Full Opinion

NO. 12-26-00008-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS PAUL MATTHEW GILLIAM, § APPEAL FROM THE 7TH APPELLANT V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Paul Matthew Gilliam appeals his conviction for assault family violence with a prior conviction. In three issues, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient, the trial court erroneously excluded evidence, and the judgment and bill of costs include unauthorized fees. We modify and affirm. BACKGROUND Appellant was charged by indictment with assault family violence with a prior qualifying conviction. The indictment alleged Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Cara Coppock, a person with whom he had a dating relationship, by causing her to strike a hard object, grabbing her with his hands, or pushing her. The indictment further alleged a prior assault conviction involving a family member and contained two enhancement paragraphs. Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Appellant “guilty” as charged. At the punishment phase, Appellant pleaded “true” to the enhancement paragraphs. Afterwards, the jury assessed punishment at sixty years imprisonment. This appeal follows. EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY In his first issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he urges the evidence does not support the jury’s finding that he assaulted Coppock. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct at 2786–87; see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and can believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented, and a reviewing court affords almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We defer to the trier of fact’s resolution of any conflicting inferences raised in the evidence and presume that the trier of fact resolved such conflicts in favor of the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried.” Id. A person commits the offense of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 2 § 22.01(a)(1). “Family violence” means: (1) an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault, but does not include defensive measures to protect oneself; or (3) dating violence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.004(1), (3). “Dating violence” means an act, other than a defensive measure to protect oneself, by an actor that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat that reasonably places the victim or applicant in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault. Id. § 71.0021(a)(2). “Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8). “Dating relationship” means a relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or intimate nature. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.0021(b). Under Texas law, it is generally a Class A misdemeanor when a person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1)(b). However, causing bodily injury to another is a third-degree felony if (1) the person commits the offense against a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Texas Family Code Sections 71.0021(b) (dating relationship), 71.003 (family member), or 71.005 (member of same household) and (2) it is shown at trial that the defendant “has been previously convicted of an offense under this chapter . . . against a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code.” Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021(b), 71.003, 71.005. With respect to assault family violence under Section 21.01(b), a prior conviction of an offense under Chapter 22 is an element of the offense and therefore must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; in other words, a prior conviction involving family violence is a “jurisdictional prior” that enhances what is otherwise a Class A assault to a third-degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2); Reyes v. State, 314 S.W.3d 74, 80-81 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.); see also Holoman v. State, No. 12-17-00364-CR, 2018 WL 5797241, at *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 5, 2018) (mem. op. on reh’g, not designated for publication), aff’d, 620 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). 3 Analysis Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he assaulted Coppock. Instead, he alleges Coppock testified that she used drugs, possessed a knife, initiated the altercation, had no visible injuries, and gave inconsistent descriptions of the alleged contact. Coppock testified at trial that she and Appellant were in a dating relationship for several years. On the day of the alleged assault, she used methamphetamine in the morning before work. When she got home, she took a nap. She realized her car was missing when she awoke. She also did not have her phone, so she walked to the nearby gas station to call her phone. Coppock believed Appellant took her car to “do something” but he would not answer the phone. By the time she returned home, Appellant was at the residence. Coppock confronted Appellant about taking her car without permission. After they yelled at each other, Coppock went inside, closed the door, and locked him out. Appellant kicked the door to get into the house and Coppock grabbed a kitchen knife “for protection.” After Appellant entered the house, Coppock backed into a corner, during which Appellant yelled and threw things at her. At some point during the altercation, Appellant spit at her and pushed her head against the door. Coppock testified that while his pushing her against the door hurt, he did not “actually hit” her. Appellant essentially argues that Coppock’s testimony is not credible. However, the jury is the sole judge of a witness’s credibility, and we give almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when it is based on a credibility evaluation. See Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461. Coppock testified that Appellant grabbed her and pushed her against the door, that the contact hurt, and that the grabbing and pushing caused bodily injury in the form of pain. Therefore, Coppock’s testimony alone provided direct evidence that Appellant assaulted her. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(8); 22.01. As a result, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE In his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a letter Coppock wrote. He further argues that the exclusion of this evidence compromised his ability to present a complete defense. 4 Standard of Review and Applicable Law “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment[,] the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984)). Rulemakers have broad latitude to constitutionally establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials, but their authority to establish such rules is not unlimited. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731, 164 L. Ed. 2d 503 (2006); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998); Potier v. State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Evidence rules that “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused” and are “‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve’” are unconstitutional. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, 118 S. Ct. at 1264 (citations omitted); Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 659–60. Thus, the constitutional right to a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” is qualified by the requirement that the defendant’s evidence be relevant and not excluded by an established evidentiary rule. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 329 n. 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). There is no constitutional right to present favorable evidence in any form a defendant desires, and the right to a meaningful and complete defense is not violated every time a rule excludes favorable evidence. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 316–17, 118 S. Ct. at 1268–69; Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 659. The hearsay doctrine is one such rule and is designed to exclude out-of-court statements offered for their truth that pose any of the four hearsay dangers of “faulty perception, faulty memory, accidental miscommunication, or insincerity.” Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). A statement that qualifies as hearsay but does not fall under one of the exceptions provided by the rules of evidence or other statutory authority is inadmissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 802. Generally, the rule requiring the exclusion of hearsay is not arbitrary or disproportionate to its purpose because the rule prevents the admission of statements that are regarded as inherently unreliable. See id.; State v. Kaiser, 822 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex. App–Fort Worth 1991, pet. ref’d). “[E]videntiary rulings rarely rise to the level of denying the fundamental constitutional rights to present a meaningful defense.” Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 663. But the improper exclusion 5 of evidence may establish a constitutional violation (1) when a state evidentiary rule categorically and arbitrarily prohibits the defendant from offering relevant evidence that is vital to his defense; or (2) when a trial court erroneously excludes relevant evidence that is a vital portion of the case and the exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. Ray v. State, 178 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In the first category, the constitutional infirmity is in the arbitrary rule of evidence itself. Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In the second category, the evidentiary rule itself is appropriate, but the trial court erroneously applies it to exclude admissible evidence to such an extent that it effectively prevents the defendant from presenting his defensive theory. Id. The exclusion of a defendant’s evidence will be constitutional error only if the evidence forms such a vital portion of his case that exclusion effectively precludes the defendant from presenting a defense. See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 665. If a defendant is not prevented from presenting the substance of his defense to the jury, the court will not find error. Id. at 666. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. See Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Analysis During cross-examination of Coppock, Appellant attempted to introduce a handwritten note Coppock wrote at a prior hearing. In the note, Coppock states that Appellant did not hit or punch her. After the State objected, the trial court allowed Appellant to question Coppock outside the jury’s presence in an attempt to establish a predicate for the note’s admissibility. Appellant claimed the note was a prior inconsistent statement against Coppock’s penal interests. Ultimately, the trial court held that the statement was inadmissible; however, the trial court explicitly stated that Appellant could question and cross-examine Coppock regarding the note, her prior statements, and any different version. Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in finding the note inadmissible. He further posits that the note’s exclusion prevented him from presenting his defense. Even assuming that excluding the note constitutes error, we disagree that it prevented Appellant from presenting his defense. During cross-examination, Appellant’s questioning followed the contents of the note. Coppock testified that Appellant did not punch or hit her, she had no visible bruises or swelling, and she did not personally view the pushing as an “assault.” Appellant also clarified the difference between being “hit” and “pushed.” Appellant’s defensive theory was that the 6 assault did not occur. And part of that defense depended on attacking Coppock’s credibility and informing the jury that she did not believe she was assaulted. Because Appellant was able to present that defensive theory to the jury, exclusion of the note itself was not harmful. See Potier, 68 S.W.3d at 666. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. ASSESSMENT OF COURT COSTS In his third issue, Appellant contends the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs include unauthorized fees. The State concedes the error. Applicable Law When the imposition of court costs is challenged on appeal, we review the assessment of costs to determine if there is a basis for the challenged costs. Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Only statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against a criminal defendant. Id. at 389; see also TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 103.002 (providing that costs may not be imposed “for a service not performed or for a service for which a cost is not expressly provided by law”). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) expressly authorizes an appellate court to modify the trial court’s judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). This Court has the authority to modify a judgment to make the record speak the truth when we have the necessary data and information to do so. Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Patterson v. State, 525 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). County and State Judicial Support Fees and Records Management and Preservation Fee The bill of costs reflects court costs of $551.50, including a county judicial support fee of $0.60, a state judicial support fee of $5.40, and a records management and preservation fee of $2.50. Said costs were authorized under former Section 133.105 of the Texas Local Government Code, which the Legislature repealed. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 133.105(a), repealed by Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 1.19(12), 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3982 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020). During its 86th Regular Session, the Legislature comprehensively revised the statutory array of criminal court costs and fees imposed on conviction (the Cost Act). See generally Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3983 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020). “Except as otherwise provided by” the Cost Act, “the changes in the law made by” 7 the Cost Act “apply only to a cost, fee, or fine on conviction for an offense committed on or after the effective date of” the Cost Act, i.e., January 1, 2020. Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 5.01, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3982, 4035–36. An offense committed before the Cost Act’s effective date “is governed by the law in effect on the date the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.” Id. The Cost Act provides for a state consolidated cost of $185 and a local consolidated cost of $105. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 133.102(a)(1), 134.101(a); Ikemere v. State, 716 S.W.3d 179, 183–84 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (discussing state consolidated court cost of $185 and local consolidated court cost of $105 provided by Cost Act). Because Appellant committed the instant offense on or about June 27, 2025, and was convicted on December 18, 2025, former Section 133.105 of the Local Government Code does not apply. See Act of May 23, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1352, § 5.01, 2019 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3982, 4035–36. We therefore conclude that the county and state judicial support fees and record management fees were improperly assessed. See Thompson v. State, No. 12-25-00336-CR, 2026 WL 1194016, at *5 (Tex. App.–Tyler Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Attorney’s Fees “A defendant who is determined by the trial court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant’s financial circumstances occurs.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p); see Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). If, after a defendant is convicted, the trial court determines that the defendant has financial resources that enable him to offset, in whole or in part, the costs of legal services provided by a court-appointed attorney, the court must order the defendant to reimburse the amount it finds he can pay. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.05(g). But before a trial court may order reimbursement of attorney’s fees by such a defendant, the court must determine, based on facts in the record, that the defendant has the financial resources to enable him to offset, in whole or in part, the costs of the legal services provided. Branton v. State, No. 12-24-00151-CR, 2025 WL 1074978, at *8 (Tex. App.–Tyler Apr. 9, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Johnson v. State, 405 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2013, no pet.)). If the record does not demonstrate a material 8 change in the defendant’s financial circumstances, there is no basis for ordering reimbursement of attorney’s fees. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(p); Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557; Johnson, 405 S.W.3d at 354. In the instant case, the record demonstrates that the trial court determined that Appellant is indigent and appointed both trial and appellate counsel for Appellant. The bill of costs indicates that the court costs included attorney’s fees in the amount of $300.00. Because the record does not reflect that the trial court ever found that Appellant’s financial circumstances materially changed after it found him to be indigent, there is no basis for the trial court’s order requiring Appellant to reimburse the attorney’s fees. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g); Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557; Johnson, 405 S.W.3d at 354. Summation The bill of costs and the judgment list the total amount of court costs as $551.50. The attached Order to Withdraw Funds likewise reflects this amount. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Judicial Support Fee (county) of $0.60, the Judicial Support Fee (state) of $5.40, the “Records Management & Preservation Fee” of $2.50, and Attorney’s Fees of $300.00 in the bill of costs each should be stricken and the judgment and withdrawal order should be modified to reflect the removal of these fees. Appellant’s third issue is sustained. DISPOSITION We overruled Appellant’s first and second issues and sustained his third issue. Accordingly, we modify the bill of costs by striking the assessments of the Judicial Support Fee (county) of $0.60, the Judicial Support Fee (state) of $5.40, the “Records Management & Preservation Fee” of $2.50, and the Attorney’s Fees of $300.00. We further modify the costs assessed in the judgment and order to withdraw funds by changing the costs assessed and funds available for withdrawal from $551.50 to $243.00 respectively. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. BRIAN HOYLE Justice Opinion delivered November 10, 2026. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J. (DO NOT PUBLISH) 9 COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS JUDGMENT NOVEMBER 10, 2026 NO. 12-26-00008-CR PAUL MATTHEW GILLIAM, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the 7th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-1577-25) THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the bill of costs, order to withdraw funds, and judgment of the court below should be modified, and as modified is affirmed. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the bill of costs of the court below be modified by striking the assessments of the “Judicial Support Fee – (County)”, the “Judicial Support Fee – (State)”, and “Records Management & Preservation Fee”, and the Attorney’s Fees. It further is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the costs assessed in the judgment and order to withdraw funds be modified by changing the total costs assessed and funds available for withdrawal from $551.50 to $243.00 respectively, that the judgment is affirmed as modified, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance. Brian Hoyle, Justice. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Davis, J.