Ex Parte Alejandro Lopez Estrada v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket01-25-00297-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion issued November 10, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-25-00297-CR
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EX PARTE ALEJANDRO LOPEZ ESTRADA, Appellant
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1894118
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Alejandro Lopez Estrada, challenges the trial court’s order denying
his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.1 In his sole issue, appellant
contends that the trial court erred in denying him habeas relief.
We affirm.
1
See TEX. R. APP. P. 31.
Background
Appellant is charged with the felony offense of continuous sexual abuse of a
young child under Texas Penal Code section 21.02.2
Appellant filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that
his confinement and restraint were unlawful because the statute under which he was
charged, section 21.02, was facially unconstitutional. According to appellant,
section 21.02 was unconstitutional because it “explicitly allow[ed] for a
non-unanimous jury verdict” in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Appellant requested that the trial
court hold section 21.02 unconstitutional and dismiss the charge against him.
In its response to appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, the
State asserted that section 21.02 did not violate appellant’s Sixth Amendment right
to jury unanimity. According to the State, “all Texas appellate courts to address the
issue [raised by appellant] ha[d] consistently held that [s]ection 21.02 d[id] not
2
A Harris County Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment, alleging that
appellant, on or about August 11, 2019 and continuing through June 6, 2020,
“during a period of time of thirty or more days in duration, commit[ted] at least two
acts of sexual abuse against a child younger than fourteen years of age, including an
act constituting the offense of [a]ggravated [s]exual [a]ssault of a [c]hild, committed
against J.B.[, the complainant,] on or about August 11, 2019, and an act constituting
the offense of indecency with a child by contact, committed against [the
complainant] on or about June 6, 2020, and [appellant] was at least seventeen years
of age at the time of the commission of each of those acts.” See TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 21.02(b), (c).
2
violate a defendant’s federal or Texas right to jury unanimity.” The State also noted
that none of the cases relied on by appellant in his pretrial application supported his
argument. And it requested that the trial court deny appellant’s application.
After a hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s pretrial application for writ
of habeas corpus.
Standard of Review
A pretrial writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy. Ex parte Ingram,
533 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A defendant may seek a pretrial writ
of habeas corpus to challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute, i.e., to attack
the validity of the statute itself. See Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015). Whether a statute is facially constitutional is a question of law
that we review de novo. Salinas v. State, 464 S.W.3d 363, 366 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015). A person challenging the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of
showing it is unconstitutional. Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 514. When assessing a
statute’s constitutionality, reviewing courts “presume that the statute is valid and that
the Legislature has not acted unreasonably or arbitrarily” when enacting the statute.
Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Constitutionality of Texas Penal Code Section 21.02
In his sole issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus because section 21.02 is facially
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unconstitutional as it “explicitly allows conviction upon a non-unanimous jury
verdict in violation of the Sixth Amendment” of the United States Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Texas Penal Code section 21.02 provides that a person seventeen years of age
or older commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if, “during
a period that is [thirty] or more days in duration, the person commits two or more
acts of sexual abuse” on a child younger than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL
CODE § 21.02(b). Section 21.02(c) defines “act of sexual abuse” to include sexual
assault under Texas Penal Code section 22.011, aggravated sexual assault under
section 22.021, and indecency with a child under section 21.11(a)(1), “other than by
touching . . . the breast of a child.” Id. § 21.02(c) (internal quotations omitted). And
importantly for our purposes, the statute provides that jurors need not “agree
unanimously on which specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the
defendant or the exact date when those acts were committed,” but they “must agree
unanimously that the defendant, during a period that is [thirty] or more days in
duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse.” Id. § 21.02(d).
The Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to
convict a defendant of a serious offense. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 93
(2020). Applying this protection to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the
United States Supreme Court in 2020 struck down certain Louisiana and Oregon
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laws permitting convictions of a serious crime by a nonunanimous, 10-2, jury
verdict. Id. at 87, 93.
Appellant argues that section 21.02, like the laws struck down in Ramos,
violates the Sixth Amendment because it “endorses a non-unanimous verdict by
providing that the jury need not be unanimous in agreeing on specific predicate
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt to convict.” However, whether section 21.02
complies with the jury-unanimity requirement under the federal and Texas
constitutions has been addressed by Texas courts on multiple occasions.
We note that like the Sixth Amendment, the Texas Constitution requires “jury
unanimity . . . in felony cases,” and under Texas statutes, “unanimity is required in
all criminal cases.” Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see
also Holton v. State, 487 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.);
Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 404 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) (“Jury
unanimity is required in all criminal cases in Texas.”). However, jury unanimity
does not mean that the jurors must agree unanimously that a defendant committed
the crime in one, specific way or even with one specific act. See Floyd v. State, 714
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). Instead, jurors are required to agree unanimously only on each
“element” of an offense, and not on the manner and means by which a defendant
committed the offense. See Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. Crim.
5
App. 2006); see also Luna v. State, --- S.W.3d ---, No. 01-24-00757-CR, 2026 WL
3174055, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2026, no pet. h.). The
Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict only as to all the essential
elements of an offense—not the manner and means. Trice v. State, 721 S.W.3d 614,
627 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2025, pet. ref’d) (analyzing constitutionality of Texas
Penal Code section 21.02(d) under Sixth Amendment in light of Supreme Court’s
decision in Ramos); see also Kent v. State, 483 S.W.3d 557, 561–62 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (not distinguishing between federal and state constitutional rights to jury
unanimity).
Thus, regarding section 21.02, “[t]he question . . . is whether the specific acts
of sexual abuse enumerated in the statute are elements of the offense [of continuous
sexual abuse of a young child] or merely . . . the manner and means by which one of
the elements is accomplished.” Favors v. State, No. 01-24-00118-CR, 2025 WL
1463301, at *8 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 21, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication); see also Carbajal v. Guerrero, Cause No. EP-24-CV-49-KC, 2025
WL 1699838, at *25–26 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 2025) (mem. op. and order)
(addressing whether Texas Penal Code section 21.02 is unconstitutional under Sixth
Amendment because “it does not require jurors to unanimously agree on which
predicate offenses the accused committed for a conviction”). “If they are elements,
then jury unanimity is a requirement; if they are manners and means, then jury
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unanimity is not required.” Favors, 2025 WL 1463301, at *8; see also Trice, 721
S.W.3d at 627.
Texas appellate courts have repeatedly held that the sexual abuse acts listed
in section 21.02(c) are not elements of the offense. See, e.g., Ramos v. State, 636
S.W.3d 646, 656–57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Ponce v. State, No. 01-24-01015-CR,
2026 WL 2117720, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 23, 2026, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Hill v. State, No. 10-24-00276-CR, 2026
WL 699341, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 12, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Cisnerosmartinez v. State, No. 02-24-00144-CR, 2025
WL 1840568, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Trice, 721 S.W.3d at 627–29; Harrison v. State, No.
06-21-00031-CR, 2021 WL 5828678, at *8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 9, 2021,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Feliciano-Salinas v. State, No.
05-17-01487-CR, 2018 WL 6273412, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 30, 2018, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Carmichael v. State, 505 S.W.3d
95, 105–06 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d); Holton, 487 S.W.3d at 606;
McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 872–73 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2012, no pet.).
Instead, they have held that the elements of the offense on which the jury must
agree unanimously are that the defendant (1) is seventeen years of age or older and
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(2) committed two or more acts of sexual abuse (3) on a child younger than fourteen
years of age (4) during a period of thirty or more days in duration. See TEX. PENAL
CODE § 21.02(b); Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 405; see also Carbajal, 2025 WL 1699838,
at *26. Thus, although the State must show that a defendant engaged in a “pattern
of behavior or the series of acts,” jury unanimity is not required regarding which of
the particular acts of sexual abuse the defendant committed. See Holton, 487 S.W.3d
at 606–07 (internal quotations omitted); Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 405; see also
Martinez v. State, No. 01-24-00767-CV, 2026 WL 2449157, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 20, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[T]he jury need not be unanimous about which two acts of sexual
abuse constituted the crime as long as they are unanimous that two acts occurred.”);
Hill, 2026 WL 699341, at *8 (“[T]he statute does not violate the constitutional right
to jury unanimity because the individual acts of sexual abuse are the manner and
means by which the element of two or more acts of sexual abuse is committed, and
not elements in and of themselves.” (internal quotations omitted)); Stevens v. State,
No. 02-23-00122-CR, 2024 WL 3978169, at *15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 29,
2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding trial court
instruction to jury that “they did not need to agree unanimously on which underlying
acts of sexual abuse were committed” did not violate Sixth Amendment’s
jury-unanimity requirement).
8
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that section 21.02 does not violate the
Sixth Amendment’s jury-unanimity requirement even though jurors need not agree
as to the specific acts of sexual abuse that were committed by the defendant. See
Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-19-00718-CR, 2021 WL 2931358, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding section 21.02 does not violate defendant’s constitutional right
to unanimous jury verdict and upholding section 21.02’s constitutionality); see also
Thrice, 721 S.W.3d at 628–29 (holding section 21.02 complies with the Sixth
Amendment even though “it authorizes a jury to return a guilty verdict . . . if the jury
does not unanimously agree on which specific acts of sexual abuse were
committed”); Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169, at *15 (rejecting argument section 21.02
violated Sixth Amendment’s jury-unanimity requirement); Jacobson v. State, 325
S.W.3d 733, 737–39 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.).
Appellant asks this Court to reconsider the above conclusion in light of the
United States Supreme Court’s 2020 opinion in Ramos, but our sister appellate
courts have already done so.3 As previously noted, in Ramos, the Supreme Court
3
And we have continued to uphold the constitutionality of Texas Penal Code section
21.02 post-Ramos. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, No. 01-19-00718-CR, 2021 WL
2931358, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); see also Clay v. State, No. 01-19-00278-CR,
2021 WL 1095908, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31, 2021, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (transfer case, but considering precedent
of First Court of Appeals and transferor appellate court).
9
found that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, required a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a
serious offense. 590 U.S. at 93. Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional certain laws in Louisiana and Oregon that permitted convictions of
serious offenses on jury verdicts agreed to by only ten of twelve jurors. Id. at 87,
93.
However, Texas appellate courts have determined that the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Ramos does not invalidate prior holdings by Texas courts with respect to
whether Texas Penal Code section 21.02 requires juror unanimity as to the specific
acts of sexual abuse committed by a defendant. See, e.g., Thrice, 721 S.W.3d at
628–29; Williams v. State, No. 02-20-00104-CR, 2021 WL 5227167, at *8 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication); see also Ortega v. Director, TDCJ-CID, Civ. Action No. 4:20cv942,
2023 WL 9502071, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2023) (report and recommendation)
(“[S]ection 21.02(d) of the Texas Penal Code does not violate a defendant’s
constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Petitioner has not presented any
clearly established Supreme Court precedent that holds to the contrary.”);
Mumphord v. Lumpkin, Civ. Action No. 4:22-cv-1446, 2023 WL 6444887, at *10
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2023) (mem. op. and order) (holding post-Ramos that section
21.02 did not run afoul of jury-unanimity requirement); Stevens, 2024 WL 3978169,
10
at *15; Carbajal v. State, No. 10-22-00238-CR, 2023 WL 6158371, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Waco Sept. 21, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(“After reviewing Ramos, we are unpersuaded by [defendant’s] argument that the
holding in Ramos somehow invalidates the prior holdings of Texas courts with
respect to whether section 21.02 of the Texas Penal Code requires jury unanimity as
to the underlying offenses.”).
In doing so, our sister courts have noted that whether section 21.02 violates
the jury-unanimity requirement turns on the fact that “the specific acts of sexual
abuse alleged to have constituted [continuous sexual abuse of a young child] are not
separate elements of the offense subject to the unanimity requirement,” and Ramos
did not change that Texas precedent. See Williams, 2021 WL 5227167, at *8
(internal quotations omitted); see also Carbajal, 2023 WL 6158371, at *4; Navarro
v. State, 535 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet. ref’d) (Texas courts
have “determined that the individual acts of sexual abuse are the manner and means
by which the element of ‘two or more acts of sexual abuse’ is committed, and not
elements in and of themselves”; thus, “section 21.01 does not violate a defendant’s
constitutional right to jury unanimity”). Ramos instead dealt with a different type of
Sixth-Amendment issue. See Carbajal, 2023 WL 6158371, at *4 (rejecting
defendant’s suggestion “Ramos changes Texas precedent that the underlying [acts
of sexual abuse] are not separate elements subject to the unanimity requirement”).
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Because we have concluded that section 21.02 does not violate the Sixth
Amendment’s jury-unanimity requirement, appellant’s facially unconstitutional
challenge to section 21.02 fails. Accordingly, we hold that appellant did not
establish that he was entitled to habeas relief and the trial court did not err in denying
appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus.
We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Andew Johnson
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Johnson and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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