Hasani Gray v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
Docket02-26-00046-CR
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00046-CR
___________________________
HASANI GRAY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 297th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1868613
Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Hasani Gray appeals his conviction for aggravated assault causing
serious bodily injury. Raising two points, Gray argues that the trial court erred by
(1) denying his request to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge and
(2) denying his request for a continuance due to the State’s purportedly untimely
production of 4,000 pages of medical records. We will affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
By December 2024, Gray and Christopher Ragland had known each other for
several years and generally got along well. But around this time, Gray accused
Ragland of stealing the keys to his Mercedes. Ragland denied taking the keys, and this
caused a rift between them. Gray was so angry about the purportedly stolen keys that
he threatened to hurt Ragland.
In March 2025, Ragland was staying at a friend’s house in Kennedale. This
house was a “trap house” where people frequently did drugs and would come and stay
for short periods of time.1
1
See, e.g., Wilson v. State, No. 02-17-00388-CR, 2019 WL 2041831, at *2 n.4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 9, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“A ‘trap house’ is the same as a ‘dope house.’”); Gabriel v. State, 842 S.W.2d 328, 332
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992) (op. on. reh’g) (describing a “‘trap’ house” as “a facility
used exclusively for the sale of drugs”), aff’d, 900 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
2
One day, Ragland was at the Kennedale house with his girlfriend Angela King
and several other people. He spent the day putting together a LEGO set in the living
room. Eventually, Gray arrived at the house with three women. Shortly after his
arrival, Gray announced to King within earshot of Ragland that she did not need to
worry about his previous threats against Ragland concerning the purportedly stolen
keys and that “he was going to forgive and forget.”
Throughout the day, Ragland continued to work on his LEGO set in the living
room, and King hung out in the room with him. At one point, King went upstairs to
get her phone. Ragland testified that during this interlude, he was struck in the back
of the head while he was sitting on the floor and looking down at his LEGOs. He
stated that he tried to pick himself up, but then he was hit again.
Having heard some commotion, King ran downstairs where she saw Gray
kicking Ragland, who was on the floor surrounded by the broken pieces of a blender
that had been on the kitchen counter. King jumped on Gray’s back and “did
whatever [she] could to make him stop.” Eventually, another man in the house
entered the living room and physically intervened to prevent Gray from continuing to
assault Ragland. Gray then left the house with two women.2 King never saw Ragland
put up any fight against Gray before he left.
2
One of these women, Brittany Story, testified in Gray’s defense. According to
her account, Ragland started the altercation by “talking smack” to Gray. Story also
testified that Ragland “had something in his hand” shortly before the fight started, but
she admitted on cross-examination that she did not know what it was.
3
After the assault, King and others were able to get Ragland back up on his feet,
but he was dizzy and did not know where he was. He continued to complain about
his injuries. Eventually, his speech began to slur, he started bleeding from his ear, and
he passed out. Realizing that Ragland needed medical attention, King took him to the
hospital.
At the hospital, tests revealed that Ragland had a skull fracture, a brain
hemorrhage, and a bruise on his left temporal lobe. Because of the brain hemorrhage,
Ragland had to undergo a craniotomy to relieve the pressure on his brain. He
remained in the hospital for approximately two months recovering from his injuries
and surgery. He had to relearn how to walk and continued to experience head pain
and blurred vision through the time of trial.
As a result of the March 2025 incident, Gray was charged with aggravated
robbery3 and aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code
§§ 22.02(a)(1), 29.03(a)(1). The indictment also alleged that Gray was a repeat
offender. He pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial was held. The jury acquitted Gray of
the aggravated-robbery charge, but it convicted him of aggravated assault causing
serious bodily injury. Gray pleaded “true” to the indictment’s repeat-offender
allegation, and after hearing additional evidence, the jury assessed his punishment at
The robbery charge was based on Gray’s allegedly having stolen Ragland’s
3
phone at the time of the assault.
4
forty-two years in prison. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. This appeal
followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Self-Defense Instruction
In his first point, Gray contends that the trial court erred by denying his request
to include a self-defense instruction in the jury charge. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive issue—including
self-defense—that is raised by the evidence regardless of the evidence’s strength or
credibility. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). The evidence
raises a defensive issue if it is sufficient—when viewed in the light most favorable to
the defendant’s requested instruction—to support a rational jury finding as to each
element of the defense. Id. A trial court errs by refusing a self-defense instruction if it
is raised by the evidence. Id.
“Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance defense requiring the defendant to
admit to his otherwise illegal conduct.” Id. “He cannot both invoke self-defense and
flatly deny the charged conduct.” Id. Further, a person is only justified in using force
against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful
force. See id. (citing Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(a)). And he is justified in using deadly
5
force4 against another only if he would be justified in using force under Penal Code
Section 9.31 and reasonably believes that deadly force is immediately necessary to
protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. See
id. (citing Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a)).
2. Analysis
Because Gray caused serious bodily injury to Ragland, he was entitled to a
self-defense instruction only if the evidence would support a rational jury finding that
he had reasonably believed that his use of deadly force had been immediately
necessary to protect himself against Ragland’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly
force. See id.; see also Tex. Penal Code § 9.32(a). But there is nothing in the record to
support such a finding.
Gray argues that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction because a defense
witness testified that Ragland had provoked Gray by “talking smack,” that the two of
them had wrestled on the floor “for a second” until someone broke them up, and that
Ragland “had something in his hand” shortly before the assault took place. But the
use of force—let alone deadly force—against another is not justified in response to
verbal provocation alone. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(b)(1); Trotter v. State,
4
“Deadly force” means “force that is intended or known by the actor to cause,
or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious
bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code § 9.01(3).
6
No. 02-20-00048-CR, 2021 WL 4472630, at *7 n.10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
And we reject Gray’s assertion that “[a] reasonable juror could infer that the
[purported] object in . . . Ragland’s hand was a deadly weapon.” The defense witness
admitted on cross-examination that she did not know what Ragland purportedly had
in his hand, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that it was a deadly weapon.
Thus, any inference that Ragland had been holding a deadly weapon prior to the
assault would amount to mere speculation. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15–16
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (explaining that juries may make reasonable inferences in
reaching a verdict but cannot engage in speculation, which the court defined as “mere
theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented”);
Haberland v. State, No. 01-24-00332-CR, 2026 WL 1979048, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(noting that a “jury’s verdict cannot rest on conjecture or speculation” (citing Anderson
v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013))).
Because the record contains insufficient evidence to support a rational jury
finding that Gray reasonably believed that his use of deadly force was immediately
necessary to protect himself against Ragland’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly
force, the trial court did not err by refusing Gray’s requested self-defense instruction.
See Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.3d 336, 341–42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
We overrule Gray’s first point.
7
8
B. Request for Continuance
In his second point, Gray contends that the trial court erred by denying his
request for a continuance to allow his trial counsel additional time to review
approximately 4,000 pages of medical records that the State had purportedly produced
in an untimely manner.5 Again, we disagree.
Article 39.14(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State, “as
soon as practicable after receiving a timely request,” to produce and permit the
inspection and electronic duplication of “material” evidence by the defense.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(a); State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 692 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2024); see Watkins v. State, 619 S.W.3d 265, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (defining
“material” under Article 39.14 as “having a logical connection to a consequential fact”
and “synonymous with ‘relevant’”). The State’s general obligation to produce
evidence under Article 39.14(a) is not triggered unless the defendant makes a specific
request for a designated item. See Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 278; Hinojosa v. State,
554 S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, no pet.) (noting that a timely request is
required to trigger Article 39.14(a) requirements).
5
Gray alternatively requested that the medical records be excluded from
evidence and that Dr. Nikhil Patel, one of the doctors who treated Ragland, be
prohibited from testifying. Because the State never offered the records into evidence,
Gray’s request to exclude them is moot. Further, because the State properly included
Dr. Patel on its timely filed witness list and because, as explained below, the State’s
disclosure of the medical records was not untimely in the first place, we hold that the
trial court did not err by declining to exclude Dr. Patel as a witness.
9
Here, Gray did not make a specific discovery request for Ragland’s medical
records until five days after the State had already produced them. Because Gray did
not request the medical records before the State produced them, their production was
not untimely under Article 39.14(a).6 See Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 278; Hinojosa,
554 S.W.3d at 797. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by refusing to grant Gray’s
request for a continuance.
We overrule Gray’s second point.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Gray’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: November 12, 2026
6
Nothing in the record suggests—nor has Gray asserted—that the medical
records at issue constituted “exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating document[s],
item[s], or information” that the State was required to disclose even in the absence of
a request. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 39.14(h).
10