Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00658-CR Austin McLure Bounds, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE 368TH DISTRICT COURT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY NO. 24-0655-K368, THE HONORABLE SARAH SOELDNER BRUCHMILLER, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION Austin McClure Bounds was charged with the felony offense of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount that was 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(d). The indictment also alleged that he had previously been convicted of possession of a controlled substance in the same amount as above. See id. § 481.115(d); Tex. Penal Code § 12.42. The jury found him guilty of the charged offense, and he pleaded true to the enhancement allegation. Following a punishment hearing, the jury sentenced him to 30 years’ imprisonment, and the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction accordingly. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.32. In eight issues on appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, that the trial court erred by failing to include in the jury charge instructions for spoliation and corroboration, and that the cumulative effect of two of the jury charge errors and the erroneous denial of his motion to suppress should result in the reversal of his conviction. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. BACKGROUND Before the events at issue in this case, William Kaman Sr. was living in a home on Karolyn Drive in Round Rock, Texas. He had lived there for several years, and his property had a main house, a large garage with two sleeping areas and air conditioning, and a shed for storage. One of his sons, William Kaman Jr., lived in one of the garage bedrooms but did not live in the main house. Kaman Sr. died, and Kaman Jr. moved into the main home. Kaman Sr. had another son who was named as executor for the estate. Following Kaman Sr.’s death, his son serving as executor and neighbors called the police multiple times to report that there were several unauthorized people living in the home and that other individuals were driving to the home at odd hours and engaging in behavior leading the callers to believe that drugs were being sold at the home. After receiving these tips, police officers surveilled the home for several months and parked unmarked police cars close enough to be able to observe who was driving to the home but far enough away to avoid being noticed. One of the officers, Sergeant Eric Mount, decided to stop by the home on his way to work around 8:00 a.m. on the morning of April 5, 2024. While Sergeant Mount was watching the home, a truck drove to the property. Once the truck parked at the Karolyn home, a man approached the vehicle, opened the front passenger side door, and got inside. Although Sergeant Mount was too far away to identify the person who got inside the vehicle, he was close enough to notice the man’s clothing and his stature. Sergeant 2 Mount saw the passenger quickly get out of the vehicle and walk into the backyard as the truck drove away from the house. Sergeant Mount believed that the behavior he just observed was consistent with “a hand-to-hand drug sale.” He then followed the truck and observed the driver traveling in the middle lane of a road with three lanes traveling in the same direction. The driver later turned into a parking lot from the middle lane and crossed over the right-hand lane of the road. Believing he had seen a traffic violation, Sergeant Mount contacted patrol officers in the area to report that the driver had committed a traffic offense and to request that the officers make a traffic stop. A nearby officer in a marked police car initiated a traffic stop, and Sergeant Mount drove to the police station once he saw the responding officers initiating the traffic stop. One of the officers performing the stop was Officer Miles Tucker, who was a K-9 handler for the police department and had his police drug dog with him. After the driver of the truck pulled over, the officer approached the vehicle to speak with the driver, and the driver identified himself as Jason Farrington. Farrington was argumentative with the officer about the stop, and his hands were shaking. Farrington told the officer that he had just dropped his daughter off at a house on Karolyn Drive. The officer asked to see Farrington’s driver’s license and asked dispatch to run a criminal history on him. Although Farrington admitted to having received traffic citations in the past, he did not mention that he had previously been arrested and convicted of offenses involving illegal drugs. Officer Tucker walked his drug dog around the truck, and the dog alerted near the passenger door. At that point, Officer Tucker removed Farrington from the vehicle and frisked Farrington. Officer Tucker and two other officers then searched the vehicle and found a handgun in the center console and a baggie containing a white substance in a rear cup holder. Subsequent 3 testing on the white substance revealed that it was 14.31 grams of methamphetamine. Officer Tucker arrested Farrington and transported him to the police station. When Farrington arrived at the police station, Sergeant Mount and Detective Justin LeFan interviewed him. The officers informed Farrington that they were investigating Kaman Jr., and Sergeant Mount stated that he thought he saw Kaman Jr. get into Farrington’s truck earlier. Farrington corrected Sergeant Mount to say that Bounds had been the person who got into the truck with him, not Kaman Jr. Sergeant Mount knew Bounds because he was a long-term resident of Round Rock. According to Sergeant Mount and Detective LeFan, Farrington confirmed that he purchased the drugs from Bounds earlier that day. Farrington was taken to jail after the interview. Following the interview, Sergeant Mount returned to the Karolyn home and parked his unmarked car closer to the home than he had been last time. He then placed a mask over his face to conceal his identity, got out of the car, walked on the sidewalk in front of the home, and saw a man wearing the same clothes he had seen earlier on the man who got inside the truck. When he got closer, Sergeant Mount recognized the man as Bounds. While Sergeant Mount returned to the Karolyn home, Detective LeFan prepared a search-warrant affidavit and later obtained a search warrant to search the house. A SWAT team executed the warrant later that day, and the officers found inside the home Bounds, another man, and a woman. Kaman Jr. was not in the home. One of the SWAT officers frisked Bounds and placed him in the backseat of Officer Taylor Roberson’s patrol car. While observing Bounds, Officer Roberson noticed Bound’s cellphone and took custody of the phone before later giving the phone to Sergeant Mount. 4 Several officers searched the home and the other structures on the property. The officers found inside Kaman Jr.’s bedroom baggies that could have been used for the distribution of drugs, a scale, and 11.03 grams of methamphetamine. When searching the shed, another drug dog alerted to pants found in the shed. While looking through the pants, the officers found a bag of pills that appeared to be Xanax. In that same area, the police found mail, paperwork, and prescription bottles with Bounds’s name on them. Additionally, the police found a scale with residue on it. Bounds was initially arrested for possessing Xanax, but he was later charged with manufacturing or distributing methamphetamine. The police did not find any money on Bounds when he was arrested. After Bounds was arrested, police searched his phone. The settings folder confirmed that the phone number for the phone was the same one that was associated with Bounds. Further, the police found Farrington as a contact in the phone, and the phone number given for the contact matched the phone number Farrington had previously given to the police. The text thread between Bounds’s and Farrington’s phones showed that they began communicating with one another in September 2023 with Bounds identifying himself in the first message. In another text message exchange, Farrington asked where to meet Bounds, and Bounds specified the Karolyn home and told Farrington to park on the rear driveway near the garage. On April 4, 2024, Bounds wrote the following messages to Farrington: Hey good News better product available, some of the best in along time, and I got a little break on it so I can do 150 for a half Really good halftime show. Definitely a great game so far 120 if you only wanna stay for first quarter 5 A few hours later, Farrington responded, “Ok” and “I’m down.” Bounds responded, “Cool” and “When”? Farrington answered, “I’ll be there tomorrow morning for real at 9 o’clock if you were going to be up.” Bounds informed Farrington that he would “be up” at that time. At 7:48 a.m. on April 5, Bounds texted Farrington, “Let me know when your ready.” Farrington responded, “I’m headed to your location.” Bounds said, “Ok sounds good.” At 8:24 a.m., Farrington texted Bounds, “2 min” and “Here.” After Bounds was charged with manufacturing or distributing methamphetamine, a trial was held in which the following witnesses testified about the events summarized above: officers involved in the traffic stop of Farrington, officers involved in the investigation of the Karolyn home, and Farrington. The witnesses provided additional testimony set out below. The trial court also admitted into evidence photos of the Karolyn home and items found throughout the property, copies of the text messages between Farrington and Bounds, photos of the truck and items found inside, the lab reports for the testing performed on the methamphetamine found inside the truck and inside Kaman Jr.’s bedroom, and a timeline prepared by defense counsel. In his testimony, Farrington explained that he was currently on community supervision after pleading guilty to the offense of possessing a controlled substance. He also stated that no promise was made regarding his testimony in this case when he pleaded guilty. He provided his primary phone number and agreed it matched the contact information on Bounds’s phone. He agreed that he saw Bounds on April 5 and believed it was at the home on Karolyn Drive, which he had been to before to buy a coat from Bounds, but he explained that Bounds did not live there. Further, he testified that he had purchased methamphetamine from Bounds before, that he went to the Karolyn home on April 5 to buy methamphetamine after Bounds offered to sell it, that he went there alone, and that Bounds got into the truck when he arrived. 6 Although Farrington admitted that he was talking with Bounds on April 5, he said he would have bought methamphetamine from whomever he could. He remembered that he was wanting to buy large amounts of methamphetamine at the time and wanted to buy at least 14 grams or a half ounce. He described Bounds as a middleman who was supposed to connect him with the person who lived at the home. Farrington testified that he had been using drugs and had not slept for days at the time he went to meet Bounds and did not remember everything that happened that day. He recalled wanting to buy a larger amount than Bounds had, so Farrington left the house upset. When discussing his interview, Farrington stated that the police officers said that if he provided enough information, they would let him leave, but he agreed that he was not allowed to leave and was instead arrested. He recalled trying to tell the police what they wanted to hear so he could leave. After learning the amount of methamphetamine found in the truck, he was shocked because he felt like it should have been a larger amount since he had bought drugs from multiple people. For that reason, Farrington testified that he did not know if he bought any drugs from Bounds that day. In addition, Farrington testified that Bounds never had the amount of methamphetamine found in the truck. Further, Farrington explained that following his arrest he wrote an email to Bounds and to Bounds’s attorney explaining that he did not buy drugs from Bounds on April 5; however, he also agreed that he wrote the emails after Bounds asked him to. Sergeant Mount testified that the police did not make any promises to Farrington if he agreed to talk to them; on the contrary, Sergeant Mount explained that Farrington wanted to talk. Although Sergeant Mount stated that he told Farrington he would put a note in the file indicating that Farrington was being cooperative, Sergeant Mount also testified that Farrington could not have been a confidential informant because of his criminal history, that he told 7 Farrington he could not make any deal with him, and that he never told Farrington that Farrington would not go to jail that day. Further, he explained that Farrington was not an informant because there was no arrangement set up ahead of time and because Farrington did not bring the drugs to the police. When discussing Farrington’s interview, Sergeant Mount agreed that interviews should be recorded, but he also agreed there was no recording of the interview despite there being cameras in the interview room. He explained that neither of the interviewing officers asked for the recording to be preserved. Although he acknowledged that the interview had not been recorded, Sergeant Mount testified that the two officers who conducted the interview could testify about the interview. Concerning his observations of the Karolyn home, Sergeant Mount testified that the man’s getting into the truck briefly before getting out and the driver’s leaving the area afterward were consistent with a “hand-to-hand drug sale.” Further, he related that a half ounce is approximately fourteen grams. Detective LeFan testified that at the start of the interview, Farrington was Mirandized and told the officers that he understood his rights. Further, Detective LeFan explained that neither officer told Farrington he would be let go if he gave them information; rather, Detective LeFan remembered that Farrington was told that his cooperation would be noted in the file. Detective LeFan agreed that it was his and Sergeant Mount’s responsibility to download the interview and preserve it if it was going to be used as evidence. When told that Farrington had testified that the police had pressured him to talk, he agreed that the absence of a recording meant there was no way to corroborate what happened at the interview; however, he testified that he could describe what happened. He was surprised by the summary provided of 8 Farrington’s testimony concerning the interview and by Farrington’s claim at trial that he did not buy any drugs from Bounds. After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury found Bounds guilty of the charged offense. At the start of the punishment hearing, Bounds pleaded true to the enhancement paragraph alleging that he had previously been convicted of possessing a controlled substance. The State called Sergeant Mount to testify about more text messages between Bounds and Farrington in which they discussed Farrington’s buying drugs from Bounds and also mentioned buying them at the Karolyn home. Next, the State called another police officer who testified regarding an incident in which Bounds was found to be in possession of more than 30 grams of methamphetamine following a traffic stop. The trial court also admitted into evidence numerous judgments from previous convictions for Bounds, including convictions for assault, reckless driving, interference with a public servant’s duties, evading arrest, criminal mischief, unlawful use of a criminal instrument, and theft. When the State rested, Bounds chose to testify and explained that he began struggling with his mental health after his mother died when he was twenty-one, that he had nowhere to live, and that he turned to drugs to help cope. Further, he admitted that he had stolen things to pay for drugs. He related that he had previously been shot in the stomach, had sustained head injuries in the past that he had not fully recovered from, and had been diagnosed with multiple mental-health disorders. In addition, he testified that Kaman Sr. gave him a place to stay, that Kaman Jr. used and sold drugs, and that he felt like he had to help when Kaman Jr. asked for assistance with selling drugs. Bounds admitted that he had been placed on community supervision in the past and had his community supervision revoked. 9 Once he finished testifying, Bounds called a forensic psychiatrist who testified that Bounds had previously been diagnosed with several mental illnesses and been declared incompetent and hospitalized. The forensic psychiatrist also testified that mental-health issues can lead to substance abuse and that substance abuse can cause mental-health episodes. Next, Bounds called his sponsor who testified that Bounds was trying to change his life and had already made significant changes. Finally, Bounds called his sister who testified that their father had never been a part of their lives, that their mother died unexpectedly, that she had to go live with relatives after her mother died because she was a minor, and that Bounds was left alone. In addition, she discussed Bounds’s life-long mental-health battle. After considering the evidence from the punishment hearing, the jury sentenced Bounds to 30 years’ imprisonment, and the trial court rendered its judgment of conviction consistent with the jury’s verdict. Bounds appeals his conviction. DISCUSSION Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first three issues, Bounds challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). In making this determination, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and consider all of the admitted evidence, regardless of whether it was properly 10 admitted.” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577. “The jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of the witnesses.” Id. “Juries can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence so long as each inference is supported by the evidence produced at trial,” id., and are “free to apply common sense, knowledge, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life in drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence,” Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). “When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination.” Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Appellate courts must “determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Appellate courts also must bear in mind that “direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally” and that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor” and “can be sufficient” on its own “to establish guilt.” Kiffe v. State, 361 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). The evidence is legally insufficient if “the record contains no evidence, or merely a ‘modicum’ of evidence, probative of an element of the offense” or if “the evidence conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 107 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320). Furthermore, reviewing courts “measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the so-called hypothetically correct jury charge, one which accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.” See DeLay v. State, 465 S.W.3d 232, 244 n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 11 Under the Health and Safety Code, an individual commits the offense of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance if he “knowingly manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1,” which includes methamphetamine. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.102(6), .112(a). “‘Deliver’ means to transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia, regardless of whether there is an agency relationship. The term includes offering to sell a controlled substance, counterfeit substance, or drug paraphernalia.” Id. § 481.002(8). “‘Agent’ means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser.” Id. § 481.002(2). “[A]n actual transfer or delivery, as commonly understood, contemplates the manual transfer of property from the transferor to the transferee or to the transferee’s agents or to someone identified in law with the transferee.” Heberling v. State, 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (emphasis removed). The indictment in this case alleged that Bounds committed the offense by offering to sell, actually transferring, or constructively transferring methamphetamine. “When a jury returns a general guilty verdict on an indictment charging alternate methods of committing the same offense, the verdict stands ‘if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the theories submitted.’” Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)); see also Delacey v. State, No. 14-16-00575-CR, 2017 WL 6559669, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that it is unnecessary to address sufficiency of evidence for second manner of committing offense if there is sufficient evidence to support commission by first manner). 12 Sufficiency of Evidence of Offense In his first issue, Bounds argues that there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that he offered to sell, actually transferred, or constructively transferred a controlled substance and that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. Concerning an actual transfer, Bounds notes that Sergeant Mount did not testify about seeing any hand-to-hand transaction, see the person getting into the truck holding drugs, or see the person with money after getting out of the vehicle. Bounds also highlights that the police did not find any money on him when he was arrested and that there was no evidence indicating that he had any drugs or paraphernalia on him or that he was intoxicated. 1 Further, he notes that Farrington testified that he did not remember buying drugs from Bounds on April 5 and would have had more drugs if he made a purchase. Additionally, Bounds emphasizes Farrington’s testimony that he went to the Karolyn home previously to purchase a coat and that he emailed Bounds and Bounds’s attorneys to tell them that he did not buy anything from Bounds on April 5. Moreover, Bounds references how Farrington testified that Bounds was supposed to connect Farrington with the person who lived at the Karolyn home and that he did not have a strong recollection of April 5 because he had been using drugs in the days leading up to his driving to the Karolyn home. Although Bounds points to the above when arguing that the evidence was insufficient, the jury was tasked with deciding what weight to give to that evidence. See 1 In his briefing, Bounds argues that the evidence was insufficient, in part, because he was outside the home when law enforcement arrived. Although Sergeant Mount testified that he saw Bounds outside the home after interviewing Farrington, he also explained that Bounds was inside the home when the search warrant was later executed. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that defendant’s presence when search is conducted is factor to consider when determining if sufficient links between defendant and contraband in home exist). 13 Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577. Additionally, there was other evidence presented that the jury could have considered when deciding what weight to give to the evidence Bounds relies on and determining whether he was guilty. For example, Farrington testified that he had purchased methamphetamine from Bounds before and went to see Bounds on April 5 to purchase more methamphetamine from him. In addition, Farrington remembered that Bounds got into the truck on April 5, which occurred shortly before the police performed a traffic stop and found the methamphetamine inside the truck. Concerning the emails Farrington wrote to Bounds and Bounds’s attorney, Farrington admitted that he wrote the emails because Bounds asked him to and testified that he had known Bounds for years. Cf. Durant v. State, 688 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, pet. ref’d) (noting that jury is free to consider witness’s relationship to defendant when evaluating witness’s credibility). Additionally, the police seized Bounds’s phone from his person, and Bounds confirmed to the police that the phone belonged to him. Farrington admitted that the contact information for him in Bounds’s phone, including his phone number, was accurate. Text messages exchanged between Bounds’s and Farrington’s phones showed that Bounds told Farrington to drive to the Karolyn home months before the day in question, that Bounds told Farrington on April 4 that he had just received some “better product,” that he would sell Farrington “a half” for $150 or a “quarter” for $120, that Bounds agreed and said he would come by tomorrow morning (April 5) around 9:00 a.m., and that Farrington texted the next morning to say that he was headed to Bound’s location and arrived at 8:24 a.m. See Cook v. State, 460 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (relying in sufficiency review on text messages between defendant and another person making arrangements to purchase “eight-balls”). 14 Around that time, Sergeant Mount observed the truck that Farrington was driving pull up to the Karolyn home and saw a man briefly get inside the truck before the truck drove away. See Wyatt v. State, 951 S.W.2d 144, 148-49 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. ref’d) (overruling sufficiency challenge to conviction for delivery of controlled substance in part because record showed that officer observed defendant’s activity). Sergeant Mount testified that this behavior was consistent with a drug sale and that when he returned to the property later and was able to get closer, he recognized Bounds as the man who got into the truck. See Bennett v. State, No. 14-02-00647-CR, 2003 WL 21782524, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 31, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (emphasizing in sufficiency review that officer testified that his observations of defendant were consistent with “a hand-to- hand drug transaction”). Sergeant Mount also testified that a half ounce is approximately fourteen grams, and Farrington testified at trial that he wanted to purchase fourteen grams or a half ounce of methamphetamine on April 5. When the police initiated a traffic stop of Farrington shortly after he left the Karolyn home, the police found about fourteen grams of methamphetamine in his truck. Although the police did not find money on Bounds when they arrested him, “it is not necessary that appellant be found with large amounts of cash.” Moreno v. State, 195 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). Moreover, Detective LeFan testified that individuals can now pay for drugs through cash apps on their phones. Furthermore, the police found mail, clothing, and prescription medications belonging to Bounds in the shed on the property, and in that same area the police found scales with residue on them and what appeared to be Xanax. See Tex. Health & Safety Code 15 §§ 481.002(17) (including scales within definition of paraphernalia), .183 (explaining that determination regarding whether something is paraphernalia may consider presence of controlled-substance residue); Jordan v. State, 139 S.W.3d 723, 726-27 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (determining that evidence was sufficient and noting that defendant had more than one controlled substance); Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) (explaining that presence of drug paraphernalia bears upon mental state). Given our standard of review, the evidence summarized above, and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that Bounds committed the offense of delivering methamphetamine by actually transferring the controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 481.102(6), (8), .112(a); see also Cook, 460 S.W.3d at 707-08, 709-10 (overruling sufficiency issue where text messages detailed plan to purchase drugs from defendant, defendant drove to scheduled location, police observed individual get into defendant’s car, and police later recovered drugs from that individual). Because we have determined that the evidence was sufficient to establish delivery through actual transfer, we need not address whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Bounds constructively transferred or offered to sell the controlled substance. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Sanchez, 376 S.W.3d at 775. 2 2 In this issue, Bounds points to closing arguments made by his attorney at trial in which his attorney asserted that if there was evidence he was trying to sell a controlled substance, the controlled substance was Xanax, not methamphetamine. Based on this argument, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the controlled substance was methamphetamine. However, “the arguments of the parties are of no consequence” in sufficiency review “because arguments are not evidence.” See Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Accordingly, any reliance on argument in a sufficiency review would be error. Id. In any event, for the reasons previously given, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support a determination that Bounds delivered methamphetamine to Farrington. 16 For these reasons, we overrule Bounds’s first issue on appeal. Sufficiency of Evidence Corroborating Offer to Sell In his second issue, Bounds contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because it failed to corroborate any offer to sell as required by section 481.182 of the Health and Safety Code. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.182. That provision reads as follows: For the purpose of establishing a delivery under this chapter, proof of an offer to sell must be corroborated by: (1) a person other than the person to whom the offer is made; or (2) evidence other than a statement of the person to whom the offer is made. Id. After referring to this statute, Bounds asserts that without Farrington’s testimony and statements to the police, the evidence is insufficient to corroborate an offer to sell by him. This provision applies to delivery of a controlled substance through an offer to sell. See id. §§ 481.002(8), .112. Because we have determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Bounds’s conviction under the alternative manner of actual transfer, we need not address whether the evidence supporting proof of an offer to sell was sufficiently corroborated. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Sanchez, 376 S.W.3d at 775. Accordingly, we overrule Bounds’s second issue on appeal. 17 Sufficiency of Evidence Corroborating Informant In his third issue, Bounds argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because Farrington was an informant and because the State failed to present evidence that would have corroborated Farrington’s testimony. As support, Bounds points to article 38.141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: (a) A defendant may not be convicted of an offense under Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, on the testimony of a person who is not a licensed peace officer or a special investigator but who is acting covertly on behalf of a law enforcement agency or under the color of law enforcement unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. (b) Corroboration is not sufficient for the purposes of this article if the corroboration only shows the commission of the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.141; see id. arts. 2A.001 (listing who qualifies as peace officers), .002 (listing individuals who are special investigators). After referencing the statute, Bounds argues that Farrington’s testimony formed the basis for his conviction, that his testimony was not sufficiently corroborated, and that, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. “In some cases, . . . a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue turns on the meaning of the statute under which the defendant has been prosecuted,” and “[t]hat question, like all statutory construction questions, is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Liverman v. State, 470 S.W.3d 831, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “The overarching rule of statutory construction is that we construe a statute in accordance with the plain meaning of its text unless the text is ambiguous or the plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not possibly have intended.” Ex parte Vela, 460 S.W.3d 610, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “In 18 ascertaining the plain meaning of a word, we read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Lopez v. State, 253 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.011 (addressing common and technical usage of words in construing statutes). Appellate courts also interpret statutes “together and harmonized, if possible,” to give effect to all of the statutory provisions. See Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Appellate courts “presume that every word has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible.” O’Brien v. State, 544 S.W.3d 376, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “If the plain language is clear and unambiguous,” the “analysis ends because ‘the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.’” Id. (quoting Tha Dang Nguyen v. State, 359 S.W.3d 636, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). Article 38.141 was enacted because informants, like accomplices, “could fall into the class of a discredited witness with selfish interests and possibly corrupt motives.” Cantelon v. State, 85 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). For article 38.141 to apply, the testifying witness may not be a licensed peace officer or a special investigator but must be acting covertly on behalf of or under color of law enforcement. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.141. The “acting covertly on behalf of” requirement indicates that the informant must have been acting in secret for the benefit of law enforcement at the time the alleged offense occurred for which he will be providing information. See Ex parte Vela, 460 S.W.3d at 612; see also Covert, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/covert (last visited September 9, 2026) (including synonyms for covert as secret or hidden). 19 Consistent with that construction, appellate courts have determined that the statute applies to situations in which a witness enters into an agreement with law enforcement to perform a future act, such as a controlled purchase of a controlled substance, and is monitored by the police during the transaction. See Taylor v. State, 328 S.W.3d 574, 575 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d) (describing scenario where informant agreed to buy drugs in exchange for agreement not to be prosecuted, was fitted with recording device, and was given money to buy drugs); King v. State, 334 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2011, pet. ref’d) (discussing similar situation with district attorney’s office); Simmons v. State, 205 S.W.3d 65, 68, 73 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (determining that article 38.141 applied when individual was arrested, agreed to contact defendant, and agreed to “‘complete six case credits’ in order to get his case dismissed” because he was “indisputably acting covertly on behalf of law enforcement”). Here, in contrast, Farrington was arrested after the police discovered methamphetamine in his truck. Farrington was not working covertly on behalf of law enforcement at the time of the drug d