Ex Parte Gonzalo Leon Jr. v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 3, 2026
Docket14-26-00589-CR
JudgeChristopher
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-26-00589-CR
EX PARTE GONZALO LEON JR.
On Appeal from the 177th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1963954
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Gonzalo Leon, Jr., challenges the trial court’s order denying his
application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction of bail set at $1,500,000
for a charge of capital murder. Holding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion, we affirm.
Background
Appellant is alleged to have shot and killed an eleven-year-old child on
August 30, 2025. At the habeas hearing, the trial court admitted a probable cause
affidavit prepared by a detective with the Houston Police Department in relation to
this arrest. That affidavit states a juvenile witness told police he and his cousin, the
eleven-year-old complainant, were walking through the neighborhood, knocking
on the doors of residences, and running away as part of a prank called “ding dong
ditch.” The witness stated that he and complainant had knocked on appellant’s
door several times as part of this prank. On the final instance, the witness stated the
complainant knocked on appellant’s door and as they ran from appellant’s
residence, the witness heard a gunshot, causing him to look back toward appellant.
He then watched as appellant fired a second gunshot striking complainant in the
back. Complainant later died at a hospital while being treated for the gunshot
wound.
The affidavit states police arriving at the scene called out to appellant using
their vehicle PA system for approximately twenty minutes before he exited his
residence. Officers spoke to appellant’s wife who confirmed she and appellant’s
three-year-old daughter were inside the residence at the time of the shooting. After
entering the home upon consent of appellant’s wife, police observed several
assault-type rifles in a closet near appellant’s front door. The next day, officers
found approximately twenty firearms, including four to five assault-type rifles,
shotguns, and multiple pistols. Police also observed a hatchet and multiple swords
in appellant’s home.
Appellant was charged with capital murder and arrested on April 27, 2026.
The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas
corpus to reduce his $1,500,000 bond. Appellant presented two witnesses at the
habeas hearing: an attorney representing a bail-bond company and a private
investigator.
Attorney Representing Bail-Bond Company – Shelby Burns
Burns testified that appellant’s mother, brother, and wife had contacted a
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bail-bond company, but could not make bail. According to Burns, the family was
qualified for bail set at range from $300,000 to $500,000 because the family could
afford to pay a 10% cash premium of $50,000. Burns acknowledged that his
assessment was based on conversations with the family and “some documentation”
that provided “a picture [of the family’s financial resources], but it’s not super . . .
clear.” Burns testified appellant’s mother owned an unencumbered residence with
a collateral value of approximately $300,000. Burns testified that appellant “owns
a business,” referencing appellant’s employment as the vice president of his
family’s restaurant business prior to the arrest. Burns testified this “source of
income” ties appellant to Harris County. However, Burns was unaware of the
length of appellant’s employment in this position. Burns testified appellant owns
an encumbered residence with a collateral value of $50,000. On cross-examination,
Burns acknowledged he did not assess any potential collateral value associated
with the family’s restaurant business or appellant’s potential ownership interest in
it because the existence of the business was only recently brought to his attention.
He testified there was “potential for collateral” in the business, but he had not
“explored that yet.” Burns did not assess any other property, cars, or cash
associated with appellant’s family.
Private Investigator – Jim Willis
Willis testified appellant possessed no criminal history despite one prior
arrest in Guadalupe County, dismissed as a case of mistaken identity. Willis
testified appellant served and was honorably discharged from the United States
Army and Texas National Guard. Willis testified appellant had moved to a hotel
with his family prior to his arrest but he believed this move was intended to protect
appellant’s family rather than demonstrating an intent to flee. Willis based this
belief on media presence at appellant’s former residence, two burglaries at
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appellant’s former residence occurring after the family moved into the hotel, and
the hotel’s proximity to a college where appellant was enrolled before being
expelled. Willis testified police found a large amount of clothing belonging to
appellant and his family inside appellant’s hotel room. According to Willis, this
clothing could signal an intent to flee but could also signal an intent to stay at the
hotel for an extended period.
Willis testified appellant earned the sole income for his wife and three-year-
old child by working at the family’s restaurant business prior to his arrest. Willis
testified he believed the family presently owned real estate associated with one
restaurant location possessing a collateral value of approximately $760,000.
According to Willis, he was aware the family previously owned additional
restaurant locations, but those properties were sold. Willis did not testify regarding
the timing of this sale and did not have knowledge regarding the amount of sale
proceeds, if any. However, Willis acknowledged there “potentially could be . . .
some cash available” relating to the sale of this real estate. Willis testified
appellant’s wife and child no longer lived in appellant’s residence but had moved
into an apartment. Willis agreed appellant’s residence could be sold without the
family’s displacement. Willis testified he was aware of the current income of
appellant’s wife but did not state that amount for the record. Willis testified
appellant’s mother possessed a residence he believed was located on “Wallisville”
in the “east side” of town and agreed the appraisal value of that location could be
$397,236. Willis later agreed appellant’s mother jointly owned a residential
property located at Sagewillow Lane with an appraisal value of $291,461.
The State did not present witnesses but admitted a complaint affidavit
related to this arrest, a Harris County Appraisal District document showing
appellant’s mother owned a restaurant property appraised at $760,586, and a Harris
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County Appraisal District document showing appellant’s mother jointly owned a
Sagewillow Lane residential property appraised at $291,461. After both sides
presented closing arguments, the court declined to reduce appellant’s bond amount.
Analysis
The right to be free from excessive bail is protected by the United States and
Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 11. We
review a challenge to the excessiveness of bail for an abuse of discretion. See Ex
parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Under this
standard, we may not disturb the trial court’s decision if it falls within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See Ex parte Castillo–Lorente, 420 S.W.3d 884, 887
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We defer to all of the trial court’s
implied factual findings supported by the record. Phuong Anh Thi Le v. State, 300
S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
The amount of bail required in any case is within the discretion of the trial
court subject to the following rules:
1. The bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give
reasonable assurance of compliance with the undertaking.
2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as an instrument
of oppression.
3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it
was committed are to be considered, including whether the
offense:
(A) is an offense involving violence as defined by Article
17.03(b-3)(2); or
(B) involves violence directed against a peace officer.
4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be
taken on this point.
5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law
enforcement, and the community shall be considered.
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6. The criminal history record information for the defendant,
including information obtained through the statewide
telecommunications system maintained by the Department of
Public Safety and through the public safety report system
developed under Article 17.021, shall be considered, including
any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and
any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court
following released on bail
7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15.
In addition to these rules, case law provides that courts may consider the
following set of factors: (l) the defendant’s work record; (2) the defendant’s family
and community ties; (3) the defendant’s length of residency; (4) the defendant’s
prior criminal record; (5) the defendant’s conformity with previous bond
conditions; (6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; (7) the aggravating
circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense; and (8)
whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at
850; Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1980); Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, no pet.).
1. Nature and Circumstances of Alleged Offense
When determining reasonable bail, a trial court shall give the most weight to
the nature of the offense and the length of possible sentence. See Rubac, 611
S.W.2d at 849; Ex parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2015, no pet.). It is appropriate to consider whether the offense alleged to have
been committed involved violence in setting the amount of bail. Nimnicht, 467
S.W.3d at 67.
Appellant is charged with capital murder, a violent crime that carries a long
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sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.03(b-3)(2)(B) (defining capital
murder as an offense involving violence). The capital murder charge, a capital
felony, carries a punishment of life imprisonment without parole. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.31(a); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 1(b) (providing a
defendant may not be sentenced to death for an offense under Section 19.03(a)(9)).
The potential of life imprisonment without parole provides a strong incentive to
flee. See Ex parte Cardenas, 557 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2018, no pet.) (affirming a $750,000 bond where punishment associated with a
capital murder charge provided a strong incentive to flee). Because murder is a
violent offense a high bail is reasonable. See Ex parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d 160,
166 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. re’d) (affirming a $1,500,000 bail for
defendant charged with capital murder given the violent nature of the crime).
The serious and violent nature of a capital murder charge and the potential
sentence appellant faces related to the charge weigh against a determination that
the bail amount set by the trial court was excessive.
2. Sufficiently High to Assure Appearance But Not Oppress
Bail needs to be in an amount sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the
defendant will appear. When bail is set so high that a person cannot realistically
pay it, however, the trial court essentially “displaces the presumption of innocence
and replaces it with a guaranteed trial appearance.” Ex parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d
835, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Bail may not be used as
an instrument of oppression. See Ex parte Guerra, 383 S.W.3d 229, 233–34 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). Bail set in a particular amount becomes
oppressive when it assumes that the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount
and when it is set for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain
incarcerated. See Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
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Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (where bail amount set “solely to prevent [defendant] from
getting out of jail,” “bail [was] being used as an instrument of oppression”).
Appellant’s primary argument is that bail is being used as an instrument of
oppression. In his brief, appellant relies on a chart of aggregated bail amounts set
in Harris County for murder and capital murder offenses in cases filed from March
17, 2025, through March 14, 2026. Appellant contends the instant bail amount
exceeds the highest bail set for capital murder in Harris County by $700,000. As
support for the contention that this data provides a measure of reasonableness,
appellant cites to Ex parte Beard, in which the court reduced bail for a capital
murder charge from $8,000,000 to $500,000 after reviewing bail amounts in
comparable cases. Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002,
pet. ref’d). Although the court in Beard found a review of similar capital murder
cases instructive, it looked at the specific facts of comparable cases and cautioned
against overgeneralization when making bail comparisons. Id. at 571 (“Case law is
of relatively little value in addressing the ultimate question of the appropriate
amount of bail in a particular case . . . because the cases are so individualized that
generalization from results reached in others is difficult.”). Appellant further relies
on Ludwig v. State, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals reduced bail from
$1,000,000 to $50,000 in relation to murder and capital murder charges. Ludwig v.
State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam). However, in
reaching its decision in Ludwig, the Court emphasized the importance of testimony
suggesting family members could only contribute $10,000 toward the accused’s
release. Id.
Both cases cited by appellant are over 20 years old, thus they “are too old to
provide useful dollar-to-dollar comparisons due to the changing value of money.”
Ex Parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no
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pet.). More recent cases instruct that a $1,500,000 bond for a capital murder or
murder charge is not patently excessive or oppressive. See e.g. Ex parte Lu, No.
14-23-00023-CR, 2023 WL 5217789, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Aug. 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming
$5,000,000 bond amount for capital murder charge); Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 166
(affirming a $1,500,000 bond for capital murder charge); Ex parte Bautista-
Renteria, 717 S.W.3d 445, 550 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2025, no pet.) (affirming
$2,500,000 bond amount for murder when appellant had local ties and no criminal
history, but the shooting was a “random, violent, and senseless” incident that took
place in front of young children); Ex parte Hartsfield, No. 01-23-00824-CR, 2024
WL 33974188, (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (affirming $2,000,000 bond amount for retired
military veteran charged with murder); Ex parte Johnson, No. 14-23-00567-CR,
2024 WL 1326138, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming $3,000,000 bond amount for
murder when appellant had local ties and no criminal history because appellant
failed to offer complete testimony as to the family’s assets). Although some courts
have reversed orders setting comparable bail amounts for a capital murder charge,
several courts have upheld similar amounts for similar charged offenses. The
question here is whether the trial court’s decision falls outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement. See Castillo-Lorente, 420 S.W.3d at 887.
Based on testimony at the bail hearing, the trial court could have properly
concluded appellant posed a flight risk when he exhibited a twenty-minute delay
prior to complying with police requests to exit his residence, moved into a hotel
with a large amount of clothing, and at some time possessed a tie to Guadalupe
County.
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Accordingly, the trial court could have properly concluded that a bail
amount of $1,500,000 for the charged capital murder offense is not higher than
reasonably necessary to assure compliance with the undertaking and that bail is not
unconstitutionally oppressive. C.f. Durst, 148 S.W.3d at 498 (concluding that bail
may be set at a high amount where the defendant presents a flight risk).
3. Ability to Make Bail
To demonstrate inability to make bail, a defendant generally must establish
his and his family’s funds have been exhausted. Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 234–35.
The accused’s ability to make bail is only one factor to be considered in
determining the appropriate amount of bail. Id. “If the ability to make bond in a
specified amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would
be completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the unique posture of
determining what his bond should be.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Miller, 631 S.W.2d
825, 827 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d)). Appellant’s evidence of his
inability to make bail was limited to the testimony of Shelby Burns and Jim Willis.
Appellant presented no documentary evidence of his assets and financial resources.
The trial court could have properly concluded appellant failed to establish
his and his family’s funds have been exhausted based on testimony that Burns
possessed an incomplete picture of the family’s finances and did not assess the
value or full extent of the family’s property, business assets, vehicles, or accounts.
Willis’s testimony further supports this conclusion by identifying additional assets
associated with the family, such as recently sold business real estate and residential
property that may be owned by appellant’s mother.
To the extent the trial court did not find credible the testimony as to
appellant’s ability to make bond given the witnesses’ lack of knowledge related to
the value of properties owned by appellant and his mother, and the lack of
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testimony relating to vehicles, bank accounts, and income in possession of the
family, we afford the trial court wide discretion in assessing credibility. See Ex
parte Duque, 540 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet.
struck) (“In habeas proceedings, ‘[v]irtually every fact finding involves a
credibility determination,’ and ‘the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the
credibility of the witnesses’”) (quoting Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
Moreover, without a showing that available funds have been exhausted,
evidence of the “largest bond” a defendant can make is generally insufficient to
meet a defendant’s burden to demonstrate that a bail amount is excessive. See Ex
parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)
(concluding that bail bondsman’s testimony of the “largest bond” the defendant
could make did not carry the burden to establish inability to make bail); Dupuy,
498 S.W.3d at 235 (considering appellant’s failure to offer documentary evidence
of assets and financial resources in holding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to reduce appellant’s bail).
The trial court could have properly concluded that the amount of bail was
reasonable under the circumstances because appellant has offered vague and
incomplete evidence supporting his claimed inability to make bail. See Ex parte
Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (affirming trial
court’s denial of habeas application where there was insufficient evidence on the
appellant’s ability to make bond).
4. Future Safety of the Victims and the Community
The trial court must also consider the future safety of the victim of the
alleged offenses and the community in setting appellant’s bail amounts. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(5). Although appellant no longer poses a threat to
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the complainant, it is important to note the violent nature of the crime with which
he is charged. See Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“[T]he gravity and the nature of the charges against
[appellant] indicates that he presents a risk to the safety of the community.”).
Appellant is alleged to have killed an eleven-year-old child by shooting the
child in the back. This shooting was witnessed by the complainant’s cousin –
another juvenile – and took place while appellant’s child was in the home. The
random, violent, and senseless nature of this offense raises a concern for the future
safety of the community. See Bautista-Renteria, 717 S.W.3d at 550 (holding the
“random, violent, and senseless” nature of a shooting that occurred in front of
young children suggested an ongoing risk to the community); Gonzalez, 383
S.W.3d at 165 (holding the inexplicable and brutal nature of the offense suggested
an ongoing danger to the community). This factor weighs in favor of the trial
court’s finding.
5. Rubac Factors
Appellant’s work record. The record shows appellant was employed as the
vice president of the family’s restaurant business prior to his arrest. The record
does not reflect how long appellant was employed in this position. The record
shows appellant previously served in the United States Army and the Texas
National Guard. This factor supports a reduced bond amount.
Appellant’s family and community ties. The record shows appellant
possesses ties to Harris County through his mother. He also possesses ties to his
wife and child although the precise location of their current residence is not
reflected in the record. However, the trial court could have properly found
appellant posed a flight risk, despite these ties, when he delayed in response to
police requests to exit his residence, moved his family into a hotel with a large
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amount of clothing, and possessed a prior tie to Guadalupe County. This factor
supports a high bond amount.
Length of appellant’s residency. The record does not reflect the length of
appellant’s residency despite his counsel’s closing argument remark that appellant
“has lived here practically his entire life.” This factor is neutral.
Appellant’s prior criminal record. Appellant has no criminal history outside
of an arrest in Guadalupe County that was dismissed as a case of mistaken identity.
This factor supports a reduced bond amount.
Appellant’s other bonds. The record does not reflect whether appellant has
ever been released on any bonds. This factor is neutral.
Aggravating circumstances in the charged offense. Appellant is alleged to
have used a firearm in killing an eleven-year-old child in the presence of another
juvenile while they ran away from appellant’s door during a neighborhood game of
“ding dong ditch.” This factor supports a high bond amount.
On balance, the Rubac factors weigh both for and against bail reduction. As
such, we cannot hold that the trial abused its discretion in setting a high bond.
CONCLUSION
Appellant is charged with the violent and serious offense of capital murder.
Alongside our sister court, we have affirmed a bond for capital murder equal to and
greater than $1,500,000. See e.g Lu, 2023 WL 5217789, at *1 (affirming
$5,000,000 bond amount for capital murder charge); Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 166
(affirming a $1,500,000 bond for capital murder charge). Appellant has failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating that he cannot afford the bond. See Ex parte
Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d)
(“[A]ppellant must do more than show a lower bail amount would be preferable to
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the amount selected for him; he must demonstrate his bail falls outside the zone of
reasonable disagreement.”). On the records and briefs presented to this court, we
hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s application
for writ of habeas. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the
trial court’s order denying habeas-corpus relief.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bridges and Boatman.
Do Not Publish – Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
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