Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00046-CR ___________________________ HASANI GRAY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 297th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1868613 Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION Appellant Hasani Gray appeals his conviction for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. Raising two points, Gray argues that the trial court erred by (1) denying his request to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge and (2) denying his request for a continuance due to the State’s purportedly untimely production of 4,000 pages of medical records. We will affirm. II. BACKGROUND By December 2024, Gray and Christopher Ragland had known each other for several years and generally got along well. But around this time, Gray accused Ragland of stealing the keys to his Mercedes. Ragland denied taking the keys, and this caused a rift between them. Gray was so angry about the purportedly stolen keys that he threatened to hurt Ragland. In March 2025, Ragland was staying at a friend’s house in Kennedale. This house was a “trap house” where people frequently did drugs and would come and stay for short periods of time.1 1 See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. 02-17-00388-CR, 2019 WL 2041831, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A ‘trap house’ is the same as a ‘dope house.’”); Gabriel v. State, 842 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (op. on. reh’g) (describing a “‘trap’ house” as “a facility used exclusively for the sale of drugs”), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 2 One day, Ragland was at the Kennedale house with his girlfriend Angela King and several other people. He spent the day putting together a LEGO set in the living room. Eventually, Gray arrived at the house with three women. Shortly after his arrival, Gray announced to King within earshot of Ragland that she did not need to worry about his previous threats against Ragland concerning the purportedly stolen keys and that “he was going to forgive and forget.” Throughout the day, Ragland continued to work on his LEGO set in the living room, and King hung out in the room with him. At one point, King went upstairs to get her phone. Ragland testified that during this interlude, he was struck in the back of the head while he was sitting on the floor and looking down at his LEGOs. He stated that he tried to pick himself up, but then he was hit again. Having heard some commotion, King ran downstairs where she saw Gray kicking Ragland, who was on the floor surrounded by the broken pieces of a blender that had been on the kitchen counter. King jumped on Gray’s back and “did whatever [she] could to make him stop.” Eventually, another man in the house entered the living room and physically intervened to prevent Gray from continuing to assault Ragland. Gray then left the house with two women.2 King never saw Ragland put up any fight against Gray before he left. 2 One of these women, Brittany Story, testified in Gray’s defense. According to her account, Ragland started the altercation by “talking smack” to Gray. Story also testified that Ragland “had something in his hand” shortly before the fight started, but she admitted on cross-examination that she did not know what it was. 3 After the assault, King and others were able to get Ragland back up on his feet, but he was dizzy and did not know where he was. He continued to complain about his injuries. Eventually, his speech began to slur, he started bleeding from his ear, and he passed out. Realizing that Ragland needed medical attention, King took him to the hospital. At the hospital, tests revealed that Ragland had a skull fracture, a brain hemorrhage, and a bruise on his left temporal lobe. Because of the brain hemorrhage, Ragland had to undergo a craniotomy to relieve the pressure on his brain. He remained in the hospital for approximately two months recovering from his injuries and surgery. He had to relearn how to walk and continued to experience head pain and blurred vision through the time of trial. As a result of the March 2025 incident, Gray was charged with aggravated robbery3 and aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.02(a)(1), 29.03(a)(1). The indictment also alleged that Gray was a repeat offender. He pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial was held. The jury acquitted Gray of the aggravated-robbery charge, but it convicted him of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. Gray pleaded “true” to the indictment’s repeat-offender allegation, and after hearing additional evidence, the jury assessed his punishment at The robbery charge was based on Gray’s allegedly having stolen Ragland’s 3 phone at the time of the assault. 4 forty-two years in prison. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal followed. III. DISCUSSION A. Self-Defense Instruction In his first point, Gray contends that the trial court erred by denying his request to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge. We disagree. 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue—including self-defense—that is raised by the evidence regardless of the evidence’s strength or credibility. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The evidence raises a defensive issue if it is sufficient—when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested instruction—to support a rational jury finding as to each element of the defense. Id. A trial court errs by refusing a self-defense instruction if it is raised by the evidence. Id. “Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance defense requiring the defendant to admit to his otherwise illegal conduct.” Id. “He cannot both invoke self-defense and flatly deny the charged conduct.” Id. Further, a person is only justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. See id. (citing Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(a)). And he is justified in using deadly 5 force4 against another only if he would be justified in using force under Penal Code Section 9.31 and reasonably believes that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. See id. (citing Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)). 2. Analysis Because Gray caused serious bodily injury to Ragland, he was entitled to a self-defense instruction only if the evidence would support a rational jury finding that he had reasonably believed that his use of deadly force had been immediately necessary to protect himself against Ragland’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. See id.; see also Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a). But there is nothing in the record to support such a finding. Gray argues that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction because a defense witness testified that Ragland had provoked Gray by “talking smack,” that the two of them had wrestled on the floor “for a second” until someone broke them up, and that Ragland “had something in his hand” shortly before the assault took place. But the use of force—let alone deadly force—against another is not justified in response to verbal provocation alone. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(b)(1); Trotter v. State, 4 “Deadly force” means “force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code § 9.01(3). 6 No. 02-20-00048-CR, 2021 WL 4472630, at *7 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). And we reject Gray’s assertion that “[a] reasonable juror could infer that the [purported] object in . . . Ragland’s hand was a deadly weapon.” The defense witness admitted on cross-examination that she did not know what Ragland purportedly had in his hand, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that it was a deadly weapon. Thus, any inference that Ragland had been holding a deadly weapon prior to the assault would amount to mere speculation. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (explaining that juries may make reasonable inferences in reaching a verdict but cannot engage in speculation, which the court defined as “mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented”); Haberland v. State, No. 01-24-00332-CR, 2026 WL 1979048, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that a “jury’s verdict cannot rest on conjecture or speculation” (citing Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013))). Because the record contains insufficient evidence to support a rational jury finding that Gray reasonably believed that his use of deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against Ragland’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, the trial court did not err by refusing Gray’s requested self-defense instruction. See Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.3d 336, 341–42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). We overrule Gray’s first point. 7 8 B. Request for Continuance In his second point, Gray contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance to allow his trial counsel additional time to review approximately 4,000 pages of medical records that the State had purportedly produced in an untimely manner.5 Again, we disagree. Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State, “as soon as practicable after receiving a timely request,” to produce and permit the inspection and electronic duplication of “material” evidence by the defense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(a); State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); see Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (defining “material” under Article 39.14 as “having a logical connection to a consequential fact” and “synonymous with ‘relevant’”). The State’s general obligation to produce evidence under Article 39.14(a) is not triggered unless the defendant makes a specific request for a designated item. See Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 278; Hinojosa v. State, 554 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, no pet.) (noting that a timely request is required to trigger Article 39.14(a) requirements). 5 Gray alternatively requested that the medical records be excluded from evidence and that Dr. Nikhil Patel, one of the doctors who treated Ragland, be prohibited from testifying. Because the State never offered the records into evidence, Gray’s request to exclude them is moot. Further, because the State properly included Dr. Patel on its timely filed witness list and because, as explained below, the State’s disclosure of the medical records was not untimely in the first place, we hold that the trial court did not err by declining to exclude Dr. Patel as a witness. 9 Here, Gray did not make a specific discovery request for Ragland’s medical records until five days after the State had already produced them. Because Gray did not request the medical records before the State produced them, their production was not untimely under Article 39.14(a).6 See Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 278; Hinojosa, 554 S.W.3d at 797. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to grant Gray’s request for a continuance. We overrule Gray’s second point. IV. CONCLUSION Having overruled both of Gray’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Dana Womack Dana Womack Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: November 12, 2026 6 Nothing in the record suggests—nor has Gray asserted—that the medical records at issue constituted “exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document[s], item[s], or information” that the State was required to disclose even in the absence of a request. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(h). 10