Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-26-00054-CR ___________________________ ROBIN TAVIONNE DURROUGH, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 485th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1691870 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth MEMORANDUM OPINION In May 2023, Appellant Robin Tavionne Durrough pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and the trial court placed her on ten years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.053; Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(2). In December 2025, the State filed its second amended petition to adjudicate, alleging Durrough had violated conditions of her community supervision by failing to report to the Community Supervision and Corrections Department of Tarrant County as directed, possessing or using marijuana, failing to pay supervision reimbursement fees, and failing to complete the “Supportive Outpatient” and “Anger Management” programs. At a hearing on February 19, 2026, Durrough pleaded true to each allegation. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated her guilty of the underlying offense, and, after a hearing on punishment, sentenced her to eight years’ confinement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.053; Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(A)(2). Durrough appealed. Durrough’s court-appointed appellate attorney has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion, stating that the appeal presents no arguable points. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). We agree. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See id. In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified 2 Durrough of the motion to withdraw, provided her with a copy of the brief, informed her of her right to file a pro se response, took concrete measures to facilitate Durrough’s review of the appellate record, and informed her of her right to seek discretionary review should this court agree that the appeal is frivolous. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded Durrough an opportunity to file a pro se response, but she has not done so. The State did not file a brief. We have independently examined the record, as is our duty when appointed counsel files an Anders brief. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). After carefully reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Our independent review of the record reveals nothing further that might arguably support an appeal. See Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28. Accordingly, we grant Durrough’s attorney’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /s/ Bonnie Sudderth Bonnie Sudderth Chief Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) 3 Delivered: September 3, 2026 4