Full Opinion

Opinion filed August 13, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00100-CR __________ JUAN JESUS VALENZUELA, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 70th District Court Ector County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. A-22-0987-CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Juan Jesus Valenzuela, pled guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2026). Pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement between Appellant and the State, the trial court placed Appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of five years. The State subsequently moved to adjudicate Appellant’s guilt. The State alleged in its motion that on or about February 27, 2025, Appellant had committed an offense, namely, reckless driving, in violation of Rule (a) of the rules of community supervision. Appellant pled “not true” to the allegation. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, and having considered the evidence presented, the trial court found the single allegation in the State’s motion to be “true,” adjudicated Appellant guilty, and imposed a sentence of eighteen years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this court, supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record and applicable law and concludes that there are no meritorious or arguable grounds to present on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Counsel has provided Appellant with a copy of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and copies of the clerk’s and reporter’s record. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to (1) object to counsel’s motion, (2) review the record, (3) file a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief, and (4) file a petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5, 68. As such, court- appointed counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders, 386 U.S. at 742– 44; Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 409–12; and Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Appellant did not file a response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed the brief and the record, and we conclude that this appeal is without merit. In a revocation proceeding, the State need only prove a violation of a term or condition of community supervision by a preponderance of the evidence—the greater weight of credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the probationer has 2 violated a term or condition of his community supervision. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Guillory v. State, 652 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). In this setting, the trial court, as the trier of the facts, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be afforded their testimony, and may resolve any inconsistencies in their testimony. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Naquin v. State, 607 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Although we review a trial court’s revocation decision under an abuse of discretion standard, see Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493, we review the evidence presented at a revocation proceeding in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Here, the evidence presented at the hearing, though contested, is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of “true.” See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764. Namely, the arresting officer testified he observed Appellant “cutting people off, driving down the center lane,” and operating his vehicle in excess of ninety-nine miles per hour in a forty miles-per-hour zone on the evening of February 27, 2025. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.401 (West 2022) (“A person commits an offense [of reckless driving] if the person drives a vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”). Appellant denied speeding over ninety miles per hour but conceded that it had been “[a]bout 70 miles an hour” and that he had driven on the median to maneuver around traffic. It is well-settled that proof of only a single violation of the terms and conditions of a probationer’s community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation order. Bryant v. State, 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Sanchez v. 3 State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Jones v. State, 472 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d); Hart v. State, 264 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). Therefore, based on our review of the record, we agree with counsel that no arguable grounds for appeal exist.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE August 13, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 1 Appellant has the right to file a petition for discretionary review pursuant to Rule 68 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 4