Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0866-24 THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. SAUL SUAREZ, Appellee ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS BRAZOS COUNTY RICHARDSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., YEARY, NEWELL, WALKER, MCCLURE, FINLEY, and PARKER, J.J., joined. KEEL, J., concurred. OPINION The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search when officers reasonably, though erroneously, believe that the consenting individual possesses authority over the premises. Here, Sylvia Sanchez, mother to Saul Suarez (Appellee), gave officers consent to search Appellee’s bedroom. The trial court determined that Sanchez lacked actual authority and that officers did not act under apparent authority. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling, finding that officers did not act reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. We hold that the officers acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case back to the trial court for trial on the merits. I. Background On September 8, 2017, officers with the City of Bryan Police Department found a deceased nineteen-year-old in a pickup truck at a local park. Officers spoke with witnesses and concluded that there was an exchange of gunfire between the deceased and another male. During the investigation, officers were informed that sixteen-year-old Anthony Lopez had been shot. Officers believed that locating Anthony Lopez was an emergency because he had a gunshot wound, and he matched the description of the male who witnesses observed at the park. The officers proceeded to conduct an emergency ping on Anthony Lopez’s phone, which led the officers to Sylvia Sanchez’s apartment. Sanchez is Appellee’s mother, and Appellee also resides at this apartment. Officers arrived at Sanchez’s apartment around 10:00 at night, where they found Anthony Lopez and Appellee. Officers detained Anthony 2 Lopez, and he was taken to the hospital to be treated for his gunshot wound. Appellee was detained due to an unrelated outstanding warrant. When officers arrived at Sanchez’s apartment, they did not initially believe that Appellee was involved in the crime. Det. Davis testified that he only believed him to be a witness. 1 Sanchez and other members of the family who reside at the apartment were present and willing to speak with the officers. This includes Jeremiah Contreras, Sanchez’s nephew, Angel Sanchez, Sanchez’s niece, and Geneva, Sanchez’s mother. The body camera footage reveals that Sanchez consented to officers conducting a walk-through of the apartment. Meanwhile, Sanchez told officers that she was at work all day, she has heard about the shooting, and states that “this little boy [Anthony Lopez] apparently was here.” The officers then elicited a timeline of the day from everyone present within the home. Sanchez revealed that Anthony Lopez could have come in through the back door connected to Appellee’s bedroom. This led officers to believe Anthony Lopez could have left evidence in Sanchez’s apartment. The officers asked Sanchez whether they could search. 1 Q. Did you discuss with [Ms. Suarez] the need for the police to search through her apartment? A. I did. Q. When you had that conversation with her was Saul Suarez a suspect in any criminal case related to Anthony Lopez? A. No. At the time in my mind he was a witness. 3 Sanchez gave the officers verbal consent and signed a written consent form for search of the apartment. Officers recovered a shotgun, Glock pistol, bullets, bloody clothing, and cell phone from Appellee’s room. Subsequently, Appellee was charged and indicted with Felony Murder, Possession of a Prohibited Weapon, and two counts of Aggravated Robbery. After Appellee’s motion to sever was granted, the case went to trial on the two counts of Aggravated Robbery. Appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence found during a search of Appellee’s mother’s apartment under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution. At the motion to suppress hearing, Det. Davis—the officer who obtained consent to search—and Sanchez were called to testify. Sanchez testified that although it was her apartment, she had did not have access to Appellee’s room because he was eighteen and “[i]t was his privacy so nobody was allowed to go in there without his permission.” After the motion to suppress hearing, the trial court granted the motion finding that the search was unreasonable because Sanchez did not have actual authority to consent to the officer’s search of Appellee’s room nor did they act under apparent authority. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling, finding that “the trial court did not err in concluding that the officers were not 4 reasonable in believing that [Sanchez] had apparent authority to consent to the search of Suarez’s bedroom.” This Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in finding that the officers did not act reasonably under the Fourth Amendment. II. Applicable Law The Fourth Amendment protects the right of a person “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 1.06 (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures). “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (emphasis added); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless they fit within a previously established exception. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “Voluntary consent is one such exception.” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 448 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165–66 (1974)). “A third party can consent to a search to the detriment of another’s privacy interest if the third party has actual authority over the place or thing to be searched.” Hubert v. State, 312 5 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A third party’s valid authority to consent to a search of another’s property depends on whether they share “common authority” over the premises or property. Id. Although property interests may be relevant to the inquiry, common authority to consent does not run solely on the law of property. Id. Common authority is shown by mutual use of the property by person generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. Whether a consent search is valid is a question of fact to be determined under the “totality of the circumstances.” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 448. “Although consent must be positive, it may be given orally or by action or shown by circumstantial evidence.” Id. However, the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless search when officers reasonably, though erroneously, believe that the consenting individual possesses authority over the premises. Id. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibility to their conclusions of probability. 6 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Apparent authority is determined under an objective standard of reasonableness: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” Limon v. State, 340 S.W.3d 753, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The federal constitution requires the state to prove the validity of the consent by a preponderance of the evidence, while the Texas Constitution requires the State to show by clear and convincing evidence that the consent was valid. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). On appeal, determinations of actual and apparent authority are reviewed de novo as mixed questions of law and fact. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 756. The job of the appellate court is to review the decision of the lower court for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s conclusion and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. We will sustain the lower court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. (citing Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s express or implied determination of historical facts and review de novo 7 the court’s application of search and seizure to those facts. Id. (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). III. Analysis Totality of the Circumstances In considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner under the Fourth Amendment. This Court recognizes that in the context of apparent authority, “reasonableness hinges ʻon widely shared social expectations’ and ʻcommonly held understanding about the authority that co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other’s interest.’” Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 757. Notably, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that, as a general matter, a parent more commonly shares common authority over a child’s bedroom, whereas a child does not ordinarily possess the same authority over a parent’s bedroom. This “hierarchy” was mentioned in Georgia v. Randolph: Unless the people living together fall within some recognized hierarchy, like a household of parent and child or barracks housing military personnel of different grades, there is no societal understanding of superior and inferior, a fact reflected in a standard formulation of domestic property law, that [e]ach cotenant . . . has the right to use and enjoy the entire property as if he or she were the sole owner, limited only by the same right in the other cotenants. 8 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114 (2006). The Supreme Court later elaborated on this hierarchical societal understanding in Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding: As acknowledged by this Court, this principle is based on the “societal understanding of superior and inferior” with respect to the “parent and child” relationship. In light of this relationship, the Court has indicated that a parent can authorize a third-party search of a child by consenting to such a search, even if the child denies his consent. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 399–400 (2009). This Court has further acknowledged the existence of a parental hierarchy in Hubert. This Court stated: Although a determination of joint access, vel non, is always a fact- specific inquiry, under the “common authority” test, where the defendant lives “with a parent or other close relative,” and the relative consents to a search of defendant's bedroom, most courts presume that the relative has sufficient common authority over the bedroom to authorize the consent to search. The defendant may, however, overcome this presumption by presenting evidence that defendant had “exclusive possession of the searched premises.” 9 Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 556. Thus, under our case law, there is a reasonable presumption that, when children reside with their parent(s), the parent(s) have common authority over their children’s bedroom. 2 Here, it is undisputed that Sanchez was Appellee’s mother. Body camera footage documents Sanchez representing Appellee as her son several times to the officers. Det. Davis testified: Q. Did Sylvia Sanchez represent that it was her apartment and that she was in charge? A. She did. I believe she said it was her and her kids that lived there, so I assumed she was the head matriarch of the scene. The officers acted reasonably when they gave substantial weight to the fact that it was Appellee’s mother who consented to the search of Appellee’s bedroom. Officers may reasonably presume Appellee’s mother shared common authority over the bedroom 2 This Court recognizes that there are limitations to when a third party can give officers consent to search another cohabitant’s personal areas such as a bedroom. In Limon, this Court stated: [A] child of eight might well be considered to have the power to consent to the police crossing the threshold into that part of the house where any caller, such as a pollster or salesman, might well be admitted, but no one would reasonably expect such a child to be in a position to authorize anyone to rummage through his parents’ bedroom. Limon, 340 S.W.3d at 757 (citing Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 112 (2006)). 10 unless confronted with facts suggesting otherwise. In this case, the officers were not confronted with any facts that would call the consenting party’s authority into question. In finding the officers’ actions unreasonable, the trial court placed significant weight on the fact that Appellee was eighteen years old. It is unclear whether Det. Davis was aware of Appellee’s age. However, another officer present did have knowledge that Appellee was eighteen—though it is not clear if that knowledge had been shared at the time of the search. Nevertheless, the inquiry does not end simply if officers knew Appellee was eighteen. In Texas, there have been several cases where courts held that parents had authority to consent to the search of their children’s bedrooms residing in the same household even where that child is a legal adult. 3 The 3 In Hubert v. State, 312 at 562 n.33, this Court acknowledged several cases where parents had authority to consent to their adult children’s bedrooms: See Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532 (Tex Crim. App. 1972) (holding that twenty- year-old appellant's mother had authority to consent to a search of son's bedroom where appellant had agreed to pay $10 per week as rent, he had not instructed mother to stay out of his room, and mother "infrequently" entered appellant's room to pick up after him); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (explaining that mother's ownership of the house in which appellant lived was prima facie evidence of authority to let police officers search the house and the fact that appellant was an adult living in a bedroom within that house did not necessarily negate the mother's authority to consent to search room); Turner v. State, 931 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist]. 1996) (holding that appellant's mother had the authority to consent to search of defendant's bedroom; defendant lived with parents rent-free for four years, mother owned the house, appellant's bedroom door was open, mother knocked whenever appellant's door was locked, and there were no restrictions placed on mother's right to enter bedroom); Sallings v. State, 789 11 inquiry ultimately depends on whether a reasonable officer would have objectively believed that the consenting parent retained common authority over their child’s bedroom. Nothing before the officers indicated that Appellee’s role within the household restricted Sanchez’s authority to consent to a search of his bedroom. The body camera footage shows that an officer asked Sanchez if the back rooms are her “kids’ rooms.” 4 Additionally, the prime suspect, Anthony Lopez, was sixteen years old, and Sanchez told officers that “this little boy apparently was here.” These facts further suggest that Sanchez exercised parental authority within the household. Sanchez never informed officers that her son was an adult with a separate living space. Thus, officers could have reasonably believed that, regardless of whether he knew Appellee S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1990, pet. ref'd) (holding that appellant's father had authority to consent to search of defendant's bedroom where house defendant lived in was owned by his parents, room was not locked, and defendant's family was not denied access to bedroom); Grays v. State, 905 S.W.2d 54, (Tex App.—Amarillo, 1995) (holding that defendant's mother had common authority over defendant's room in her house even though defendant paid rent and installed a lock in his room, where he sought her permission to install the lock and gave her the only other key to the room); Willard v. State, 682 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 1984, pet. granted) (holding that defendant's adult son who was living on defendant's property had equal control over use of premises and had authority to consent to a search); Smith v. State, 797 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (holding that mother who was resident of house shared with adult daughter could give valid consent to search premises). 4 Lt. Johnson: I assume you have kids’ rooms back here, too? Sylvia Sanchez: Well, it’s her room and it’s just my son. That’s it. 12 was eighteen, Appellee remained subject to his mother’s authority in a manner consistent with the commonly recognized parental hierarchy. Furthermore, Det. Davis testified regarding his experience in determining who has authority to consent to a search. 5 Q. Generally what is your practice when you ask for consent from people inside a house? When you ask for consent to search, do you go through and ask everybody or do you find a homeowner? How do you go about doing that? A. Generally speaking we’ll find somebody who steps forward and says, this is my home, what do you need here, Officer. And then I’ll converse with them and unless there’s some other person that comes up and contradicts them, then I generally deal with that person who seems to have authority over the grounds. This practice is aligned with the standards for establishing actual authority as courts have recognized that a homeowner can possess authority to consent to a search of a residence. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 109 (holding that a person with authority to consent “might be the householder against whom evidence is sought.”); Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 564 (stating that property interests are relevant to the determination of common authority although not the sole determination). In Hubert, this Court held that Hubert’s grandfather had actual authority to consent to search his bedroom. This 5 Det. Davis testified that he worked for the Bryan Police Department for twenty-eight years and had been in the investigation division for approximately sixteen years. 13 Court relied heavily on the fact that Hubert’s grandfather was the exclusive owner of the house and the only individual with a proprietary interest. Id. In this case, Sanchez appeared to have authority over the apartment. First, Sanchez gave officers verbal consent to search. Det. Davis: There’s been a murder. Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Det. Davis: We don’t know for sure that he’s [Anthony Lopez] involved. Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Det. Davis: But everything’s leading us to here to your home. He’s inside your home. We need to make sure that he didn’t leave a gun or some other weapon or some other evidence from this guy in your home. So, we’re going to request that you give us consent to look to make sure that none of that stuff is in here. Would you be willing to do that? Sylvia Sanchez: Yeah. Det. Davis: We don’t have any choice. This is where he’s at. Sylvia Sanchez: Yeah. Det. Davis: We have to look. Sylvia Sanchez: Ok. Then, Det. Davis further inquired as to whether Sanchez had the proper authority to consent to the search of the apartment while filling out the consent form. Det. Davis: Ms. Sanchez, I’m assuming this is your, you’re the, you’re the uh, the adult here, this is your home? Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Det. Davis: Ok. 14 Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Here, Sanchez confirmed that she was the adult and that the apartment was her home. In confirming this understanding, Sanchez effectively represented that she had the authority over the home though others lived with her in it. 6 It is reasonable that 6 This Court notes that the facts of this case are substantially similar to those in Hubert. Sanchez was also the only individual who held a proprietary interest in the apartment. A copy of the lease shows that only Sanchez’s name is listed. Sanchez testified: Q. When the officers were on scene and they asked whose apartment it was, you very quickly respond and say that it’s your apartment? A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. Yes, uh-huh, because it was mine because I was the one that signed the lease so—as you can see on the lease. I was the head of the household. Q. You were the one paying rent? A. I was the one paying the rent, yes, ma’am. Q. Saul was not paying rent? A. No, Saul was not paying rent. . . . Additionally, it was later determined that Appellee was still in school. Q. How old was Saul back in September of 2017? A. He was 18. Q. Was he in school? A. Yes, he was. Q. What grade? A. He was about—I think in the 11th grade. Furthermore, Sanchez represented well after the fact that she lacked access to Appellee’s room after he was already arrested, but the body camera footage reveals that Sanchez had at least some access to Appellee’s room. As in Hubert, Appellee likely assumed the risk that Sanchez might permit the search of any area of the apartment—including his bedroom. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 564. Thus, the record tends to support a finding that Sanchez had actual authority to consent to the 15 officers could have credibly believed that Sanchez had the authority to consent to a search of the entire abode. 7 The fact that other family members were present in the home does not negate nor qualify Sanchez’s ability to give consent to search the entire apartment. Based on Det. Davis’s testimony, the presence of a single-family unit residing together is a factor officers consider when determining who has authority to consent to a search. Q. Did you ever come across a search of a home or an apartment where there was a bedroom or a separate room that was part of that property that was equipped with a lock? A. Yes. Q. In those situations what have you done? A. Well, that would at least raise a question to me and then I would ask further, you know, questions to the person I’ve already been dealing with. Q. Have you had situations where you’ve searched an apartment where there were multiple roommates? A. Yes. Q. And have you—when it comes to entering each particular roommate’s room, have you gotten multiple people’s consent? A. Under those circumstances multiple. Q. And why is that? A. Because they’re generally not a family unit, they’re like two or three or four different entities of their own source. Like some of these apartments where the students live, they’ll rent them out search of Appellee’s bedroom. Because this is not the question before us, we only address apparent authority. 7 See id. (demonstrating that Sanchez may have had actual authority because she was the one who signed the lease and testified that she was the “head of the household”). 16 one room at a time and they’ll have a general living quarter, but that didn’t seem to be this scenario. Q. Did you have any indication whatsoever on that night that you needed anybody’s permission or consent to search other than Sylvia’s? A. No, sir. In the body camera footage, Sanchez identified everyone in the house as a family unit. She identified Saul Suarez, her son, Jeremiah Contreras, her nephew, Angel Sanchez, her niece, and Geneva, her mother. This was made clear to the officers before consent was given and the commencement of the search. Based on the information available, the officers acted reasonably in obtaining consent solely from Sanchez, despite the presence of other individuals. Moreover, it is noteworthy that Sanchez never limited the scope of her consent. Per Det. Davis: Q. “Did anybody tell you, hey, you can search these rooms, but that’s Saul’s room and you’ll need to ask him for his consent?” A. No. My understanding, we had carte blanch authority to go wherever.” This scenario is similar to Hubert where this Court found that Hubert: assumed the risk that the grandfather might permit the search of any area of the house that he might reasonably suspect the appellant was using for criminal purposes, even including the appellant’s bedroom— at least in the absence of any agreement between the two that would 17 expressly prohibit the grandfather from making such an intrusion, or some other obvious indicium of exclusion, such as a lock on the door . . . . Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 564. Like in Hubert, there was no apparent agreement between Sanchez and Appellee that would have expressly prohibited her from entering the bedroom. From the very beginning, Sanchez authorized the officers to search the entire residence, starting with a walk-through. Lt. Johnson: Anybody else in here? Sylvia Sanchez: No. Everybody else is outside . . . Lt. Johnson: Can I walk through? Sylvia Sanchez: That’s fine. That’s fine, yeah. Lt. Johnson: I assume you have kids’ rooms back here, too? Sylvia Sanchez: Well, it’s her room and it’s just my son. That’s it. Sanchez was aware that Appellee’s bedroom was the primary focus of the search because it was the room where the suspect had been. In fact, Sanchez and other family members informed officers that Anthony Lopez would have gained access to the apartment through Appellee’s bedroom. Furthermore, Sanchez told officers that she saw Anthony Lopez sitting on Appellee’s bed. Sanchez signed the consent form 18 that broadly authorized search of the “apartment”—knowing that Appellee’s bedroom would be included in the area searched. 8 Physical Limitations Nothing about the apartment’s physical condition or design suggested any limitation. Det. Davis testified: Q. Was Saul’s bedroom locked? A. No. Q. Was it equipped with a lock? A. I don’t know. Body camera footage shows that Appellee’s door was wide open and not locked. Officers were able to walk straight into the bedroom without any physical obstruction. Based on his experience, Det. Davis would have recognized that further inquiry would have been required had there been a lock on the door. Q. Did you ever come across a search of a home or an apartment where there was a bedroom or a separate room that was part of that property that was equipped with a lock? 8 Sanchez also signed a consent form granting officers the ability to search the entire apartment. This also, when combined with other facts, supports an objectively reasonable belief by officers that Sanchez had the authority to authorize a search of the entire apartment. I, Sylvia Sanchez, having been requested by Det. S. Davis, of the Bryan Police Department, to permit him/her and his/her fellow officer(s) to search my Apartment located at 1824 Wilde Oak #21 and having been informed by him/her that I do not have to consent to such search and that I have the right to refuse consent to such search, and understanding my rights, I freely and voluntarily consent to such search. 19 A. Yes. Q. In those situations what have you done? A. Well, that would at least raise a question to me and then I would ask further, you know, questions to the person I’ve already been dealing with. Because there was an absence of “some other obvious indicium of exclusion, such as a lock on the door,” the physical condition supports the reasonableness of the officer’s belief at that time. Id. Accordingly, reasonable officers could have also objectively concluded that Sanchez had the authority to consent based on her conduct while inside Appellee’s bedroom. The body camera footage shows Sanchez following officers into Appellee’s bedroom at the time of the search. When officers asked if Appellee took any medications, Sanchez immediately said, “Yes,” and grabbed the medication on Appellee’s dresser. Although the dresser had several other items on it, Sanchez appeared to know exactly where Appellee’s medication was located. Sanchez then handed it to the officers. 9 In Sorensen v. State, this Court held that a mother could consent to the search of her adult son’s bedroom because she had a right to be in the room as “on occasion 9 Sanchez proceeded to say: “He already took them. He takes them right at 7:30, so he already took them.” Sanchez knew the location of Appellee’s medication and had knowledge that he had already taken his medication. This is another indicator that Sanchez had “equal access” to the room. 20 she cleaned the appellant’s room and picked up after him, although it was only infrequently” and “had never been instructed to stay out of his room and it was customary for her to take the laundry she did for appellant into his bedroom.” Sorensen v. State, 478 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). As in Sorensen, this interaction could have led reasonable officers to objectively believe that Sanchez had some access to Appellee’s bedroom based on her familiarity with the location of his medicine—even if she only entered his bedroom on an infrequent basis. Lastly, this Court has recognized that before the Supreme Court of the United States adopted the apparent authority doctrine, a case called Stoner v. California found there to be no valid consent as “there is nothing in the record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner’s room.” State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964)). When the Supreme Court adopted apparent authority “in Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court made clear that the doctrine is consistent with Stoner.” Id. Here, the record reflects several facts that when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, could lead a reasonable officer to objectively believe that Sanchez had authority to consent to the search of Appellee’s bedroom. Further Inquiry 21 In McNairy v. State, this Court narrowed the scope of apparent authority, holding that officers must take further steps to resolve ambiguity when the facts surrounding a third party’s authority are unclear. McNairy v. State, 835 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Under the apparent authority doctrine, an officer conducting a consent search must make reasonable inquiries when “ambiguous circumstances” arise. Thus, when confronted with a situation that does not reasonably appear to be included within the consent obtained, the searching officer must stop and make inquiries as to the continued effectiveness of the consent. Id. at 105 (internal citation omitted). In affirming the trial court’s motion to suppress, the court of appeals held that there the circumstances were ambiguous because it was unreasonable for officers to believe that Sanchez was the matriarch of the family as her nieces, nephews, and mother also lived in the apartment. However, the court of appeals mistakenly treated evidence of a family household as evidence of ambiguity. In McNairy, this Court held that the officers were not reasonably justified in searching appellant’s residence based on the apparent authority of appellant’s landlord. Id. The facts in McNairy are distinct from the facts in this case. In McNairy, this Court relied on a Supreme Court of the United States case, which held that “a landlord cannot normally give effective consent to allow a search of a tenant’s premises.” Id. (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961)). We have no 22 such guidance from the Supreme Court in this case. However, we do have guidance from this Court. In Hubert, this Court has held: Although a determination of joint access, vel non, is always a fact- specific inquiry, under the “common authority” test, where the defendant lives “with a parent or other close relative,” and the relative consents to a search of defendant's bedroom, most courts presume that the relative has sufficient common authority over the bedroom to authorize the consent to search. Hubert, 312 S.W.3d at 563. Thus, a parent or close relative can normally give effective consent to allow a search of a child’s bedroom. It was made clear to officers that Sanchez was Appellee’s mother and other residents in the home were Sanchez’s family members. Based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could objectively believe that Sanchez was the matriarch.10 Therefore, there were no ambiguous circumstances in this case. 10 The body camera footage further supports this conclusion. It shows Sanchez’s mother in a wheelchair and appearing to depend on Sanchez for care. Sanchez told officers: I had to go get her dinner. So, and I asked my son you know, I was going to go get something to eat and I saw him [Anthony Lopez] sitting down on the bed. These statements reasonably conveyed that Sanchez functioned as the matriarch of the household. In these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have no reason to question her authority over the home. 23 Nevertheless, even if these were ambiguous circumstances, further inquiries were made. Before searching, Det. Davis made sure to clarify that Sanchez was the head of the household. Det. Davis: Ms. Sanchez, I’m assuming this is your, you’re the, you’re the uh, the adult here, this is your home? Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Det. Davis: Ok. Sylvia Sanchez: Yes. Furthermore, Det. Davis read the consent form to Sanchez, and Sanchez signed the consent form allowing access to the entire apartment. Det. Davis’s actions were sufficient to determine the continued effectiveness of the consent. CONCLUSION We conclude that a reasonable officer could have objectively believed that Sanchez had authority to consent to the search of Appellee’s bedroom given the facts available to the officers in the moment before the search.11 Thus, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the courts below and remand the case back for trial on the merits. 11 We do not hold that a parent can always consent to search their eighteen-year-old child’s room. This case is based on the facts presented to us, and courts should still look at the totality of the evidence, as we do here, to determine whether the person who consented had authority or apparent authority. 24 Delivered: October 29, 2026 Publish 25