James Nathan Grassie v. the State of Texas

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-25-00164-CR JAMES NATHAN GRASSIE, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. DC-2023-CR-2701, Honorable Douglas H. Freitag, Presiding October 23, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, James Nathan Grassie, was convicted of two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a young child and one count of indecency with a child. 1 He was sentenced to life imprisonment for both continuous sexual abuse offenses and 20 years’ imprisonment for the indecency with a child offense. In this appeal, Appellant challenges the denial of his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus and three evidentiary rulings by the trial court. We affirm. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 21.02(b), 21.11(a)(1).  BACKGROUND Appellant was arrested on June 8, 2022, following allegations of sexual abuse made by his son, N.G., and a schoolmate of his son, I.M. 2 Soon thereafter, more boys made allegations, including C.H. and A.J. The State indicted Appellant on two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, one involving N.G. and one involving C.H., and two counts of indecency with a child, one involving A.J. and one involving I.M. The case proceeded to trial by jury on November 28, 2023. As discussed more fully below, the trial court granted a mistrial on December 4 at the request of the defense and with the agreement of the State. In April of 2025, Appellant filed an application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from double jeopardy, which the trial court denied. Following a second jury trial in April and May of 2025, Appellant was convicted and sentenced. 3 His motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. Appellant timely brought this appeal. ANALYSIS Issue 1: Pretrial Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Appellant first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from double jeopardy because the State’s conduct barred retrial. The State responds that double jeopardy did not bar 2 Because the complaining witnesses were minors at the time of the alleged abuse, we refer to them by initials to protect their identity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). 3 Prior to trial, the State dismissed the indecency count involving A.J. 2 the second trial because the State’s conduct leading to the defense-requested mistrial was not designed to cause a mistrial. It is the burden of the habeas applicant to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Ex parte Coleman, 350 S.W.3d 155, 160 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350, 353 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (orig. proceeding)). When reviewing the habeas court’s ruling, we may consider evidence adduced at the habeas hearing and the record as it existed before the habeas court at the time of the hearing. Id. We review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact but review de novo its application of law to those facts. Wafer v. State, 58 S.W.3d 138, 140 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). We review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will uphold that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. Appellant identifies three subjects relevant to the motion for mistrial: discovery related to C.H.’s cell phone, discovery related to Appellant’s iPads, and information regarding a parallel investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The background of those three matters is as follows: Cell Phone Download Soon after Appellant was arrested in June of 2022, a Lubbock police officer documented that he had downloaded C.H.’s cell phone. However, when defense counsel received a hard drive with the download in 2023, it did not work. In October of 2023, a 3 prosecutor told the defense that C.H.’s phone download “does not work” and that the police department did not have a working copy, either. 4 On the evening of November 28, 2023, the first day of trial, the State learned that the cell phone of C.H. had been downloaded successfully after a detective had independently made another attempt to retrieve the information using new software. The State provided a working copy of the download to the defense the following morning. The extraction included a report from June 8, 2022, and a report from November 28, 2023. The prosecutors maintained that they were unaware of any successful download of C.H.’s phone before November of 2023. The defense sought a continuance for the purpose of reviewing the information or, alternatively, a mistrial. The State opposed the request for a mistrial. The trial court granted a continuance. By December 4, the review had not been completed, and it was unclear how much additional time would be required. The defense again sought a mistrial, which the trial court granted. The State did not oppose the mistrial, but informed the defense that it did not want Appellant to later argue double jeopardy in a writ. At the time, the defense agreed. iPads and Computer Tower In October of 2023, the defense received a supplemental report stating that a Lubbock Police Department sergeant had received two iPads, which had been in the office of the lead detective on the case, from an investigator. The detective, who was on administrative leave at the time, said he received the iPads from Appellant’s estranged 4 A prosecutor indicated that the download showed four folders, but the folders could not be opened. 4 wife, A.G., and that he spoke to a prosecutor about them. The State had not informed the defense about the iPads. In early November of 2023, defense counsel discussed the iPads with a prosecutor, who voiced concerns about the iPads being obtained illegally because A.G. took them from Appellant’s separate residence after he was arrested. On November 15, the defense filed a motion to release the two iPads and Appellant’s cell phone, since they had not been downloaded. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued against release of the devices, citing concerns that they may contain child pornography. The trial court ordered that Appellant’s expert witness be allowed to privately view the material, which he did. The defense later learned that prosecutors had met with the detective in August of 2023, and the detective stated that he had the password to one of the iPads. On December 1, 2023, the defense filed a “Formal Request for Compliance with Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,” seeking chain-of-custody information about the iPads and other electronic devices. The State met with the detective again and learned that A.G. had turned over a computer tower from Appellant’s home along with the two iPads. The detective revealed that a video of the exchange between him and A.G. was on his work computer. The State provided that video to the defense on December 6, 2023. FBI Investigation In October of 2024, the defense learned that the FBI was also investigating Appellant. The State received all of the FBI’s discovery and provided it to the defense. From this disclosure, the defense learned that an FBI special agent was contacted by the Lubbock Police Department regarding the case on December 7, 2023, shortly after the mistrial. The FBI then obtained the iPads and computer tower and secured search 5 warrants for those items. The FBI also obtained Appellant’s cell phone and a cell phone from C.H.’s mother. Data from Appellant’s cell phone had been extracted by the FBI on June 3, 2024. During this time, one of the prosecutors handling Appellant’s case was also serving as a special prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The State informed defense counsel that it would not use any of the information downloaded from Appellant’s devices or the devices provided by his wife in the second trial. Appellant’s Application On April 23, 2025, Appellant filed an application for pretrial writ of habeas corpus seeking dismissal of the case on double jeopardy grounds. At the hearing on the motion, Appellant’s counsel argued that the State intentionally failed to provide the download report of C.H.’s cell phone prior to trial, failed to disclose its conversation with the detective in August of 2023 regarding the existence of the iPads, failed to investigate evidence regarding the detective’s receipt of the electronic devices, and waited until after the mistrial to meet with the detective about these items. The State produced evidence indicating that it had confirmed that the download of C.H.’s phone did not work a month before trial and it did not learn otherwise until November 28, on the evening of the first day of trial. The State further demonstrated that, after their meeting with the detective with the iPads in August of 2023, prosecutors believed that the detective would write a supplemental report, but he did not. The prosecutors had not communicated with the detective in September or October of 2023 because he was under investigation. The State asserted that it did not want a mistrial or intentionally goad the defense into seeking a mistrial. The trial court denied the application, stating it “does not find that the 6 prosecution intentionally, or recklessly, or in any other way goaded the Defense into” requesting a mistrial. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred because “the State proceeded to trial while concealing material discovery, made the mistrial inevitable, and then used the resulting reset to obtain evidence it could not access during trial.” Double Jeopardy Generally, a defendant in a criminal case may not be put in jeopardy by the State twice for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 14; see also Pierson v. State, 426 S.W.3d 763, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This protection attaches after the jury is sworn, as the defendant has a right to have the jury empaneled and sworn in his case to try it. Pierson, 426 S.W.3d at 769. The double jeopardy clause is not violated if the trial ends prematurely, absent exceptional circumstances that show the prosecutor intentionally provoked a mistrial. State v. Rushing, 703 S.W.3d 356, 363 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, pet. ref’d). However, if the defendant presents objective facts and circumstances demonstrating that the prosecutor’s misconduct in the case was done with the intent to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial, double jeopardy may bar a second trial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 678–79, 102 S. Ct. 2083, 72 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1982). Whether a claim is raised under the United States Constitution or Texas Constitution, the reviewing court must determine whether a defendant successfully moved for a mistrial because the prosecutor engaged in conduct (1) with the intent to provoke the defense into requesting a mistrial or (2) with the intent to avoid an acquittal. Ex parte Martinez, 560 S.W.3d 681, 697 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing 7 Ex parte Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d 494, 507–08 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), and Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). In Ex parte Wheeler, the Court of Criminal Appeals set forth several non-exclusive factors to guide courts in determining whether the State possessed the necessary intent to induce a mistrial: (1) Did it reasonably appear, at the time the prosecutor acted, that the defendant would likely obtain an acquittal?; (2) Was the alleged misconduct repeated after admonitions from the trial court?; (3) Did the prosecutor provide a “good faith” explanation for her conduct?; (4) Was the conduct clearly erroneous?; (5) Was there a plausible basis—factually or legally—for the conduct, despite any ultimate impropriety?; and (6) Were the prosecutor’s actions leading up to the mistrial consistent with inadvertence, negligence, or lack of judgment, or were they consistent with intentional misconduct? Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also Martinez, 560 S.W.3d at 697. We first consider whether, at the time of the State’s actions leading up to the mistrial, it reasonably appeared that Appellant would likely obtain an acquittal. At the time the mistrial was declared, the State had opened and had presented two witnesses, both of whom gave incriminating testimony against Appellant. The defense had waived its opening and reserved cross-examination of the witnesses, so the defense had not yet been heard. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, the record does not show that Appellant would likely have obtained an acquittal or that trial was going badly for the State. The next Wheeler factor to consider is whether the alleged misconduct was repeated after admonitions from the trial court. As Appellant acknowledges, no 8 admonishment appears in the record. There is no evidence that the State withheld information after being ordered to disclose it. This factor, like the first, favors the State. Third, we ask whether the prosecutor provided a “good faith” explanation for her conduct. We consider this factor along with the final factor, which asks whether the prosecutor’s actions leading up to the mistrial were consistent with inadvertence, negligence, or lack of judgment, or were consistent with intentional misconduct. Appellant concedes in his brief that the State’s explanation regarding the November 2023 download of C.H.’s phone, as discussed above, has merit. As for the State’s decision not to talk to the detective until after trial, the prosecutor explained that counsel for the State met with the detective in August of 2023 and learned he had the iPads. Because the devices were given to him by Appellant’s wife, the State wanted to “research the legality of that” and expected the detective to provide a supplemental report about his procurement of the iPads. After the detective was placed on administrative leave in late September or early October, the prosecutors did not have further communication with him before trial. However, the State did provide the defense with a supplemental report that revealed the existence of the iPads, and the defense had an expert review the iPads. Only after the mistrial did the State learn of the existence of the computer tower and video of A.G. providing it to the detective. As for the FBI referral, the prosecutor explained at the pretrial hearing that the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the FBI “had always been watching this case.” The trial judge observed that an FBI officer had attended portions of the trial proceedings. It was the Lubbock Police Department that contacted the FBI following the mistrial. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the habeas court’s ruling, we conclude that the prosecutor provided a good faith explanation for the complained-of issues and 9 that the State’s conduct was more consistent with inadvertence, negligence, or lack of judgment than with intentional misconduct. Supporting our conclusion is the trial court’s express finding that the State did not “intentionally, or recklessly, or in any other way goad[] the Defense into” moving for a mistrial. See Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 362 (trial courts are in best position to determine whether prosecutor’s conduct evinces intent to cause mistrial). These factors favor the State. The State does not challenge the fourth Wheeler factor, which is whether the conduct was “clearly erroneous.” We note that section 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a duty on the State to disclose material evidence and will assume, without deciding, that this factor favors Appellant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(a). Lastly, we consider the fifth factor, whether there was a plausible basis—factually or legally—for the conduct, despite any ultimate impropriety. Although Appellant argues no reason exists for the failure to locate the video or for the immediate FBI referral, the record indicates that the State offered plausible bases for both matters. The prosecutor stated that her office expected a supplemental report from the detective and later ceased communication with the detective once he was under investigation. While perhaps the State could or should have done more, its explanation is plausible. Similarly plausible is the State’s statement that the FBI was already monitoring the case before the mistrial. Therefore, this factor favors the State. After considering all of the Wheeler factors, we conclude the evidence does not indicate that the State’s conduct arose from its fear of an acquittal or its intent to goad the defense into seeking a mistrial. See Masonheimer, 220 S.W.3d at 507–08; Lewis, 219 10 S.W.3d at 336. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that prosecutors engaged in conduct to provoke him into moving for a mistrial or to avoid the possibility of an acquittal. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Issue 2: Testimony of SANE Expert Next, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the testimony of the State’s Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) expert over Appellant’s expert reliability objection. The State contends that Appellant’s objections were on qualification and relevance grounds, not reliability grounds, and therefore not preserved for review. We begin by addressing the State’s argument. Before the first trial, the trial court held a Rule 702/Rule 705 hearing at which defense counsel raised objections to the testimony of Carrie Edwards, a SANE nurse. Edwards testified regarding her SANE exam of N.G., including her finding that N.G. had an area of hypopigmented tissue just below his anus. Edwards opined that the tissue was consistent with scar tissue and could be consistent with N.G.’s outcry of multiple anal penetrations over a period of several years. When questioned by defense counsel as to whether she was saying it “could be” scar tissue or “is” scar tissue, Edwards replied, “I’m saying it looks a lot like scar tissue.” She testified that she was not “calling it 100 percent anything[.]” Defense counsel made several objections, including to Edwards’ “testimony regarding it being the – a scar, or more likely to be a scar, or the extent that she’s going to give an opinion on it being a scar versus a normal variant.” Counsel argued that, 11 according to applicable guidelines, Edwards could not give that opinion, concluding, “So [I] object to the extent that that opinion is offered.” Before Edwards testified at the second trial, defense counsel renewed his objections under Rules 702 and 705, stating, “If the Court recalls, she talked, specifically, about some scarring, and I’d made objections previously about her testifying outside of procedures and principles that were commonly accepted. I just wanted to renew those objections.” An objection must be specific enough “to make the trial court aware of the complaint[.]” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The record indicates that Appellant challenged the underlying basis for Edwards’ opinion regarding N.G.’s hypopigmented tissue and that the trial court understood it as a reliability challenge. We agree with Appellant that his arguments at trial preserved his challenge to the reliability of Edwards’ opinion. See Layton v. State, 280 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (en banc) (rejecting hyper- technical requirements for preservation of complaint for appeal). Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s complaint. An expert witness may testify regarding “scientific, technical, or other specialized” matters if the expert is qualified and if the expert’s opinion is relevant and based on a reliable foundation. TEX. R. EVID. 702; Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001). In determining whether expert testimony is reliable, a court should examine “the principles, research, and methodology underlying an expert’s conclusions.” Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002). We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. 12  When making reliability determinations, courts must consider (1) whether the field of expertise is a legitimate one; (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s testimony falls within that field; and (3) whether the expert’s testimony properly relies on and/or uses the principles involved in the field. Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998), overruled on other grounds by State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “The court in discharging its duty as gatekeeper must determine how the reliability of particular testimony is to be assessed. The reliability inquiry is, thus, a flexible one.” Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Here, Appellant challenges the reliability of Edwards’ opinion that N.G. appeared to have perianal scarring, arguing that her opinion is contradicted by medical literature providing that perianal scarring is “difficult to diagnose unless an acute injury was previously documented.” 5 At trial, Edwards testified that she observed unusual tissue just below N.G.’s anus. The area was lighter in color and had a different texture than surrounding skin, and no hair was growing on the area. Edwards opined that the tissue was consistent with scar tissue. Edwards acknowledged that current guidelines in her field provide that perianal scarring is “a finding that is rare and hard to diagnose” in the absence of a prior exam showing trauma. In his cross-examination of Edwards, Appellant’s counsel asked her whether she could say “with certainty” that N.G. had perianal scarring. She responded, “I can say that it appears to be scar tissue.” Defense counsel pressed the issue, asking, “You can’t 100 5 Appellant’s SANE expert testified similarly, stating, “You cannot say absolutely for sure that something is a scar unless you’ve got something documented that there had been an acute injury[.]” She testified that what Edwards observed could have been a normal variant or could have been caused by trauma. 13 percent say that it’s scar tissue, can you?” Edwards replied, “I can 100 percent say it’s consistent with the appearance of scar tissue, but, again, without having seen the actual tear, or trauma myself, I would just say that it’s consistent with the appearance of scar tissue. I’m not giving it a medical diagnosis.” She testified that the appearance of N.G.’s tissue was consistent with perianal scarring and consistent with N.G.’s statement that he recalled anal bleeding. Edwards conceded that the tissue could be a normal variant, but, given all the factors, she “leaned more towards it appears to be scar tissue.” Given Edwards’ training, experience, and examination of N.G., the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the State established a foundation for the reliability of her opinion. See Vela, 209 S.W.3d at 133. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Appellant’s reliability objection because the ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Wolfe, 509 S.W.3d at 335. Appellant’s second issue is overruled. Issue 3: Email Evidence Third, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence two emails that Appellant’s wife, A.G., wrote to Appellant while he was in jail. Appellant objected on the grounds of hearsay, irrelevance, improper victim-impact evidence, and inadmissibility under Rules 403 and 404(b). The trial court overruled all of Appellant’s objections and A.G. read the emails from the witness stand. In the first email, A.G. wrote that she never hated Appellant until she “found out” what he really is, that Appellant “bought X-box and Fortnite gift cards hoping to keep little boys[’] mouths shut,” that Appellant was where he belonged, that A.G. intended to divorce Appellant, and that he had wasted 22 years of her life. In the second, written on the couple’s anniversary, 14 A.G. wrote that she had dreaded the arrival of their anniversary date but that she had fond memories of their early marriage and honeymoon. A.G. wrote that, although she had now spent many days wondering “if it was all fake,” she had once been truly in love with Appellant and she “remembered all the good times.” We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 263–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Generally, the erroneous admission of evidence is non-constitutional error. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (evidence inadmissible under Rule 403 subject to harm analysis); Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (improper admission of hearsay is non-constitutional error); Lindsay v. State, 102 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (erroneously admitted victim-impact testimony is non-constitutional error). We disregard a non-constitutional error that does not affect a criminal defendant’s substantial rights. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. An error requires reversal only when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Id. We will not reverse if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had only a slight effect. Id. We consider (1) the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; (2) the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; (3) the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; and (4) whether the State emphasized the complained-of error. Id. Assuming without deciding that admission of the emails was erroneous for any of the reasons raised by Appellant, we proceed to a harm analysis. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the error was not a violation of Appellant's substantial rights. 15 First, the jury heard other testimony from A.G. that revelation of the sexual abuse and her separation from Appellant were challenging circumstances for her family. For example, she testified that this situation has made her angry and sad, that her life is financially more difficult now, that she filed for divorce, and that she “got rid of all evidence of [Appellant].” See Lindsay, 102 S.W.3d 223 at 230 (victim-impact testimony harmless if evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted to prove same fact). A.G.’s emails expressed similar sentiments, albeit perhaps in stronger terms. See Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (noting evidence of grief was “consistent with the reasonably foreseeable general inference that a murdered victim would leave grieving relatives behind”); Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (admission of improper victim-impact testimony harmless when jury could understand that victim’s family would not be objective about punishment); Bain v. State, 115 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d) (noting that jury would likely assume impact of sexual assault on victim). Additionally, the State did not emphasize the email evidence, which comprised a very short portion of the ten-day trial. A.G. read the emails and the State did not ask her any follow-up questions about them, although Appellant’s counsel did. See Sanders v. State, 255 S.W.3d 754, 762 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (based on “brief presentation” of erroneously admitted extraneous offense evidence, it did not substantially sway or influence jury’s verdict and was harmless error). Finally, the jury heard significant other evidence of Appellant’s guilt, including testimony from N.G., I.M., and C.H. See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 357–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (strength of evidence of guilt, especially if overwhelming, is factor to be considered). We have fair assurance that the two emails from Appellant’s wife did not have a substantial 16 or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict in light of the other significant evidence of Appellant’s guilt. Appellant’s third issue is overruled. Issue 4: Outcry Witness Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting K.H.’s outcry testimony because the statement C.H. made to her did not describe a discernible offense. Appellant further contends that the State’s notice did not match K.H.’s actual testimony. We review a trial court’s decision to admit an outcry statement under the abuse of discretion standard. Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of outcry evidence. Id. Under article 38.072, a proper outcry witness is the first adult to whom the child spoke about the abuse “in some discernable manner.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (discussing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072). During a pretrial hearing, both A.G. and K.H. testified about learning of C.H.’s abuse. A.G. testified that her son N.G. told her C.H. was also a victim. A.G.’s younger son called C.H. on the phone, then “he came back around the corner, still on the phone, and he was crying, and he shook his head yes.” A.G. then spoke to C.H. herself, telling him she was proud of him and that they needed to inform his parents. A.G. was asked, “Did [C.H.] tell you anything of substance at that point about what had happened to him?” A.G. answered, “No.” A.G. went to C.H.’s home the next day to inform his mother, K.H. K.H. testified that she spoke to C.H., who told her Appellant had “been inappropriate with him and sexually abused him over the past years.” C.H. said he had gone into Appellant’s bedroom and that Appellant touched him on top of his clothes. Appellant argued that 17 A.G., not K.H., was the proper outcry witness for C.H. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection. Improper admission of outcry testimony is non-constitutional error, meaning it will not warrant a reversal of conviction unless such error affects a defendant’s substantial rights in light of the entire record. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Molina v. State, No. 07-22- 00004-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 728, *10–12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 6, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Substantial rights are not affected if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance the error did not influence the jury or had but slight effect. Fuentes v. State, No. 07-17-00104-CR, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 926, at *19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 8, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In light of the entire record, we conclude that any error in the admission of K.H.’s outcry testimony did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. C.H. provided direct, specific testimony that Appellant abused him over a period of several years. C.H. described how Appellant would tell C.H. to come into his bedroom, show him pornographic videos, and touch his genitals, both over and under his clothes. See Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 814–15 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (holding improper admission of outcry testimony harmless where similar testimony admitted through complainant and pediatrician); West v. State, 121 S.W.3d 95, 105 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (error in admitting outcry testimony did not influence jury’s verdict or had but slight effect because complainant provided detailed testimony about offense); Molina, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 728, at *11–12 (improper admission of outcry evidence no basis for reversal of conviction if similar evidence admitted without objection). 18  In a related argument, Appellant contends that the State’s pretrial notice was not sufficient to put him on notice of K.H.’s outcry testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072, § 2(b)(1) (requiring State to provide defense with written summary of outcry statement). The State’s summary must give the defendant adequate notice of the content and scope of the outcry testimony. Owens v. State, 381 S.W.3d 696, 703 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2012, no pet.). The purpose of the pretrial notice is to prevent surprises to defense counsel. See Biggs v. State, 921 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). Here, the State’s notice to Appellant provided, “[C.H.] told [K.H.] that [Appellant] sexually abused him multiple times over a period of years, and that [Appellant] continued to try to touch him inappropriately even after [C.H.] told him no.” Appellant’s complaint is not that K.H. testified to additional statements that were not in the summary but that the summary was a statement “more detailed than what [K.H.] testified she actually heard.” We note that Appellant had the opportunity to, and did, cross-examine K.H. at the outcry hearing. There is no indication in the record that Appellant was surprised or prejudiced because the content of K.H.’s outcry testimony was less detailed than the pretrial notice might have suggested. And, as discussed above, C.H. testified to the details of the offense. See Gibson v. State, 595 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020, no pet.) (“In cases involving the improper admission of outcry testimony, the error is harmless when the victim testifies in court to the same or similar statements that were improperly admitted . . . .”); see also Tschoepe v. State, Nos. 04-06-00743-CR, 04-06-00744-CR, 04-06-00745-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1393, at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 27, 19 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue. CONCLUSION Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judy C. Parker Chief Justice Do not publish. 20