Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-25-00297-CR KYLE LYNN SHELTON, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 100th District Court Hall County, Texas Trial Court No. 4192, Honorable Dale Rabe, Presiding September 29, 2026 OPINION Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, Kyle Lynn Shelton, appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), one gram or more but less than four grams.1 On appeal, by his sole issue, he claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained through a purported vehicle impoundment and 1 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(c), § 481.102(6). inventory search. We reverse and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. BACKGROUND In late September 2023, Texas Game Warden Zach Fisher encountered Appellant illegally driving an off-highway vehicle (“OHV”) in a remote location on a trail in Caprock Canyon State Park. After running Appellant’s information with the Hall County Sheriff’s Office, Warden Fisher discovered an active arrest warrant for Appellant for criminal mischief. Warden Fisher decided to arrest Appellant based on that warrant. Warden Fisher then had to devise a plan for taking Appellant into custody and securing Appellant’s vehicles. Due to the presence of firearms in Appellant’s possession, he requested assistance from the Hall County Sheriff, Tom Heck, in making the arrest. Once Sheriff Heck arrived, Warden Fisher separated Appellant from the OHV, informed Appellant of the outstanding warrant, and placed Appellant under arrest. Appellant indicated his truck was parked by the river and had a trailer for the OHV. Appellant said he left the keys locked inside the truck because the truck had a digital combination lock on the door, which Appellant could not remember. Warden Fisher asked Appellant if there was anyone who could take possession of the OHV and the truck, but ultimately, Warden Fisher decided they would likely need to impound the OHV and the truck. Sheriff Heck transported Appellant to the Hall County Jail and contacted Deputy Thomas to come assist Warden Fisher.2 When Deputy Thomas arrived on the scene, the officers discussed the situation. Warden Fisher expressed concerns about Appellant illegally hunting with his rifles, and 2 Deputy Thomas, although an experienced law enforcement officer, had been on the job only two days with the Hall County Sheriff’s Department at the time of Appellant’s arrest. 2 he expressed his desire to investigate the truck for evidence of any potential game hunting violations. After these discussions, the officers decided to tow Appellant’s truck. Prior to towing and impoundment, Warden Fisher expressed a desire to perform an inventory of the truck’s contents. To complete the inventory, Appellant’s truck needed to be unlocked by Deputy Thomas. Deputy Thomas realized he did not have his unlock kit and had to travel back to the Sheriff’s office in Memphis to retrieve it. Warden Fisher accompanied Deputy Thomas on the drive and turned off his bodycam. In addition to retrieving his unlock kit, Deputy Thomas stopped to refuel his vehicle. The pair returned to Appellant’s truck an hour and a half later to complete the inventory and impoundment of Appellant’s vehicles. Warden Fisher took out a copy of an inventory form from his truck and began completing it based on his visual observations of the truck.3 Meanwhile, Deputy Thomas, who did not have the inventory form, attempted to unlock the truck. During this process, Deputy Thomas told Warden Fisher he saw a pipe. Deputy Thomas proceeded to unlock the vehicle. Warden Fisher had not seen any such object during his initial visual inspection of the truck’s interior through the windows, and so he asked Deputy Thomas where it was. Deputy Thomas indicated he stood on the driver’s side running board of the truck to attempt to unlock it, and from this new vantage point, looking down at a sharp angle, he could just make out the pipe. At this point, Warden Fisher realized he may need to record the discovery of potential contraband or other items in the vehicle. But, before turning on his bodycam, Warden Fisher removed the keys from the vehicle and deactivated the alarm which had 3 Warden Fisher testified there is a policy to complete a Parks and Wildlife inventory sheet to document any items left inside the vehicle before the vehicle is towed. 3 been triggered by Deputy Thomas’s use of the unlock kit. Then, Warden Fisher turned on his bodycam.4 The officers then closed the truck doors and proceeded with the search of the vehicle. As identified by Deputy Thomas, Warden Fisher repositioned himself to mimic the sharp angle to view and capture images of the glass pipe with black residue inside the driver’s side door pocket. The officers continued to inventory the contents of the vehicle, and Deputy Thomas eventually discovered a baggie of a crystal-like substance in the overhead sunglass holder and drug paraphernalia. The Texas Department of Public Safety crime laboratory tested the substance and determined it was 2.79 grams of methamphetamine. Appellant, already in custody, was charged with possession of a controlled substance. Before trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence found from the search of his truck. He argued the vehicle impoundment was pretextual and lacked legal justification, rendering the search unconstitutional and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The State responded the search was lawful as part of the required inventory ancillary to the legal impoundment of Appellant’s truck. The State also claimed that the impoundment was justified by Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) policy. At hearing, Warden Fisher testified that the purpose of an inventory search is to document any valuables found in an impounded car to make sure all the contents are returned when the police release the vehicle. Warden Fisher also testified that he completed the form provided by the TPWD to document the contents of an impounded 4 Deputy Thomas had not yet been issued a bodycam, and there were no recordings from Deputy Thomas introduced during the proceedings or at trial. 4 vehicle. This form requires the officer to document the specific items of personal property found in the vehicle by listing the items in columns depending on where in the car the officer finds the item. After the hearing, the trial court found that the inventory search was lawful and the evidence discovered in plain view during the inventory process provided further probable cause for the further search of Appellant’s vehicle. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. At trial, Appellant re-urged the motion, which was denied by the trial court again.5 The jury found Appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance. A mistrial was declared during the punishment phase due to jury misconduct. Pursuant to an agreed recommendation by both the State and Appellant, the trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years’ imprisonment which was suspended for five years with community supervision. Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. ANALYSIS Appellant’s sole issue contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence—the controlled substance—discovered during the purported inventory search of his truck. We agree. A motion to suppress is a specialized objection regarding the admissibility of evidence. Moore v. State, No. 07-24-00357-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS 6692, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2025, pet. ref’d) (citing Hall v. State, 303 S.W.3d 336, 342 n.9 (Tex. App. —Amarillo 2009, pet. ref’d)). Such a motion is the proper remedy when evidence is illegally obtained in violation of a defendant’s rights. Id. We review a motion to suppress 5 Appellant also requested a jury charge regarding the acquired evidence. 5 under a bifurcated standard of review: fact findings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and applications of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Ruiz, 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We will sustain the trial court’s application of the law if it is correct on any applicable theory of law, and the record reasonably supports the ruling. Id. We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and reverse the judgment only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Hereford v. State, 339 S.W.3d 111, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Fourth Amendment and the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9. However, a police officer’s inventory of the contents of an automobile is permissible if conducted pursuant to a lawful impoundment of the vehicle, requiring a showing that (1) the driver was arrested; (2) no alternatives other than impoundment were available to insure the automobile’s protection; (3) the impounding agency had an inventory policy; and (4) the policy was followed. See Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Delgado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Tex. Crim App. 1986)). One must remember that an inventory search is warrantless and viewed as an exception to the constitutional requirement for a warrant due to its underlying policy. Taylor v. State, 699 S.W.3d 33, 39 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2024, pet. granted ) ( citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987)). The inventory search must be designed to produce an inventory of the vehicle’s contents and must not be a “ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.” Moskey v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (quoting Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). 6 The State bears the burden of establishing that the police conducted a lawful inventory search. Id. (citing Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). In addition to proving the lawful predicate for impounding the vehicle, i.e. arrest and no reasonable alternatives to impoundment, the State must prove the impounding agency had an inventory policy, and the officers followed that policy. Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46, 50 & n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). The inventory search must be conducted in good faith and pursuant to a reasonable, standardized police procedure “designed to accomplish the ‘caretaking’ function.” Taylor, 699 S.W.3d at 37 (quoting Calhoun v. State, No. 03-16-00691-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4835, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin May 26, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). Our Court of Criminal Appeals stressed the need for compliance when saying to be lawful, “an inventory search must not deviate from police department policy[.]” Taylor, 699 S.W.3d at 37 (quoting Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 195). This requirement ensures that inventory searches are conducted pursuant to standardized procedures rather than as a pretext for investigatory searches. Id. Here, we assume, arguendo, the lawful predicate for impounding Appellant’s vehicle existed and turn our focus to the evaluation of the existence of and compliance with the TPWD’s inventory and impoundment policies. This Court applied Moberg just last year in circumstances somewhat analogous to this record. See id. at 37–41. In Taylor, this Court reversed a denial of suppression where a written departmental policy was in evidence but where the record showed the officer’s inventory became “pro forma and cursory” once contraband was discovered. Id. at 39–41. Because the entire premise 7 for excusing the search warrant requirement is the caretaking rationale itself, this Court held that even under a standard tolerating something less than “totally mechanical” compliance with the department policy, the substantive abandonment of the caretaking function once evidence surfaced was fatal to the constitutionality of the search. Id. at 41. Notably, the panel invited the Court of Criminal Appeals to clarify how much deviation Moberg tolerates but treated the “must not deviate” language as controlling in the meantime. Id. at 41 n.2.6 Taylor at least had a written policy in the record against which we could measure the officers’ conduct clause by clause. This record has no such benchmark. Warden Fisher offered only testimony that “a policy” required towing when no licensed driver was nearby and required completion of an inventory sheet before a tow company received the vehicle. No written policy or standard operating procedure was ever introduced—not at the suppression hearing and not during trial. Warden Fisher testified that whatever governs these procedures resides in internal “General Orders” unavailable to the public. A bare assertion that a policy exists, without proof of its substance, does not carry the State’s burden. Moberg, 810 S.W.2d at 195; Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (requiring standardized criteria or established routine, not an officer’s unadorned say-so). Where the actual terms of the policy are never placed before the court, the reviewing court has nothing against which to test compliance. We cannot know whether the policy required the officers to seek Appellant’s authorization before opening containers, whether it mandated a specific documentation sequence, whether it addressed locked vehicles, or whether it constrained the officers’ discretion at all. This is the precise defect Wells 6 At the time of this opinion, the Court of Criminal Appeals has not issued its opinion in Taylor to clarify the compliance standard articulated in Moberg. 8 condemned, an “uncanalized discretion” masquerading as administrative routine. 495 U.S. at 4. The deficiency here is compounded by the actions of the officers themselves. On cross-examination, Warden Fisher admitted that before undertaking any inventory, he looked through the vehicle’s windows specifically to search for evidence of “hunting violations” or “any violations, basically.” An inventory conducted for that purpose is not “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute,” the touchstone Moberg borrows from Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Warden Fisher’s account places his conduct outside the requirement that the inventory is not a pretext for an investigatory motive, regardless of what the unproven policy might otherwise have authorized. This is reinforced by the sequence in the case. Fisher deactivated his body camera for roughly an hour during the period in which he and Deputy Thomas discussed whether and how to search the vehicle. Additionally, the evidence reveals Deputy Thomas was acting independently of Warden Fisher when he was attempting to unlock the vehicle. Deputy Thomas did not testify regarding his knowledge of or adherence to the TPWD inventory policy, and he is the one that initially discovered the pipe and subsequently the baggie containing the controlled substance. Conduct that trails off into evidence-hunting rather than a substantive caretaking inventory is fatal “even under a standard mandating less than strict or ‘totally mechanical’ compliance.” Taylor, 699 S.W.3d at 41. The State has relied on Evers v. State, 576 S.W.2d 46, 50 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), and Mayberry v. State, 830 S.W.2d 176, 181 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d), for the proposition that a defendant who wishes to attack the substance of a policy or a deviation from it must develop the record. That principle presupposes the State has first 9 made a threshold showing of the policy’s existence and substance sufficient to trigger deference. Where, as here, the State offers only a conclusory description with no written policy, the State is not relieved of its initial burden. In any event, Appellant did develop the record on deviation through Warden Fisher’s own cross-examination admissions regarding his investigative purpose, the body-camera gap, and the absence of any produced policy. Without the policy as evidence, Appellant had nothing further to develop. The State did not prove the substance of a standardized inventory policy. The only officer who spoke to that policy gave testimony affirmatively showing his own conduct was not confined to the caretaking purpose of the policy. The officer who discovered the purported contraband and the controlled substance did not testify to the policy or his compliance with the policy. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence garnered from the inventory search, and this decision fell outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. The trial court’s decision not to suppress can still be affirmed if it is correct under any legal theory applicable to the case. Calloway v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The testimony of the officers implicates the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. The plain-view doctrine is conditioned on the lawfulness of the vantage point from which the officer observes the item. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990). It is not a freestanding license to validate whatever an officer happens to see. Additionally, the discovery of contraband “does not relieve the officer of the obligation to complete an inventory search in compliance with departmental policy.” Taylor, 699 S.W.3d at 39. 10 Here, the officers’ testimony made it clear that the pipe was found after they returned to the vehicle and the inventory search had begun. Deputy Thomas’s vantage point was not independent of the inventory process. He mounted the running board specifically to reach the lock mechanism as part of executing what Warden Fisher purported to be an authorized impoundment and inventory. If the inventory was unlawful because the State failed to establish the existence of a standardized policy and Warden Fisher’s own testimony shows that he was searching for “violations,” rather than performing a caretaking function, then the officers lacked any lawful basis to engage with the vehicle, much less to stand on its running board and peer through the windshield. An officer cannot bootstrap an unconstitutional search into a lawful vantage point simply by locating contraband while conducting it. This also moots the factual dispute Appellant’s brief raises about whether the pipe was truly visible from a normal vantage point; the running-board positioning itself was unlawful from the outset. Because the plain view doctrine strictly requires that law enforcement officers have a lawful right to be in the position from which they view an item, an illegal inventory search nullifies the legality of their presence. Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23 and the Fourth Amendment, any contraband discovered in plain view during an unlawful search is considered fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a); Zepeda v. State, No. 07-03-00135-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10684, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 30, 2004, no pet.) (citing Smith v. State, 542 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)). Because the improper search uncovered the very contraband underlying Appellant’s prosecution also prevents us from deeming the error harmless. TEX. R. APP. 11 P. 44.2(a). Without evidence of the controlled substance, the State faced extreme difficulty proving Appellant possessed the substance. Appellant’s sole issue is sustained. CONCLUSION Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to trial court for further proceedings. Laura A. W. Pratt Justice Publish. 12