.C. , questioned them
repeatedly about the timing of events, and asked why they did not tell anyone about
the abuse. However, the jury convicted Jones of continuous sexual abuse of T.S., a
4
L.C. testified that her mother was at work when Jones abused her.
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child younger than fourteen, and sentenced him to forty-five years’ confinement.
This appeal followed.
Motion to Quash the Indictment
In his first issue, Jones contends that the trial court erred by declining to quash
the indictment because it did not identify a period of at least thirty days during which
the abuse occurred. The State responds that the indictment and disclosed discovery
adequately informed Jones of that period, satisfying his due process right to notice
and enabling him to prepare a defense.
On June 22, 2023, Jones filed a “Motion to Quash Indictment” that, in part,
challenged the sufficiency of the indictment to “adequately describe or specify a
period that was 30 or more days in duration in which alleged sexual abuse took
place.”
During the first pre-trial hearing on the motion to quash, Jones conceded that
“the indictment does track the language of the statute.” But he maintained that he
was “essentially flying blind trying to figure out what time period and what years
because there are no specific dates that are provided.” The State responded that
neither the statute nor case law required a range of dates in the indictment. The trial
court agreed and denied the motion.
At a second pre-trial hearing, Jones renewed his motion to quash. In addition
to its previous arguments, the State emphasized that Jones’ due process right to
notice of the charges against him had been satisfied by discovery documents in
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which T.S. stated that he sexually abused her between the ages of eight and twelve.
The trial court again denied the motion, stating that “[d]ue process has been met.”
The sufficiency of a charging instrument presents a question of law. Smith v.
State, 309 S.W.3d 10, 13–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An appellate court therefore
reviews a trial judge’s ruling on a motion to quash a charging instrument de novo.
Smith, 309 S.W.3d at 13–14; Duke v. State, No. 05-24-01092-CR, 2025 WL
2988742, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 23, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Holton v. State, 487 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015,
no pet.) (“Questions of law—such as the sufficiency of an indictment—are reviewed
de novo because neither the trial court nor the reviewing court occupies an
appreciably better position than the other to decide the issue.”).
A charging instrument must be specific enough to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense. State v. Moff,
154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). “An indictment that tracks the
language of a statute usually gives sufficient notice.” State v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d
352, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). However, this due process requirement may be
satisfied by means other than the language in the charging instrument, and when a
motion to quash is overruled, a defendant suffers no harm unless he did not, in fact,
receive notice of the State’s theory against which he would have to defend. Smith v.
State, 297 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
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A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child if, during
a period of thirty or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of
sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against
one or more victims; and at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual
abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger
than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b). The statute defines
“acts of sexual abuse” to include the offenses of indecency with a child by sexual
contact and aggravated sexual assault. Id. §§ 21.11(a)(2), 22.021.
The primary purpose for specifying a date in an indictment is to show that the
prosecution is not barred by a statute of limitations. See Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d
683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). However, continuous sexual abuse of a child has
no statute of limitations. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.01(1)(D). The Texas
Legislature “created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child in response to
a need to address sexual assaults against young children who are normally unable to
identify the exact dates of the offenses when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.”
Baez v. State, 486 S.W.3d 592, 595 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d).
Although the exact dates of the abuse need not be proven, the offense of continuous
sexual abuse of a child requires proof that there were two or more acts of sexual
abuse that occurred during a period of thirty or more days in duration. Garner v.
State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.).
The indictment alleged:
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Defendant, on or about the 1st day of September, 2017, in the County
of Dallas, State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and
knowingly, during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when
the defendant was 17 years of age or older, commit two or more acts of
sexual abuse against T.S., a child younger than 14 years of age,
hereinafter called complainant, namely by:
the penetration of the complainant’s female sexual organ by the
Defendant’s finger AND by the contact between the hand of the
complainant and the genitals of the Defendant with the intent to arouse
and gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant.
Jones argues that the indictment “only alleged that the offense occurred on or
about September 1st;” therefore, it is unclear when the thirty-day period begins or
ends. Thus, the denial of the motion to quash “amounted to a trial by ambush”
because the State was allowed to hide the time period of the underlying acts. We
disagree.
The statute places no time limitation on when the acts of abuse may have
occurred, other than the effective date of the statute and the date the child turns
fourteen years of age. Hernandez-Silva v. State, No. 03-19-00219-CR, 2020 WL
4726632, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Thus, “[t]he State need not prove the exact dates of the
abuse, only that there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a
period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666,
676 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, “while the State
must provide the defendant with notice of the time period in which the continuous
sexual abuse is alleged to have occurred, it is not necessary for the State to allege
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the exact dates on which the predicate acts of sexual abuse occurred, as those dates
are not essential to the State’s case and are considered to be evidentiary facts only.”
Bleil v. State, 496 S.W.3d 194, 204 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d);
Holton, 487 S.W.3d at 610. Moreover, courts have repeatedly concluded that the “on
or about” language is sufficient. See Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 256 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997) (concluding that “on or about” language allows the State to prove
a date other than the one alleged in the indictment as long as the date is anterior to
the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitation period); see
also Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).
In this case, the indictment tracked the language of the statute, specified the
predicate acts of abuse Jones was alleged to have committed, and stated that the
conduct began on or about a particular date, and lasted through the thirty-day
minimum period of time set forth in the statute. See, e.g., Holton, 487 S.W.3d at 610;
see also Garcia v. State, 981 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (concluding
that an indictment need not “narrow” the window of time within which an offense
must have occurred to satisfy the constitutional notice requirement). Moreover,
Jones received ample notice of the State’s theory of criminal liability through
discovery that he received including the victim’s indication that the abuse occurred
between the ages of eight and twelve. We conclude that the record establishes that
Jones had ample understanding of the accusations levied against him, demonstrating
that he received notice sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process and
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to prepare his defense. See Smith, 297 S.W.3d at (noting that an indictment must be
“specific enough to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him
so that he may prepare a defense”). Jones’ first issue is overruled.
Extraneous-Offense Evidence
In his second and third issues, Jones contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting extraneous-offense evidence describing Jones’ sexual abuse
of L.C. and his assault of C.C. He argues in a fourth issue that the trial court abused
its discretion by denying his mid-trial request for a limiting instruction on the
admission of L.C.’s extraneous-offense evidence about her sexual abuse.
A. Jones’ Sexual Abuse of L.C.
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing
L.C.’s testimony. Jones contends that the extraneous-offense evidence was not
probative under rule 404(b) because L.C.’s allegations were neither in conformity
with nor similar to T.S.’s allegations, and thus her testimony was unfairly prejudicial
under rule 403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b).
1. Standard or Review and Applicable Law
We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of an extraneous
offense for an abuse of discretion. Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 222 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d); Alvaradoflores v. State, No. 05-24-00309-CR, 2025 WL
1953401, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 16, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). If the trial court’s ruling falls within the zone of
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reasonable disagreement, there is no abuse of discretion. Keller, 604 S.W.3d at 222.
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we may not substitute
our opinion for that of the trial court. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003).
Evidence of extraneous offenses is generally inadmissible “to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). By enacting article 38.37, the
legislature created an exception to the general exclusion of character evidence in
criminal trials. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37; Miller v. State, No. 05-
22-01309-CR, 2024 WL 322265, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 29, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, at the trial of a defendant accused
of continuous sexual abuse of a child, evidence that the defendant committed a
separate sex offense against another child may be admissible under section 2 of
article 38.37 “for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the
character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the character of
the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(a)(1)(B), 2(b); Miller,
2024 WL 322265, at *3.
The admission of extraneous evidence under article 38.37, section 2(b) does
not require that the defendant has been charged with, tried for, or convicted of the
separate offense. Castillo v. State, 573 S.W.3d 869, 880–81 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d); Miller, 2024 WL 322265, at *3. But before introducing
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evidence under article 38.37, the trial judge must conduct a hearing outside the jury’s
presence to “determine that the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be
adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37,
§ 2(a)(1); Miller, 2024 WL 322265, at *3.
When evidence of a defendant’s extraneous acts is determined to be relevant
and admissible under article 38.37, section 2, this evidence nonetheless remains
subject to exclusion under rule 403. Miller, 2024 WL 322265, at *4. Under rule 403,
the court may exclude otherwise relevant and admissible evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 does not exclude all prejudicial evidence. It
focuses only on the danger of “unfair” prejudice. State v. Mechler, 153 S.W.3d 435,
440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *2–3.
When undertaking a rule 403 analysis, the trial court must balance the inherent
probative force of the proffered evidence and the proponent’s need for that evidence
against: (1) any tendency of the evidence to suggest a decision on an improper basis;
(2) any tendency of the evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues;
(3) any tendency of the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not
been equipped to evaluate the probative force of the evidence; and (4) the likelihood
that presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or
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merely repeat evidence already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637,
641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *3.
Having explained the requirements of rule 403, we next turn to the specific
meanings of the rule’s key phrases. “Probative value” means more than mere
relevance. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d. at 641. Rather, “probative value” refers to the
inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it serves to
make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation—
coupled with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence. Id.
The rule’s second key phrase, “unfair prejudice,” refers to a tendency to
suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one. Id. “Confusion of the issues” refers to a tendency to confuse or
distract the jury from the main issues in the case. Id. The rule’s fourth key phrase,
“misleading the jury,” concerns the tendency of an item of evidence to be given
undue weight by the jury for reasons other than emotional grounds (for example,
scientific evidence that a jury is not equipped to judge). Id.; Valadez v. State, 663
S.W.3d 133, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Finally, the rule’s fifth and sixth key
phrases, “undue delay” and “needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” are, we
think, self-explanatory and concern the efficiency of the trial proceeding rather than
the threat of an inaccurate decision. Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d. at 641;
Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *3.
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“The trial court has broad discretion in conducting a rule 403 balancing test,
and we will not lightly disturb the decision rendered.” Hall v. State, 67 S.W.3d 870,
876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). “The balance is always slanted toward admission of
relevant evidence because rule 403 carries a presumption that relevant evidence will
generally be more probative than prejudicial.” Rodriguez v. State, 678 S.W.3d 375,
386–87 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. ref’d). “If judicial restraint is ever desirable,
it is when a rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.”
Id. at 387 (quoting Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990) (en banc)); see also Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *3.
2. Application of Law to Facts
The trial court held a pre-trial 38.37 hearing at which T.S. and L.C. testified.
Jones objected to L.C.’s testimony, arguing that because “there’s clearly no
conformity between the description of how the acts occurred, how the intent arose,”
and “it doesn’t outweigh any probative versus prejudiciality [sic].” The judge
overruled the objection, stating:
The acts testified to by [L.C.] certainly are relevant, and they do
include acts that are in conformity with the character of the Defendant.
The time window, the setup of sleeping over, having that custody
or having that - - that time there, there are substantial similarities in the
environment of those two acts and substantial similarities regarding the
acts taken both before the alleged acts and after the alleged acts and
during. Therefore, they will be admissible.
To the extent that Jones argues the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting L.C.’s testimony because it was not probative under rule 404(b), his
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argument lacks merit. The enactment of article 38.37 of the code of criminal
procedure created a statutory exception to rule 404(b). TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.37, § 2(a)(1)(C), (b); Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *6. Article 38.37
supersedes the application of rule 404(b), making extraneous-offense evidence
admissible that rule 404(b) would otherwise preclude. Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL
1953401, at *6 (citing Medrano v. State, No. 05-18-01364-CR, 2020 WL 1921684,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication)).
We next consider whether the trial court acted within its discretion by
balancing the rule 403 factors, and we address each factor in turn.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the probative value
of evidence is often “a function of the similarity of the extraneous transaction to the
charged offense.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390. Here, although the specific acts
of sexual abuse were not identical, there were sufficient similarities to make L.C.’s
testimony probative. L.C. and T.S. were both young girls of similar age when Jones
abused them. They both had a parental-type relationship with him. The abuse
occurred at night, when the victims’ mothers were not present, though sometimes
other family members were nearby in the apartment. Jones instigated and guided the
abuse of both girls: he made T.S. touch his penis and he forced L.C.’s head to move
up and down on his penis. Both girls were abused in a bedroom. In both cases, after
Jones finished the abuse, he told the girls to go to sleep without saying anything
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about the abuse. The extraneous offense Jones committed against L.C. was
sufficiently similar to the charged offense to have probative value. See
Alvaradoflores, 2025 WL 1953401, at *4. Accordingly, this factor weighs against
finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the extraneous-offense
evidence.
The State had ample need for the extraneous-offense evidence. There were no
eyewitnesses and no physical evidence to corroborate T.S.’s testimony. Jones
challenged T.S.’s credibility, and his wife testified that he was with her on most
nights, indicating he had few opportunities to commit the abuse. Without the
evidence, the State’s case would have “basically come down to” T.S.’s word against
his. Id. Thus, the second factor weighs in favor of admission.
Sexually-related bad acts and misconduct involving children are inherently
inflammatory. Newton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet.
ref’d). However, the plain language of rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence merely because it is prejudicial. Pawlak v. State, 420
S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Only “unfair prejudice” provides the basis
for the exclusion of relevant evidence. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 378. In this case,
the trial court instructed the jury not to consider extraneous offenses “for any purpose
unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed
such other offense or offenses.” The trial court’s limiting instruction counter-
balanced the danger of unfair prejudice. Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (“The impermissible inference of character conformity
can be minimized through a limiting instruction.”). We presume the jury followed
the instruction. Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 228 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet.
ref’d). Thus, the possibility that the jury’s decision was based on an improper basis
was mitigated.
Although the evidence encompassed inflammatory allegations of child abuse,
those allegations were no more serious than the allegations forming the basis of the
indictment. See Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016,
pet. ref’d). Moreover, the extraneous-offense testimony was not confusing or
technical but concerned matters, including credibility, that are easily understood by
laypeople. Id. (explaining that scientific evidence might mislead a jury that is not
properly equipped to judge the probative force of the evidence). As such, these
factors weigh against finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
the extraneous-offense evidence.
In considering the time needed to develop the evidence, the more significant
issue is whether the jury would be distracted from consideration of the charged
offense during the time needed to present the extraneous-offense evidence. Mechler,
153 S.W.3d at 441. The time needed to develop the evidence necessarily includes
introduction of the evidence, along with cross-examination, redirect examination,
and any rebuttal offered by the defense in response to the evidence. Hart v. State,
688 S.W.3d 883, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).
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Here, L.C.’s testimony spanned approximately sixty pages of the four-
hundred-page trial. We find nothing in the record indicating that the development of
this evidence distracted the jury from considering the offense against T.S., and the
time spent developing it was not excessive given the overall length of the trial. See
Jackson v. State, No. 05-25-00350-CR, 2026 WL 2258705, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Aug. 5, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding
that the time used was not significant and was unlikely to have distracted the jury
when the evidence covered fifty-three pages of the approximately five-hundred-page
trial). This factor also weighs against finding that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting the extraneous-offense evidence.
In sum, considering the deferential standard of review and bearing in mind
that rule 403 authorizes exclusion of evidence only when there is a clear disparity
between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value, the
trial court could reasonably have concluded that L.C.’s testimony should be
admitted. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. See Hall, 67
S.W.3d at 876 (“The trial court has broad discretion in conducting a rule 403
balancing test, and we will not lightly disturb the decision rendered.”). We overrule
Jones’ second issue.
B. Jones’ Physical Abuse of L.C.’s Mother
In his third issue, Jones argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing L.C. to testify that Jones physically assaulted C.C., her mother. He objected
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during trial that her extraneous-offense testimony was more prejudicial than
probative and inadmissible under both rule 404(b) and article 38.37.5 The State
responded that the evidence was probative because it explained why L.C. delayed
telling C.C. about the abuse, namely that L.C. was afraid that Jones would assault
her mother again.
“Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible.” Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d
235, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); TEX. R. EVID. 402. Rule 401 provides that
evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 401. When determining whether
evidence is relevant, courts should examine the purpose for which the evidence is
being introduced. Layton, 280 S.W.3d at 240. “It is critical that there is a direct or
logical connection between the actual evidence and the proposition sought to be
proved.” Id.; Youngblood v. State, No. 05-22-00812-CR, 2023 WL 7179082, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 1, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). But such evidence “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,
5
Jones has not presented any argument on appeal supporting his article 38.37 objection at trial;
therefore, we do not consider it. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
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preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX.
R. EVID. 404(b)(2). The admissible purposes enumerated in rule 404(b)(2) are not
“collectively exhaustive.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009). Evidence of an extraneous bad act is also “admissible to explain why a victim
of sexual assault did not make a prompt outcry.” Wilson v. State, 90 S.W.3d 391,
394 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, no pet.) (citing Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117, 119
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983)); see also Hurst v. State, No. 05-19-00747-CR, 2021 WL
3233868, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); Garrett v. State, No. 05-13-00883-CR, 2015 WL 4751218, at *2
(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 12, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
The defense’s theory of the case was that the sexual abuse did not occur and
that the victims were not credible. Evidence of Jones’ violent acts made it more
likely that L.C.’s delayed report was not fabricated but was instead motivated by her
fear that Jones would hurt her mother. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by ruling that evidence of Jones’ physical abuse of C.C.
was admissible for a non-propensity purpose under rule 404(b).
Relevant evidence may still be excluded “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. R. 403. Rule 403 favors the admission of relevant evidence,
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and it is presumed that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.
Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This is particularly
true in “he said, she said” sexual assault cases. See Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d
555, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hurst v. State, No. 05-19-00747-CR, 2021 WL
3233868, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication). We next consider the rule 403 factors as discussed above.
The trial court could reasonably have concluded that the evidence’s probative
value was significant. Evidence of Jones’ physical abuse of C.C. helped explain
L.C.’s reason for the delayed outcry. In other words, the evidence made her outcry
more credible. See Hurst, 2021 WL 3233868, at *7.
Second, it is unlikely that the extraneous evidence distracted the jury from the
main issue of the case—whether Jones continuously sexually abused T.S.—or that
the jury gave it undue weight. The State also did not spend an inordinate amount of
time developing testimony about Jones’ abuse of C.C.
Third, the jury charge included a limiting instruction, and we must presume
the jury followed it. Id. (citing Colburn v. State, 966 S.W.3d 511, 520 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (en banc)).
While evidence that Jones committed extraneous acts of violence was
“undoubtedly prejudicial” to him, it was “not unfairly prejudicial” compared to its
probative value. See Mechler, 153 S.W.3d at 440. Given the deferential standard of
review, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s rule 403 balancing falls outside “the
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zone of reasonable disagreement.” See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. We
overrule Jones’ third issue.
C. Mid-trial limiting instruction
Jones next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his mid-
trial request for an article 38.37 limiting instruction that the jury could not consider
L.C.’s testimony unless it believed it beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the conclusion of the article 38.37 hearing, the trial court denied Jones’
request for a mid-trial instruction about the State’s burden of proof for extraneous
offenses because “it is unnecessary at this point for a limiting instruction because
there is no part of that testimony that ought to be limited, given its conformity with
the law.” Jones maintained that not only was a limiting instruction required in the
jury charge but also required each time that L.C. mentioned the extraneous sexual
offenses because “it’s not a comment on the weight of the evidence.” The State
responded:
[State]: [I]f I can ask, Judge, what limiting instruction is opposing
counsel asking for? The only one that’s in 38.37 is that they can
consider it if they believe it beyond a reasonable doubt. But it’s - - they
are allowed to believe it for any relevant purpose. So I don’t know what
he’s limiting besides their level of belief.
The Court: Yeah, that - -
[Defense]: That’s exactly what we’re asking for. They can’t consider it
unless they believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court overruled the objection.
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When evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the trial court must, upon
request, provide a mid-trial limiting instruction, “as failing to provide the instruction
may improperly result in the jury forming a negative inference about the defendant.”
Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Derrough
v. State, No. 02-24-00281-CR, 2025 WL 1774761, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
June 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Delgado
v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). This improper inference,
once formed, cannot easily be cured by an instruction in the jury charge. Id.
In Jackson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained:
[W]hen an extraneous offense is admitted in the guilt phase of a
trial, failing to give a limiting instruction at the time of admission may
result in the jury drawing inferences about the defendant’s guilt based
upon character conformity, a use of the evidence that was not
contemplated by the trial court. The danger then becomes that the
improper inference drawn cannot later be erased by an instruction in the
charge. By contrast, failing to instruct on the burden of proof does not
carry the danger of causing jurors to draw an inference not
contemplated by the trial court when the evidence was admitted.
Moreover, burden of proof is typically a question jurors encounter when
all of the evidence has been taken. If proof that a defendant committed
an extraneous offense is weak, jurors are just as likely to perceive that
weakness after all of the evidence has been taken as they are when the
extraneous offense was initially admitted. Therefore, we hold that a trial
court is not required to give an instruction concerning the burden of
proof at the time evidence of unadjudicated offenses and bad acts is
admitted.
Id. at 477–78.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Jones’
request for a mid-trial limiting instruction stating that the jury “can’t consider it
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unless they believe it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Such an instruction addresses the
State’s burden of proof, and “a trial court is not required to give an instruction
concerning the burden of proof at the time evidence of unadjudicated offenses and
bad acts is admitted.” Jackson, 992 S.W.2d 478; see also Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at
251 (stating that “even when a party properly requests a limiting instruction at the
time the evidence is first offered, the trial judge need not give an instruction on the
burden of proof at that time”); Reese v. State, No. 13-21-00329-CR, 2023 WL
2421663, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not des