Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 13, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00983-CR ——————————— YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Criminal Court at Law No. 7 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2513246 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Yolanda Inez Jinez was convicted of the misdemeanor offense of terroristic threat and sentenced to 180 days in county jail, probated to 15 months of community supervision. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a). On appeal, she argues that the evidence was legally insufficient because there was a material variance between the evidence presented at trial and the evidentiary statements in the complaint supporting the charging instrument. Because there is no variance between the information that charged Jinez with the offense of terroristic threat and the evidence presented at trial, and because the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction, we affirm. Background Jinez was charged by information with the Class B misdemeanor offense of terroristic threat. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a). The complaint that supported the information stated: IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS Before me, the undersigned Assistant District Attorney of Harris County, Texas, this day appeared the undersigned affiant, who under oath says that he has good reason to believe and does believe that in Harris County, Texas, YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ, hereafter styled the Defendant heretofore on or about May 20, 2024, did then and there unlawfully, threaten to commit an offense involving violence, namely a Murder upon [J.P.] hereinafter called the Complainant, with the intent to place the Complainant in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. The complaint included a probable cause affidavit from Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy K. Garza. He and another deputy responded to a call for service on Tuesday evening, May 21, 2024, and met with J.P., who told them “he was threatened by his employee’s girlfriend in the CVS parking lot” the day before. The probable cause affidavit, included in the complaint, continued: 2 [J.P.] stated his employee . . . “Beto” . . . had a girlfriend named Yolanda Jinez, who he also employed for a short term. [J.P.] stated Beto had been his employee for approximately eight months . . . . [J.P.] stated he had been harassed by [Jinez] for most of the time that Beto had been employed with [Jinez] stating [J.P.] was taking advantage of Beto due to his undocumented status. [J.P.] stated he did not care about the harassment and ‘brushed it off’ and continued to employ Beto because he was a good worker. [J.P.] stated he was at the CVS . . . [in] Channelview . . . on Monday, May 20, 2024, to pick up prescription medicine for his wife. [J.P.] stated he parked his truck on the south side parking lot and when he was returning to the truck, an unknown vehicle had blocked him in. [J.P.] then stated he observed [Jinez] exit the vehicle and began to tell him[,] “You thought I wasn’t going to find you,” which [J.P.] then stated he told her[,] “I didn’t know you were looking for me.” [J.P.] stated [Jinez] reached under the floor board which appeared to him as if she was reaching for a firearm. [J.P.] stated he grabbed his firearm from the middle console and placed it on the passenger seat, still in a holster. [J.P.] stated to [Jinez] to let him leave, which she failed to do so [J.P.] then stated she told him [,] “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December, so he can fucking kill you.” This threat caused [J.P.] to be in fear[,] and he stated he wanted to pursue charges. The information, which was signed on the same day as the complaint, stated: IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS Comes now the undersigned District Attorney of Harris County, Texas, on behalf of the State of Texas, and presents in and to the Harris County Criminal Court at Law No ____ of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas, YOLANDA INEZ JINEZ, hereinafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about May 20, 2024, did then and there unlawfully, threaten to commit an offense involving violence, namely a Murder upon [J.P.], hereinafter called the Complainant, with the intent to place the Complainant in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. 3 J.P. was the sole witness at trial. He testified that he owned an RV repair business, had employed Jinez’s boyfriend Beto “for quite sometime,” and had employed Jinez “at one time as well.” Beginning around July or September 2023, Jinez sent him harassing messages through text, cell phone, and videos on social media, all asserting that J.P. was mistreating Beto. J.P. asked her to stop multiple times. In May 2024, J.P. drove his full-sized truck and trailer to a CVS to pick up time sensitive medication for his seriously ill wife. J.P. parked parallel to the side of the building, across six parking spots. When J.P. left the store, Jinez drove up, pulled her car in front of J.P.’s truck blocking him in, and confronted him. J.P. testified that her demeanor was “very angry”, she had a “very mean face,” and her “tone of voice was very angry.” He said they were “screaming at each other right off the bat.” He said he was confused because he did not know she was aggravated or looking for him. He asked her to move her car, but she refused. J.P. testified that during the confrontation, Jinez told him that he was not the only one who had a gun. As she reached for something in the car, she said that she had a gun. J.P. believed she was reaching for a gun. J.P. was standing on the running board of his truck between the open driver’s side door and the driver’s 4 seat. He grabbed his holstered gun from beneath the seat and put it on the driver’s seat, within reach.1 Neither Jinez nor J.P. pointed a gun at each other. J.P. testified that as he attempted to deescalate the situation, Jinez “told me she was going to kill me, and if not, that she was going to get her brother—once he got out of jail, I believe in Chicago—to come down here and kill me.” The State followed up: Q. Do you remember the exact words she said? A. I don’t remember. Q. But you remember those were the details she said? A. Yes. She said, “I am going to kill you, Motherfucker, and if I don’t, I am going to get my brother to kill you.” J.P. testified that he was afraid, and he believed Jinez’s threat “100 percent.” Q. So because of what she said and what she did, you were afraid of her brother killing you? A. Either her or her brother. Q. Yeah, because what she said and what she did, you were also afraid of her killing you? A. That’s correct. Q. And if nothing else, because of what she did and what she said, you were afraid of her in some way hurting you? A. Yes. Q. At that time? 1 J.P. testified that he “never keep[s] [his] pistol in the console.” 5 A. Yes. Q. In that moment? A. Yes. On cross examination, J.P. testified that Jinez said, “I will kill you.” He was “very much” surprised that Jinez’s threat was not included in the police report, and that the only quoted threat included in the report was Jinez’s statement, “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you.” Q. Would it surprise you that the only quote that they put in the police report was, “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you”? A. That would be—that would surprise me that I would not have said that she said the exact same thing. On redirect examination, the State asked about the specific threat and its impact on J.P.: Q. You stated that the Defendant said, “I will kill you,” and then, kind of in the same breath, said, “My brother will kill you in December.” A. Yes. Q. So is it fair to think that whenever you were telling the police officers who were taking notes by hand on their notepad, they may have combined those? A. I would think so. Q. Great. And to just be abundantly clear, were you afraid that your life was in danger, specifically, in immediate danger, on May 20, 2024, based on the words and actions of the Defendant? 6 A. Yes. J.P. left the encounter, cared for his wife overnight, and then contacted law enforcement the next day. J.P. explained he did not call the police until the following day because his wife needed “time-sensitive” medications given her medical condition and he knew calling the police would be a “lengthy process.” At the charge conference, the defense requested a limiting instruction focusing on the quoted statement in the complaint, “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you.” The defense sought “a limiting instruction or clarification to the jury that the threat was that statement, not the gun or any other statement.” Defense counsel argued: “That’s what we were prepared for and on notice for, not the gun piece.” The State argued that the information stated only that the threat was murder. The trial court agreed with the State, denying the request for a limiting instruction and noting that the information did not allege any “manner and means specifically,” and that the information was “the formal notice of the charges” against Jinez. The jury found Jinez guilty of the Class B misdemeanor of terroristic threat with the intent to place another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, and the trial court sentenced her to 180 days in jail, which was probated to 15 months’ community supervision. Jinez appealed. 7 Analysis On appeal, Jinez argues that the evidence is legally insufficient due to a material variance between the evidentiary statements in the complaint and the evidence presented at trial. She contends that she had notice only that the State alleged she threatened to have her brother harm J.P. seven months in the future, which is not a threat of imminent serious bodily injury. She argues that she was surprised and harmed when J.P. testified that she also said, “I will kill you,” which she asserts is a much more immediate threat and a separate offense. She asserts that the statements “I will kill you,” and “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you,” are two separate offenses, and she had no notice of the threat, “I will kill you.” The State responds that any challenge to the information was waived, the information is a sufficient charging document, and the evidence supports the conviction. I. Terroristic threat As relevant here, a person commits the offense of “terroristic threat” if she “threatens to commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to . . . place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.07(a)(2). A threat is a “communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s property, esp. one that might diminish a person’s 8 freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent; a declaration, express or implied, of an intent to inflict loss or pain on another.” THREAT, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It is immaterial whether the victim or anyone else was actually placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury or whether the accused had the capability or intention to carry out his threat. Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). Rather, it is the threat of violence, made with the intent to place the victim in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, that constitutes the offense. See id. at 306; George v. State, 841 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d, 890 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“All that is necessary to complete the offense is that the accused, by his threat, sought as a desired reaction to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”). “Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.” George, 841 S.W.2d at 547 (citing Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); see TEX. PEN. CODE § 6.03 (“A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.”). “A victim’s reaction, while unnecessary to prove under the statute, may provide evidence of the actor’s intent.” Calder v. State, No. 12-25- 9 00085-CR, 2026 WL 181337, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 22, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). II. The Charging Instrument To begin a Class B misdemeanor prosecution in a county court, the State presents either an indictment or an information as a charging instrument.2 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 12.02; see also State v. Drummond, 501 S.W.3d 78, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 725 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). “An ‘information’ is a written statement filed and presented [o]n behalf of the State by the district or county attorney, charging the defendant with an offense which may by law be so prosecuted.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.20. 3 2 A complaint alone is the charging instrument that invokes the court’s jurisdiction for a prosecution in a justice or municipal court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 45A.001 (“The purpose of this chapter is to establish procedures for processing cases under the criminal jurisdiction of the justice and municipal courts.”); id. art. 45A.002(1) (“In this chapter . . . ‘Complaint’ means a sworn allegation charging an accused person with the commission of an offense.”). In her brief, Jinez cites several cases for the proposition that the purpose of the complaint is to inform the defendant of the facts surrounding the charged offense to permit him to prepare a defense. Two of the cases she relies on, Rose v. State, 799 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no pet.), and Vallejo v. State, 408 S.W.2d 113, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), involve speeding prosecutions that originated in municipal court, where the complaint itself is the charging instrument. By contrast, the charging instrument here is the information presented by the State. 3 An information is sufficient if it meets the following requisites: (1) It shall commence, “In the name and by the authority of the State of Texas”; 10 “An information that tracks the statutory language is ordinarily sufficient” to provide an accused with notice of the offense charged. George, 841 S.W.2d at 548 (citing Beck v. State, 682 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). “Unless a fact is essential for notice to the accused, the information need not plead the evidence relied upon by the State.” Id. For the offense of terroristic threat, details like the nature of the threat, whether it was written or verbal, and how the threat was communicated are evidentiary in nature and need not be included in the information. Id. Under article 1.14(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant generally waives any objection to “a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information” by failing to object before trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.14(b). (2) That it appear to have been presented in a court having jurisdiction of the offense set forth; (3) That it appear to have been presented by the proper officer; (4) That it contain the name of the accused, or state that his name is unknown and give a reasonably accurate description of him; (5) It must appear that the place where the offense is charged to have been committed is within the jurisdiction of the court where the information is filed; (6) That the time mentioned be some date anterior to the filing of the information, and that the offense does not appear to be barred by limitation; (7) That the offense be set forth in plain and intelligible words; (8) That it conclude, “Against the peace and dignity of the State”; and (9) It must be signed by the district or county attorney, officially. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.21. 11 When the State presents an information, an underlying complaint is required. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22; Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 81. “A complaint to support an information is a sworn affidavit, duly attested to by the district or county attorney, that is made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense.” Drummond, 501 S.W.3d at 81 (internal quotations omitted); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22. “The purpose of the complaint is to inform the defendant of the facts surrounding the charged offense to permit him to prepare a defense to the charge.” State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). The complaint’s affiant must be a “credible person,” but the affiant need not be “the person who originally complained about the alleged offense to the district attorney.” Id. (citations omitted). “[C]ourts have long held that this affiant can be a police officer, or someone else, including someone without personal knowledge of the facts supporting the offense.” State v. Yakushkin, 625 S.W.3d 552, 561 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d). 4 4 Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 15.05, a complaint is sufficient if it: (1) states the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, gives some reasonably definite description of her; (2) shows that the accused has committed some offense, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the accused has committed the offense; (3) states the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done; and (4) is signed by the affiant by writing his name or affixing his mark. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 15.05; State v. McField, 649 S.W.3d 721, 726–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d). The affiant may base his belief that an offense has been committed on information he read from a police report, without directly 12 III. Evidentiary Sufficiency “Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime charged.” Cada v. State, 334 S.W.3d 766, 772–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We follow the usual standards of review for legal sufficiency. 5 “We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the offense as defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 773 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment [or information], does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the speaking to the law enforcement officer who had knowledge of the offense. McField, 649 S.W.3d at 727. 5 We evaluate legal sufficiency by considering all the evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (factfinder is sole judge of weight and credibility of evidence). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor” and “the standard of review on appeal is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.” Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see also Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (cleaned up) (stating “circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt”). The testimony of a sole witness to an offense may constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction. See Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (upholding conviction for assault with intent to murder where only one witness saw defendant with gun); Davis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (“It is well established that a conviction may be based on the testimony of a single eyewitness.”). 13 State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240; see Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 546–47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (applying hypothetically correct jury charge analysis to sufficiency review of conviction for misdemeanor charged by information and without any reference to complaint). “‘As authorized by the indictment’ [or information] means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument.” Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546. “A ‘variance’ occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “Under Gollihar v. State, whether an unproved allegation is to be included in the hypothetically correct jury instruction is determined by whether or not the variance between the allegation and proof is ‘material.’” Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546–47 (citing Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 257). A material variance prejudices a defendant’s substantial rights and renders the evidence insufficient. Id. at 547. A material variance arises “when the [information], as written, 1) fails to adequately inform the defendant of the charge against him, or 2) subjects the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.”6 Id. 6 The Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of variances: 14 IV. The State did not offer proof of a distinct, unpled statutory violation at trial. Jinez argues that there is a material variance between the complaint and the evidence at trial because the State adduced evidence of “a distinct, unpled statutory violation at trial.” Appellant’s Br. 20. The complaint, however, is not the charging instrument in this case. Rather, the complaint, with its probable cause affidavit, was made in support of the information—the charging instrument here. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 21.22; Tollett v. State, 219 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2007, pet. ref’d) (noting that unlike in justice or municipal courts, complaint is not charging instrument in court at law). Jinez has not cited, and we have not found, any authority supporting her argument that in determining whether 1. a statutory allegation that defines the offense; not subject to materiality analysis, or, if it is, is always material; the hypothetically correct jury charge will always include the statutory allegations in the indictment; 2. a non-statutory allegation that is descriptive of an element of the offense that defines or helps define the allowable unit of prosecution; sometimes material; the hypothetically correct jury charge will sometimes include the non-statutory allegations in the indictment and sometimes not; 3. a non-statutory allegation that has nothing to do with the allowable unit of prosecution; never material; the hypothetically correct jury charge will never include the non-statutory allegations in the indictment. Ramjattansingh v. State, 548 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “The bottom line is that, in a sufficiency review, we tolerate variances as long as they are not so great that the proof at trial ‘shows an entirely different offense’ than what was alleged in the charging instrument.” Id. 15 there is a variance, we may consider the averments made in the supporting complaint and probable cause affidavit. To the extent Jinez argues we should extend the law to so hold, we decline the invitation. See Chavis v. State, 177 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 246) (holding that “variance occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the charging instrument and the proof at trial”). Reviewing the charging instrument and the proof at trial here, we conclude there is no variance. The gravamen of the terroristic threat statute is the making of a threat of violence coupled with one of the six statutory intended effects. Gillette v. State, 444 S.W.3d 713, 729 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, no pet.). Terroristic threat is a nature of conduct offense. See id. at 730; see also Johnson v. State, 710 S.W.3d 447, 455 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, no pet.) (same). Section 22.07(a)(2), pursuant to which Jinez was charged, does not require the victim or anyone else to actually be placed in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. The offense is completed once a person makes a threat to commit a violent offense seeking the desired reaction. Grimaldo v. State, No. 13-20-00404-CR, 2021 WL 4202163, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 16, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also In re A.C., 48 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2001, pet. denied) (“The offense is completed 16 if the accused, by his threat, sought as a desired reaction, to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.”). Here, the State presented evidence that, after harassing J.P. for eight months online and through text messages, Jinez tracked or followed J.P. to a CVS, blocked his exit from the parking lot with her car, angrily screamed at him and threatened to kill him. The evidence at trial showed that there was one threat of violence: a threat to murder J.P. The testimony was that on May 20, 2024, during an altercation outside CVS, Jinez threatened to kill J.P. or that her brother would kill J.P. when he was released from prison. In other words, the evidence established that Jinez threatened to murder J.P. as alleged in the information. V. There is no variance between the information and the evidence at trial, which is legally sufficient under Jackson and a hypothetically correct jury charge. The information alleged that on or about May 20, 2024, Jinez threatened J.P. with murder with the intent to place him in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Given this information, a hypothetically correct jury charge would require the jury to find that Jinez threatened J.P. with murder and that she did so with the intent to place him in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546–47. But it would not require the jury to find that Jinez said, “I can’t wait until my brother gets out of prison in December so he can fucking kill you,” because the specific words used to threaten murder are evidentiary and not part of 17 the offense as defined by the statute or the information. See George, 841 S.W.2d at 548 (holding that information need not plead evidence relied upon by State). The evidence at trial consisted of J.P.’s testimony. He testified that on May 20, 2024, in the same breath, Jinez threatened to kill him or that her brother would kill him, saying, “I am going to kill you, Motherfucker, and if I don’t, I am going to get my brother to kill you.” He testified that she made this threat of murder after eight months of harassing him online and by text messages. He said that when she made the statement, Jinez had an angry demeanor and was screaming at him, after blocking his vehicle from leaving the parking lot of a pharmacy. He testified that Jinez mentioned having a gun and made a movement in her car that he believed was her reaching for a gun. He testified that he believed her threats and “in that moment” feared that he would be murdered or hurt. In light of this evidence, the jury could have reasonably found that Jinez made the threat with the intent to place J.P. in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. See id. at 547 (“Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.”). Because the discrepancies Jinez points to are only differences in the evidence presented to support the charge, we conclude that there was no variance between the information and the evidence presented at trial. See id. Moreover, considering all the evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict because 18 a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895; see George, 841 S.W.2d at 547 (“Intent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.”). Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Susanna Dokupil Justice Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2. 19