Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-25-00906-CR CHRISTOPHER HINTON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 458th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23-DCR-104531A MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted appellant Christopher Hinton of manslaughter and found that he used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. In three issues, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, contends that the State misstated the law of recklessness during voir dire, and argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain autopsy photographs. Finding no merit in appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background On the morning of July 31, 2021, appellant was driving his Chevrolet Silverado 3500 truck home after having it serviced. According to appellant, while driving home, he became involved in a road rage encounter with the driver of a gray Volvo. Appellant told police that the encounter began after a lane change and escalated as the Volvo followed him through the area and toward Highway 59. Appellant stated that he eventually “jumped on 59, speeding down” in an effort to get away from the Volvo. He exited Highway 59 at Dairy Ashford and proceeded southbound on the service road toward the intersection. The service road had a posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour, and its rightmost lane was a right-turn-only lane onto Dairy Ashford. Dairy Ashford had northbound and southbound lanes separated by a grassy median. It was a sunny day, and there were no “obstructions or impediments” to drivers approaching the intersection. Appellant’s truck was the only vehicle traveling on the service road, and he intended to turn right onto Dairy Ashford. Data recovered from his truck showed that approximately five seconds before the collision, his truck was traveling 93 miles per hour. Appellant then began braking, and the truck’s speed steadily decreased as it approached the intersection at Dairy Ashford. Appellant later explained that he looked in his sideview mirror to see whether the Volvo was still following him and was unsure whether the traffic light was green because, as he put it, he was “too busy trying to see” whether the Volvo remained behind him. When appellant attempted to make the right turn onto Dairy Ashford, he was traveling considerably faster than the speed at which the turn could safely be negotiated. He lost control of his truck, and his truck left more than 100 feet of skid marks as it approached the intersection. A crash reconstructionist estimated that the truck was traveling approximately 2 71 miles per hour when it began leaving those marks. By the time appellant reached the right-hand turn onto Dairy Ashford, his truck had slowed to approximately 49 miles per hour. The reconstructionist calculated, however, that the turn could not be successfully negotiated above approximately 35 miles per hour. At appellant’s speed, the reconstructionist testified that it was “physically impossible for him to make that turn,” and the truck’s momentum continued to carry it essentially straight despite his attempt to turn. Meanwhile, traffic on northbound Dairy Ashford was stopped at a red light. Ray Schilens was driving a silver Honda Accord and was stopped in the leftmost lane with his fourteen-year-old grandson seated in the front passenger seat. Abayomi Odutola was stopped in his maroon Jeep in the adjacent lane. Schilens heard what he described as a “racing engine and squealing tires” and looked up to see appellant’s truck approximately 50 to 100 feet away. Moments later, appellant’s truck struck the triangular median separating the turn lane from the service road, crossed the grassy median, and became airborne over Schilens’ Honda before striking the driver’s side of Odutola’s Jeep. The reconstructionist estimated that appellant’s truck was traveling approximately 35 miles per hour when it struck the stationary Jeep. Odutola died from injuries sustained in the collision. 3 Investigators found no evidence of a pre-collision mechanical failure and also examined appellant’s cell phone and tested his blood for alcohol with his consent. The phone data showed that appellant had made and received numerous calls and text messages throughout the morning. Appellant told police that he had been on the phone with his wife while driving, although the data showed that his last call with her ended approximately three minutes before the collision. A text message arrived 4 at approximately the time of the collision but was not read until later. Appellant also told police that he had not consumed alcohol that morning. Testing of his blood, however, drawn approximately three and a half hours after the collision, revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.063 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, with an uncertainty measurement of plus or minus 0.003. The State presented testimony distinguishing legal intoxication from impairment, explaining that alcohol may affect a person’s ability to divide attention, track moving objects, steer, and respond to emergencies even at concentrations below the legal threshold for intoxication. The State charged appellant with manslaughter, alleging that he recklessly caused Odutola’s death by failing to control his speed, traveling at an unsafe speed, failing to maintain his lane of travel, making an unsafe turn, turning at an unsafe speed, operating a motor vehicle while using a cellular telephone, or operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol. The jury found appellant guilty and further found that he used his motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. The trial court assessed punishment at ten years’ imprisonment. Discussion Appellant raises three issues. He first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his manslaughter conviction, arguing that the evidence does not establish that he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. In his second issue, appellant contends that the State misstated the law of recklessness during voir dire and throughout trial. Finally, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting three autopsy photographs over his Rule 403 objection. We address each issue in turn. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence 5 Appellant’s sufficiency challenge concerns the culpable mental state required for manslaughter, specifically whether the evidence supports a finding that he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would occur. We begin with the applicable standard of review and governing law. A. Standard of Review and Governing Law A person commits manslaughter if he recklessly causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code § 19.04(a). A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint. Id. at § 6.03(c); see Britain v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“Manslaughter is a result-oriented offense.”). Recklessness differs from criminal negligence in the actor’s awareness of the risk. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A reckless actor perceives a substantial and unjustifiable risk but consciously disregards it, whereas a criminally negligent actor fails to perceive a risk of which he ought to be aware. See Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(c), (d). As the Court of Criminal Appeals has explained, “[c]riminal negligence depends upon a morally blameworthy failure to appreciate a substantial and unjustifiable risk while recklessness depends upon a more serious moral blameworthiness—the actual disregard of a known substantial and unjustifiable risk.” Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 751. The distinction turns on whether the actor actually perceived the risk, rather than merely whether he should have perceived it. See id. at 751–53. Whether the actor is aware of the requisite risk is a conclusion to be reached by the trier of fact from all the evidence and the 6 inferences drawn therefrom. See Miller v. State, No. 03-07-00527-CR, 2010 WL 140390, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 13, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Dillon v. State, 574 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). “The issue is not one of theoretical possibility, but one of whether, given all the circumstances, it is reasonable to infer that the particular individual on trial was in fact aware of the risk.” Dillon, 574 S.W.2d at 95. A defendant, however, need not be aware of the specific risk of another’s death in order to commit manslaughter. Miller, 2010 WL 140390, at *5. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy and must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence, and it is the factfinder’s prerogative to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733; Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating weight and credibility of evidence. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Instead, we must defer to the jury’s evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to various evidence. Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that 7 resolution. Zuniga, 551 S.W.3d at 733. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging instrument. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge accurately states the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not increase the State’s burden of proof, and adequately describes the offense with which the defendant is charged. Id. We consider all evidence presented to the jury, whether properly or improperly admitted at trial. Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The law does not require a particular type of evidence, and we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, together with any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. See Johnson v. State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Sharif v. State, 640 S.W.3d 636, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). B. Analysis Appellant does not dispute that his conduct created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death or that disregarding that risk constituted a gross deviation from the applicable standard of care. He argues instead that the State failed to prove he was actually aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. According to appellant, the evidence shows only that his efforts to slow his truck came too late to avoid hitting the triangular median and ultimately the vehicle occupied by Odutola, not that he was subjectively aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death. We disagree with appellant’s position. The indictment in this case, presented disjunctively, charged appellant with manslaughter, alleging that appellant did then and there recklessly cause the death of an individual, namely, Abayomi Odutola, hereafter called the Complainant, by failing to 8 control speed, traveling at an unsafe speed, failing to maintain his lane of travel, making an unsafe turn, turning at an unsafe speed, operating a motor vehicle while using a cellular telephone, or operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol by driving his motor vehicle into and causing it to collide with a motor vehicle occupied by the Complainant. Thus, the jury was instructed that it could find appellant guilty of manslaughter based on several alternative means of recklessly causing Odutola’s death. See Flores v. State, 536 S.W.3d 560, 576 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. ref’d). When alternative means for committing manslaughter are submitted to the jury, proof of any one alternative means is sufficient to support the conviction. Williams v. State, 473 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). Also, when the jury returns a general guilty verdict on an indictment presenting alternative theories of the same offense, as in this case, the verdict stands if the evidence supports one of the theories charged. Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The evidence showed that approximately five seconds before the collision, appellant was traveling 93 miles per hour on a service road with a posted speed limit of 50 miles per hour. His truck was traveling approximately 71 miles per hour when it began leaving more than 100 feet of skid marks and approximately 49 miles per hour when he attempted the right-hand turn onto Dairy Ashford. The reconstructionist calculated that the turn could not be successfully negotiated above approximately 35 miles per hour. Thus, although appellant attempted to slow his truck, he approached the intersection at an exceptionally high speed and attempted the turn while still traveling at a speed exceeding that at which it could safely be negotiated. The circumstances surrounding appellant’s driving also permitted the jury to 9 infer that he appreciated and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of death. Appellant acknowledged that he was driving unsafely but explained that he believed his conduct was necessary to escape the Volvo during the alleged road rage incident. Although the jury rejected his asserted necessity defense, it could still consider his acknowledgment of unsafe driving as evidence that he appreciated the risk associated with his conduct. Appellant was asked during his recorded interview with the investigating officer whether the traffic signal was green. Appellant indicated that he believed traffic was proceeding straight through the intersection but was unsure of the signal’s status because he was “too busy paying attention to see if” the Volvo was following him. The jury could have considered appellant’s acknowledgment of distracted driving, together with his exceptionally high speed and subsequent attempt to negotiate the turn, in determining whether he appreciated and consciously disregarded the substantial risk of death associated with his conduct. See Dillon, 574 S.W.2d at 95; Cooks v. State, 5 S.W.3d 292, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); see also Jacobson v. State, No. 14-25-00629-CR, 2026 WL 2239118, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The jury also heard evidence that appellant’s blood-alcohol concentration was 0.063 approximately three and a half hours after the collision, along with testimony concerning the effects alcohol may have on alertness, coordination, and judgment. And although the evidence did not establish that appellant exhibited the effects described in the testimony, the jury could have considered appellant’s alcohol consumption together with the other circumstances surrounding his driving in determining whether his actions were reckless. See, e.g., Fulton v. State, 576 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2019, pet. ref’d) (noting that other courts have held that 10 driving after consuming alcohol or controlled substances without establishing legal intoxication can establish recklessness); accord Rubio v. State, 203 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he actions of driving under the influence of alcohol can be used to show a conscious disregard of a substantial risk.”); Buie v. State, No. 03-02-00280-CR, 2003 WL 21189757, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A jury can determine whether a person’s driving after consuming alcohol and marijuana shows the requisite disregard for risk without considering whether his consumption of those substances deprived him of the normal use of his physical and mental faculties.”). We disagree with appellant’s argument that his attempt to brake demonstrates that he acted to avoid the danger once he perceived it, thereby negating the requisite mental state. His argument only focuses on his unsuccessful efforts to slow his truck down, but does not account for his conduct preceding it. Before attempting to brake, appellant was traveling at an exceptionally high speed while monitoring the Volvo rather than the roadway ahead. Although he reduced his speed from 93 miles per hour as he approached the intersection, he was still traveling approximately 49 miles per hour when he attempted a right-hand turn that the reconstructionist determined could not safely be negotiated above approximately 35 miles per hour. Appellant argues that he did not know the turn’s critical curve speed, but a defendant need not anticipate the specific risk of another’s death in order to commit manslaughter. See Miller, 2010 WL 140390, at *5. Rather, the evidence must establish that he appreciated and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. His effort to reduce his speed did not necessarily negate the inference that he had already appreciated and consciously disregarded the substantial risk associated with his driving. See Aliff v. State, 627 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (concluding that appellant’s conduct demonstrated conscious risk creation despite 11 evidence that he locked his brakes before a fatal collision). The jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant recognized the danger created by his driving but nevertheless continued his course of conduct, including attempting the turn while still traveling at an unsafe speed. In other words, the objective evidence of his speed and manner of driving did not merely establish that his conduct was dangerous; when considered with his acknowledgment that he was driving unsafely and distracted, it supported the further inference that he understood the danger and chose to disregard it. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and giving deference to the jury’s resolution of reasonable competing inferences, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of but consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would occur. We therefore conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s manslaughter conviction and overrule his first issue. II. Alleged Misstatements of the Law of Recklessness In his second issue, appellant contends that the State repeatedly misstated the law governing recklessness during voir dire and throughout trial. He divides his complaint into two subparts. First, he argues that the State used “reckless” and “recklessly” in their ordinary sense rather than as terms carrying the culpable mental state prescribed by the Penal Code. Second, he alleges that the State improperly described the standard-of-care component of recklessness using principles applicable to civil negligence. The State responds that appellant did not preserve either complaint for appellate review. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party generally must make a timely objection stating the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity 12 to make the trial court aware of the complaint. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). The complaint raised on appeal must also comport with the objection made at trial. See Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lovill v. State, 319 S.W.3d 687, 691–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“A complaint will not be preserved if the legal basis of the complaint raised on appeal varies from the complaint made at trial.”). A misstatement of law by the State during voir dire require an objection at the time the alleged misstatement occurs to preserve the issue for appellate review. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, No. 05-18-00724-CR, 2019 WL 6606365, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Salinas v. State, No. 07-00-0093-CR, 2002 WL 1870249, at *4 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Aug. 12, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). Appellant did not preserve either complaint. Although defense counsel objected during one of the voir dire exchanges appellant now challenges, the objection concerned a different legal issue. The prosecutor was explaining whether jurors were required to agree on which alleged reckless act caused Odutola’s death. After counsel interjected, “[c]aused the death?” counsel objected that the prosecutor’s statement was “not a correct statement of the law.” The trial court directed the prosecutor to rephrase. That objection, however, concerned the prosecutor’s explanation of unanimity as to the alleged reckless acts; it did not alert the trial court to either complaint appellant now raises concerning the prosecutor’s use of the terms “reckless” and “recklessly” or her description of the applicable standard of care. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339; Lovill, 319 S.W.3d at 691–92; see also Rogers, 2019 WL 6606365, at *7. Because appellant did not preserve either complaint presented in his second issue, we overrule the issue. III. Admission of Autopsy Photographs In his third issue, appellant challenges the admission of three autopsy 13 photographs—State’s Exhibits 100, 101, and 102—under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. According to appellant, the photographs were unnecessarily gruesome and cumulative of other evidence depicting Odutola’s injuries, and their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed their probative value. The State maintains that the photographs assisted the jury in understanding the nature and extent of Odutola’s injuries as described by the medical examiner. A. Standard of Review and Governing Law We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). A trial court is given wide discretion when deciding admissibility of photographs. Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Under Texas Rule of Evidence 403, even relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Tex. R. Evid. 403. “Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant evidence, and the presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389. Rule 403 requires both trial and reviewing courts to analyze and balance “(1) the probative value of the evidence; (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way; (3) the time needed to develop the evidence; [and] (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 489 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). With respect to the relevance of photographic evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeals instructs, 14 A photograph should add something that is relevant, legitimate, and logical to the testimony that accompanies it and that assists the jury in its decision-making duties. Sometimes this will, incidentally, include elements that are emotional and prejudicial. Our case law is clear on this point: If there are elements of a photograph that are genuinely helpful to the jury in making its decision, the photograph is inadmissible only if the emotional and prejudicial aspects substantially outweigh the helpful aspects. Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 491–92. B. Analysis The photographs were introduced during the testimony of Dr. Karen Ross, the medical examiner who performed Odutola’s autopsy. As the State’s first witness, Ross testified before the jury heard evidence reconstructing the collision. Five autopsy photographs had already been admitted—State’s Exhibits 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99—when the State offered the three challenged exhibits. Those earlier photographs, however, did not fully depict the injuries Ross sought to explain. Exhibits 95 through 97 concerned identification and the condition of Odutola’s body when received, while Exhibits 98 and 99 showed an extensive laceration extending along his left side and back. Although the challenged photographs depicted different views of the same injury, each revealed additional details. Exhibit 100 illustrated the depth of the laceration; Exhibit 101 showed its extension beneath the skin and foreign objects consistent with automobile parts embedded in the wound; and Exhibit 102 provided a closer view of the damage to Odutola’s lower ribs and spine, which Ross described as “crushed” and “pulpified.” These distinctions were particularly relevant to Ross’s explanation that external injuries do not necessarily reveal the extent of internal damage resulting from blunt force trauma. The availability of other photographs and Ross’s testimony does not substantially diminish the probative value of the challenged exhibits. Although 15 appellant emphasizes that Odutola’s cause of death was undisputed, the State remained responsible for establishing that his death resulted from the collision. More importantly, the photographs illustrated injuries that were not readily apparent from the earlier exhibits and assisted Ross in explaining their severity. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized, “[a] visual image of the injuries appellant inflicted on the victim is evidence that is relevant to the jury’s determination [and the] fact that the jury also heard testimony regarding the injuries depicted does not reduce the relevance of the visual depiction.” Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (upholding admission of autopsy photographs showing injuries discovered during the internal examination of the victim’s body). Although the photographs were graphic, their disturbing nature resulted from the injuries they depicted rather than any apparent effort to inflame the jury. See Gallo, 239 S.W.3d at 763. Each photograph accompanied Ross’s explanation of the injuries and served an identifiable evidentiary purpose. Appellant points to the trial court’s warning to Odutola’s family before the photographs were published as an indication of their prejudicial effect. But that precaution does not establish that the photographs were likely to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, and the record does not reflect that an emotional outburst occurred. See Erazo, 144 S.W.3d at 491–92. The time required to present the photographs also weighs in favor of admission, as appellant acknowledges. Under the circumstances of this case, the challenged photographs were highly probative of the nature and extent of the injuries Odutola sustained in the collision. Their distinct explanatory value, despite depicting different views of the same general injury, weighed in favor of admission. Considering that value, the limited number of photographs admitted, and their potential for unfair prejudice, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision fell outside the zone of reasonable 16 disagreement. We overrule appellant’s third issue. Conclusion We affirm the judgment of the trial court. /s/ Maritza Antú Justice Panel consists of Justices Hart, McLaughlin, and Antú. Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 17