Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026 In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00589-CR EX PARTE GONZALO LEON JR. On Appeal from the 177th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1963954 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Gonzalo Leon, Jr., challenges the trial court’s order denying his application for writ of habeas corpus seeking a reduction of bail set at $1,500,000 for a charge of capital murder. Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm. Background Appellant is alleged to have shot and killed an eleven-year-old child on August 30, 2025. At the habeas hearing, the trial court admitted a probable cause affidavit prepared by a detective with the Houston Police Department in relation to this arrest. That affidavit states a juvenile witness told police he and his cousin, the eleven-year-old complainant, were walking through the neighborhood, knocking on the doors of residences, and running away as part of a prank called “ding dong ditch.” The witness stated that he and complainant had knocked on appellant’s door several times as part of this prank. On the final instance, the witness stated the complainant knocked on appellant’s door and as they ran from appellant’s residence, the witness heard a gunshot, causing him to look back toward appellant. He then watched as appellant fired a second gunshot striking complainant in the back. Complainant later died at a hospital while being treated for the gunshot wound. The affidavit states police arriving at the scene called out to appellant using their vehicle PA system for approximately twenty minutes before he exited his residence. Officers spoke to appellant’s wife who confirmed she and appellant’s three-year-old daughter were inside the residence at the time of the shooting. After entering the home upon consent of appellant’s wife, police observed several assault-type rifles in a closet near appellant’s front door. The next day, officers found approximately twenty firearms, including four to five assault-type rifles, shotguns, and multiple pistols. Police also observed a hatchet and multiple swords in appellant’s home. Appellant was charged with capital murder and arrested on April 27, 2026. The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus to reduce his $1,500,000 bond. Appellant presented two witnesses at the habeas hearing: an attorney representing a bail-bond company and a private investigator. Attorney Representing Bail-Bond Company – Shelby Burns Burns testified that appellant’s mother, brother, and wife had contacted a 2 bail-bond company, but could not make bail. According to Burns, the family was qualified for bail set at range from $300,000 to $500,000 because the family could afford to pay a 10% cash premium of $50,000. Burns acknowledged that his assessment was based on conversations with the family and “some documentation” that provided “a picture [of the family’s financial resources], but it’s not super . . . clear.” Burns testified appellant’s mother owned an unencumbered residence with a collateral value of approximately $300,000. Burns testified that appellant “owns a business,” referencing appellant’s employment as the vice president of his family’s restaurant business prior to the arrest. Burns testified this “source of income” ties appellant to Harris County. However, Burns was unaware of the length of appellant’s employment in this position. Burns testified appellant owns an encumbered residence with a collateral value of $50,000. On cross-examination, Burns acknowledged he did not assess any potential collateral value associated with the family’s restaurant business or appellant’s potential ownership interest in it because the existence of the business was only recently brought to his attention. He testified there was “potential for collateral” in the business, but he had not “explored that yet.” Burns did not assess any other property, cars, or cash associated with appellant’s family. Private Investigator – Jim Willis Willis testified appellant possessed no criminal history despite one prior arrest in Guadalupe County, dismissed as a case of mistaken identity. Willis testified appellant served and was honorably discharged from the United States Army and Texas National Guard. Willis testified appellant had moved to a hotel with his family prior to his arrest but he believed this move was intended to protect appellant’s family rather than demonstrating an intent to flee. Willis based this belief on media presence at appellant’s former residence, two burglaries at 3 appellant’s former residence occurring after the family moved into the hotel, and the hotel’s proximity to a college where appellant was enrolled before being expelled. Willis testified police found a large amount of clothing belonging to appellant and his family inside appellant’s hotel room. According to Willis, this clothing could signal an intent to flee but could also signal an intent to stay at the hotel for an extended period. Willis testified appellant earned the sole income for his wife and three-year- old child by working at the family’s restaurant business prior to his arrest. Willis testified he believed the family presently owned real estate associated with one restaurant location possessing a collateral value of approximately $760,000. According to Willis, he was aware the family previously owned additional restaurant locations, but those properties were sold. Willis did not testify regarding the timing of this sale and did not have knowledge regarding the amount of sale proceeds, if any. However, Willis acknowledged there “potentially could be . . . some cash available” relating to the sale of this real estate. Willis testified appellant’s wife and child no longer lived in appellant’s residence but had moved into an apartment. Willis agreed appellant’s residence could be sold without the family’s displacement. Willis testified he was aware of the current income of appellant’s wife but did not state that amount for the record. Willis testified appellant’s mother possessed a residence he believed was located on “Wallisville” in the “east side” of town and agreed the appraisal value of that location could be $397,236. Willis later agreed appellant’s mother jointly owned a residential property located at Sagewillow Lane with an appraisal value of $291,461. The State did not present witnesses but admitted a complaint affidavit related to this arrest, a Harris County Appraisal District document showing appellant’s mother owned a restaurant property appraised at $760,586, and a Harris 4 County Appraisal District document showing appellant’s mother jointly owned a Sagewillow Lane residential property appraised at $291,461. After both sides presented closing arguments, the court declined to reduce appellant’s bond amount. Analysis The right to be free from excessive bail is protected by the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Tex. Const. art. I, § 11. We review a challenge to the excessiveness of bail for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Under this standard, we may not disturb the trial court’s decision if it falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Ex parte Castillo–Lorente, 420 S.W.3d 884, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). We defer to all of the trial court’s implied factual findings supported by the record. Phuong Anh Thi Le v. State, 300 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The amount of bail required in any case is within the discretion of the trial court subject to the following rules: 1. The bail and any conditions of bail shall be sufficient to give reasonable assurance of compliance with the undertaking. 2. The power to require bail is not to be so used as an instrument of oppression. 3. The nature of the offense and the circumstances under which it was committed are to be considered, including whether the offense: (A) is an offense involving violence as defined by Article 17.03(b-3)(2); or (B) involves violence directed against a peace officer. 4. The ability to make bail shall be considered, and proof may be taken on this point. 5. The future safety of a victim of the alleged offense, law enforcement, and the community shall be considered. 5 6. The criminal history record information for the defendant, including information obtained through the statewide telecommunications system maintained by the Department of Public Safety and through the public safety report system developed under Article 17.021, shall be considered, including any acts of family violence, other pending criminal charges, and any instances in which the defendant failed to appear in court following released on bail 7. The citizenship status of the defendant shall be considered. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. In addition to these rules, case law provides that courts may consider the following set of factors: (l) the defendant’s work record; (2) the defendant’s family and community ties; (3) the defendant’s length of residency; (4) the defendant’s prior criminal record; (5) the defendant’s conformity with previous bond conditions; (6) the existence of other outstanding bonds, if any; (7) the aggravating circumstances alleged to have been involved in the charged offense; and (8) whether the defendant is a citizen of the United States. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 850; Ex parte Rodriguez, 595 S.W.2d 549, 550 n. 2 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Ex parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). 1. Nature and Circumstances of Alleged Offense When determining reasonable bail, a trial court shall give the most weight to the nature of the offense and the length of possible sentence. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849; Ex parte Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.). It is appropriate to consider whether the offense alleged to have been committed involved violence in setting the amount of bail. Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d at 67. Appellant is charged with capital murder, a violent crime that carries a long 6 sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.03(b-3)(2)(B) (defining capital murder as an offense involving violence). The capital murder charge, a capital felony, carries a punishment of life imprisonment without parole. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 1(b) (providing a defendant may not be sentenced to death for an offense under Section 19.03(a)(9)). The potential of life imprisonment without parole provides a strong incentive to flee. See Ex parte Cardenas, 557 S.W.3d 722, 731 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2018, no pet.) (affirming a $750,000 bond where punishment associated with a capital murder charge provided a strong incentive to flee). Because murder is a violent offense a high bail is reasonable. See Ex parte Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d 160, 166 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. re’d) (affirming a $1,500,000 bail for defendant charged with capital murder given the violent nature of the crime). The serious and violent nature of a capital murder charge and the potential sentence appellant faces related to the charge weigh against a determination that the bail amount set by the trial court was excessive. 2. Sufficiently High to Assure Appearance But Not Oppress Bail needs to be in an amount sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the defendant will appear. When bail is set so high that a person cannot realistically pay it, however, the trial court essentially “displaces the presumption of innocence and replaces it with a guaranteed trial appearance.” Ex parte Bogia, 56 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Bail may not be used as an instrument of oppression. See Ex parte Guerra, 383 S.W.3d 229, 233–34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). Bail set in a particular amount becomes oppressive when it assumes that the defendant cannot afford bail in that amount and when it is set for the express purpose of forcing the defendant to remain incarcerated. See Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 7 Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (where bail amount set “solely to prevent [defendant] from getting out of jail,” “bail [was] being used as an instrument of oppression”). Appellant’s primary argument is that bail is being used as an instrument of oppression. In his brief, appellant relies on a chart of aggregated bail amounts set in Harris County for murder and capital murder offenses in cases filed from March 17, 2025, through March 14, 2026. Appellant contends the instant bail amount exceeds the highest bail set for capital murder in Harris County by $700,000. As support for the contention that this data provides a measure of reasonableness, appellant cites to Ex parte Beard, in which the court reduced bail for a capital murder charge from $8,000,000 to $500,000 after reviewing bail amounts in comparable cases. Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566, 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d). Although the court in Beard found a review of similar capital murder cases instructive, it looked at the specific facts of comparable cases and cautioned against overgeneralization when making bail comparisons. Id. at 571 (“Case law is of relatively little value in addressing the ultimate question of the appropriate amount of bail in a particular case . . . because the cases are so individualized that generalization from results reached in others is difficult.”). Appellant further relies on Ludwig v. State, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals reduced bail from $1,000,000 to $50,000 in relation to murder and capital murder charges. Ludwig v. State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (per curiam). However, in reaching its decision in Ludwig, the Court emphasized the importance of testimony suggesting family members could only contribute $10,000 toward the accused’s release. Id. Both cases cited by appellant are over 20 years old, thus they “are too old to provide useful dollar-to-dollar comparisons due to the changing value of money.” Ex Parte Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d 220, 233 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no 8 pet.). More recent cases instruct that a $1,500,000 bond for a capital murder or murder charge is not patently excessive or oppressive. See e.g. Ex parte Lu, No. 14-23-00023-CR, 2023 WL 5217789, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming $5,000,000 bond amount for capital murder charge); Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 166 (affirming a $1,500,000 bond for capital murder charge); Ex parte Bautista- Renteria, 717 S.W.3d 445, 550 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2025, no pet.) (affirming $2,500,000 bond amount for murder when appellant had local ties and no criminal history, but the shooting was a “random, violent, and senseless” incident that took place in front of young children); Ex parte Hartsfield, No. 01-23-00824-CR, 2024 WL 33974188, (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming $2,000,000 bond amount for retired military veteran charged with murder); Ex parte Johnson, No. 14-23-00567-CR, 2024 WL 1326138, (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming $3,000,000 bond amount for murder when appellant had local ties and no criminal history because appellant failed to offer complete testimony as to the family’s assets). Although some courts have reversed orders setting comparable bail amounts for a capital murder charge, several courts have upheld similar amounts for similar charged offenses. The question here is whether the trial court’s decision falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Castillo-Lorente, 420 S.W.3d at 887. Based on testimony at the bail hearing, the trial court could have properly concluded appellant posed a flight risk when he exhibited a twenty-minute delay prior to complying with police requests to exit his residence, moved into a hotel with a large amount of clothing, and at some time possessed a tie to Guadalupe County. 9 Accordingly, the trial court could have properly concluded that a bail amount of $1,500,000 for the charged capital murder offense is not higher than reasonably necessary to assure compliance with the undertaking and that bail is not unconstitutionally oppressive. C.f. Durst, 148 S.W.3d at 498 (concluding that bail may be set at a high amount where the defendant presents a flight risk). 3. Ability to Make Bail To demonstrate inability to make bail, a defendant generally must establish his and his family’s funds have been exhausted. Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 234–35. The accused’s ability to make bail is only one factor to be considered in determining the appropriate amount of bail. Id. “If the ability to make bond in a specified amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting bond would be completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the unique posture of determining what his bond should be.” Id. (quoting Ex parte Miller, 631 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, pet. ref’d)). Appellant’s evidence of his inability to make bail was limited to the testimony of Shelby Burns and Jim Willis. Appellant presented no documentary evidence of his assets and financial resources. The trial court could have properly concluded appellant failed to establish his and his family’s funds have been exhausted based on testimony that Burns possessed an incomplete picture of the family’s finances and did not assess the value or full extent of the family’s property, business assets, vehicles, or accounts. Willis’s testimony further supports this conclusion by identifying additional assets associated with the family, such as recently sold business real estate and residential property that may be owned by appellant’s mother. To the extent the trial court did not find credible the testimony as to appellant’s ability to make bond given the witnesses’ lack of knowledge related to the value of properties owned by appellant and his mother, and the lack of 10 testimony relating to vehicles, bank accounts, and income in possession of the family, we afford the trial court wide discretion in assessing credibility. See Ex parte Duque, 540 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. struck) (“In habeas proceedings, ‘[v]irtually every fact finding involves a credibility determination,’ and ‘the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses’”) (quoting Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Moreover, without a showing that available funds have been exhausted, evidence of the “largest bond” a defendant can make is generally insufficient to meet a defendant’s burden to demonstrate that a bail amount is excessive. See Ex parte Ruiz, 129 S.W.3d 751, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (concluding that bail bondsman’s testimony of the “largest bond” the defendant could make did not carry the burden to establish inability to make bail); Dupuy, 498 S.W.3d at 235 (considering appellant’s failure to offer documentary evidence of assets and financial resources in holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce appellant’s bail). The trial court could have properly concluded that the amount of bail was reasonable under the circumstances because appellant has offered vague and incomplete evidence supporting his claimed inability to make bail. See Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (affirming trial court’s denial of habeas application where there was insufficient evidence on the appellant’s ability to make bond). 4. Future Safety of the Victims and the Community The trial court must also consider the future safety of the victim of the alleged offenses and the community in setting appellant’s bail amounts. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(5). Although appellant no longer poses a threat to 11 the complainant, it is important to note the violent nature of the crime with which he is charged. See Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“[T]he gravity and the nature of the charges against [appellant] indicates that he presents a risk to the safety of the community.”). Appellant is alleged to have killed an eleven-year-old child by shooting the child in the back. This shooting was witnessed by the complainant’s cousin – another juvenile – and took place while appellant’s child was in the home. The random, violent, and senseless nature of this offense raises a concern for the future safety of the community. See Bautista-Renteria, 717 S.W.3d at 550 (holding the “random, violent, and senseless” nature of a shooting that occurred in front of young children suggested an ongoing risk to the community); Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 165 (holding the inexplicable and brutal nature of the offense suggested an ongoing danger to the community). This factor weighs in favor of the trial court’s finding. 5. Rubac Factors Appellant’s work record. The record shows appellant was employed as the vice president of the family’s restaurant business prior to his arrest. The record does not reflect how long appellant was employed in this position. The record shows appellant previously served in the United States Army and the Texas National Guard. This factor supports a reduced bond amount. Appellant’s family and community ties. The record shows appellant possesses ties to Harris County through his mother. He also possesses ties to his wife and child although the precise location of their current residence is not reflected in the record. However, the trial court could have properly found appellant posed a flight risk, despite these ties, when he delayed in response to police requests to exit his residence, moved his family into a hotel with a large 12 amount of clothing, and possessed a prior tie to Guadalupe County. This factor supports a high bond amount. Length of appellant’s residency. The record does not reflect the length of appellant’s residency despite his counsel’s closing argument remark that appellant “has lived here practically his entire life.” This factor is neutral. Appellant’s prior criminal record. Appellant has no criminal history outside of an arrest in Guadalupe County that was dismissed as a case of mistaken identity. This factor supports a reduced bond amount. Appellant’s other bonds. The record does not reflect whether appellant has ever been released on any bonds. This factor is neutral. Aggravating circumstances in the charged offense. Appellant is alleged to have used a firearm in killing an eleven-year-old child in the presence of another juvenile while they ran away from appellant’s door during a neighborhood game of “ding dong ditch.” This factor supports a high bond amount. On balance, the Rubac factors weigh both for and against bail reduction. As such, we cannot hold that the trial abused its discretion in setting a high bond. CONCLUSION Appellant is charged with the violent and serious offense of capital murder. Alongside our sister court, we have affirmed a bond for capital murder equal to and greater than $1,500,000. See e.g Lu, 2023 WL 5217789, at *1 (affirming $5,000,000 bond amount for capital murder charge); Gonzalez, 383 S.W.3d at 166 (affirming a $1,500,000 bond for capital murder charge). Appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that he cannot afford the bond. See Ex parte Estrada, 640 S.W.3d 246, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. ref’d) (“[A]ppellant must do more than show a lower bail amount would be preferable to 13 the amount selected for him; he must demonstrate his bail falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.”). On the records and briefs presented to this court, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s order denying habeas-corpus relief. /s/ Tracy Christopher Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bridges and Boatman. Do Not Publish – Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 14