Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 5, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-24-00298-CR __________ JUAN SORIA, III, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23CRCC-00379 MEMORANDUM OPINION The State charged Appellant, Juan Soria, III, by information with assault causing bodily injury–family violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2026). The jury found him guilty of the charged offense and assessed his punishment at confinement in the Erath County Jail for three months and a fine of $4,000. The trial court made an affirmative finding of family violence and sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury’s verdict. See TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art. 42.013 (West 2018). In a single issue, Appellant challenges his conviction based on an alleged violation of Rule 614 of the Rules of Evidence and Article 36.03 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 36.03 (West Supp. 2026); TEX. R. EVID. 614. We affirm. Background Facts The State charged Appellant with intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to his then-wife, G.S., by striking her in the face. G.S. was the first witness called by the State during its case-in-chief. Immediately prior to her testimony, Appellant invoked “the rule.”1 As the State’s first witness, G.S. remained in the courtroom while the trial court admonished the other witnesses about the rule. G.S. testified that in the early morning hours of August 23, 2023, Appellant awakened her by slapping her face. She testified that Appellant then accused her of engaging in some type of conduct with neighbors that resulted in Appellant being threatened. Appellant also accused G.S. of cheating on him. While the couple argued, G.S. noticed that Appellant had her cell phone. As she reached for the phone, G.S. testified that Appellant hit her mouth with his elbow as he attempted to block her, resulting in her suffering a busted lip. G.S. testified that, after Appellant left the house for work, she got in her car with the couple’s young children and drove to her mother’s home. When G.S. discovered that her mother was not home, she started driving to her father’s house. G.S.’s father called the police when he learned what had happened between Appellant and G.S. Officers with the Stephenville Police Department arrived at Appellant’s and G.S.’s home to take her statement and photographs of her face. G.S. 1 Appellant was pro se at trial with stand-by counsel. Appellant is represented by counsel on appeal. 2 testified that she filed for divorce from Appellant the next day. The couple was divorced by the time of trial. Appellant briefly cross-examined G.S. He asked her why she did not go to the police station rather than to her parents’ homes when she left the house. He also asked her how she knew that he slapped her if she was asleep. After Appellant’s cross-examination, the trial court recessed for lunch. There was no discussion at the time with respect to G.S. being subject to the rule. The trial resumed with the State calling G.S.’s father as a witness. Afterwards, the State called three Stephenville police officers as witnesses. The testimony of G.S.’s father and the three police officers spanned approximately thirty pages of the reporter’s record. After the State rested, Appellant called G.S. as his first and only witness. Prior to questioning G.S., however, Appellant advised the trial court that G.S. had violated the rule by sitting in the courtroom while her father and the three police officers testified. He presented the trial court with an oral “motion to dismiss.” The trial court clarified that Appellant sought a mistrial by way of his motion. After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion for mistrial. Further, the trial court ruled that it would not exclude G.S.’s testimony. During his subsequent examination of G.S., Appellant did not ask her about any of the details of the assault or what she had reported to her father or the police officers. Instead, he asked her questions suggesting that she was motivated to make a report to the police in order to gain a financial advantage in the divorce. Analysis In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court should have excluded G.S.’s testimony under Rule 614 and Article 36.03. If a witness violates “the Rule,” the testimony of that witness may be admitted or excluded at the trial court’s discretion. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); 3 Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 677 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). On appeal, the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude testimony will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Bell, 938 S.W.2d at 50. “The procedure of excluding witnesses from the courtroom is commonly called putting the witnesses ‘under the rule.’” Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see TEX. R. EVID. 614. “The purpose of placing witnesses under the rule is to prevent the testimony of one witness from influencing the testimony of another, consciously or not.” Russell, 155 S.W.3d at 179. Article 36.03(a) provides exceptions to this rule. Article 36.03(a) states the following: Notwithstanding Rule 614, Texas Rules of Evidence, a court at the request of a party may order the exclusion of a witness who for the purposes of the prosecution is a victim, close relative of a deceased victim, or guardian of a victim only if the witness is to testify and the court determines that the testimony of the witness would be materially affected if the witness hears other testimony at the trial. CRIM. PROC. 36.03(a); see TEX. R. EVID. 614(d) (providing the same with respect to the victim of a criminal offense). “A trial court is ‘without authority to exclude [a qualifying witness] unless the court determine[s] her testimony would be materially affected if she heard the other testimony at trial.’” Garcia v. State, 553 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d) (quoting Wilson v. State, 179 S.W.3d 240, 248 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.)). “In the absence of such a showing, a trial court does not err in allowing the witness to remain in the courtroom.” Id. “Additionally, unlike Rule 614, Article 36.03 places the burden on the party seeking exclusion of a witness to make an offer of proof to justify the exclusion.” Id. As noted above, G.S. was the first witness to testify at trial. Accordingly, the application of the rule was of no consequence to her initial testimony; it could not have been affected by the testimony of other witnesses. 4 Appellant bore the burden of seeking G.S.’s exclusion from the courtroom. See id. At no time did Appellant seek for G.S. to be excluded from the courtroom as contemplated by Article 36.03 or Rule 614. Appellant asserts on appeal that the trial court should have instructed him at trial that he had the right to seek her exclusion after she testified. Appellant’s contention is incorrect—“[i]t is not the trial judge’s duty to educate the accused in the laws of this State.” Flemon v. State, 629 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no pet.). “When an accused decides to appear at trial pro se, he is still required to follow the rules of evidence, procedure, and substantive law.” Id. (citing Williams v. State, 549 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). Irrespective of Appellant’s failure to preserve his appellate complaint or show error by the trial court, the record does not indicate any harm arising from G.S.’s presence in the courtroom after her initial testimony. The testimony from G.S.’s father and the three police officers with respect to her report of the assault did not materially differ from her previous trial testimony. For example, Officer Trevor Augustus of the Stephenville Police Department testified that G.S. reported to the officers as follows: [G.S.] stated she was slapped across the face while she was sleeping, and that she was confronted about -- saying that he confronted her about cheating on her [sic]. And then she stated she tried to get her phone, and noticed it was in his pocket. And whenever she was reaching to get her phone, she was elbowed into -- on the face and the mouth. When Appellant recalled G.S. as a witness, he did not ask her any questions that pertained to the testimony offered by her father or the police officers. Accordingly, her subsequent testimony was not materially affected by her presence in the courtroom as contemplated by Article 36.03 and Rule 614(d). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s request for relief arising 5 from G.S.’s presence in the courtroom after her initial testimony. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. This Court’s Ruling We affirm the judgment of the trial court. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE November 5, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 6