John Elwyn Hanson v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed September 17, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00072-CR __________ JOHN ELWYN HANSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 266th District Court Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 23CRDC-00037 MEMORANDUM OPINION On the afternoon of September 28, 2022, Appellant, John Elwyn Hanson, sped down U.S. Highway 67 in Erath County in his Dodge Charger with his passenger and new girlfriend, Cassandra Ripley. The Dodge Charger left dark, rubber tire marks on the roadway as Appellant “[did] doughnuts” with it before speeding past another vehicle at approximately 120 miles per hour. At a curve in the road, Appellant lost control of his vehicle; it left the roadway, flipped, and crashed, coming to rest upside down in a bar ditch adjacent to U.S. Highway 67. As a result, Ripley sustained several injuries. It was later determined that Appellant’s blood- alcohol concentration (BAC) was 0.123 when the rollover occurred. A jury convicted Appellant of intoxication assault, a third-degree felony, as charged in the indictment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07(a)(1), (c) (West 2011). Appellant pled “true” to two enhancement allegations, and the jury found them to be “true,” which enhanced his punishment range to that of a habitual felony offender. PENAL § 12.42(d) (West Supp. 2025). The jury assessed his punishment at seventy- five years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, and the trial court sentenced him accordingly. In nine issues, Appellant contends that a new trial should be granted based on a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, Brady 1 and Article 39.14 violations, newly discovered evidence, and the admission of perjurious testimony. We affirm. I. The Issues Appellant raises nine issues on appeal. They are: (1) The trial court erred and violated Appellant’s right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting testimony from the forensic analyst who tested the blood sample that was obtained from Appellant when the lab technician who performed the blood draw did not testify; (2) The State disclosed “newly discovered material and favorable evidence”—medical records documenting Ripley’s alleged injuries from another vehicular accident—posttrial; (3) Appellant obtained “newly discovered and favorable evidence”—that Ripley could operate a motor vehicle, contrary to her trial testimony— posttrial; 1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 2  (4) Appellant’s due process rights were violated when Ripley allegedly provided material and false testimony, which misled the jury and contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict; (5) The State did not disclose Brady material until posttrial; (6) The State did not disclose Article 39.14 material until posttrial; (7) There was evidence of juror misconduct because an unidentified juror allegedly discussed his “pending verdict” with another unidentified juror before jury deliberations commenced; (8) The interests of justice require either the grant of a new trial or that a new trial hearing be held because of the false evidence presented at trial, the alleged Brady and Article 39.14 violations, and the juror misconduct; and (9) The cumulative effect of these errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. II. Background A. The Crash Ronald Bush was driving on U.S. Highway 67 near Stephenville when he observed a black sedan doing “doughnuts” on the two-lane road. The vehicle then proceeded down the highway past Bush in the opposite direction. The same vehicle soon reappeared, now driving in the same direction as Bush; at first, it drove in front of him, but soon slowed down so much that Bush passed it. Then the vehicle “blew past” him again, speeding ahead toward a curve in the highway, where Bush saw the vehicle lose control and roll into a bar ditch, coming to rest upside down. Bush testified that he was not sure how fast that vehicle was traveling, but he was driving sixty-five miles per hour, and the other vehicle was traveling much faster before it crashed. Bush stopped, called 9-1-1, and exited his vehicle to assist the occupants; Appellant climbed out of the driver’s side of the inverted vehicle and yelled, “Cassandra.” Emergency responders arrived and used power tools to remove Ripley from the vehicle. 3  Trooper Justin Becker, a sergeant with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), was dispatched to the crash site at around 1:00 p.m. that day and observed that Appellant’s vehicle appeared to have left the roadway at the curve and traveled down the bar ditch for approximately 500 feet before coming to rest upside down; the vehicle was severely damaged. With other emergency responders on-scene, Trooper Becker spoke with Bush, who told him that Appellant’s vehicle had been traveling at a very high rate of speed, possibly as fast as 120 miles per hour. Trooper Becker observed that the speedometer on Appellant’s vehicle had frozen and displayed eighty miles per hour, and he testified that this indicated the speed at which the speedometer locked after a heavy impact, which would likely be less than the vehicle’s actual speed when it left the roadway. Trooper Becker also discovered dark, rubber tire marks on the roadway a few miles before the crash location, consistent with Bush’s statement that the vehicle had been performing doughnuts on the highway earlier. Trooper Becker also spoke with Appellant at the scene, who stated he had lost control of the vehicle while maneuvering out of the curve. During their brief interaction, Appellant denied that he had recently consumed any alcohol. Trooper Becker took photographs of the scene and observed that Ripley was strapped to a gurney, receiving medical attention in an ambulance, and she smelled of gasoline. He attempted to speak with her, but she was disoriented. Appellant and Ripley were then transported by ambulance to a hospital in Stephenville. Trooper Becker’s body camera recorded his on-scene investigation. Ripley testified that she had been communicating with Appellant online for about a month before the crash; she met him face-to-face for the first time only days beforehand. Although they had previously met multiple times, the crash occurred during their second “outing” or date together. Appellant came to her house in Joshua around 6:00 a.m. that day, and she testified that around 9:00 a.m. they consumed 4 some butter pecan moonshine that he had brought with him. At around 9:30 a.m., they left her home, Appellant drove around Keene, and proceeded to drive on U.S. Highway 67 toward Stephenville. Appellant stopped at a drive-through liquor store in Glen Rose, where he purchased another bottle of moonshine at around 11:30 a.m.; while in Stephenville, he drove around the courthouse before heading east to Joshua. On their return to Joshua, at one spot on U.S. Highway 67, Appellant did doughnuts on the roadway to “show off.” Ripley testified that Appellant was speeding, and that she asked him to stop doing doughnuts “because he was scaring the crap out of [her].” Although she was not sure how fast he was driving, she testified that he told her later that he had reached up to 160 miles per hour. According to Ripley’s description of the moments before the accident, Appellant sped around a curve and hit a dip in the pavement that caused both driver’s side tires to leave the roadway. Ripley attempted to grab the steering wheel because they were headed directly toward a concrete culvert. She remembered screaming and then blacking out. She testified that Appellant later told her that his vehicle flipped twice and rolled four more times. She woke up in the hospital in Stephenville. Ripley suffered multiple fractured ribs and a head laceration that required nine staples to close. Ripley was released from the hospital later that night; the next evening, according to her testimony as well as her medical records, she suffered a seizure, was hospitalized, and diagnosed with a small brain bleed. Ripley testified that she suffered from numerous other health conditions that she did not attribute to the crash, including type 2 diabetes, neuropathy in her legs, and heart disease. She had a triple bypass CABG heart surgical procedure performed and a pacemaker implanted more than two years after the crash. While she did not claim that these conditions stemmed from the crash, she described other continuing effects from it, such as vertigo, memory loss, pain where her ribs were fractured, and a malformed healed rib that protruded. Ripley testified that, because of her injuries 5 from the crash, “I can’t drive anymore. It’s hard for me to carry on a conversation because of my memory lapses and trying to have to search in my head for the word that I’m wanting to say.” Dr. Jeffrey Hutchins, the Stephenville physician who supervised Ripley’s treatment and treated Appellant at the hospital after the crash, also testified that Ripley’s medical records reflected that she had sustained several fractured ribs, head injuries, and a brain bleed, and suffered from post-accident seizures. Appellant provided some medical history when he was admitted to the hospital in Stephenville; the “patient history” in his hospital records states that he had consumed approximately a half liter of alcohol that day and that his vehicle was traveling at 120 miles per hour before the crash. B. The Blood Draw2 Trooper Becker went to the hospital to continue his investigation, where he again spoke with Appellant. At this point, Appellant admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that morning. Trooper Becker attempted to administer a breathalyzer test to Appellant, but the reading would not register. He thereafter obtained Appellant’s voluntary consent to draw blood 3 and a hospital-provided phlebotomist, Amanda Mickelson, performed the blood draw approximately two hours after the 2 Before the challenged blood draw was obtained, Appellant’s blood was drawn a separate time when he first arrived at the hospital, around 2:15 p.m., as part of standard emergency medical procedure, and his BAC was analyzed for medical purposes. Appellant’s medical records state that he gave verbal consent to be treated and show that his BAC for this blood draw was measured at 161.7 milligrams per deciliter. See Rollins v. State, No. 10–11–00455–CR, 2012 WL 3799222, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 30, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of a hospital blood draw taken for medical purposes where the defendant consented to treatment). Dr. Hutchins testified that he generally would expect that BAC level to impair an ordinary person. Appellant did not object to the admission of his medical records that contained this BAC result, nor did he object to Dr. Hutchins’s testimony. See Subirias v. State, 278 S.W.3d 406, 413–14 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d). 3 At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that Appellant consented to the blood draw. 6 crash. Trooper Becker’s investigation at the hospital as recorded by his body-camera was admitted and played during his testimony. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a “Notice of Defense Objection to the State’s Usage of a Chain of Custody Affidavit and/or a Certificate of Analysis,” in which he expressly reserved his right to confront any witness who was involved in securing and analyzing his blood draws, and he objected to the presentment of any witness “not involved in the scientific testing of any substance at issue in this case.” At several junctures before and during trial, Appellant objected to the absence and unavailability of Mickelson. In support of his objections, Appellant argued that Mickelson’s testimony was crucial to the authentication of the blood draw procedures she followed and the subsequent chain of custody of Appellant’s blood specimen, and her absence made such authentication impossible. The trial court sustained Appellant’s Crawford 4 objection as to Mickelson and stated: “if she’s not here to testify, there’ll be no testamentary documents or evidence submitted under her signature.” Mickelson did not testify, and no such documents or evidence were offered or admitted. Trooper Becker testified that he was present for Appellant’s blood draw, and that he packaged the kit containing the sample and followed the normal procedures that are utilized for sending a sample to the DPS crime laboratory for testing. He testified that he retrieved the kit from the lab after the testing had been completed and brought it to trial. He explained that although he observed the blood draw, he could not “vouch for” the procedures that Mickelson followed. Video footage of the blood draw as shown in Trooper Becker’s body camera was admitted; it showed blood-filled tubes in the kit, and Trooper Becker testified that Mickelson handed those tubes to him after the blood draw was completed. 4 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 7  Sara Giorgianni, a forensic scientist with the DPS crime laboratory in Lubbock, testified that she performed a toxicology analysis on a blood specimen submitted to the lab that corresponded to Appellant’s name. She explained that the specimen she tested arrived in the mail in a blood kit with identifying case number MID-2210-03997, which matched the case number on the kit that Trooper Becker brought to trial. She did not find any irregularities in the kit’s processing, storage, and analysis, nor did she observe any qualities in the specimen that would indicate a discrepancy with its quality. Appellant renewed his objection that (1) Mickelson was not available to testify, (2) Trooper Becker testified that he could not verify the processes followed by Mickelson to draw Appellant’s blood, and his body camera did not record the entire blood draw procedure, and, therefore, (3) Giorgianni could not verify or testify that Appellant’s blood specimen had not been tampered with or that she had received the correct sample. The trial court overruled the objection and permitted Giorgianni to testify that the results of her forensic toxicology analysis showed that Appellant’s BAC was 0.123 when Mickelson drew his blood, about two hours after the crash. She also testified that the BAC result from the hospital’s medical blood draw, taken an hour after the crash, converted to 0.134. On cross-examination Giorgianni agreed that she did not know what methodology Mickelson had used and commented that she works “under the trust system that there was a proper blood draw completed.” C. Motion for New Trial Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he asserted the remaining issues presented on appeal. Posttrial, the State disclosed approximately 1,300 pages of Ripley’s medical records which, Appellant asserts, show that Ripley’s injuries were caused by a subsequent vehicular accident that occurred in September 2023, rather than by the accident with Appellant. 8  According to the State’s verified statement in support of its opposition to Appellant’s motion, in the month prior to trial, it filed a motion for continuance because Ripley was hospitalized following heart surgery. To determine whether it was appropriate to seek a second continuance based on the feasibility and risks of Ripley’s travel and appearance for trial, the State secured a subpoena duces tecum for medical records relating to her most recent hospitalization. Although approximately 1,300 pages were produced pursuant to the subpoena, the State failed to ensure that these records were uploaded to the discovery portal. During trial preparations, the State and Appellant’s trial counsel discussed the existence and purpose of these records, but the State asserted that neither its attorney nor Appellant’s trial counsel were aware that these records had not been uploaded to the discovery portal. Posttrial, Appellant’s trial counsel requested copies of the additional records, which the State provided on March 19, seven days after trial had concluded. The records to which Appellant refers consist of a hospital consultation note from January 2025, when Ripley was hospitalized after falling and losing consciousness. The note states in various places that Ripley’s medical history included a brain bleed and associated seizures from a vehicular accident that occurred in “September 2023.” In his motion, Appellant averred that, prior to trial, he attempted to coordinate an interview with Ripley, and he filed a disclosure request pursuant to Brady and Article 39.14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (West Supp. 2025). Appellant also attached to his motion a crash report created by the City of Burleson Police Department, which indicated that Ripley was the driver in a 2024 vehicular accident, which was contrary to her trial testimony that she had been unable to drive since the accident with Appellant. 9  Finally, Appellant attached to his motion the affidavit of Cynthia Hanson, his wife, in which Cynthia attested that, before juror deliberations began, she overheard an unidentified juror state to another unidentified juror: “[H]e’s guilty. We need to just do this.” Without holding a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for new trial. This appeal followed. III. Analysis To establish that Appellant committed the offense of intoxication assault, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant, by mistake or accident, while operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication, caused serious bodily injury to another. PENAL § 49.07(a)(1). In this context, “‘serious bodily injury’ means injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” PENAL § 49.07(b). A. Confrontation Clause In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas constitution when it admitted testimony from Giorgianni regarding the results of her forensic testing of Appellant’s blood draw because it denied Appellant the right to cross-examine Mickelson, the technician who performed the blood draw. Although Appellant’s complaint includes a challenge under the Texas constitution, he does not assert that the Texas constitution provides any greater protection than its federal counterpart; therefore, we analyze his claim based solely upon the applicable provisions of the United States Constitution. Gilley v. State, 383 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012), aff’d, 418 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 10  In most instances, we review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 742–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999)). This standard also applies to a trial court’s rulings on authentication issues. Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). However, we review legal rulings of a constitutional dimension, such as whether a particular matter is subject to a Sixth Amendment challenge or a statement is testimonial or non-testimonial, de novo. Wall, 184 S.W.3d at 742. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has the right to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)). The Confrontation Clause bars the admission of an absent witness’s statements unless the witness is unavailable, and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross- examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54. The principal concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence to be presented against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in an adversarial proceeding before the trier of fact. Nicholls v. State, 630 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990)). Appellant is correct that the protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause apply to forensic reports, including blood analyses. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 785–86 (2024); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661–63 (2011); Melendez- Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 312 (2009). But the Confrontation Clause does not require “that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1. 11  The Texas courts that have considered this issue have consistently held that when the analyst who tests a blood sample is available for cross-examination, testimony from the phlebotomist who drew the sample for forensic testing and analysis is not required, and the Confrontation Clause is not violated if, as here, the phlebotomist is not involved in the analysis nor did she contribute to the preparation of the report that documented the test results. See State v. Guzman, 439 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.); Mitchell v. State, 419 S.W.3d 655, 661–62 (Tex. App—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d); Adkins v. State, 418 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d); Alford v. State, No. 02-16- 00030-CR, 2017 WL 370939, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, Jan. 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Hall v. State, No. 02-13-00597- CR, 2015 WL 4380765, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We agree with our sister courts’ reasoning. Within his Confrontation Clause objections, 5 Appellant argued that the chain of custody for his blood specimen, as well as the reliability or quality of the specimen as obtained, was not established because Giorgianni was not present for the blood draw and Trooper Becker was not able to vouch for the procedures that Mickelson followed to extract Appellant’s blood. The chain of custody must be adequately preserved. Watson v. State, 421 S.W.3d 186, 190 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d); Mitchell, 419 S.W.3d at 659. It is sufficiently authenticated when the State establishes “the beginning and the end of the chain of custody, particularly when the chain ends at a laboratory.” Watson, 421 S.W.3d at 190 (quoting 5 Unlike in Adkins, in which the appellant explicitly argued that the testimony of the nurse who performed the blood draw was essential under the Kelly test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, see Adkins, 418 S.W.3d at 861–63 (citing Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)), Appellant frames his issue—including his concerns about the blood draw procedures and chain of custody—exclusively as an alleged Confrontation Clause violation. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. 12 Martinez v. State, 186 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d)). If necessary, the State may prove links in the chain with circumstantial evidence. Id. Here, the chain of custody was established at the outset by Trooper Becker’s testimony that (1) he was present for the blood draw, (2) he packaged and secured the kit that contained Appellant’s blood sample and followed the required procedures and protocol by sending it to a DPS crime laboratory for testing, and (3) he retrieved the same kit from the lab and brought it to trial. See Bwondara v. State, No. 02-25-00148-CR, 2025 WL 3723945, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 23, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Mitchell, 419 S.W.3d at 661–62. The blood sample’s chain of custody was completed and further established by Giorgianni’s testimony that the specimen she received and tested arrived in the mail in a blood kit with identifying case number MID-2210-03997, which matched the case number on the kit that Trooper Becker brought to trial. “[P]roof validating the initial and terminal links of the chain of custody supports the admission of evidence absent evidence of tampering, modifying, or commingling.” Qualls v. State, 547 S.W.3d 663, 680 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), disapproved on other grounds by Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); see also Pitcock v. State, No. 11-13-00213-CR, 2015 WL 4722213, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (discussing proof establishing the beginning and end of the chain of custody). Moreover, without proof of tampering, altering, or commingling, gaps or infirmities in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Qualls, 547 S.W.3d at 680; see Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 504– 05 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lagrone v. State, 942 S.W.2d 602, 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 13 1997); Mello v. State, 806 S.W.2d 875, 878 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1991, pet. ref’d). This is especially so when the chain of custody ends at the laboratory, as it did in this instance. Martinez, 186 S.W.3d at 62. And proof of only an opportunity to tamper, alter, or commingle the challenged evidence is not sufficient to mandate its exclusion. Qualls, 547 S.W.3d at 680. Giorgianni testified that she did not observe anything in the specimen that would indicate a concern with its quality. 6 See Adkins, 418 S.W.3d at 862 (holding that the phlebotomist’s testimony was not necessary to establish the quality of the blood sample because the analyst was able to discern its quality independently); see also Hall, 2015 WL 4380765, at *3 (holding that the officer who testified that the proper procedures for a blood draw were followed was not a “surrogate” witness for the phlebotomist because the appellant never had any right to cross-examine her under the Confrontation Clause). She also testified that she did not find any irregularities in the kit’s processing, storage, and analysis. We conclude that the chain of custody for Appellant’s blood specimen was sufficiently established from beginning to end. See Watson, 421 S.W.3d at 190; Martinez, 186 S.W.3d at 62. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and Appellant’s right to confrontation was not violated, when it permitted Giorgianni to testify about Appellant’s BAC results. See Lawyer v. State, No. AP-77,124, 2026 WL 1853845, at *6–8 (Tex. Crim. App. June 25, 2026) (holding that a medical examiner’s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause when she testified about the conclusions that she reached in reliance on the reports and photographs 6 Appellant cites Coulter v. State, which reversed a conviction based on hearsay and confrontation grounds, for the proposition that even formal, admissible evidence must have a sufficient indicia of reliability to ensure its “indispensable fundamental trustworthiness.” 494 S.W.2d 876, 882–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Coulter involved the admission of a crime lab report under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Id. Its pre-Crawford standard has been generally superseded by Crawford’s emphasis on cross-examination, to which Giorgianni was subjected. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (holding that “reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross examination”). 14 gathered by her office and did not testify about or vouch for an absent expert’s report, conclusions, observations, or methods). Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue. B. Motion for New Trial We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Burch v. State, 541 S.W.3d 816, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We do not substitute our judgment for the trial court’s but, instead, determine whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3 (listing the grounds for a mandatory grant of a new trial). “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial [court]’s ruling and presume that all reasonable factual findings that could have been made against the losing party” were made. Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122. When denying a motion for new trial, a trial court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable view of the record could support its ruling. Id. 1. Newly Discovered Evidence In his second, third, and fourth issues, Appellant contends that Ripley’s medical records and the 2024 crash report that the State disclosed posttrial constitute newly discovered and favorable evidence that warranted the grant of a new trial or new trial hearing, and that the admission of Ripley’s demonstrably false testimony about her inability to operate a vehicle after the accident violated his right to due process. The State responds that (1) the late disclosure of Ripley’s medical records was inadvertent, (2) the “material” item Appellant identifies consists of a scrivener’s error or date-transcription error and refers to the accident involving Appellant, which occurred in September 2022, and (3) the 2024 crash report is not inconsistent with Ripley’s testimony nor is it material to any element of the charged offense. 15  A defendant who files a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must show that: (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new evidence is probably true and will probably bring about a different result in a new trial. State v. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d 143, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d 1, 2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)); see CRIM. PROC. art. 40.001 (West 2018). The movant’s failure to establish any of the essential prongs of this test warrants the trial court’s denial of the motion. Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 148– 49; Pinson v. State, No. 11-17-00003-CR, 2018 WL 6722294, at *6–7 (Tex. App.— Eastland Dec. 21, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The use of material, false testimony to procure a conviction violates a defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, regardless of whether the State does so knowingly or unknowingly. Ukwuachu v. State, 613 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); Ex parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). With any claim that alleges the use of false testimony, we must determine whether the testimony was false and material. Ukwuachu, 613 S.W.3d at 156. False testimony is material only if there is a reasonable likelihood that its admission affected the jury’s judgment and was material to their verdict. Ex parte Weinstein, 421 S.W.3d 656, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Ex parte Chavez, 371 S.W.3d 200, 206–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In examining whether testimony was false, the proper inquiry is “whether the particular testimony, taken as a whole, gives the jury a false impression.” Ukwuachu, 613 16 S.W.3d at 156 (cleaned up). To prove this, the record must contain some credible evidence that clearly undermines the evidence presented at trial, thereby demonstrating that the challenged evidence is, in fact, false. Id. As the State points out, substantial evidence was presented at trial that Ripley’s brain bleed and associated seizures stemmed from the September 2022 accident involving Appellant: Ripley and Dr. Hutchins both testified to that effect, and her medical records that were admitted showed the same. Trooper Becker testified that first responders used power tools to dissect Appellant’s crashed Dodge Charger and rescue Ripley, and that she was strapped to a gurney and unable to communicate at the crash scene. Her medical records that were disclosed posttrial show the identical injuries, and state, erroneously, that her injuries resulted from a vehicular accident in September “2023” rather than September 2022. The 2024 crash report shows that a driver with a Joshua address and the same name and birth date as Ripley failed to yield and was involved in a vehicular accident in Burleson, and that no person sustained any injuries. Appellant asserts that this evidence—that Ripley drove a vehicle in 2024—pertains to the contested issues of causation and serious bodily injury because Ripley testified that her injuries were so severe that she “[couldn’t] drive anymore.” The State argues that Ripley made this statement in the context of the lasting effects of her limited mobility that resulted from the fractured ribs and head trauma that she previously sustained and that her poor driving, as demonstrated by the fault assigned to her in the 2024 crash report, is therefore consistent with her trial testimony. The State also contends that the substantial evidence of Ripley’s serious bodily injuries discussed above renders this point immaterial. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude that it was reasonable for the trial court to find that the medical records disclosed by the State posttrial are indicative of a scrivener’s error, and that this error 17 instead refers to the injuries Ripley sustained and that were caused by Appellant’s conduct from the September 2022 accident. See Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 148–49 (requiring that the new evidence must probably be true and will probably bring about a different result in a new trial); Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122. Likewise, it would be reasonable for the trial court to find that the 2024 crash report was neither necessarily inconsistent with Ripley’s testimony nor material to the issues of causation or serious bodily injury and consequently would not likely bring about a different result if a new trial was granted. See Arizmendi, 519 S.W.3d at 148–49; Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122. A defendant has no absolute right to a hearing on a motion for new trial. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, a hearing is not required when the matters raised in the motion can be ascertained and determined from the record, as it can here. Id.; Reyes v. State, 465 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on either new evidence ground advanced by Appellant when it denied Appellant’s motion for new trial without a hearing. See McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 150; Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338–39. Moreover, we agree with the State’s argument regarding Appellant’s due process contentions. Appellant did not establish that Ripley’s testimony that she “[couldn’t] drive anymore,” taken as a whole, gave the jury a false impression, nor did he establish that it was reasonably likely that Ripley’s testimony, if false, affected the jury’s judgment or verdict. See Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122; Ukwuachu, 613 S.W.3d at 156 (requiring testimony used to obtain a conviction to be both false and material to trigger a defendant’s due process rights). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion for new trial on this ground. McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 150. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second, third, and fourth issues. 18  2. Brady and Article 39.14 In his fifth and sixth issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for new trial because the State failed to timely disclose approximately 1,300 pages of Ripley’s medical records and the 2024 crash report. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; CRIM. PROC. art. 39.14(a), (h). Specifically, Appellant asserts that, even if these medical records merely contain a scrivener’s error, this information would have supported one of Appellant’s main arguments at trial: that medical records are not always accurate. He similarly argues that the 2024 crash report would have supplied another potential after-the-fact source of Ripley’s injuries and undermined her credibility. Under Brady, the State has a constitutional duty to disclose to a defendant material, exculpatory evidence. See Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). To establish reversible error based on a Brady violation, Appellant must prove that: (1) the State failed to disclose evidence, regardless of good faith or bad conduct; (2) the withheld evidence is favorable to him; and (3) the evidence is material in that there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Hance v. State, 714 S.W.3d 775, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, no pet.) (citing Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 809); see Ex parte Lalonde, 570 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“Incorporated into the third prong, materiality, is a requirement that [the] defendant must be prejudiced by the state’s failure to disclose the favorable evidence.” (quoting Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006))). The complained-of evidence fails to satisfy the materiality prong of Brady because neither document indicates that the outcome of Appellant’s trial would have been different. See Pena, 353 S.W.3d at 812 (“[T]he defendant must show that, ‘in light of all the evidence, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the prosecutor made a timely disclosure.’” (quoting 19 Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002))). “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have receive