Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00121-CR ___________________________ DOMINIQUE SHARICE ROBERTS WOOTEN, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 4 Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. CR-2025-00060-D Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Appellant Dominique Sharice Roberts Wooten, appearing pro se, appeals her conviction for misdemeanor assault causing bodily injury for which she was sentenced, following a bench trial, to ninety days in jail; the trial court suspended the sentence and placed her on twelve months’ community supervision. See Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). In three issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to disprove her self-defense claim and the sufficiency of the evidence to prove bodily injury, and she argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling her constitutional objection and by allowing the State to question her regarding her refusal to speak with law enforcement before her arrest. Because a rational factfinder could have rejected Wooten’s self-defense claim and could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant had sustained bodily injury and because the Fifth Amendment does not protect against pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, but because the judgment contains a clerical error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. II. Background On September 2, 2023, around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m., the complainant was awakened by “a whole bunch of loud music”; the noise was coming from the apartment directly above hers. After a few hours had elapsed during which she was unsuccessful in trying to fall back asleep, the complainant went upstairs to try to persuade her neighbor to turn down the music. 2 After knocking on the door, the complainant heard her neighbor—later identified as Wooten—yell, “Get away from my door.” The complainant knocked again and heard the same thing, so she yelled through the door for Wooten to turn down the music. The door opened, and Wooten started filming the complainant and said that people at the apartment complex were racist. The complainant told Wooten that her music was really loud, Wooten said some other things and then closed the door, and the complainant started walking back to her apartment. When the complainant was near the stairs, she heard Wooten’s door open, turned around, and saw Wooten running at her. The complainant told Wooten, “[Y]ou better not hit me,” but Wooten hit the complainant. The complainant said that Wooten “did like some jump kick thing”; grabbed the complainant’s hair, pulling out a few strands and causing her pain; and then hit the crown of her head a few times, causing her pain.1 The complainant testified that she did nothing to defend herself and did nothing that could have been interpreted by Wooten as aggressive. Wooten abruptly stopped attacking the complainant and yelled that she was going back to her apartment. 1 The complainant believed that Wooten was intoxicated “on something” based on her appearance and her actions. 3 The complainant returned to her apartment and called 911.2 About twenty minutes later, the police came and took the complainant’s statement and photographed her head and scalp. The complainant testified that the photographs did not show bruises or marks and that it did not surprise her because Wooten “didn’t hit anywhere where you could see” as the areas were covered by hair. The responding officer testified that the police had received reports of “several noise disturbances” involving Wooten’s apartment, so he showed the complainant a photograph of Wooten, and the complainant identified her as her attacker. As the officers approached Wooten’s apartment, they found a pair of glasses that belonged to the complainant, who did not realize that she had lost them. The responding officer said that he had a brief conversation with Wooten through the door but that she did not want to open the door. Wooten was not arrested that day. Wooten took the stand in her own defense and provided a different version of what had occurred on the morning of September 2: So I was playing music and then I want to say close to 7:00 a.m., I turned the music off. And after that, I was walking in the hallway because I was just like checking my door to make sure there was no mail or anything at my door. I was walking down the hallway and then someone came up the stairs and she was walking towards me. And she was -- I don’t know if I can say yet, sorry. I’m just going to say she yelled at me and she was like, hey, your TV is loud, and I did use profanity. I told her to get the F away from me, but I was already in the hallway. 2 The recording of the complainant’s 911 call was admitted into evidence at the bench trial. 4 And whenever I heard her say something else, I did go towards her[,] and then I pushed her [a]way from me. Then I saw her [and her] glasses fall. She got right back up, walked downstairs, and then I walked back into my apartment. Wooten testified that she did not punch the complainant, grab her hair, or perform a jump kick at her. Wooten explained why she had pushed the complainant, saying, “I was just in defense mode. I had been going through a lot[,] and I just felt like in that moment, I needed to protect myself. . . . [T]o me, in that moment, she was in my personal space[,] and so I did push her.” When asked about the threat that the complainant posed, Wooten testified as follows: Q. She’s coming at you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Getting in your face? A. She wasn’t necessarily in my face, but she was in my personal space. Q. And do you believe if you didn’t defend yourself she was going to do something to you? A. I don’t know. Q. Do you think there was a threat potentially from her, based on how she’s acting? A. In that moment, to me, yes. .... 5 Q. How did it get physical? You said she was, I guess, in your personal space but not in your face, do you know about how far away from you she was? A. I don’t. Q. But you felt threatened? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can you explain why? A. Because the day before, I had already experienced officers banging on my door, and so I was just in defense mode. Like I said before, I was going through a lot at that time. And so in that moment, I felt like, okay, I need to push this person away from me. Q. Okay. But did she make any kind of aggressive moves towards you? Did she swing towards you? A. Just walking towards me. Q. Okay. So she was just walking towards you? A. And then yelling. Or she scream[ed] and yelled. Q. And you pushed her? A. Yes, sir. Q. You pushed her. It must have been pretty hard if she fell down to the ground? A. Yes, sir. Q. And her glasses fell off? A. Yes, sir. 6 Wooten admitted that she did not know the complainant and that this was the first time she had seen her. Wooten said that the complainant did not knock on her door but crossed paths with her when she was in the hallway. Wooten was asked more about how the complainant had identified Wooten as the source of the loud noise since the two had never met: Q. Okay. And you said you kind of had already started walking down the hall when you ran into her or when she saw you and started yelling at you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Was it she just started yelling at you as soon as she saw you? A. Yeah. Q. Okay. But you testified that you had no interactions with her before this. Correct? A. No, sir. Q. You didn’t know her[,] and she didn’t know you? A. No, sir. Q. So she just saw somebody in the hallway vaguely near the apartment. I think you had said you had already walked a bit down the hallway[,] and she just assumed that was the person? A. She did, yeah. Q. Okay. And she came at that person who she didn’t know and she had no idea if this was the right [person] before she came at you screaming and aggressive? A. Yes, sir. 7 Q. Okay. Even though she didn’t know who you were, and you didn’t know who she was? A. Correct. Wooten testified that she was not intoxicated during the incident and that the complainant had lied when she testified that Wooten had punched her and had pulled out her hair. After hearing the testimony, the trial court found Wooten guilty, sentenced her to ninety days in jail, suspended the sentence, and placed her on twelve months’ community supervision. This appeal followed. III. Sufficiency Challenges In her first and second issues, Wooten challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to (1) disprove beyond a reasonable doubt her claim of self-defense and (2) prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she caused the complainant bodily harm. Because the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Wooten’s sufficiency challenges fail. A. Standard of Review In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Baltimore v. State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to 8 resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341. The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 342. Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 656. B. Applicable Law 1. Self-Defense Self-defense is a confession-and-avoidance defense requiring the defendant to admit to her otherwise illegal conduct. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. 9 App. 2020).3 This court has recently explained the burdens involved when a defendant raises a claim of self-defense and how we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defense: After the defendant has introduced some evidence supporting a defense under Section 2.03 of the Penal Code, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove it. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (explaining that a conviction produces an implicit finding against the defensive theory). This burden does not require the State to introduce evidence disproving the defense; rather, it requires the State to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. To determine evidentiary sufficiency to disprove a nonaffirmative defense, the appellate court asks whether after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the [defensive] issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Handsborough v. State, No. 02-22-00300-CR, 2023 WL 8940402, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 28, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (first citing Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594; and then citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14). Furthermore, in a 3 An appellant does not have to admit the manner and means of the alleged assault in order to meet the requirements of the confession-and-avoidance doctrine; thus, a defendant claiming self-defense who admits an assault by a different manner and means than that alleged in the charging instrument will be entitled to a self- defense instruction as long as his admission pertains to the same event. Ebikam v. State, No. PD-1199-18, 2020 WL 3067581, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. June 10, 2020) (not designated for publication); cf. Bufkin v. State, 207 S.W.3d 779, 781–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (a defendant may not “foist upon the State a crime the State did not intend to prosecute” but may claim a different version of events). 10 bench trial, the trial court is free to accept or reject defensive evidence on the issue of self-defense. See Dearborn v. State, 420 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914); see, e.g., Cossette v. State, No. 01- 24-00324-CR, 2026 WL 692239, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 12, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that following a bench trial, the court found appellant guilty of murder, implicitly rejecting his claim of self- defense). 2. Bodily Injury As applicable to this case, a person commits the offense of assault bodily injury if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). “Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8). Any physical pain, no matter how minor, is sufficient to establish bodily injury. Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lindsay v. State, No. 12-24-00224-CR, 2025 WL 2492061, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 29, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Because the experience of pain is subjective, a victim’s testimony that pain was experienced is sufficient evidence of bodily injury. See Babineaux v. State, No. 02-21-00085-CR, 2023 WL 164089, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 12, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Jimenez v. State, No. 08-20-00003-CR, 2022 WL 484548, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 17, 2022, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“Physical pain is inherently subjective, and both this [c]ourt and the 11 Court of Criminal Appeals have held that a victim’s testimony—if believed by the jury—that she felt pain is sufficient to establish the element of bodily injury.”). C. Analysis 1. Self-Defense Regarding Wooten’s first issue that challenges the rejection of her self-defense claim and that places the burden on the State to disprove her defensive claim, as explained above, it was not the State’s burden to disprove her claim of self-defense; instead, the State was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. It did so. We reiterate at the outset of our analysis that the trial court, as the factfinder during the bench trial, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and that we may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.04; Martin, 635 S.W.3d at 679. Here, before the trial court found Wooten guilty, it told her, “I believe that [the complainant] was credible. I believe [her testimony was] way more credible than what I heard from your testimony.” Because the trial court disbelieved Wooten’s testimony, her self-defense argument could not succeed. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, the record demonstrates the following: • The complainant did not verbally or physically threaten Wooten but instead asked her to turn down her music and then walked away; 12 • When the complainant was almost to the stairs, Wooten opened her door and pursued the complainant; • Wooten initiated the physical attack, grabbing the complainant’s hair and striking her head; and • Throughout the attack, the complainant did nothing to defend herself. As summarized by the State, “From this evidence, a rational factfinder could have found[] beyond a reasonable doubt[] that Wooten’s use of force was not immediately necessary to protect herself from any alleged use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Even assuming that the complainant’s requests for Wooten to turn down her music constituted verbal provocation, the use of force is not justified against verbal provocation. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31(b)(1) (stating that use of force is not justified against another in response to verbal provocation alone). Moreover, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense of assault causing bodily injury 4 beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have found against Wooten on her self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Columbus v. State, 720 S.W.3d 400, 406 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2025) (en banc op. on reh’g), aff’d, No. PD-0538-25, 2026 WL 1852097, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2026) (concluding that the record did not indicate that the The complaint and the information charged Wooten with “intentionally, 4 knowingly, or recklessly[] caus[ing] bodily injury to [the complainant], by striking [the complainant] with the defendant’s hand or pulling [the complainant’s] hair with the defendant’s hand.” 13 jury was irrational in rejecting appellant’s testimony about his self-defense claim). Accordingly, we overrule Wooten’s first issue. 2. Bodily Injury The crux of Wooten’s second issue, which challenges the sufficiency of the bodily injury evidence, is that the “State’s case rested primarily upon the complainant’s testimony” and that such testimony could not be believed because “the objective evidence admitted at trial failed to substantiate the complainant’s allegations of bodily injury.” Specifically, Wooten argues that the State presented no independent physical evidence establishing that she had punched the complainant or had grabbed her hair. Again, Wooten’s arguments ignore that the trial court, as the factfinder, was entitled to believe the complainant’s description of the September 2 incident and to reject Wooten’s version, see Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); that circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, see Carter v. State, 620 S.W.3d 147, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); and that a victim’s testimony that pain was experienced is sufficient evidence of bodily injury, see Jimenez, 2022 WL 484548, at *3. Here, the trial court had before it the complainant’s testimony that Wooten had grabbed her hair, pulling out a few strands and causing her pain, and that Wooten had hit the crown of the complainant’s head a few times, causing her pain. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Wooten’s 14 grabbing the complainant’s hair and striking her head caused bodily injuries—physical pain. See Chavez v. State, No. 03-24-00427-CR, 2025 WL 1005618, at *6 (Tex. App.— Austin Apr. 4, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding evidence sufficient to support assault even though photographs did not show a visible injury when 911 call captured victim saying that she had experienced pain when she was hit). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support Wooten’s conviction, and we overrule her second issue. IV. Fifth Amendment Objection In her third issue, Wooten argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the State to question her about why she did not want to speak to the responding officer before her arrest. Because pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is not protected by the Fifth Amendment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly overruling Wooten’s Fifth Amendment objection. A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The Texarkana Court of Appeals has recently set forth the standard of review and the law that applies to a Fifth Amendment complaint: As for [appellant’s] Fifth Amendment complaint, “We review [a] trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence” for “an abuse of discretion.” Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A[n a]buse of discretion occurs only if the decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g). . . . 15 A comment on a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, even during a defendant’s impeachment or cross-examination, violates the rights of the accused under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618[, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245] (1976); Johnson v. State, 83 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d); Myers v. State, No. 06-12-00156-CR, 2013 WL 1867623, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 3, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 356 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). This is because “[t]he plain language of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from compelled self- incrimination.” Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), aff’d, 570 U.S. 178 (2013). However, “[i]n pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances, a suspect’s interaction with police officers is not compelled.” Id. For this reason, “the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility” after he has chosen to testify. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238[, 100 S. Ct. 2124, 2129] (1980) (emphasis added). Venson v. State, No. 06-25-00066-CR, 2026 WL 1278919, at *6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 11, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). B. What the Record Shows Wooten’s argument is based on the following questioning that took place during her cross-examination: Q. Okay. So when police came to your door, did you want to talk with them? A. No, sir. Q. Okay. Why not? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, Your Honor, I think this is getting into my client’s Fifth Amendment right at that point. I don’t think the State can comment on her decision to not to talk to police at that time. 16 [THE STATE]: I think at that point, Judge, there’s no charges that have been brought or anything like that. It’s -- THE COURT: Yeah, I’ll allow it. Q. All right. So why did you not want to talk to the police? A. One, I had already been in the hallway and pushed her away from me. So I was just like, I don’t want to talk to anybody else. I just want to be left alone. Q. You didn’t want to give them your side of the story? A. No, sir, because usually when I open my door for the police, it’s because I call them. So I was already very cautious about opening my door. C. Analysis At the outset, we note, as the State did, that Wooten objected only on Fifth Amendment grounds in the trial court. Yet in her brief, she cites Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 and centers the bulk of her argument on the alleged lack of relevance and unfair prejudice of admitting her testimony regarding her pre-arrest silence. Wooten, however, did not object in the trial court on these grounds and has therefore not preserved her Rule 401, 402, and 403 arguments for review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Montelongo v. State, 623 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (noting that Rule 33.1 requires a timely, specific objection and a ruling by the trial court to preserve a complaint for appellate review). Regarding the ruling on Wooten’s Fifth Amendment objection, she has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. The complained-of questioning 17 concerned only her pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence; thus, the trial court properly overruled her objection. See Dobbs v. State, 699 S.W.3d 799, 807 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.) (holding that detective’s testimony about her failed attempt to obtain a statement from appellant before he was arrested was admissible); see also Head v. State, No. 02-21-00215-CR, 2023 WL 1859930, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declining to expand the scope of the Fifth Amendment to cover pre-arrest silence). We therefore overrule Wooten’s third issue. V. Modification of Judgment Although Wooten does not complain about it on appeal, we note a clerical error in the trial court’s judgment. When the trial court orally pronounced Wooten’s sentence, it did not pronounce any fine, but the judgment includes a fine of $300 and does not suspend it. When a variation exists between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence, “the oral pronouncement controls.” Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Here, because the trial court did not orally pronounce the $300 fine, the fine’s inclusion in the judgment was error. See Daniel v. State, No. 02-25-00246-CR, 2026 WL 2275306, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Pursuant to our authority to modify a judgment “to make the record speak the truth when the matter has been called to [our] attention by any source,” see French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 18 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), we modify the judgment to delete the $300 fine, see Daniel, 2026 WL 2275306, at *5. 5 VI. Conclusion Having overruled Wooten’s three issues but having modified the judgment to delete the unpronounced fine, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. /s/ Dabney Bassel Dabney Bassel Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: October 22, 2026 5 Wooten’s “failure to complain on appeal about the fine does not vitiate our authority to modify the judgment.” See Daniel, 2026 WL 2275306, at *5 n.15 (citing Munoz v. State, No. 02-25-00032-CR, 2026 WL 71063, at *9 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 8, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting cases)). 19