Jose Cruz-Vasquez v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket05-25-01331-CR
JudgeGoldstein
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 18, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-01331-CR
JOSE CRUZ-VASQUEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F22-34193
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare
Opinion by Justice Goldstein
Jose Cruz-Vasquez appeals his continuous sexual abuse of a child younger
than fourteen conviction. A jury convicted Cruz-Vasquez, and the trial court
sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. In three issues, Cruz-Vasquez
argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, and the trial court
abused its discretion in permitting testimony concerning a forensic interview over
Cruz-Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
BACKGROUND
In August 2023, Cruz-Vasquez was charged by indictment with continuous
sexual abuse of a child younger than fourteen as follows:
That JOSE RICARDO CRUZVASQUEZ, hereinafter called
Defendant, on or about the 20th day of June, 2014 in the County of
Dallas, State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly,
during a period that was 30 or more days in duration, when the
defendant was 17 years of age or older, commit two or more acts of
sexual abuse against J.C., a child younger than 14 years of age,
hereinafter called complainant, namely by:
the penetration of the complainant’s sexual organ by the Defendant’s
finger AND by contact between the mouth of the defendant and the
sexual organ of the complainant AND by the contact between the hand
of the Defendant and the genitals of the complainant with the intent to
arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the Defendant.
At trial in September 2025, J.C. testified that she was born in February 2007 and was
eighteen years old at the time of trial. J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez is her uncle
and related numerous instances of sexual abuse.
When J.C. was in elementary school, she saw Cruz-Vasquez “a lot” because
Cruz-Vasquez and his wife, Zoila, babysat J.C. at an apartment in Irving, Texas. J.C.
testified that, the first time Cruz-Vasquez did “something inappropriate” to her, she
was in elementary school. J.C. remembered Cruz-Vasquez “playing music, and we
started dancing, and he started touching” J.C. on her nipple, and “[h]e would squeeze
it” over her clothes. J.C. “stopped” and “moved away,” and she “already knew he
shouldn’t be doing it.”
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On another occasion when J.C. and Cruz-Vasquez were in the car “at a
carnival,” Cruz-Vasquez told J.C. that, if she “wanted to get on the ride, that [Cruz-
Vasquez] would have to [sic] doing something first.” Cruz-Vasquez told J.C. to put
her “legs up,” and he put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina for “[a] minute.” J.C. did not
tell anyone about this incident because she “was afraid they weren’t going to
believe” her.
J.C. testified about an incident at “the apartment complex [Cruz-Vasquez]
used to live at and they would babysit” where there was a pool, and J.C. “didn’t
know how to swim.” J.C. was wearing “regular shorts,” and Cruz-Vasquez put his
hand on her vagina and “put his fingers up there.”
Cruz-Vasquez “moved to a house” where he “had a hammock outside.” J.C.
was in the hammock, and Cruz-Vasquez came outside and asked if J.C. remembered
“when [he] put [his] tongue down there.” J.C. “had nothing to say” and felt
uncomfortable, but she knew what Cruz-Vasquez was talking about.
Another time at the house, J.C. and Cruz-Vasquez were on the couch in the
living room, and Zoila was in her bedroom. Cruz-Vasquez showed J.C. “porn” that
“looked like anime” on his phone. J.C. had clothes on, but Cruz-Vasquez put his
hand inside her pants1 and “put his fingers inside [her] vagina.” In response to
1
J.C. initially testified that Cruz-Vasquez took off her pants and underwear but then clarified that Cruz-
Vasquez “[w]orked around” her clothes and touched her vagina by “putting his hand inside [her] pants.”
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questioning by the prosecutor, J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez’ finger “went inside”
her vagina and went “[i]nside a hole.”
On another occasion at the house, on “a trail that went to the garage,” Cruz-
Vasquez “pulled out his penis and showed” it to J.C. for “[l]ike 10 seconds.” J.C.
had never seen a penis before, and she “ran inside” because she was “uncomfortable”
and did not “want to see it.”
On a family outing to Lake Waxahachie, J.C. was “deep in the water” with
Cruz-Vasquez. Cruz-Vasquez “would pick [J.C.] up and, like, in a way, throw” her.
Two times, when Cruz-Vasquez picked up J.C., he touched her on her vagina over
the shorts she was wearing.
J.C.’s aunt’s house was behind Cruz-Vasquez’ house and, when Cruz-
Vasquez had a party, he asked J.C. if she wanted to see the puppies in his back yard,
but he touched J.C.’s nipples and vagina over her clothes before she could play with
the puppies.
At J.C.’s mother’s apartment on one occasion, Cruz-Vasquez came over when
J.C. was doing homework in her mother’s bedroom “on the carpet in the floor.”
Cruz-Vasquez “wanted to help,” but “instead of helping, he wanted to touch” J.C.
J.C. “made a noise like no, no” but Cruz-Vasquez tried to touch J.C. on her nipples,
so she ran away out of the room.
J.C. testified that Cruz-Vasquez touched her nipples “[m]ore than twice,”
touched her vagina over her clothes “[m]ore than once,” put his finger inside the
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hole in her vagina “[t]wo or three” times, and put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina once.
Cruz-Vasquez showed his penis to J.C. once but did not have her touch it. When
asked about the timing of these incidents of abuse, J.C. testified they were “spread
out” over “more” than 30 days and happened over “years.” The abuse stopped when
Cruz-Vasquez “moved far away.”
Elieio Molina, director of forensic services at the Dallas Children’s Advocacy
Center, testified that he did not conduct the forensic interview of J.C., but he watched
the video of the interview conducted at the Irving Family Advocacy Center by
Kimberly Skidmore. The State tendered the video of the interview to defense counsel
and asked that it be admitted into evidence. The following exchange then occurred:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I do object. I object to any
testimony about this video. It’s not admissible.
THE COURT: Can I see the lawyers please?
(State's Exhibit No. 9 offered.)
(Off-the-record discussion)
[PROSECUTOR]: Permission to publish, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Admitted. You can publishing.
(State’s Exhibit No. 9 admitted.)
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Move for a mistrial, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled.
The prosecutor then asked Molina, “without going into anything that was said,” if
he was able to see in the interview whether J.C. “was able to provide sensory
details,” and defense counsel objected that he “believe[d] it’s hearsay” and “call[ed]
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for speculation.” The trial court sustained the objection. The prosecutor asked
Molina if he was “able to observe the demeanor of the victim,” and Molina
answered, “Yes.” Defense counsel again objected that the answer called for hearsay
and speculation. The trial court ruled that it would allow Molina to answer, and
defense counsel requested “a running objection to any comment from this witness
about this video.” The trial court granted defense counsel’s request but denied
defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial.
In response to further questioning about J.C.’s demeanor in the video, Molina
stated that J.C. “when they were talking about neutral topics, non-abuse related, you
could tell she was kind of quiet in the beginning, and then she started opening up.”
Defense counsel again raised a hearsay objection and stated that “He just said that
she was quiet.” The trial court asked to see the lawyers and conducted an off-the-
record discussion. The prosecutor asked Molina how many times he had “testified
as an expert at a hearing where a child had been sexually abused, and Molina said
he had testified “over 20” times. The prosecutor then passed the witness, defense
counsel stated he had no questions, and the trial court excused the witness.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found appellant guilty of continuous sexual
assault of a child. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
In his first issue, Cruz-Vasquez argues the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction. Specifically, Cruz-Vasquez complains that the evidence is
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insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more acts of sexual abuse
occurred during a period of 30 days or more in duration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom,
a rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Alfaro-Jimenez v.
State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 243, 243–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). It is the factfinder’s
responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony and weigh the evidence. Nisbett
v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A reviewing court does not
sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder
by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards v. State, 666
S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Thus, if the record supports conflicting
inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the
verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v.
State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The evidence need not directly prove the defendant’s guilt; circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the defendant’s guilt, and
circumstantial evidence, alone, can be sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v.
State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214
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S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the defendant’s guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction. Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we treat direct
and circumstantial evidence equally, and we must consider the cumulative force of
all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray
v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if
(1) during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, he commits two or more
acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed
against one or more victims, and (2) at the time of the commission of each act of
sexual abuse, the actor is seventeen years of age or older and the victim is a child
younger than fourteen years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of
the victim at the time the offense is committed. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b). “[A]ct
of sexual abuse” means an act that violates one or more enumerated penal laws of
section 21.02(c), which includes the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child
and indecency with a child by contact. Id. § 21.02(c)(2), (4); see also id. §§
21.11(a)(1), 22.021. Here, the indictment alleged appellant committed two or more
acts of sexual abuse against J.C. during a period of thirty or more days in duration.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has for decades recognized that child
victims cannot be expected to testify with the same clarity and ability that is expected
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of mature and capable adults. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1990). Therefore, “[t]he legislature created the offense of continuous sexual
abuse of a child in response to a need to address sexual assaults against young
children who are normally unable to identify the exact dates of the offenses when
there are ongoing acts of sexual abuse.” Michell v. State, 381 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2012, no pet.); see Williams v. State, 305 S.W.3d 886, 890 n.7 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2010, no pet.) (citing Dixon v. State, 201 S.W.3d 731, 737 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., concurring)).
The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
continuous sexual abuse of a child. Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 266, 271 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2017, no pet.); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07; see also
Villalon, 791 S.W.2d at 134. Furthermore, corroboration of the victim’s testimony
by medical or physical evidence is not required. Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d
327, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.); see Cantu v. State,
366 S.W.3d 771, 775–76 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); Lee v. State, 176
S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Thus, J.C.’s testimony, without more, can be sufficient to
support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Garner, 523 S.W.3d
at 271.
“[A]lthough the exact dates of the [sexual] abuse need not be proven, the
offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child does require proof that there were two
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or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or more
days in duration.” Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561; see Smith v. State, 340 S.W.3d 41,
48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The jury was charged to
determine whether the abuse occurred “during a period that was 30 days or more in
duration.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b)(1). Here, Cruz-Vasquez only challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the duration element of the offense: he
contends that C.V.’s testimony does not provide sufficient evidence for the jury to
reasonably infer that the sexually abusive acts he allegedly committed against her
occurred over a period of more than thirty days.
Speculation is the mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of
the facts and evidence presented. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). Conversely, “an inference is a
conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence
from them.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). “Juries are permitted to draw
multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence as long as each inference is
supported by the evidence presented at trial[.]” Id. (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at
15).
Benchmarks in a child victim’s testimony may permit the jury to infer that the
acts of sexual abuse spanned a period of thirty days or longer. See Wishert v. State,
654 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d); Soto v. State, No. 11-
19-00214-CR, 2021 WL 3235881 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2021, no pet.)
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(mem. op., not designated for publication); Michell, 381 S.W.3d 554. These
benchmarks include the various addresses where the child victims lived when the
different abuses occurred, the sheer number of abuses, and testimony from the
victims about their ages when the acts of sexual abuse occurred. See Soto, 2021 WL
3235881, at *4–5; Michell, 381 S.W.3d at 561.
Here, J.C. provided detailed testimony establishing Cruz-Vasquez on multiple
occasions—at least nine—at various locations such as the Irving apartment; Lake
Waxahachie; J.C.’s aunt’s house; J.C.’s mother’s house; a carnival; the pool at Cruz-
Vasquez’ apartment complex; and, after he moved, his house. J.C. testified Cruz-
Vasquez touched her nipples “[m]ore than twice,” touched her vagina over her
clothes “[m]ore than once,” put his finger inside the hole in her vagina “[t]wo or
three” times, and put his tongue on J.C.’s vagina once. The record thus includes the
necessary benchmarks to establish the abuse occurred during a period of thirty days
or more. The record contains evidence that different occasions of abuse occurred at
different locations where Cruz-Vasquez lived or was present, evidence of the sheer
number of abuses, and testimony from J.C. that the incidents of abuse were “spread
out” over “more” than 30 days and happened over “years.” See Meza v. State, 706
S.W.3d 914, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, pet. ref’d).
In addition to the testimony of the child victim, which alone may be sufficient,
the State presented evidence through outcry testimony and the carnival spreadsheet
to help establish timeframe parameters. The defense offered the testimony of Cruz-
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Vasquez and his wife that provided the jury with contradicting evidence associated
with the timeline. Not able to sit as the thirteenth juror, we presume as we must that
the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt, 368 S.W.3d at 525–26.
Considered as a whole, the cumulative force of the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s finding that appellant’s repeated acts of sexual abuse against J.C.
occurred during a period of thirty days or more in duration. As such, we conclude
the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could
have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child as charged in the
indictment. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Wishert, 654 S.W.3d at 329. Accordingly,
we overrule Cruz-Vasquez’ first issue.
In his second and third issues, Cruz-Vasquez argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in permitting testimony concerning a forensic interview over Cruz-
Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation. Specifically, Cruz-Vasquez
complains that Molina “did not participate in the forensic interview of J.C.” and his
testimony concerning the contents of that interview were “hearsay and purely
speculative as he had no involvement in J.C.’s interview.” The State argues that
issues two and three should be summarily overruled because Cruz-Vasquez failed to
preserve error.
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Assuming without deciding that Cruz-Vasquez preserved issues two and three
for our review, we conclude he has failed to establish he was harmed by the error, if
any, in the trial court’s permitting Molina to testify concerning J.C.’s forensic
interview.
Because the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is not constitutional
error, we apply the standard set out in Rule 44.2(b) and disregard the error if it did
not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos v.
State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd)
(erroneous admission of a hearsay statement constitutes non-constitutional error
subject to a harm analysis); Brumfield v. State, No. 05-11-00816-CR, 2012 WL
3711742, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (trial court’s overruling appellant’s objection of
“speculation” or “calls for speculation” subject to harmless error analysis).
A defendant’s substantial rights are affected when the error had a substantial
and injurious effect in determining the verdict. Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779 (citing
Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). We should not overturn
a conviction for such an error if, after examining the record as a whole, we have fair
assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Id.; see
also Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Here, the record shows that, at most, Molina succeeded only in testifying
“Yes” when asked if he was “able to observe the demeanor of the victim” and stating
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that J.C. was “kind of quiet in the beginning, and then she started opening up.” Also
before the jury was J.C.’s graphic, detailed testimony specifying the sexual abuse
she suffered at the hands of Cruz-Vasquez over a period of “years.”
Considering the entire record, as we must when conducting a harm analysis
under Rule 44.2(b), we conclude that a fair assurance exists that any error in
permitting Molina’s limited testimony concerning J.C.’s forensic interview over
Cruz-Vasquez’ objections to hearsay and speculation did not influence the jury or
had but a slight effect. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779.
Accordingly, any error in admitting the forensic interview does not constitute
reversible error. We overrule Cruz-Vasquez’ second and third issues.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Bonnie Goldstein/
BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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