Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. PD-0877-24 DYLAN EUGENE TAYLOR, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS HAYS COUNTY RICHARDSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which SCHENCK, P.J., YEARY, NEWELL, KEEL, MCCLURE, and PARKER, J.J., joined. FINLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which WALKER, J., joined. OPINION Appellee Dylan Eugene Taylor was arrested for two prior warrants after he was encountered illegally parked outside his ex-girlfriend’s house. Before his vehicle was impounded, police conducted an inventory search of his car to find a firearm that Appellee was not in lawful possession of. Appellee challenged the inventory search because it was not performed in perfect conformity with official departmental policy. The question before the Court is whether the appellate court below was correct in requiring strict mechanical compliance with official police departmental policy to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. We reverse the appellate court below and affirm the trial court’s denial of suppression. Background On the evening of November 28, 2020, officers from the Kyle Police Department responded to a 911 call from Appellee’s ex-girlfriend from her home. The ex-girlfriend reported that Appellee, residing almost an hour away in Pflugerville, was sitting in his vehicle outside her house for hours and refusing to leave. At one point, Appellee demanded to know, via text, if there was another man in the home after a FedEx driver delivered a package. Officers Seagraves and Waters arrived and found Appellee sitting in his vehicle illegally parked next to a stop sign facing and in close proximity to the ex-girlfriend’s home. Their entire encounter with Appellee was recorded on police body-worn cameras. 2 At that time, Appellee had two active arrest warrants (of which Appellee was unaware) for the offenses of Stalking and Terroristic Threat. 1 These warrants were based on incidents from a month prior where the ex-girlfriend alleged that Appellee was harassing her to the point she was in fear for her safety. Per his ex-girlfriend’s allegations, Appellee made repeated phone calls and texts from unknown numbers despite her demands to leave her alone and blocking his number. In one such text, Appellee allegedly threatened his ex-girlfriend’s life if she didn’t comply with his wishes. He also allegedly texted a contemporaneous picture of her home as part of the threat signifying that he was nearby. After confirming the existence of the warrants, the officers detained Appellee and placed him under arrest. Since Appellee’s vehicle was illegally parked, Officer Seagraves asked Appellee if a nearby friend or relative could pick it up or if he had a preferred towing service. Officer Seagraves also testified that he wanted to remove the vehicle from the scene to prevent Appellee from having an excuse to return. Appellee wanted to call his mother to pick up the vehicle, but the officers declined 1 For additional context, the State detailed Appellant’s extensive criminal history during a bond hearing. St. Exh. BH1. From 2000 to 2013, Appellant managed to accrue the following notable convictions: Credit Card Abuse, several state felony drug charges, Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by Felon, several Terroristic Threat charges, Assault Bodily Injury, Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon along with another Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by Felon, and Prohibited item in a Correctional Facility. Id. There were two additional arrests for Assault Family Violence in 2018 and 2019, but the charges were either declined or dismissed. Id. 3 because she lived too far away in Pflugerville. 2 Appellee also did not have a preferred towing company. Officer Seagraves subsequently called for a tow truck. Per police department policy, Officer Waters began an inventory search of the vehicle prior to turning over custody to the towing company. Per Appellee’s request, Officer Waters removed Appellee’s keys, wallet, and phone from the vehicle to travel with Appellee while in custody. Upon opening the center console, Officer Waters found a 9mm Smith & Wesson handgun with an aftermarket laser grip. The center console was not locked when Officer Waters opened it. 3 Per standard practice, Officer Waters removed the handgun from the vehicle and had dispatch to run a check to see if Appellee was a convicted felon allowed to possess a handgun or not. Officer Waters 2 Per official department policy, officers must have vehicles belonging to arrestees towed “unless: There is a friend or relative at the scene, and the arrestee wishes to release the vehicle to them, . . . .” (1 CR 19). 3 Per official departmental policy during inventory searches: The scope of the inventory includes all open and closed containers and compartments and any locked containers or compartments as long as the officer has a key. Locked or sealed items shall not be forcibly entered if doing so will damage them. Locked items that are not searched will be noted on the Impound report. In general, the inventory extends to all areas of the vehicle in which personal property or hazardous materials may reasonably be found. (1 CR 22). 4 also obtained the serial number (covered by the laser grip) to have it checked, per standard protocol, as to whether the gun was stolen or not. Officer Waters then placed the gun back in the car and photographed it, per standard practice, so that the photograph could be attached to the final inventory report and show the gun as an item found in the vehicle. During this time, Officer Waters had not yet heard back from dispatch regarding whether Appellee was in lawful possession of the gun or not. Officer Waters testified that, until he had more information, he would operate as if the gun was possessed lawfully. Accordingly, after photographing it, he placed the gun back inside the vehicle’s center console. Officer Waters then continued his inventory search in the back of the vehicle. Because there were a lot of “miscellaneous items,” Officer Waters elected to take pictures instead of itemizing every single item there. Per Officer Waters, taking pictures in such situations was standard practice and would show “the last way we saw the vehicle was [sic], however it was in that picture.” (3 RR 36). Officer Waters testified that all pictures taken, in accordance with standard practice, were then attached to the final inventory report. 4 The inventory report (with all pictures 4 Per official departmental policy: A vehicle inventory report shall be completed whenever an officer assumes responsibility for towing a vehicle, and shall complete an inventory at the location 5 attached) was then printed and included in the Vehicle Inventory Slip given to the tow truck driver taking possession of the vehicle. Another copy of the inventory report was included in the Tow Vehicle Receipt which the officers kept. Although the inventory report was not signed by Appellee, 5 Officer Waters testified that it was “not common practice” to obtain such a signature when the vehicle owner or operator was under arrest. 6 (3 RR 48, 49). As relevant to this case, Appellee was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by Felon under Section 46.04 of the Texas Penal Code. Before trial, Appellee filed his “Motion to Suppress and Dismiss with Prejudice” under the argument that the inventory search leading to the discovery of the firearm was unconstitutional because it failed to comply with departmental policy. The trial court denied where the vehicle was seized unless reasons of safety or practicality require the inventory to take place later. (1 CR 21). 5 Per official departmental policy: The owner or operator of the vehicle shall be asked to remove, if possible, all valuables from the vehicle prior to impoundment. If such items cannot be removed, they shall be inventoried before the vehicle is removed, and the owner/operator shall be requested to verify the completeness of the inventory by signature. (1 CR 21). 6 “But with the body camera and with the tow log and everything else, we generally – we don’t have the arrestee sign the tow log.” (3 RR 49). 6 Appellee’s motion after holding a pretrial hearing. Appellee was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted. Because he had two prior felony convictions, punishment was enhanced to a minimum of 25 years of incarceration. He was sentenced to 30 years incarceration as a habitual offender. On direct appeal, the court of appeals found that the inventory search deviated from police departmental policy. Taylor v. State, 699 S.W.3d 33, 36-41 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2024). Relying on our case law in Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the lower appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion in denying suppression. Id. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. On discretionary review, for the reasons below, we now reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court. Inventory Search Law The Fourth Amendment protects the right of a person “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.06 (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures). “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (emphasis added); Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of 7 the circumstances.” Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable unless they fit within a previously established exception. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “an inventory search may be ʻreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment even though it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause.” Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987). This exception was developed from “three distinct needs: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the police from potential danger.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (internal citations omitted). Thus, as applied to vehicles, case law has accorded a certain amount of “deference to police caretaking procedures designed to secure and protect vehicles and their contents within police custody”—especially where there is no probable cause to believe that evidence of crime is present. 7 Id. at 372; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-12 (1996). 7 In contrast, “when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982). 8 Where there is no probable cause, “an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811. “The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). The inventory search cannot be used as a “pretext for obtaining evidence of . . . violation of . . . penal laws.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-717, n. 27 (1987)). Thus, this Court has held that inventory searches should not “deviate from police department policy.” Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “But in forbidding uncanalized discretion to police officers conducting inventory searches, there is no reason to insist that they be conducted in a totally mechanical ʻall or nothing’ fashion.” Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. As explained by the Supreme Court, “[a] police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and characteristics of the container itself.” Id. “The allowances of the exercise of judgment based on concerns related to the purposes of the inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Accordingly, inventory searches are generally constitutional where there is “no showing that the police, who were 9 following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” 8 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. Analysis Appellee’s case is a long way from the scenario feared by the Supreme Court. Here, there is no sign that Officer Waters “acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.” Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372. Appellee was already under arrest for preexisting warrants, and his vehicle was left without anyone to drive it away. Thus, towing the vehicle to be impounded was the only realistic option. Thus, there was no pretext because Appellee’s vehicle was always going to be towed. An inventory search was inevitable. To the extent that the Appellee complains that Officer Waters did not perfectly conform to departmental policy, we do not think these minor deviations are the type that violate the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. 9 Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. Failing to get a signature and forgetting to ask if Appellee had any valuables 8 But where probable cause exists, ulterior motives will not “invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996). 9 Given that Appellant had warrants for the offenses Stalking and Terroristic Threat against his ex-girlfriend, an argument could be made that police had probable cause to believe Appellant was committing a crime at the time of his arrest. Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261; Whren, 517 U.S. at 811. In fact, Officer Waters testified during the suppression hearing that he believed Appellant was utilizing the vehicle to commit a criminal offense when police responded to the 911 call. 10 (other than his phone, wallet, and keys) are not the kind of deviations that would allow the police to utilize inventory searches as a pretext for criminal investigations. Moreover, it is understandable for police officers to forego obtaining physical signatures from arrestees that are handcuffed at the time of the inventory search. Finally, the totality of this inventory search served its purpose: all of the items within the vehicle were recorded into an inventory report so as to protect Appellee’s rights to his property, protect the police from liability for lost or stolen property, and protect the police from any potential danger. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369. To the extent that not everything in Appellee’s vehicle was catalogued in a written meticulously itemized report, departmental policy did not explicitly require it. We do not think that police officers should have to itemize every gas receipt and gum wrapper found in a vehicle during an inventory search. As the officer performing the inventory search, Officer Waters was “allowed sufficient latitude to determine” which areas of the vehicle to examine closely and which to afford a more cursory inspection. Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. Although not ideal for all cases, it was sufficiently reasonable in this situation that the miscellaneous items in the rear were photographed and attached to the inventory report to demonstrate the condition of the vehicle’s interior and its contents. 11 Conclusion Under a totality of the circumstances, the inventory search of Appellee’s vehicle was reasonable and thus, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Any minor deviations from official departmental policy, under the facts of this case, were not of the character to create a pretext for an ulterior criminal investigation. For these reasons, we reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court. Delivered: October 29, 2026 Publish 12