Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00491-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG JEREMY FABIAN FUENTES A/K/A JEREMY FUENTES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 404TH DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Peña, West, and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña Appellant Jeremy Fabian Fuentes a/k/a Jeremy Fuentes appeals his conviction of two counts of aggravated assault on a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B). Following a bench trial, the trial judge found Fuentes guilty of the indicted offenses and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. By a single issue, Fuentes argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND On September 20, 2023, Harlingen Police Department (HPD) Officers Marian Hernandez and Jacob Chavez were dispatched to a residence on North 9th Street in Harlingen in response to a domestic disturbance call. The State introduced video footage from both officers’ body worn cameras. The footage from Hernandez’s camera showed her approaching a vehicle in the yard, and the vehicle’s occupant indicating he was Fuentes’s cousin and that police were called “because my cousin is in there tripping.” Hernandez then approached the residence where she was met by Fuentes’s mother who pointed in the direction of screaming in the house and gave her permission to enter the residence. Hernandez entered the house and found a bedroom with an open door and a bedridden occupant inside who later identified herself as Fuentes’s grandmother. Fuentes’s grandmother stated “[she] need[ed] him in jail” when she motioned towards the kitchen where Hernandez heard screaming and loud talking. Hernandez proceeded through the house, passed the kitchen, and entered a back room where she encountered Fuentes. Fuentes immediately asserted “you can’t come to my house” as he blocked further entry into the room. He then slowly advanced towards Hernandez, closing the distance between them. Hernandez backed into the kitchen while attempting to question Fuentes regarding the reason for the call. Chavez then arrived to assist. Both officers attempted to de-escalate the situation and continued to question Fuentes as to what caused the domestic disturbance call. Fuentes insisted nothing 2 happened and claimed that the officers knew him from a prior incident where he was allegedly beaten by law enforcement. After the officers denied any prior involvement with Fuentes, he left the kitchen to retrieve a cell phone with video footage purportedly of a prior incident involving Fuentes and law enforcement officers. When Fuentes left the room Chavez noticed a knife in the kitchen and he attempted to hide the knife by “putting it underneath the microwave just to get it out of sight.” As Hernandez and Chavez insisted they never encountered Fuentes before, he re-entered the room and his behavior became more erratic. He gesticulated towards the officers, postured, pointed his finger toward them and closed the distance between himself and Chavez multiple times standing face to face. Additionally, Fuentes demanded the officers leave his house and began to make statements such as: “[y]ou wanna play with me?” and “[y]ou wanna play with God?” Hernandez testified at trial that she saw that [Fuentes] had dilated pupils” and in her experience, it was a sign “[he] might be under the influence of a narcotic.” She explained Fuentes’s attention seemed divided between the officers and other household members. Fuentes yelled at others present in the house to “shut the fuck up!” and accused the officers of “breaking and entering.” He then said “I could do what I want to here” and told the officers “[g]et out of my house.” The officers detailed that Fuentes continued to escalate the situation and observed that his statements and actions became more aggressive when he said “[i]f I say you dead, you dead. I do what I want to.” Finally, Fuentes asked the officers “[y]ou think I’m playing? I can do what I want to here” and proceeded to grab the knife which Chavez had attempted to hide from sight in the space underneath the microwave. In response to Fuentes grabbing the knife, Chavez drew his 3 gun, and Hernandez drew her taser. Hernandez testified she felt threatened after Fuentes picked up the knife. Hernandez stated because of Fuentes’s statements and his erratic gestures she “wasn’t sure of what his next move [would be]. He had already picked up the knife and he was making comments.” Similarly, Chavez testified Fuentes got uncomfortably close to him and indicated that he felt threatened even before he had to draw his gun; Chavez drew his weapon because he “didn’t know what [Fuentes’s] intentions were.” In his testimony, Chavez interpreted Fuentes’s actions as a “threat.” He indicated that he was afraid that Fuentes was going to attack him with the knife. After considering the evidence submitted, the trial court found Fuentes guilty on both counts of aggravated assault on a public servant. See id. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B). The court sentenced him as described above. See id. § 12.32. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be supported by sufficient evidence. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). This is no less true when a judge, rather than a jury, sits as the factfinder. See Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a rational [factfinder] could find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In a legal sufficiency review, “we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that evidence and reasonable 4 inferences therefrom, a rational [factfinder] could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). This “includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence can be equally probative, and guilt can be established beyond a reasonable doubt solely by circumstantial evidence. Id. When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial, as occurred here, we defer to the judge’s role as the factfinder, which includes “resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts.” Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “[A]n inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We consider “whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448 (quoting Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). On the other hand, a finding cannot be based on speculation. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Unlike a reasonable inference, “speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and evidence presented.” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This standard applies equally to both jury and bench trials. Id. A hypothetically correct charge is “one that accurately sets out the law, is 5 authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict its theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. As relevant here, a person commits the offense of assault if the person “intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(2). A person commits the offense of aggravated assault “if the person commits assault as defined in [section] 22.01 and the person . . . uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.” TEX. PEN. CODE § 22.02(a)(2). An aggravated assault is a first-degree felony if it is committed “against a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty.” Id. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). A “public servant” is defined as “a person . . . employed, or otherwise designated as . . . an officer, employee, or agent of government.” Id. § 1.07(41)(A). The Texas Court of Criminal appeals held “there must be some evidence of a threat being made to sustain a conviction of assault by threat.” Olivas v. State, 203 S.W. 3d 341, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis original). Further, “[a] person commits assault by threat when he acts with the intent to cause in another person a reasonable apprehension of imminent bodily injury, though not necessarily with the intent to cause such harm.” Jefferson v. State, 346 S.W. 3d 254, 256-57 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011 pet. ref’d). “It is well established that a threat may be communicated by action or conduct as well as by words.” Id.; see also Jones v. State, 500 S.W. 3d 106, 113 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet). 6 B. Analysis Fuentes argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he “did not point a knife at any officer,” and he “merely picked . . . up” the knife “almost casually.” The State of Texas responds that the trial evidence illustrates that “[Fuentes], in a highly aggressive and agitated state, made a multitude of threats . . . prior to grabbing the knife” including (1) “I can do what I want to here,” (2) “If I say you dead, you dead, I do what I want here,” (3) “I’ll do what the fuck I want, yea[h],” and (4) “You think I’m playing? I’ll do what I want.” The State contends the combination of these words, with Fuentes’s action of picking up the knife, and the officers’ testimony that “they felt threatened when [Fuentes] picked up the knife because they did not know his next move or his intentions,” amounts to sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated assault on a public servant beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree. The evidence demonstrates a steadily escalating confrontation. Officers responded to the residence after receiving a report of domestic disturbance. Hernandez attempted to investigate, but Fuentes immediately challenged her presence, repeatedly moved toward her, and continued advancing as she backed into the kitchen. Both officers testified Fuentes appeared to be under the influence of narcotics because of his erratic behavior and because his pupils were dilated. As the encounter progressed, Fuentes became increasingly agitated, repeatedly accusing the officers of misconduct during a prior encounter, and not relenting after the officers tried to deescalate the situation. Fuentes instead insisted that the officers leave his house and declared “[i]f I say you dead, you dead.” 7 The evidence further reflects Chavez independently recognized the kitchen knife as a potential threat. Chavez testified he attempted to hide the knife by “putting it underneath the microwave just to get it out of sight” when Fuentes briefly stepped out of the kitchen. Nevertheless, Fuentes immediately retrieved that knife and declared to the officers “[y]ou think I’m playing? I can do what I want to here.” Both officers responded by drawing their weapons and testified that they believed Fuentes intended to attack them based on the escalating situation. Fuentes argues he never pointed the knife directly at either officer. Even assuming he did not do so, the statute does not require proof that a deadly weapon was pointed at the complainants. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(2); Olivas, 203 S.W.3d at 348–51; Jefferson, 346 S.W.3d at 256–57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113. The trial court, as the sole judge of the witness’s credibility and the weight to be given the evidence, viewed the body camera recordings and heard the officer’s testimony regarding Fuentes’ conduct throughout the encounter. Jefferson, 346 S.W. 3d at, 256-57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113. Considering Fuentes’ repeated advancement toward the officers, his escalating hostility, his explicit verbal threats, his retrieval of the knife immediately after making those threats, and the officer’s testimony that they feared imminent attack with the knife, a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Fuentes intentionally or knowingly threatened the officers and committed assault by threat while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), Jefferson, 346 S.W. 3d at, 256-57; Jones, 500 S.W. 3d at 113. Additionally, the officers wore their law enforcement uniform and were responding to a domestic disturbance call. Thus, a rational factfinder could conclude Fuentes knew or should have known that his actions 8 were committed against actors he knew were public servants while they were “lawfully discharging an official duty.” See id. § 22.02(B)(2)(B). Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the convictions. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment. L. ARON PEÑA JR. Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 13th day of August, 2026. 9