Christopher Hinton v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket14-25-00906-CR
JudgeAntú
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 19, 2026
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-25-00906-CR
CHRISTOPHER HINTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 458th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 23-DCR-104531A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Christopher Hinton of manslaughter and found that
he used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.
The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. In three issues,
appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction,
contends that the State misstated the law of recklessness during voir dire, and argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain autopsy photographs.
Finding no merit in appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
On the morning of July 31, 2021, appellant was driving his Chevrolet
Silverado 3500 truck home after having it serviced. According to appellant, while
driving home, he became involved in a road rage encounter with the driver of a gray
Volvo. Appellant told police that the encounter began after a lane change and
escalated as the Volvo followed him through the area and toward Highway 59.
Appellant stated that he eventually “jumped on 59, speeding down” in an effort to
get away from the Volvo. He exited Highway 59 at Dairy Ashford and proceeded
southbound on the service road toward the intersection.
The service road had a posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour, and its
rightmost lane was a right-turn-only lane onto Dairy Ashford. Dairy Ashford had
northbound and southbound lanes separated by a grassy median. It was a sunny day,
and there were no “obstructions or impediments” to drivers approaching the
intersection. Appellant’s truck was the only vehicle traveling on the service road,
and he intended to turn right onto Dairy Ashford. Data recovered from his truck
showed that approximately five seconds before the collision, his truck was traveling
93 miles per hour. Appellant then began braking, and the truck’s speed steadily
decreased as it approached the intersection at Dairy Ashford. Appellant later
explained that he looked in his sideview mirror to see whether the Volvo was still
following him and was unsure whether the traffic light was green because, as he put
it, he was “too busy trying to see” whether the Volvo remained behind him. When
appellant attempted to make the right turn onto Dairy Ashford, he was traveling
considerably faster than the speed at which the turn could safely be negotiated. He
lost control of his truck, and his truck left more than 100 feet of skid marks as it
approached the intersection.
A crash reconstructionist estimated that the truck was traveling approximately
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71 miles per hour when it began leaving those marks. By the time appellant reached
the right-hand turn onto Dairy Ashford, his truck had slowed to approximately 49
miles per hour. The reconstructionist calculated, however, that the turn could not be
successfully negotiated above approximately 35 miles per hour. At appellant’s
speed, the reconstructionist testified that it was “physically impossible for him to
make that turn,” and the truck’s momentum continued to carry it essentially straight
despite his attempt to turn.
Meanwhile, traffic on northbound Dairy Ashford was stopped at a red light.
Ray Schilens was driving a silver Honda Accord and was stopped in the leftmost
lane with his fourteen-year-old grandson seated in the front passenger seat. Abayomi
Odutola was stopped in his maroon Jeep in the adjacent lane. Schilens heard what
he described as a “racing engine and squealing tires” and looked up to see appellant’s
truck approximately 50 to 100 feet away. Moments later, appellant’s truck struck the
triangular median separating the turn lane from the service road, crossed the grassy
median, and became airborne over Schilens’ Honda before striking the driver’s side
of Odutola’s Jeep. The reconstructionist estimated that appellant’s truck was
traveling approximately 35 miles per hour when it struck the stationary Jeep.
Odutola died from injuries sustained in the collision.
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Investigators found no evidence of a pre-collision mechanical failure and also
examined appellant’s cell phone and tested his blood for alcohol with his consent.
The phone data showed that appellant had made and received numerous calls and
text messages throughout the morning. Appellant told police that he had been on the
phone with his wife while driving, although the data showed that his last call with
her ended approximately three minutes before the collision. A text message arrived
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at approximately the time of the collision but was not read until later. Appellant also
told police that he had not consumed alcohol that morning. Testing of his blood,
however, drawn approximately three and a half hours after the collision, revealed a
blood-alcohol concentration of 0.063 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood,
with an uncertainty measurement of plus or minus 0.003. The State presented
testimony distinguishing legal intoxication from impairment, explaining that alcohol
may affect a person’s ability to divide attention, track moving objects, steer, and
respond to emergencies even at concentrations below the legal threshold for
intoxication.
The State charged appellant with manslaughter, alleging that he recklessly
caused Odutola’s death by failing to control his speed, traveling at an unsafe speed,
failing to maintain his lane of travel, making an unsafe turn, turning at an unsafe
speed, operating a motor vehicle while using a cellular telephone, or operating a
motor vehicle after consuming alcohol. The jury found appellant guilty and further
found that he used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of
the offense. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment.
Discussion
Appellant raises three issues. He first challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his manslaughter conviction, arguing that the evidence does not
establish that he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death. In his second issue, appellant contends that the State
misstated the law of recklessness during voir dire and throughout trial. Finally,
appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting three autopsy
photographs over his Rule 403 objection. We address each issue in turn.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
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Appellant’s sufficiency challenge concerns the culpable mental state required
for manslaughter, specifically whether the evidence supports a finding that he was
aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death
would occur. We begin with the applicable standard of review and governing law.
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an
individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.04(a). A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the
actor’s standpoint. Id. at § 6.03(c); see Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (“Manslaughter is a result-oriented offense.”).
Recklessness differs from criminal negligence in the actor’s awareness of the
risk. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A reckless
actor perceives a substantial and unjustifiable risk but consciously disregards it,
whereas a criminally negligent actor fails to perceive a risk of which he ought to be
aware. See Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(c), (d). As the Court of Criminal Appeals has
explained, “[c]riminal negligence depends upon a morally blameworthy failure to
appreciate a substantial and unjustifiable risk while recklessness depends upon a
more serious moral blameworthiness—the actual disregard of a known substantial
and unjustifiable risk.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751. The distinction turns on
whether the actor actually perceived the risk, rather than merely whether he should
have perceived it. See id. at 751–53. Whether the actor is aware of the requisite risk
is a conclusion to be reached by the trier of fact from all the evidence and the
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inferences drawn therefrom. See Miller v. State, No. 03-07-00527-CR, 2010 WL
140390, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 13, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); see also Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978). “The issue is not one of theoretical possibility, but one of whether, given
all the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the particular individual on trial
was in fact aware of the risk.” Dillon, 574 S.W.2d at 95. A defendant, however, need
not be aware of the specific risk of another’s death in order to commit manslaughter.
Miller, 2010 WL 140390, at *5.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in
the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d
649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We must not engage in a “divide and conquer”
strategy and must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. See Zuniga v.
State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The trier of fact is the sole judge
of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and it is the factfinder’s prerogative to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910,
914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733; Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We may not substitute our judgment for
that of the factfinder by reevaluating weight and credibility of evidence. Isassi v.
State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Instead, we must defer to the
jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to
various evidence. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
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resolution. Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733.
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against a hypothetically correct
jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging
instrument. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A
hypothetically correct jury charge accurately states the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not increase the State’s burden of proof, and adequately describes
the offense with which the defendant is charged. Id. We consider all evidence
presented to the jury, whether properly or improperly admitted at trial. Thomas v.
State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The law does not require a
particular type of evidence, and we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence,
together with any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. See Johnson v.
State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Sharif v. State, 640
S.W.3d 636, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.).
B. Analysis
Appellant does not dispute that his conduct created a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death or that disregarding that risk constituted a gross deviation
from the applicable standard of care. He argues instead that the State failed to prove
he was actually aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. According to
appellant, the evidence shows only that his efforts to slow his truck came too late to
avoid hitting the triangular median and ultimately the vehicle occupied by Odutola,
not that he was subjectively aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk
of death. We disagree with appellant’s position.
The indictment in this case, presented disjunctively, charged appellant with
manslaughter, alleging that appellant
did then and there recklessly cause the death of an individual, namely,
Abayomi Odutola, hereafter called the Complainant, by failing to
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control speed, traveling at an unsafe speed, failing to maintain his lane
of travel, making an unsafe turn, turning at an unsafe speed, operating
a motor vehicle while using a cellular telephone, or operating a motor
vehicle after consuming alcohol by driving his motor vehicle into and
causing it to collide with a motor vehicle occupied by the Complainant.
Thus, the jury was instructed that it could find appellant guilty of
manslaughter based on several alternative means of recklessly causing Odutola’s
death. See Flores v. State, 536 S.W.3d 560, 576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet.
ref’d). When alternative means for committing manslaughter are submitted to the
jury, proof of any one alternative means is sufficient to support the conviction.
Williams v. State, 473 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet.
ref’d) (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Also,
when the jury returns a general guilty verdict on an indictment presenting alternative
theories of the same offense, as in this case, the verdict stands if the evidence
supports one of the theories charged. Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).
The evidence showed that approximately five seconds before the collision,
appellant was traveling 93 miles per hour on a service road with a posted speed limit
of 50 miles per hour. His truck was traveling approximately 71 miles per hour when
it began leaving more than 100 feet of skid marks and approximately 49 miles per
hour when he attempted the right-hand turn onto Dairy Ashford. The
reconstructionist calculated that the turn could not be successfully negotiated above
approximately 35 miles per hour. Thus, although appellant attempted to slow his
truck, he approached the intersection at an exceptionally high speed and attempted
the turn while still traveling at a speed exceeding that at which it could safely be
negotiated.
The circumstances surrounding appellant’s driving also permitted the jury to
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infer that he appreciated and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death.
Appellant acknowledged that he was driving unsafely but explained that he believed
his conduct was necessary to escape the Volvo during the alleged road rage incident.
Although the jury rejected his asserted necessity defense, it could still consider his
acknowledgment of unsafe driving as evidence that he appreciated the risk
associated with his conduct.
Appellant was asked during his recorded interview with the investigating
officer whether the traffic signal was green. Appellant indicated that he believed
traffic was proceeding straight through the intersection but was unsure of the signal’s
status because he was “too busy paying attention to see if” the Volvo was following
him. The jury could have considered appellant’s acknowledgment of distracted
driving, together with his exceptionally high speed and subsequent attempt to
negotiate the turn, in determining whether he appreciated and consciously
disregarded the substantial risk of death associated with his conduct. See Dillon, 574
S.W.2d at 95; Cooks v. State, 5 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, no pet.); see also Jacobson v. State, No. 14-25-00629-CR, 2026 WL 2239118,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
The jury also heard evidence that appellant’s blood-alcohol concentration was
0.063 approximately three and a half hours after the collision, along with testimony
concerning the effects alcohol may have on alertness, coordination, and judgment.
And although the evidence did not establish that appellant exhibited the effects
described in the testimony, the jury could have considered appellant’s alcohol
consumption together with the other circumstances surrounding his driving in
determining whether his actions were reckless. See, e.g., Fulton v. State, 576 S.W.3d
905, 915 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. ref’d) (noting that other courts have held that
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driving after consuming alcohol or controlled substances without establishing legal
intoxication can establish recklessness); accord Rubio v. State, 203 S.W.3d 448, 452
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he actions of driving under the influence
of alcohol can be used to show a conscious disregard of a substantial risk.”); Buie v.
State, No. 03-02-00280-CR, 2003 WL 21189757, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22,
2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A jury can determine
whether a person’s driving after consuming alcohol and marijuana shows the
requisite disregard for risk without considering whether his consumption of those
substances deprived him of the normal use of his physical and mental faculties.”).
We disagree with appellant’s argument that his attempt to brake demonstrates
that he acted to avoid the danger once he perceived it, thereby negating the requisite
mental state. His argument only focuses on his unsuccessful efforts to slow his truck
down, but does not account for his conduct preceding it. Before attempting to brake,
appellant was traveling at an exceptionally high speed while monitoring the Volvo
rather than the roadway ahead. Although he reduced his speed from 93 miles per
hour as he approached the intersection, he was still traveling approximately 49 miles
per hour when he attempted a right-hand turn that the reconstructionist determined
could not safely be negotiated above approximately 35 miles per hour. Appellant
argues that he did not know the turn’s critical curve speed, but a defendant need not
anticipate the specific risk of another’s death in order to commit manslaughter. See
Miller, 2010 WL 140390, at *5. Rather, the evidence must establish that he
appreciated and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.
His effort to reduce his speed did not necessarily negate the inference that he had
already appreciated and consciously disregarded the substantial risk associated with
his driving. See Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
(concluding that appellant’s conduct demonstrated conscious risk creation despite
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evidence that he locked his brakes before a fatal collision).
The jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant recognized the danger
created by his driving but nevertheless continued his course of conduct, including
attempting the turn while still traveling at an unsafe speed. In other words, the
objective evidence of his speed and manner of driving did not merely establish that
his conduct was dangerous; when considered with his acknowledgment that he was
driving unsafely and distracted, it supported the further inference that he understood
the danger and chose to disregard it.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and giving
deference to the jury’s resolution of reasonable competing inferences, we conclude
that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was
aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death
would occur. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support
appellant’s manslaughter conviction and overrule his first issue.
II. Alleged Misstatements of the Law of Recklessness
In his second issue, appellant contends that the State repeatedly misstated the
law governing recklessness during voir dire and throughout trial. He divides his
complaint into two subparts. First, he argues that the State used “reckless” and
“recklessly” in their ordinary sense rather than as terms carrying the culpable mental
state prescribed by the Penal Code. Second, he alleges that the State improperly
described the standard-of-care component of recklessness using principles
applicable to civil negligence. The State responds that appellant did not preserve
either complaint for appellate review.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party generally must make a
timely objection stating the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity
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to make the trial court aware of the complaint. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The
complaint raised on appeal must also comport with the objection made at trial. See
Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lovill v. State, 319
S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be preserved if
the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at
trial.”). A misstatement of law by the State during voir dire require an objection at
the time the alleged misstatement occurs to preserve the issue for appellate review.
See, e.g., Rogers v. State, No. 05-18-00724-CR, 2019 WL 6606365, at *7 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Salinas v. State, No. 07-00-0093-CR, 2002 WL 1870249, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 12, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Appellant did not preserve either complaint. Although defense counsel
objected during one of the voir dire exchanges appellant now challenges, the
objection concerned a different legal issue. The prosecutor was explaining whether
jurors were required to agree on which alleged reckless act caused Odutola’s death.
After counsel interjected, “[c]aused the death?” counsel objected that the
prosecutor’s statement was “not a correct statement of the law.” The trial court
directed the prosecutor to rephrase. That objection, however, concerned the
prosecutor’s explanation of unanimity as to the alleged reckless acts; it did not alert
the trial court to either complaint appellant now raises concerning the prosecutor’s
use of the terms “reckless” and “recklessly” or her description of the applicable
standard of care. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691–92; see
also Rogers, 2019 WL 6606365, at *7. Because appellant did not preserve either
complaint presented in his second issue, we overrule the issue.
III. Admission of Autopsy Photographs
In his third issue, appellant challenges the admission of three autopsy
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photographs—State’s Exhibits 100, 101, and 102—under Texas Rule of Evidence
403. According to appellant, the photographs were unnecessarily gruesome and
cumulative of other evidence depicting Odutola’s injuries, and their prejudicial
effect substantially outweighed their probative value. The State maintains that the
photographs assisted the jury in understanding the nature and extent of Odutola’s
injuries as described by the medical examiner.
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court is
given wide discretion when deciding admissibility of photographs. Sonnier v. State,
913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court abuses its discretion
when its ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery v.
State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). We may not
substitute our own decision for that of the trial court. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d
622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, even relevant “evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
Tex. R. Evid. 403. “Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant evidence, and the
presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.”
Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. Rule 403 requires both trial and reviewing courts
to analyze and balance “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to
impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop
the evidence; [and] (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Erazo v. State, 144
S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
With respect to the relevance of photographic evidence, the Court of Criminal
Appeals instructs,
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A photograph should add something that is relevant, legitimate, and
logical to the testimony that accompanies it and that assists the jury in
its decision-making duties. Sometimes this will, incidentally, include
elements that are emotional and prejudicial. Our case law is clear on
this point: If there are elements of a photograph that are genuinely
helpful to the jury in making its decision, the photograph is
inadmissible only if the emotional and prejudicial aspects substantially
outweigh the helpful aspects.
Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 491–92.
B. Analysis
The photographs were introduced during the testimony of Dr. Karen Ross, the
medical examiner who performed Odutola’s autopsy. As the State’s first witness,
Ross testified before the jury heard evidence reconstructing the collision. Five
autopsy photographs had already been admitted—State’s Exhibits 95, 96, 97, 98,
and 99—when the State offered the three challenged exhibits. Those earlier
photographs, however, did not fully depict the injuries Ross sought to explain.
Exhibits 95 through 97 concerned identification and the condition of Odutola’s body
when received, while Exhibits 98 and 99 showed an extensive laceration extending
along his left side and back. Although the challenged photographs depicted different
views of the same injury, each revealed additional details. Exhibit 100 illustrated the
depth of the laceration; Exhibit 101 showed its extension beneath the skin and
foreign objects consistent with automobile parts embedded in the wound; and
Exhibit 102 provided a closer view of the damage to Odutola’s lower ribs and spine,
which Ross described as “crushed” and “pulpified.” These distinctions were
particularly relevant to Ross’s explanation that external injuries do not necessarily
reveal the extent of internal damage resulting from blunt force trauma.
The availability of other photographs and Ross’s testimony does not
substantially diminish the probative value of the challenged exhibits. Although
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appellant emphasizes that Odutola’s cause of death was undisputed, the State
remained responsible for establishing that his death resulted from the collision. More
importantly, the photographs illustrated injuries that were not readily apparent from
the earlier exhibits and assisted Ross in explaining their severity. As the Court of
Criminal Appeals has recognized, “[a] visual image of the injuries appellant inflicted
on the victim is evidence that is relevant to the jury’s determination [and the] fact
that the jury also heard testimony regarding the injuries depicted does not reduce the
relevance of the visual depiction.” Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2007) (upholding admission of autopsy photographs showing injuries
discovered during the internal examination of the victim’s body).
Although the photographs were graphic, their disturbing nature resulted from
the injuries they depicted rather than any apparent effort to inflame the jury. See
Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 763. Each photograph accompanied Ross’s explanation of the
injuries and served an identifiable evidentiary purpose. Appellant points to the trial
court’s warning to Odutola’s family before the photographs were published as an
indication of their prejudicial effect. But that precaution does not establish that the
photographs were likely to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis,
and the record does not reflect that an emotional outburst occurred. See Erazo, 144
S.W.3d at 491–92. The time required to present the photographs also weighs in favor
of admission, as appellant acknowledges.
Under the circumstances of this case, the challenged photographs were highly
probative of the nature and extent of the injuries Odutola sustained in the collision.
Their distinct explanatory value, despite depicting different views of the same
general injury, weighed in favor of admission. Considering that value, the limited
number of photographs admitted, and their potential for unfair prejudice, we cannot
conclude that the trial court’s decision fell outside the zone of reasonable
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disagreement. We overrule appellant’s third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Maritza Antú
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Hart, McLaughlin, and Antú.
Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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