Raymond Edward Morris v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket10-25-00189-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00189-CR
Raymond Edward Morris,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2022-1048-C1
JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Raymond Edward Morris of burglary of a habitation
with the intent to commit or committing the offense of misdemeanor assault.
Morris pled true to two enhancement paragraphs, and the jury sentenced him
to 99 years in prison. Morris presents six issues on appeal, arguing the
sufficiency to show he was not the owner of the property and that he used a
deadly weapon, questioning the propriety of the deadly weapon finding,
arguing he was improperly convicted on a theory not pled in the indictment,
and complaining of an error in the judgment. As modified, we will affirm.
Background
Jennifer Uptmor started a relationship with Raymond Morris in 2021.
They initially lived in a hotel and then moved into a duplex in Lacy Lakeview.
The original lease was in Morris’s name, but Uptmor “paid everything.” They
lived together for three or four months, during which time Morris was
physically abusive. At some point, Morris left for Houston, which Uptmor
considered her “way out.” While Morris was living in Houston, she removed
Morris’s name from the lease, changed the locks, and informed Morris via
email, phone calls, and texts that she had changed the lease and their
relationship was over. She put all his remaining property into his car and had
the car towed.
On November 19, 2021, Morris called the Lacy Lakeview Police
Department to ask whether Uptmor had taken out a restraining order against
him. Morris acknowledged in the call that “he was no longer living there” and
was advised by an officer not to go to the home.
The next day, Uptmor was at home with her new boyfriend, Christopher
Edgington, and a friend, Melissa Bain. Edgington had gone out the back door
to let the dogs out when Morris suddenly kicked in the front door. Morris was
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 2
holding a pipe or piece of metal about two-and-a-half to three feet long and
shouting threats to Uptmor. Edgington charged at him and put him in a choke
hold, then released him as he stopped moving and turned to check on Uptmor.
Morris then struck Edgington in the head from behind with the pipe. Uptmor
had picked up a “Sawzall” and began striking Morris everywhere she could,
chasing him out into the street until he fled the residence.
The grand jury indicted Morris for burglary of a habitation with assault
as the underlying offense and two enhancement paragraphs for prior felony
convictions. The State later filed a superseding indictment alleging the
burglary as Count I and adding an aggravated assault of Edgington as Count
II. The State filed a separate notice of intent to seek a deadly weapon finding
for Count I. Before trial, the State abandoned Count II and proceeded solely
on Count I.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first two issues, Morris complains the evidence was insufficient,
first in proving that he entered without the effective consent of the owner and
second that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the
offense.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of a
sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review
must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must
consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of
facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable
inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
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We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the
offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified
by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
OWNERSHIP
A person commits the offense of burglary of a habitation if, in relevant
part, he intentionally or knowingly enters a habitation without the effective
consent of the owner and attempts to commit or commits an assault. TEX.
PENAL CODE §30.02(3). Owner means a person who has a greater right to
possession of the property than the actor. TEX. PENAL CODE §1.07(35(A). This
definition of owner “clearly indicates that a defendant who has some, but less,
right to control a habitation than the alleged owner may be prosecuted for
burglary.” Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Morris argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove he entered
without the effective consent of the owner because he is an owner of the
property. He relies on Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 5
2018, pet. ref'd), where the Texarkana Court of Appeals concluded that Walker
was not entitled to a self-defense instruction when tried for murdering her
husband because he was not committing burglary when he entered their home.
The court concluded:
There existed no evidence that Walker had changed the locks on
the home in an effort to prevent Updyke’s entrance or that Walker
had demanded, and was given, the keys to the home. Notably,
during Walker’s interview with investigators, she specifically
stated that the home belonged to both of them. Walker has cited
no cases, nor are we able to find any, that would support her
assertion that, merely because Walker temporarily locked Updyke
out of their home the evening of the incident, Updyke’s right to
possession of their home was weakened, or that Walker’s right to
possession of their home was somehow strengthened.
Id. at 689.
However, unlike Walker, the evidence in this case does reflect that
Uptmor took steps to remove Morris’s rights to the property, including
removing his name from the lease, changing the locks, putting the utilities in
her name, and removing his personal effects. Morris acknowledged in repeated
messages to Uptmor and when speaking to the police that he did not live at the
location anymore. These facts are more akin to Morgan, where the appellant
was a co-tenant of the apartment but the complaining witness testified that
only her name was on the lease and she paid the rent. Morgan, 501 S.W.3d at
91. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the complaining witness’s
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 6
right to control over the property was greater than the appellant’s despite his
right to possession.
Here, the jury was free to credit Uptmor’s testimony that only her name
was on the lease and she paid the bills. Particularly when paired with Morris’s
acknowledgment that he no longer lived at the location, the jury could conclude
that Uptmor had a greater right to possession of the property and had not
consented to Morris’s entry. Accordingly, the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the ownership element of burglary of a habitation.
We overrule Morris’s first issue.
DEADLY WEAPON
A trial court must enter a deadly weapon finding on the judgment if the
jury finds that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the commission
of a felony offense, or immediate flight from a felony offense, and the defendant
was the one who used or exhibited the deadly weapon. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 42A.054(b), (c); Moore v. State, 520 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
The deadly weapon must “in some manner help facilitate the commission of
the felony.” Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In
other words, the deadly weapon may not simply be incidentally carried during
the offense but must actually assist in carrying out the offense in some way.
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The record in this case clearly shows that the deadly weapon was used
in order to facilitate the commission of the felony. Among other ways the Court
of Criminal Appeals includes a deadly weapon may be used is “when the object
caused the injury or increased the risk of injury during the commission of the
felony.” Plummer, 410 S.W.3d at 859. Morris struck Edgington in the head
with the metal pipe in this case, causing the injury in the assault portion of the
offense. Nor does it matter that the injury caused was only bodily injury rather
than serious bodily injury. A deadly weapon need only be capable of causing
serious bodily injury, not actually have caused it. Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908.
Further, in addition to causing Edgington’s injury, the jury could
conclude that the metal pipe was intended to provide protection against the
potential threat of resistance from the occupants of the home, a common reason
for exhibiting a weapon during a burglary. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, No. 05-
19-01549-CR, 2021 WL 1608496, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas April 26, 2021, no
pet.) (not designated for publication) (upholding deadly weapon finding
because possession of gun during burglary “emboldened Martinez to commit
the burglary and assisted him by providing protection against the potential
threat of homeowner resistance during the crime”).
Morris’s second issue is overruled.
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Propriety of Deadly Weapon Finding
In his third issue, Morris argues that a deadly weapon finding is
impermissible where the underlying offense is a misdemeanor. But a deadly
weapon finding is permissible in any felony offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art. 42A.054(b), (c); Moore, 520 S.W.3d at 908. The Court of Criminal Appeals
has previously held that a burglary of a habitation is eligible for a deadly
weapon finding. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). And
at least one of our sister courts has upheld a deadly weapon finding in a
burglary of a habitation alleging simple assault. Palacio v. State, 580 S.W.3d
447 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d.).
The language of article 42A.054 is unambiguous that “any felony offense”
is eligible for a deadly weapon finding. Morris has presented no authority
adequate to convince us to depart from the plain language of the statute.
Merely having a misdemeanor as a predicate offense does not reduce burglary
of a habitation to anything less than a felony. Morris’s third issue is overruled.
Conviction on Unalleged Offense
Morris argues in two issues that the jury’s deadly weapon finding
resulted in his improper conviction on an unalleged offense of burglary with
aggravated assault as the underlying offense.
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 9
RELEVANT LAW
No person may be brought to trial on a felony offense without an
indictment issued by a grand jury. TEX. CONST. art. I, §10. The presentment
of a valid indictment is what vests a district court with jurisdiction, and it is
the offense charged in the indictment that provides what the defendant may
be convicted of at trial. Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 677 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2023). But so long as it is properly alleged by the indictment, the State
is permitted to choose which offense to pursue. Crawford v. State, 710 S.W.3d
774, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).
In Crawford, the indictment alleged that the defendant caused bodily
injury and knew “that the complainant was a public servant, to wit: Menard
County Deputy Sheriff.” The State proceeded at trial as if the case was a
second-degree assault on a peace officer, while Crawford argued it was properly
a third-degree assault on a public servant. The Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the indictment properly included assault on a peace officer by
alleging the defendant knew the complainant was a deputy sheriff. And
“anything that is included in the charging instrument is fair game for the State
to pursue,” either alone or in the alternative as a lesser-included offense.
Crawford v. State, 710 S.W.3d 774, 783-84. Neither the defendant nor the trial
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 10
court may force the State not to pursue an allegation fairly charged in the
indictment, short of quashing it. Id.
DISCUSSION
Here, the indictment alleged:
On or about the 20th day of November, 2021 . . . Defendant did then
an there intentionally and knowingly enter a habitation, without
the effective consent of Jennifer Uptmore, the owner thereof, and
attempted to commit or committed assault against Christopher
Edgington.
The State also filed a separate notice of its intent to seek a deadly weapon
finding. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (State
must give notice in some form of intent to seek deadly weapon finding, but not
necessarily in indictment).
The indictment properly alleges burglary of a habitation with simple
assault as the underlying offense. But Morris argues that the deadly weapon
finding elevated the offense from burglary with simple assault to burglary with
aggravated assault. That is not the case. While the State may have been able
to pursue the instant case with an aggravated assault as the underlying
offense, it chose to indict only with a simple assault. That is its right. The
indictment charged burglary of a habitation with an underlying simple assault.
The jury was instructed on that offense. Nowhere was the jury empowered to
convict Morris of burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit an
Raymond Edward Morris v. The State of Texas Page 11
aggravated assault. The separate deadly weapon finding, submitted to the jury
as “Special Issue No.1,” was not an element of the offense and did not change
the offense charged in the indictment.
We overrule Morris’s fourth and fifth issues.
Error in Judgment
Finally, Morris complains that the judgment incorrectly reflects that he
pleaded Not True to the two enhancement paragraphs. The State agrees.
An appellate court has authority to reform a judgment to make the
record speak the truth when the matter has been called to its attention by any
source. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1993). Here, the record shows that Morris entered pleas of True to
both enhancement paragraphs at the start of the punishment phase.
Accordingly, we reform the judgment to change the “Plead Not True” under the
enhancement paragraphs to “Plead True.”
Conclusion
We modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as
modified.
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ANDREA WESTERFELD
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Harris, and
Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed as modified
Do Not Publish
CRPM
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