Full Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-01331-CR JOSE CRUZ-VASQUEZ, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F22-34193 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare Opinion by Justice Goldstein Jose Cruz-Vasquez appeals his continuous sexual abuse of a child younger than fourteen conviction. A jury convicted Cruz-Vasquez, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. In three issues, Cruz-Vasquez argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony concerning a forensic interview over Cruz-Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND In August 2023, Cruz-Vasquez was charged by indictment with continuous sexual abuse of a child younger than fourteen as follows: That JOSE RICARDO CRUZVASQUEZ, hereinafter called Defendant, on or about the 20th day of June, 2014 in the County of Dallas, State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly, during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when the defendant was 17 years of age or older, commit two or more acts of sexual abuse against J.C., a child younger than 14 years of age, hereinafter called complainant, namely by: the penetration of the complainant’s sexual organ by the Defendant’s finger AND by contact between the mouth of the defendant and the sexual organ of the complainant AND by the contact between the hand of the Defendant and the genitals of the complainant with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant. At trial in September 2025, J.C. testified that she was born in February 2007 and was eighteen years old at the time of trial. J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez is her uncle and related numerous instances of sexual abuse. When J.C. was in elementary school, she saw Cruz-Vasquez “a lot” because Cruz-Vasquez and his wife, Zoila, babysat J.C. at an apartment in Irving, Texas. J.C. testified that, the first time Cruz-Vasquez did “something inappropriate” to her, she was in elementary school. J.C. remembered Cruz-Vasquez “playing music, and we started dancing, and he started touching” J.C. on her nipple, and “[h]e would squeeze it” over her clothes. J.C. “stopped” and “moved away,” and she “already knew he shouldn’t be doing it.” –2– On another occasion when J.C. and Cruz-Vasquez were in the car “at a carnival,” Cruz-Vasquez told J.C. that, if she “wanted to get on the ride, that [Cruz- Vasquez] would have to [sic] doing something first.” Cruz-Vasquez told J.C. to put her “legs up,” and he put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina for “[a] minute.” J.C. did not tell anyone about this incident because she “was afraid they weren’t going to believe” her. J.C. testified about an incident at “the apartment complex [Cruz-Vasquez] used to live at and they would babysit” where there was a pool, and J.C. “didn’t know how to swim.” J.C. was wearing “regular shorts,” and Cruz-Vasquez put his hand on her vagina and “put his fingers up there.” Cruz-Vasquez “moved to a house” where he “had a hammock outside.” J.C. was in the hammock, and Cruz-Vasquez came outside and asked if J.C. remembered “when [he] put [his] tongue down there.” J.C. “had nothing to say” and felt uncomfortable, but she knew what Cruz-Vasquez was talking about. Another time at the house, J.C. and Cruz-Vasquez were on the couch in the living room, and Zoila was in her bedroom. Cruz-Vasquez showed J.C. “porn” that “looked like anime” on his phone. J.C. had clothes on, but Cruz-Vasquez put his hand inside her pants1 and “put his fingers inside [her] vagina.” In response to 1 J.C. initially testified that Cruz-Vasquez took off her pants and underwear but then clarified that Cruz- Vasquez “[w]orked around” her clothes and touched her vagina by “putting his hand inside [her] pants.” –3– questioning by the prosecutor, J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez’ finger “went inside” her vagina and went “[i]nside a hole.” On another occasion at the house, on “a trail that went to the garage,” Cruz- Vasquez “pulled out his penis and showed” it to J.C. for “[l]ike 10 seconds.” J.C. had never seen a penis before, and she “ran inside” because she was “uncomfortable” and did not “want to see it.” On a family outing to Lake Waxahachie, J.C. was “deep in the water” with Cruz-Vasquez. Cruz-Vasquez “would pick [J.C.] up and, like, in a way, throw” her. Two times, when Cruz-Vasquez picked up J.C., he touched her on her vagina over the shorts she was wearing. J.C.’s aunt’s house was behind Cruz-Vasquez’ house and, when Cruz- Vasquez had a party, he asked J.C. if she wanted to see the puppies in his back yard, but he touched J.C.’s nipples and vagina over her clothes before she could play with the puppies. At J.C.’s mother’s apartment on one occasion, Cruz-Vasquez came over when J.C. was doing homework in her mother’s bedroom “on the carpet in the floor.” Cruz-Vasquez “wanted to help,” but “instead of helping, he wanted to touch” J.C. J.C. “made a noise like no, no” but Cruz-Vasquez tried to touch J.C. on her nipples, so she ran away out of the room. J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez touched her nipples “[m]ore than twice,” touched her vagina over her clothes “[m]ore than once,” put his finger inside the –4– hole in her vagina “[t]wo or three” times, and put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina once. Cruz-Vasquez showed his penis to J.C. once but did not have her touch it. When asked about the timing of these incidents of abuse, J.C. testified they were “spread out” over “more” than 30 days and happened over “years.” The abuse stopped when Cruz-Vasquez “moved far away.” Elieio Molina, director of forensic services at the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center, testified that he did not conduct the forensic interview of J.C., but he watched the video of the interview conducted at the Irving Family Advocacy Center by Kimberly Skidmore. The State tendered the video of the interview to defense counsel and asked that it be admitted into evidence. The following exchange then occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I do object. I object to any testimony about this video. It’s not admissible. THE COURT: Can I see the lawyers please? (State's Exhibit No. 9 offered.) (Off-the-record discussion) [PROSECUTOR]: Permission to publish, Your Honor. THE COURT: Admitted. You can publishing. (State’s Exhibit No. 9 admitted.) [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move for a mistrial, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. The prosecutor then asked Molina, “without going into anything that was said,” if he was able to see in the interview whether J.C. “was able to provide sensory details,” and defense counsel objected that he “believe[d] it’s hearsay” and “call[ed] –5– for speculation.” The trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor asked Molina if he was “able to observe the demeanor of the victim,” and Molina answered, “Yes.” Defense counsel again objected that the answer called for hearsay and speculation. The trial court ruled that it would allow Molina to answer, and defense counsel requested “a running objection to any comment from this witness about this video.” The trial court granted defense counsel’s request but denied defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial. In response to further questioning about J.C.’s demeanor in the video, Molina stated that J.C. “when they were talking about neutral topics, non-abuse related, you could tell she was kind of quiet in the beginning, and then she started opening up.” Defense counsel again raised a hearsay objection and stated that “He just said that she was quiet.” The trial court asked to see the lawyers and conducted an off-the- record discussion. The prosecutor asked Molina how many times he had “testified as an expert at a hearing where a child had been sexually abused, and Molina said he had testified “over 20” times. The prosecutor then passed the witness, defense counsel stated he had no questions, and the trial court excused the witness. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual assault of a child. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS In his first issue, Cruz-Vasquez argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Cruz-Vasquez complains that the evidence is –6– insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more acts of sexual abuse occurred during a period of 30 days or more in duration. STANDARD OF REVIEW In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). It is the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony and weigh the evidence. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A reviewing court does not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Thus, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 –7– S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we treat direct and circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if (1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims, and (2) at the time of the commission of each act of sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than fourteen years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim at the time the offense is committed. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b). “[A]ct of sexual abuse” means an act that violates one or more enumerated penal laws of section 21.02(c), which includes the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contact. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4); see also id. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021. Here, the indictment alleged appellant committed two or more acts of sexual abuse against J.C. during a period of thirty or more days in duration. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades recognized that child victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and ability that is expected –8– of mature and capable adults. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he legislature created the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child in response to a need to address sexual assaults against young children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the offenses when there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.” Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890 n.7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring)). The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07; see also Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134. Furthermore, corroboration of the victim’s testimony by medical or physical evidence is not required. Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); see Cantu v. State, 366 S.W.3d 771, 775–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, J.C.’s testimony, without more, can be sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271. “[A]lthough the exact dates of the [sexual] abuse need not be proven, the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two –9– or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more days in duration.” Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561; see Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The jury was charged to determine whether the abuse occurred “during a period that was 30 days or more in duration.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)(1). Here, Cruz-Vasquez only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the duration element of the offense: he contends that C.V.’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably infer that the sexually abusive acts he allegedly committed against her occurred over a period of more than thirty days. Speculation is the mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of the facts and evidence presented. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Conversely, “an inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). “Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial[.]” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 15). Benchmarks in a child victim’s testimony may permit the jury to infer that the acts of sexual abuse spanned a period of thirty days or longer. See Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d); Soto v. State, No. 11- 19-00214-CR, 2021 WL 3235881 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2021, no pet.) –10– (mem. op., not designated for publication); Michell, 381 S.W.3d 554. These benchmarks include the various addresses where the child victims lived when the different abuses occurred, the sheer number of abuses, and testimony from the victims about their ages when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. See Soto, 2021 WL 3235881, at *4–5; Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561. Here, J.C. provided detailed testimony establishing Cruz-Vasquez on multiple occasions—at least nine—at various locations such as the Irving apartment; Lake Waxahachie; J.C.’s aunt’s house; J.C.’s mother’s house; a carnival; the pool at Cruz- Vasquez’ apartment complex; and, after he moved, his house. J.C. testified Cruz- Vasquez touched her nipples “[m]ore than twice,” touched her vagina over her clothes “[m]ore than once,” put his finger inside the hole in her vagina “[t]wo or three” times, and put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina once. The record thus includes the necessary benchmarks to establish the abuse occurred during a period of thirty days or more. The record contains evidence that different occasions of abuse occurred at different locations where Cruz-Vasquez lived or was present, evidence of the sheer number of abuses, and testimony from J.C. that the incidents of abuse were “spread out” over “more” than 30 days and happened over “years.” See Meza v. State, 706 S.W.3d 914, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet. ref’d). In addition to the testimony of the child victim, which alone may be sufficient, the State presented evidence through outcry testimony and the carnival spreadsheet to help establish timeframe parameters. The defense offered the testimony of Cruz- –11– Vasquez and his wife that provided the jury with contradicting evidence associated with the timeline. Not able to sit as the thirteenth juror, we presume as we must that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26. Considered as a whole, the cumulative force of the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that appellant’s repeated acts of sexual abuse against J.C. occurred during a period of thirty days or more in duration. As such, we conclude the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child as charged in the indictment. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 329. Accordingly, we overrule Cruz-Vasquez’ first issue. In his second and third issues, Cruz-Vasquez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony concerning a forensic interview over Cruz- Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation. Specifically, Cruz-Vasquez complains that Molina “did not participate in the forensic interview of J.C.” and his testimony concerning the contents of that interview were “hearsay and purely speculative as he had no involvement in J.C.’s interview.” The State argues that issues two and three should be summarily overruled because Cruz-Vasquez failed to preserve error. –12– Assuming without deciding that Cruz-Vasquez preserved issues two and three for our review, we conclude he has failed to establish he was harmed by the error, if any, in the trial court’s permitting Molina to testify concerning J.C.’s forensic interview. Because the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is not constitutional error, we apply the standard set out in Rule 44.2(b) and disregard the error if it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd) (erroneous admission of a hearsay statement constitutes non-constitutional error subject to a harm analysis); Brumfield v. State, No. 05-11-00816-CR, 2012 WL 3711742, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (trial court’s overruling appellant’s objection of “speculation” or “calls for speculation” subject to harmless error analysis). A defendant’s substantial rights are affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect in determining the verdict. Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). We should not overturn a conviction for such an error if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Id.; see also Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Here, the record shows that, at most, Molina succeeded only in testifying “Yes” when asked if he was “able to observe the demeanor of the victim” and stating –13– that J.C. was “kind of quiet in the beginning, and then she started opening up.” Also before the jury was J.C.’s graphic, detailed testimony specifying the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of Cruz-Vasquez over a period of “years.” Considering the entire record, as we must when conducting a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b), we conclude that a fair assurance exists that any error in permitting Molina’s limited testimony concerning J.C.’s forensic interview over Cruz-Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779. Accordingly, any error in admitting the forensic interview does not constitute reversible error. We overrule Cruz-Vasquez’ second and third issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Bonnie Goldstein/ BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) –14–