Ex Parte Sunil Keshavan Nair v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)
Date FiledAugust 6, 2026
Docket02-26-00218-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-26-00218-CR
___________________________
EX PARTE SUNIL KESHAVAN NAIR
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 4
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1917878
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This habeas appeal arises out of an alleged gold-bar scam that we have
discussed in previous cases.1 In this case, Appellant Sunil Keshavan Nair contends
that the trial court’s setting of a total bond of $15,075,000 on two counts—
$75,000 on Count One and $15 million on Count Two—is excessive. The State
concedes that the Count Two amount constitutes “an exorbitantly high bond”—as it
has done in two other related habeas appeals involving the same trial court’s setting of
bonds in the same gold-bar scam. 2 After reviewing the record, agreeing that the total
$15,075,000 bond amount is excessive, we will reverse.
I. Background
On April 24, 2026, Nair was arrested for engaging in organized criminal activity
(Count One) and financial abuse of the elderly over $150,000 (Count Two). The trial
court set Nair’s bond at $15 million on Count One and $15 million on Count Two.
Arguing that the combined $30 million bond was unreasonable and excessive, Nair
1
See Ex parte Sajwani, No. 02-26-00216-CR, slip op. at 2 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Aug. 6, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing
habeas order denying relief concerning a $7.5 million bond set on Count Two after
the $7.5 million bond on Count One was reduced to $75,000); Ex parte Malani,
Nos. 02-26-00153-CR, 02-26-00154-CR, 2026 WL 2206735, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth July 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing
habeas order denying relief on offenses involving aggregate bonds of $25 million and
$30 million after defendants were indicted as part of the gold-bar scam).
2
See Sajwani, slip op. at 3; Brief for State at 17, Ex parte Charani,
No. 02-26-00093-CR (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 10, 2026).
2
filed a motion to reduce both bond amounts and an application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
The trial court conducted a hearing at which Nair’s daughter and a bail
bondsman both testified. At the hearing’s conclusion, the trial court lowered the bond
amount on Count One from $15 million to $75,000 but denied Nair’s request to
lower the $15 million bond amount on Count Two. Nair has appealed.
II. Discussion
We need not again set forth the general factual overview of the alleged gold-bar
scam or the well-settled governing law and standard of review, all of which we have
now twice stated in our prior related opinions. 3 See Sajwani, slip op. at 6; Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *1–2. Rather, we move straight to analyzing the evidence
presented at the bond-reduction hearing under the governing guidelines. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a); Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849–50 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Chavez v. State, 671 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2023, no pet.).
A. The nature of Nair’s offense and potential sentence
When assessing the reasonableness of a bond amount, the Court of Criminal
Appeals has instructed that the “primary factors” are the punishments that can be
3
We are required to “hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable
but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to” the appeal’s final disposition.
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
3
imposed and the nature of the offenses. See Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849. In this case,
Nair has been charged with serious financial crimes: engaging in organized criminal
activity and financial abuse of the elderly. The State has pointed out that the
punishment for engaging in organized criminal activity is fifteen to ninety-nine years
or life, in prison, Tex. Penal Code § 71.02(a)(8), (b)(2), and for financial abuse of the
elderly is five to 99 years, or life, in prison, id. §§ 32.55(c), (d)(6).
But just as was the case in Sajwani, slip op. at 6–7, and Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *2–3, the evidence presented at the bond-reduction hearing was
weak regarding Nair’s connection to the alleged offenses. The State called no
witnesses at the hearing and offered only one piece of evidence: Nair’s arrest warrant
and the supporting affidavit. Other than stating Nair’s name on page one, the 98-page
arrest-warrant affidavit first mentioned him on page 96 and provided facts specific to
him only on page 97.
The affidavit stated that Nair had bought gold and “took $1 bills from people
off the street and [that] those same people [had] either dropped off gold and cash or
[had] picked up gold and cash.” It further stated that investigators knew that the
$1 bills were “[t]okens of the Hawala network”—a “network for moving cash, gold,
and silver in an untraceable fashion.” Finally, the affidavit alleged that “if people
brought in gold to sale[,] [sic] there was never a transaction recorded and that [Nair]
would negotiate then go get the cash from the owners of Malani’s to pay for the
gold.”
4
As Nair argues in his brief, “Buying gold is not illegal.” [Emphasis omitted.] He
challenges the lack of factual detail in the affidavit and specifically questions the
allegations in the arrest affidavit as compared to the indictment. For instance, Count
One in the indictment reads that Nair “did with the intent to establish, maintain, or
participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination commit the offense of
theft of property, namely money, valued at more than $30,000 but less th[a]n
$150,000, from Clifton Richard, an elderly individual.” Nowhere is Richard’s name
listed in the arrest-warrant affidavit. Nor did the State offer any evidence at the habeas
hearing connecting Nair to Richard.
Similarly, regarding Count Two, the indictment listed 15 specific complainants,
including Richard. And the State offered no evidence at the habeas hearing
connecting Nair to any specific complainant or their allegedly stolen property. In the
State’s closing argument, arguing in favor of keeping the combined $30 million bond
amounts, it argued that the loss amount in the case was “up to maybe $132 million,”
but it did not offer any evidence tying that specific loss amount to Nair individually. 4
Although Texas courts have upheld relatively high bond amounts when the
crimes at issue involve large quantities of off-the-books cash or are connected to a
broader criminal network that suggests the involvement of “monied backers,” see
4
On cross-examination, Nair’s daughter stated that she was aware that the
victims from the case were claiming a $132 million loss. But she specifically testified
that her parents “just work there”—at Malani’s—and “have nothing to do with that.”
5
Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *3 (collecting cases), the State’s affidavit contains little
evidence that Nair was a knowing participant in the larger fraud scheme. We would
expect that the State can—and presumably will—produce significantly more evidence
at trial. But the record that is before us—and that was before the trial court—is sparse
regarding Nair’s participation in the fraud scheme. See Sajwani, slip op. at 11; Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *4.
Accordingly, this bond consideration does not weigh in favor of a particularly
high bond, much less a $15,075,000 collective bond. See Sajwani, slip op. at 11; Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *4.
B. Nair’s lack of criminal history
The State put on no evidence that Nair has a criminal history. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a)(6). Before this case, he had never been arrested and had
never even received a traffic citation. The absence of any evidence of any criminal
history militates against a high bond amount. See Sajwani, slip op. at 11; Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *5.
C. Nair’s citizenship status, community ties, employment record, and medical
issues
We next consider Nair’s citizenship status, his family ties, work record, and
medical issues connecting him to North Texas. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
17.15(a)(7); Rubac, 611 S.W.3d at 849–50. Nair came to the United States in 2012 and
has continuously lived in the North Texas area. When Nair became a United States
6
citizen in 2021, he renounced his Indian citizenship and gave up his Indian passport.
Nair’s daughter testified that he has an American passport—which is in her
possession—and Nair’s counsel offered for it to be held in the trial court’s registry
during the pendency of this case. Notably, the State has not argued that Nair is a flight
risk—either at the bond-reduction hearing or on appeal.
Nair is married and has a wife and son. His mother has lived in the North
Texas area for 40 years and relies on Nair to help care for her. Nair lives with his wife
in a house that his son owns and has maintained stable employment his entire adult
life. Nair does not travel outside of the North Texas area.
According to Nair’s daughter, he lives a modest lifestyle. He has no money or
assets anywhere outside the North Texas area. A typical day consists of going to work,
spending time with his family, and going to medical appointments because of his
serious health issues.
Concerning his health, Nair has a diabetic condition that causes blood clotting
in his eyes and requires repeated surgeries every few months to prevent visual
impairment and potential blindness. Since being arrested—and the trial court’s
refusing to lower both bond amounts—Nair’s diabetic symptoms have worsened
while he has been in jail because the jail does not carry his prescribed diabetes
medication and provides him a generic drug.
These considerations do not support a high bond amount.
7
D. The government’s interests
As in Sajwani, slip op. at 12, and Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *5–6, the bond
conditions related to the government’s interests do not support a high bond amount
either. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a)(1), (5) (requiring court to determine the
amount and conditions “sufficient to give reasonable assurance that the undertaking
will be complied with” and to consider “[t]he future safety of a victim of the alleged
offense, law enforcement, and the community”). The trial court’s bond conditions are
more than adequate to protect the community’s safety and ensure Nair’s appearance
at trial, without the need for an exorbitant bond. See Sajwani, slip op. at 12–13 (first
citing Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *6; then citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
17.028(b); and then citing Ex parte Durst, 148 S.W.3d 496, 501 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (op. on reh’g)).
As a preliminary matter, again, the State’s affidavit does not show that Nair was
aware of the nationwide fraud scheme. But even if he had been aware, the initial bond
conditions—which Nair does not challenge—ensure that he cannot participate in the
scheme if he is released on bond. Those conditions require Nair to, among other
things, (1) fully participate in and comply with the rules and requirements of the
Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD) electronic-monitoring
programs; (2) not leave Tarrant or Dallas County without the trial court’s written
permission; (3) have no contact with co-defendants; (4) not access the internet
without approved monitoring software; (5) surrender his passport to the court’s
8
registry within 24 hours of release; (6) stay 500 feet away from involved jewelry-store
locations; and (7) maintain a job or enroll in full-time school.
The trial court’s bond conditions are thus more than adequate to prevent Nair
from participating in the nationwide fraud scheme while out on bond and to ensure
that he appears at trial. See Sajwani, slip op. at 14; Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *6.
Accordingly, the government’s interests do not support a high bond amount.
E. Nair’s ability to pay
Regarding Nair’s ability to pay the bond amount, the State concedes that the
record supports “a far lesser bond.” See Sajwani, slip op. at 14 (“Whether bail is
oppressive or not depends on the defendant’s financial circumstances; bail is
oppressive if it is set in an amount higher than the defendant can afford for the
purposes of forcing him to remain incarcerated.” (quoting Ex parte Howell,
No. 02-26-00134-CR, 2026 WL 2066046, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2026,
no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication))). Nair and his wife own no real
estate, automobiles, or securities. At the time of the habeas hearing, their joint bank
account contained approximately $41,000, which he characterizes in his appellate brief
as being “every penny to their name.”
Since 2016, he has earned on average around $33,000 per year, starting at
$19,550 in 2016 and earning just over $41,200 in 2025. At the time of his arrest,
9
Malani’s paid Nair $27.50 an hour, and he made around $1,660 every two weeks.5
Malani’s did not provide him with any benefits, including paid time off or health
insurance, and his daughter estimated that Nair paid $600 to $700 a month for health
insurance.
Nair’s daughter testified that his family could collectively raise $40,000 on his
behalf. But on appeal, the State has not even suggested that a bond should be set that
would require all of that money—instead suggesting that the amount on Count Two
should be reduced to $75,000, which is the Count One amount.
The trial court was free to disbelieve Nair’s daughter’s testimony regarding his
finances, but it must not speculate without evidentiary support. See Sajwani, slip op. at
15 (citing Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 789); Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *7. Apart from the
fraud network described in the State’s affidavit—an affidavit that barely mentions
Nair—there is no evidence that he has access to sufficient funds to cover the
$15,075,000 bond amounts.
But even if Nair had an unknown amount of additional wealth, it would not
justify the $15,075,000 bond amounts here. “Just as a defendant’s inability to afford
b[ond] does not, in itself, demonstrate that b[ond] is excessive, a defendant’s ability to
afford [a high bond] in the amount set does not in itself justify b[ond] in that
5
His wife also worked part-time at Malani’s, earning $13 an hour.
10
amount.” Malani, 2026 WL 2206735, at *7 (quoting Ex parte Beard, 92 S.W.3d 566,
573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d)).
Accordingly, we conclude that like the other bond considerations, Nair’s ability
to pay does not support the $15,075,000 bond amounts.
F. Summary
Applying the governing guidelines, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 17.15(a);
Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849–50; Chavez, 671 S.W.3d at 785, we conclude that the
evidence does not support the collective $15,075,000 bond amounts because (1) the
nature of the alleged offense is vague, and the evidence is weak; (2) Nair has no
known criminal history; (3) he is a United States citizen; (4) he has both family and
employment ties to North Texas; (5) he has medical needs better suited for treatment
by his personal healthcare providers outside of the jail; (6) the trial court’s bond
conditions are more than sufficient to protect the community; and (7) his liquid assets
approximate $41,000. Accordingly, after considering the evidence and relevant factors
and affording Nair the presumption of innocence to which he is constitutionally
entitled, we conclude the trial court erred by denying Nair’s application to reduce his
cumulative $15,075,000 bond amounts. See Ex parte Ramirez-Hernandez, 642 S.W.3d
907, 924 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.).
We therefore sustain Nair’s sole issue.
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III. Conclusion
Having sustained Nair’s sole issue, we reverse the trial court’s order on Nair’s
bond-reduction motion and habeas application and remand the case to the trial court
to set reasonable, non-excessive bond amounts. 6 See Sajwani, slip op. at 16; Malani,
2026 WL 2206735, at *8.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: August 6, 2026
6
Because Nair framed his appeal as challenging the collective bond amount, we
do not pass on the propriety of the individual $75,000 amount for Count One—other
than to say that it and the $15 million bond on Count Two collectively constitute an
unreasonable, excessive total bond amount.
12