Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00189-CR Raymond Edward Morris, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Thomas C. West, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2022-1048-C1 JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Raymond Edward Morris of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit or committing the offense of misdemeanor assault. Morris pled true to two enhancement paragraphs, and the jury sentenced him to 99 years in prison. Morris presents six issues on appeal, arguing the sufficiency to show he was not the owner of the property and that he used a deadly weapon, questioning the propriety of the deadly weapon finding, arguing he was improperly convicted on a theory not pled in the indictment, and complaining of an error in the judgment. As modified, we will affirm. Background Jennifer Uptmor started a relationship with Raymond Morris in 2021. They initially lived in a hotel and then moved into a duplex in Lacy Lakeview. The original lease was in Morris’s name, but Uptmor “paid everything.” They lived together for three or four months, during which time Morris was physically abusive. At some point, Morris left for Houston, which Uptmor considered her “way out.” While Morris was living in Houston, she removed Morris’s name from the lease, changed the locks, and informed Morris via email, phone calls, and texts that she had changed the lease and their relationship was over. She put all his remaining property into his car and had the car towed. On November 19, 2021, Morris called the Lacy Lakeview Police Department to ask whether Uptmor had taken out a restraining order against him. Morris acknowledged in the call that “he was no longer living there” and was advised by an officer not to go to the home. The next day, Uptmor was at home with her new boyfriend, Christopher Edgington, and a friend, Melissa Bain. Edgington had gone out the back door to let the dogs out when Morris suddenly kicked in the front door. Morris was Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 2 holding a pipe or piece of metal about two-and-a-half to three feet long and shouting threats to Uptmor. Edgington charged at him and put him in a choke hold, then released him as he stopped moving and turned to check on Uptmor. Morris then struck Edgington in the head from behind with the pipe. Uptmor had picked up a “Sawzall” and began striking Morris everywhere she could, chasing him out into the street until he fled the residence. The grand jury indicted Morris for burglary of a habitation with assault as the underlying offense and two enhancement paragraphs for prior felony convictions. The State later filed a superseding indictment alleging the burglary as Count I and adding an aggravated assault of Edgington as Count II. The State filed a separate notice of intent to seek a deadly weapon finding for Count I. Before trial, the State abandoned Count II and proceeded solely on Count I. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his first two issues, Morris complains the evidence was insufficient, first in proving that he entered without the effective consent of the owner and second that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows: When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 4 We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). OWNERSHIP A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, in relevant part, he intentionally or knowingly enters a habitation without the effective consent of the owner and attempts to commit or commits an assault. TEX. PENAL CODE §30.02(3). Owner means a person who has a greater right to possession of the property than the actor. TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07(35(A). This definition of owner “clearly indicates that a defendant who has some, but less, right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for burglary.” Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he entered without the effective consent of the owner because he is an owner of the property. He relies on Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 5 2018, pet. ref'd), where the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that Walker was not entitled to a self-defense instruction when tried for murdering her husband because he was not committing burglary when he entered their home. The court concluded: There existed no evidence that Walker had changed the locks on the home in an effort to prevent Updyke’s entrance or that Walker had demanded, and was given, the keys to the home. Notably, during Walker’s interview with investigators, she specifically stated that the home belonged to both of them. Walker has cited no cases, nor are we able to find any, that would support her assertion that, merely because Walker temporarily locked Updyke out of their home the evening of the incident, Updyke’s right to possession of their home was weakened, or that Walker’s right to possession of their home was somehow strengthened. Id. at 689. However, unlike Walker, the evidence in this case does reflect that Uptmor took steps to remove Morris’s rights to the property, including removing his name from the lease, changing the locks, putting the utilities in her name, and removing his personal effects. Morris acknowledged in repeated messages to Uptmor and when speaking to the police that he did not live at the location anymore. These facts are more akin to Morgan, where the appellant was a co-tenant of the apartment but the complaining witness testified that only her name was on the lease and she paid the rent. Morgan, 501 S.W.3d at 91. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the complaining witness’s Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 6 right to control over the property was greater than the appellant’s despite his right to possession. Here, the jury was free to credit Uptmor’s testimony that only her name was on the lease and she paid the bills. Particularly when paired with Morris’s acknowledgment that he no longer lived at the location, the jury could conclude that Uptmor had a greater right to possession of the property and had not consented to Morris’s entry. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the ownership element of burglary of a habitation. We overrule Morris’s first issue. DEADLY WEAPON A trial court must enter a deadly weapon finding on the judgment if the jury finds that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the commission of a felony offense, or immediate flight from a felony offense, and the defendant was the one who used or exhibited the deadly weapon. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(b), (c); Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). The deadly weapon must “in some manner help facilitate the commission of the felony.” Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In other words, the deadly weapon may not simply be incidentally carried during the offense but must actually assist in carrying out the offense in some way. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 7 The record in this case clearly shows that the deadly weapon was used in order to facilitate the commission of the felony. Among other ways the Court of Criminal Appeals includes a deadly weapon may be used is “when the object caused the injury or increased the risk of injury during the commission of the felony.” Plummer, 410 S.W.3d at 859. Morris struck Edgington in the head with the metal pipe in this case, causing the injury in the assault portion of the offense. Nor does it matter that the injury caused was only bodily injury rather than serious bodily injury. A deadly weapon need only be capable of causing serious bodily injury, not actually have caused it. Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908. Further, in addition to causing Edgington’s injury, the jury could conclude that the metal pipe was intended to provide protection against the potential threat of resistance from the occupants of the home, a common reason for exhibiting a weapon during a burglary. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, No. 05- 19-01549-CR, 2021 WL 1608496, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas April 26, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (upholding deadly weapon finding because possession of gun during burglary “emboldened Martinez to commit the burglary and assisted him by providing protection against the potential threat of homeowner resistance during the crime”). Morris’s second issue is overruled. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 8 Propriety of Deadly Weapon Finding In his third issue, Morris argues that a deadly weapon finding is impermissible where the underlying offense is a misdemeanor. But a deadly weapon finding is permissible in any felony offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054(b), (c); Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908. The Court of Criminal Appeals has previously held that a burglary of a habitation is eligible for a deadly weapon finding. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). And at least one of our sister courts has upheld a deadly weapon finding in a burglary of a habitation alleging simple assault. Palacio v. State, 580 S.W.3d 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d.). The language of article 42A.054 is unambiguous that “any felony offense” is eligible for a deadly weapon finding. Morris has presented no authority adequate to convince us to depart from the plain language of the statute. Merely having a misdemeanor as a predicate offense does not reduce burglary of a habitation to anything less than a felony. Morris’s third issue is overruled. Conviction on Unalleged Offense Morris argues in two issues that the jury’s deadly weapon finding resulted in his improper conviction on an unalleged offense of burglary with aggravated assault as the underlying offense. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 9 RELEVANT LAW No person may be brought to trial on a felony offense without an indictment issued by a grand jury. TEX. CONST. art. I, §10. The presentment of a valid indictment is what vests a district court with jurisdiction, and it is the offense charged in the indictment that provides what the defendant may be convicted of at trial. Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). But so long as it is properly alleged by the indictment, the State is permitted to choose which offense to pursue. Crawford v. State, 710 S.W.3d 774, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). In Crawford, the indictment alleged that the defendant caused bodily injury and knew “that the complainant was a public servant, to wit: Menard County Deputy Sheriff.” The State proceeded at trial as if the case was a second-degree assault on a peace officer, while Crawford argued it was properly a third-degree assault on a public servant. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the indictment properly included assault on a peace officer by alleging the defendant knew the complainant was a deputy sheriff. And “anything that is included in the charging instrument is fair game for the State to pursue,” either alone or in the alternative as a lesser-included offense. Crawford v. State, 710 S.W.3d 774, 783-84. Neither the defendant nor the trial Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 10 court may force the State not to pursue an allegation fairly charged in the indictment, short of quashing it. Id. DISCUSSION Here, the indictment alleged: On or about the 20th day of November, 2021 . . . Defendant did then an there intentionally and knowingly enter a habitation, without the effective consent of Jennifer Uptmore, the owner thereof, and attempted to commit or committed assault against Christopher Edgington. The State also filed a separate notice of its intent to seek a deadly weapon finding. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (State must give notice in some form of intent to seek deadly weapon finding, but not necessarily in indictment). The indictment properly alleges burglary of a habitation with simple assault as the underlying offense. But Morris argues that the deadly weapon finding elevated the offense from burglary with simple assault to burglary with aggravated assault. That is not the case. While the State may have been able to pursue the instant case with an aggravated assault as the underlying offense, it chose to indict only with a simple assault. That is its right. The indictment charged burglary of a habitation with an underlying simple assault. The jury was instructed on that offense. Nowhere was the jury empowered to convict Morris of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit an Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 11 aggravated assault. The separate deadly weapon finding, submitted to the jury as “Special Issue No.1,” was not an element of the offense and did not change the offense charged in the indictment. We overrule Morris’s fourth and fifth issues. Error in Judgment Finally, Morris complains that the judgment incorrectly reflects that he pleaded Not True to the two enhancement paragraphs. The State agrees. An appellate court has authority to reform a judgment to make the record speak the truth when the matter has been called to its attention by any source. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Here, the record shows that Morris entered pleas of True to both enhancement paragraphs at the start of the punishment phase. Accordingly, we reform the judgment to change the “Plead Not True” under the enhancement paragraphs to “Plead True.” Conclusion We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as modified. Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 12 ANDREA WESTERFELD OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed as modified Do Not Publish CRPM Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 13