Johnny Rodgers v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 3, 2026
Docket14-25-00112-CR
JudgeChristopher
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00112-CR
JOHNNY RODGERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 268th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 21-DCR-097327B
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this appeal from a conviction of burglary of a habitation, appellant raises
one issue: that the trial court reversibly erred when it admitted evidence of two
extraneous offenses during the guilt/innocence phase of trial. Holding the trial
court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
At a preliminary hearing, the parties stipulated identity would be the primary
focus of appellant’s trial. After this stipulation, the State informed the trial court
that it sought to introduce evidence of two extraneous offenses during the
guilt/innocence phase of trial. Over defense objections, the trial court allowed
evidence of two extraneous offenses to be admitted for the sole purpose of
establishing identity. In the presence of the jury, appellant pled “not guilty” to the
charge of burglary of a habitation on or about May 26, 2021. Ultimately, the jury
convicted appellant, and the trial court assessed punishment. This appeal followed.
1. Primary Offense – Burglary of a Habitation: Victor Ordonez
At trial, the complainant, Victor Ordonez, testified he was home alone on the
morning of May 26, 2021. Ordonez left for approximately ten to twenty minutes
and when he returned home, he noticed items unusually scattered on his parents’
bed. At this time, he came face-to-face with appellant “in the act.” Ordonez
testified he had never seen this individual before. Appellant held one hand behind
his back as if to conceal something and told Ordonez: “[d]on’t call the police, don’t
move, or I’ll kill you.” Appellant directed Ordonez into the living room, proceeded
to Ordonez’s bedroom, and left the room carrying Ordonez’s soft, black guitar
case. Appellant returned to the master bedroom, closing the door behind him. After
a few moments, Ordonez slowly opened the door to find appellant was gone.
Ordonez called the police and when they arrived, Ordonez described the appellant
as a black male, around 5’6 to 5’7 feet tall with an average build, wearing a white
t-shirt and sweatpants. Ordonez listed the stolen property as watches, a
PlayStation, jewelry, and his soft, black guitar case.
Daniel Gonzales, one of Ordonez’s neighbors, provided officers with video
surveillance taken by cameras at his home shortly after appellant left Ordonez’s
residence. The video depicted an individual matching the description given by
Ordonez, carrying a soft, black guitar case over his shoulder. Detectives later
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showed Ordonez a still image of this surveillance video and, although he could not
clearly see the facial features of the person in the image, Ordonez recognized him
based on consistent clothing, a distinctive white and blue lanyard, and the presence
of Ordonez’s guitar case.
Soon after the burglary, Ordonez participated in a photo array conducted by
officer Alexander Hickey. During the photo array, Ordonez identified appellant
and rated his confidence in the photo array identification as a “nine out of ten.” He
testified he was “very confident” appellant was the person who had broken into his
home. However, on cross-examination, the strength of Ordonez’s eyewitness
identification was hotly contested. Ordonez could not recall appellant’s eye color,
jewelry, shoes, facial hair, or tattoos, if any. Counsel for appellant questioned
whether Ordonez was well-rested at the time he saw appellant, raised the concept
of “tunnel vision,” and questioned the veracity of Ordonez’s identification while in
a heightened emotional state. Further, Ordonez’s photo array identification was
hotly contested because Ordonez lingered extensively on a different photo in the
array, paused on appellant’s photo having “to think about it,” and after completing
the array, asked to see the photos again.
Charles Willeby, the officer primarily responsible for developing a suspect
in this case, testified no physical evidence placed appellant inside Ordonez’s
residence or backyard. Daniel Turner, an investigator for the crime scene unit that
processed the scene, testified poor quality fingerprints collected at the scene could
not be used in an identification and no DNA was collected. However, appellant
was identified after Willeby showed other officers the Gonzales surveillance video.
Willeby, alongside another officer, conducted an interview with appellant. During
this interview, appellant asserted his innocence, denied involvement, and explained
his girlfriend lived in the neighborhood. Appellant lived approximately 1.4 miles
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from Ordonez’s residence.
On cross-examination, appellant hotly contested the identification and
questioned Willeby as to the lack of physical evidence. Further, counsel for
appellant raised witness identity as the “number one . . . most unreliable piece of
evidence when it comes to identity” and Willeby conceded a white t-shirt and dark
pants was not unusual clothing. Willeby testified a buy-receipt connected appellant
to the sale of watches at a pawnshop on May 27, 2021. However, on cross-
examination, Willeby conceded this receipt was located around four years after the
sale and no steps were taken to verify appellant was the individual who sold these
items or that they were taken from Ordonez’s residence. Max Robles, the
pawnshop manager, described this sale as including watches and a small speaker.
Roger Williamson, the officer executing appellant’s arrest warrant, testified
appellant was arrested on October 20, 2021, without shoes, wearing a white t-shirt,
black tapered sweatpants, black socks, and jewelry. On cross-examination, counsel
for appellant hotly contested the uniqueness of appellant’s appearance and
Williamson agreed appellant’s clothing and hairstyle was not unique.
In total, testimony relating to the primary offense included seven witnesses
and comprised approximately four hundred and twenty-seven pages of the record,
inclusive of cross-examination.
2. Admission of Evidence Relating to Extraneous Offenses
Prior to testimony about the extraneous offenses, the trial court provided a
limiting instruction to the jury. In this instruction, the trial court limited the
consideration of extraneous offenses to the purpose of proving identity and
instructed them to only consider the evidence if they believed, beyond a reasonable
doubt, appellant committed these offenses. This limiting instruction was repeated
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in the written jury charge.
A. Extraneous Offense at Elvia Villarreal’s Residence
Elvia Villarreal testified she left her home around 8:30 a.m. on June 23,
2021. When she returned around 1:00 p.m., she found a rock thrown through the
glass panes in a patio door at the rear of her home. Scared to enter the home alone,
she called police. When police arrived on the scene, jewelry boxes and other items
were scattered on top of the beds and drawers were opened in all three bedrooms.
Villarreal described the property stolen from the residence as cash and jewelry,
including her wedding and anniversary rings. Villarreal testified police were able
to recover and return these rings. Villarreal did not see the individual who
burglarized her home.
Donald Bond, a purchaser at Houston Gold Exchange, testified appellant
entered the store on June 24, 2021, and sold two rings matching the description
provided by Villarreal. He testified tickets are created for all store transactions and
placed in a national law enforcement database. The ticket related to this transaction
listed appellant’s driver’s license information and a photo of appellant taken at the
time of the transaction.
Gabriel Gardenas, the primary detective handling the Villarreal case,
testified he was able to connect the rings sold by appellant to Villarreal’s stolen
rings based on photographs of the jewelry. Cardenas retrieved and returned the
rings to Villarreal. Appellant lived approximately 2.3 miles from Villarreal.
B. Extraneous Offense at Fred Brunson’s Residence
Fred Brunson testified he was in his front yard on the morning of August 5,
2021, when he saw appellant circling the block for approximately forty-five
minutes. Standing around twenty feet apart, Brunson was able to see the
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appellant’s face and described him as wearing a white t-shirt and dark pants.
Brunson left his residence for around twenty minutes and returned to find appellant
walking out from the side of his residence. When Brunson entered his home, he
found the bedroom door locked from the inside and called the police. When police
arrived, they opened Bruson’s bedroom door to find jewelry boxes scattered on the
bed and opened drawers. His bathroom window was broken. Brunson described
property stolen from his residence as jewelry.
Cardenas testified Bruson called 911 around 10:30 a.m. He further testified
a neighbor made a 911 call for a trespass in her backyard that occurred at 10:34
a.m. This neighbor provided police with surveillance video showing appellant
jump from her backyard over the fence onto her driveway. In the video, appellant
wore a white shirt, black pants, and jewelry consistent with that taken from
appellant at his arrest. Cardenas identified appellant in this video because he had
seen the photograph of appellant attached to the Houston Gold Exchange sale
ticket in the Villarreal case. Cardenas showed the video to Brunson who
recognized appellant “by his face.” On cross-examination, Brunson agreed
appellant’s clothing was not uncommon. Appellant lived approximately 0.9 miles
from Brunson.
ANALYSIS
We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of extraneous
offenses for purposes other than character conformity under an abuse of discretion
standard, upholding the trial court’s decision when it is within the “zone of
reasonable disagreement.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343-44 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). A trial court’s ruling is within the zone of reasonable
disagreement when the evidence shows: (1) the extraneous offense is “relevant to a
material, non-propensity issue;” and (2) “the probative value of that evidence is not
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substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. at 344. We will
uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any theory of law
applicable to the case. Id.
1. Appellant Placed Identity at Issue.
Evidence is relevant when “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.” Tex. R. Evid. 401. Although relevant, “[e]vidence of a
crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order
to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.” Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 342. However, this
evidence may “be admissible for another purpose, such as . . . identity” when
identity is at issue in the case. Tex. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d
504, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In his brief, appellant contends the trial court erred when admitting evidence
of extraneous offenses because identity was not at issue. The State contends the
trial court did not err in allowing evidence of extraneous offenses to be admitted
for the limited purpose of identity because appellant stipulated identity was at issue
when, at the preliminary hearing, counsel for appellant stated “[w]ith regards to
identity . . . we are in agreement with the State. We have agreed that identity will
be the main focus for our defense throughout the course of this trial.”
Here, the trial court could have properly concluded appellant placed his
identity at issue through stipulation at the preliminary hearing. See Segundo v.
State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“The trial judge has
considerable latitude in determining that identity is, in fact, disputed.”). Further,
the trial court could have properly found appellant placed identity at issue in a
number of ways, specifically: (1) during opening arguments when he indicated the
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description of the suspect provided by eyewitnesses could “fit a number of people
in that neighborhood;” (2) by cross-examining witnesses about the veracity of
Ordonez’s eyewitness identification; (3) by cross-examining witnesses on their
ability to provide sufficient identifying characteristics; and (4) by raising the
excuse that appellant was seen on surveillance video walking in the neighborhood
because his girlfriend lived nearby. See id. (holding identity may be placed in
dispute by the defense’s opening statements, cross-examination, or introduction of
affirmative evidence); Harvey v. State, 3 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding identity was raised during cross-examination
when a witness’s “powers of observation” were tested).
Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding
identity was at issue and ruling the evidence was admissible under Rules 401 and
404 for the non-conformity purpose of establishing identity. Accordingly, we
proceed to the balancing test required by Rule 403.
2. The Probative Value of Extraneous Offense Evidence was Not
Substantially Outweighed by the Danger of Unfair Prejudice.
Relevant evidence may be excluded only when “its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Tex. R. Evid. 403;
Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “[I]t is presumed
that the probative value of relevant evidence exceeds any danger of unfair
prejudice. The rule envisions exclusion of evidence only when there is a clear
disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative
value.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In determining whether the prejudicial
effect of evidence relating to extraneous offenses substantially outweighs its
probative value, the following factors should be considered: (1) the probative value
of the evidence; (2) the potential the evidence has to “impress the jury in some
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irrational but indelible way”; (3) the time needed to develop evidence of the
extraneous offense; and (4) the degree of the proponent’s need for the evidence.
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on
reh’g). When the record is silent as to its findings, we presume the trial court
engaged in the required balancing test. Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195-96
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
A. Probative Value of Extraneous Offenses for Identity
The probative value of extraneous offenses on the issue of identity is
assessed by comparing the similarity between the primary and extraneous offenses.
Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 520. “No rigid rules dictate what constitutes sufficient
similarities; rather, the common characteristics may be proximity in time and
place, mode of commission of the crimes, the person’s dress, or any other elements
which mark both crimes as having been committed by the same person.” Segundo,
270 S.W.3d at 88.
In his brief, appellant contends the trial court erred in finding sufficient
similarity between the primary and extraneous offenses under the modus operandi
approach. The State contends the trial court did not err because sufficient
similarities existed under a modus operandi rationale.
i. Similarity of Offenses
As to modus operandi, appellant contends insufficient similarities exist to
overcome dissimilarities between the primary and extraneous offenses, minimizing
their probative value on the issue of identity. Appellant characterizes the “only
similarities” between the primary and extraneous offenses as appellant wearing a
generic white T-shirt and sweatpants while “walking in the neighborhood.”
Appellant characterizes the dissimilarities between the offenses as the method of
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entry into the homes because Brunson’s home was entered by breaking the master
bedroom window, Villarreal’s home was entered after a rock was thrown through
her glass backdoor, and Ordonez’s home was entered by prying open the master
bedroom’s sliding glass back door.
In response, the State argues sufficient similarities exist because the offenses
were committed: (1) close in time and physical proximity during daylight hours
while homeowners went out for a short period; and (2) by a perpetrator who wore
similar clothing, concentrated efforts on bedrooms, and stole jewelry. Appellant
concedes there would be some similarity in the offenses taking place after
homeowners leave during the day but asserts, without providing support, daytime
is too generic to support a similarity finding because it is when “most burglaries
happen throughout the course of America.”
“[S]ufficient similarity may be shown by proximity in time and place or by a
common mode of committing the offenses.” Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519 (emphasis in
original). Both are present here. First, the offenses were sufficiently similar
because they occurred within a three-month period and within three miles of
appellant’s home. Second, the offenses were sufficiently similar through a
common mode of committing the offenses. For example, the offenses were all
committed: (1) in the morning while the last person at home left briefly; (2) by
breaking a rear entrance point containing glass; (3) by targeting bedrooms; (4) by
targeting jewelry; (5) by leaving items scattered on top of beds; (6) by a suspect
wearing a white t-shirt and dark sweatpants; and (7) by a suspect seen by an
eyewitness or surveillance video near the targeted residence.
Therefore, the trial court could have properly concluded sufficient
similarities between the primary and extraneous offenses rendered evidence of the
extraneous offenses highly probative of identity under the modus operandi
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approach. See Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)
(holding offenses sufficiently similar when both were robberies, committed at
gunpoint, aided by a confederate, and three days apart); Stone v. State, 635 S.W.3d
763, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (holding offenses
“distinctively similar” and highly probative of appellant’s identity when both
occurred at the customer service desk of grocery stores on “the same side of town,”
“a few months apart,” and were committed by a perpetrator with a similar
appearance wearing a hat and sunglasses); Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519 (holding
offenses occurring “a decade apart” were not too remote to render the extraneous
offense inadmissible).
ii. Evidence Establishing Appellant Committed Extraneous Offenses
Appellant contends the trial court erred by admitting the extraneous offenses
because the State did not prove appellant was, in fact, the person who committed
those offenses when no photo identification was initiated in the extraneous
offenses.
While we agree that consideration of extraneous offenses must be limited to
those proven to be committed by appellant, the trial court reflected this
requirement in its limiting instruction prior to the introduction of the evidence and
again in the written jury charge. See Ransom, 503 S.W.2d at 813 (holding, to be
admissible, extraneous offenses must be proven and appellant shown as the
perpetrator); Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (“The proponent of the evidence has no duty to establish that
the extraneous offense resulted in a formal conviction . . . the evidence of an
extraneous offense should be admitted if there is merely ‘sufficient evidence’ from
which a hypothetical juror could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed
the extraneous act.”).
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Here, there was sufficient evidence for a hypothetical juror to conclude
appellant committed the extraneous offenses despite the absence of a formal photo
identification procedure because: (1) appellant’s photograph and driver’s license
information connected him to the sale of property stolen in the Villarreal offense;
and (2) Brunson testified he witnessed appellant at the scene of the Brunson
offense. Therefore, the trial court could have properly concluded sufficient
evidence supported the conclusion that appellant committed the extraneous
offenses.
B. The State’s Need for Extraneous Offenses
In his brief, appellant contends the State did not need the extraneous
offenses to prove its case-in-chief because “[c]learly, just based on [Ordonez’s]
testimony, the State could prove each and every element beyond a reasonable
doubt without attempting to use the extraneous offenses.” The State contends its
need for the extraneous offense evidence was considerable in light of: (1)
appellant’s vigorous dispute of identity; (2) appellant’s denial of involvement
when interviewed; (3) appellant’s claim he was in the neighborhood because his
girlfriend lived nearby; and (4) the lack of usable fingerprints or DNA at the scene.
Here, the trial court could have properly concluded the State’s need for the
extraneous offense evidence was great because Ordonez, the sole eyewitness
placing appellant inside the residence at the time of the offense, rated his
confidence in the photo array identification a nine out of ten, hesitated in selecting
appellant’s photo, lingered on a photo of another individual, asked to see the
photos again, and was in a state of heightened emotion. The trial court could have
properly found the State’s need for the evidence further increased when the scene
lacked usable fingerprints, appellant denied involvement, and appellant excused his
presence in the neighborhood. See Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex.
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Crim. App. 1996) (holding evidence of extraneous offenses “crucial” to the State’s
case when identity was a “hotly contested” issue at trial, witness testimony was the
only evidence to support a finding of identity, and witnesses were vulnerable to
attacks on their credibility); Regan v. State, 7 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting evidence of extraneous offenses when “the State had no
other way to prove appellant’s identity once he impeached [the witness’s]
identification and offered an alibi defense”).
C. Evidence of Extraneous Offenses was Unlikely to Affect Jury in
an Irrational but Indelible Way
Appellant contends, even in the presence of a limiting instruction, the
prejudicial effect of evidence associated with extraneous offenses would “spike the
emotional state” of the jury causing them to render a conviction based on an
improper conformity inference. The State responds the extraneous offenses did not
possess a likelihood of impacting the jury in an irrational but indelible way when
the evidence of extraneous offenses was no more heinous than that of the primary
offense and the trial court provided a limiting instruction.
Here, the trial court could have properly concluded the evidence associated
with the extraneous offenses was unlikely to affect the jury in an irrational yet
indelible way because the circumstances of the extraneous offence were no more
heinous than the charged offense when they did not raise any graphic testimony or
images. See Taylor, 920 S.W.2d at 323 (holding evidence of the extraneous offense
was “not likely to create a prejudice in the minds of the jury” such that it “would
have been unable to limit its consideration of the evidence to its proper purpose”
because it was “no more heinous” than the primary offense); Stone, 635 S.W.3d at
773 (holding “[e]vidence of the extraneous offense was unlikely to affect the jury
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in an irrational yet indelible way because the circumstances of the extraneous
offense were no more heinous than the charged offense” when both involved
robberies committed by a perpetrator wearing similar clothing that raised his shirt
to show a customer service desk worker a semiautomatic handgun in his
waistband). Here, the testimony and photographs serving as evidence of the
extraneous offenses were highly similar to that involved in the primary offense,
including descriptions of the residences, entry points, location of items scattered on
beds, missing property, surveillance video, maps, and identification by witnesses.
While “an extremely similar extraneous offense always carries the potential
to [irrationally] impress the jury . . . the impermissible inference of character
conformity can be minimized through a limiting instruction.” Lane, 933 S.W.2d at
520. Here, any impermissible inference regarding character conformity was
minimized through the limiting instruction given by the trial court both at the time
of the evidence’s admission and in the written jury charge. See McGregor, 394
S.W.3d at 121 (finding trial court’s limiting instruction given prior to evidence of
extraneous offenses and in the written charge weighed toward admissibility when it
informed the jury it could consider the evidence only for a proper purpose, such as
identity, rather than character conformity).
D. Time Taken to Develop Evidence of Extraneous Offenses
In his brief, appellant contends the time taken to develop evidence of
extraneous offenses was “inordinate.” The State responds the time spent on
extraneous offenses was not so significant as to weigh against their admissibility
when the entirety of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial consumed only portions
of four days and testimony dedicated to extraneous offenses consumed “well under
half that time.”
Here, the trial court could have properly concluded the time taken to develop
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evidence of the extraneous offenses was not so significant as to render it
inadmissible. Evidence of the extraneous offenses was comprised of testimony
from four of the State’s eleven witnesses and twenty-eight of the State’s ninety-
four exhibits. On balance, this factor does not weigh in favor of excluding the
evidence. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 341 (holding evidence of two extraneous
offenses was properly admitted when provided by testimony of six witnesses).
After considering the trial court’s decision in light of the Rule 403 factors,
we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the
extraneous offenses. Accordingly, we do not reach appellant’s contentions of harm
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); c.f.
Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc) (discussing the
responsibility of an appellate court to assess harm only after finding error by the
trial court).
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of two
extraneous offenses during the guilt/innocence phase of appellant’s trial.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices McLaughlin and Boatman.
Do Not Publish – Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
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