Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00409-CR Joseph Owens Sweed, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas Judge John L. Brick, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 24-01868-CRF-272 JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found Joseph Owens Sweed guilty of the offense of assault on a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). The trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. In two issues on appeal, Sweed alleges that the trial court reversibly erred in admitting extraneous-offense evidence and argues that the trial court violated his rights to due process and to assistance of counsel by restricting defense counsel’s closing argument. We affirm. Extraneous Offense Testimony In his first issue, Sweed argues that the trial court reversibly erred by overruling his objection to Corporal Carswell’s testimony that inmates in Sweed’s housing section “are mostly disciplinary inmates who have committed some form of offense against the detention center’s rules.” We find that Sweed failed to preserve this issue for review. The trial court granted Sweed’s motion in limine, which required the State to approach the bench prior to soliciting evidence related to any “alleged violations of the law.” At trial, immediately following the complained-of testimony, defense counsel requested a mistrial and objected that “this officer has violated the motion in limine. He said the inmate would have committed some sort of offense, which [sic] criminal action. That violates the motion in limine.” On appeal, however, Sweed contends that the testimony was inadmissible because the evidence was irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and improper character propensity evidence in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 404. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403, 404. At trial, Sweed objected solely that the testimony violated his motion in limine, which is insufficient to preserve error for appeal. See Harnett v. State, Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 2 38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). He did not object at trial that the testimony was irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, or improper character propensity evidence. If a party’s argument on appeal does not comport with his objection at trial, nothing is preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We find that Sweed failed to preserve his complaint. Furthermore, even if Sweed had preserved this issue for review, "overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained- of ruling." Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Sergeant Jones was the State’s first witness at trial. He testified without objection that the Special Housing Unit was a designated separate housing area “designed to hold all the offenders that are breaking the rules or that have medical or mental health needs that are going to make them contrary to general population.” Therefore, any error as to the complained-of testimony was cured because the same or similar evidence was admitted elsewhere without objection. Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 3 Moreover, we do not agree with Sweed’s characterization of the testimony as irrelevant evidence of an extraneous offense or bad act by Sweed.1 According to the record, officers were attempting to transport Sweed to a different housing unit. Proper protocol involved placing the inmate in restraints before opening the cell door. In this case, the officer permitted Sweed to walk freely out of the cell door before attempting to handcuff him. The assault occurred when Sweed’s verbal refusal to be handcuffed escalated to physically “actively resisting” being handcuffed. The objected-to testimony was in response to the State’s line of questioning about the reasons that the officer chose to continue to try to handcuff Sweed despite his refusal to comply. The officer agreed that he would be concerned that “inmates in the Special Housing Unit would see a defendant defy officer instructions” without consequences to the offender, explaining generally that such concern would arise from the fact that the inmates in that unit were “mostly” inmates with disciplinary issues. The officer did not identify Sweed as one of the inmates housed in the Special Housing Unit due to a disciplinary infraction or commission of an offense. We agree with the State that Rule 404 was not implicated by this 1 We do not address Sweed’s statement that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403, as this issue was inadequately briefed. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 4 testimony, as it did not allege an extraneous crime or bad act to which Sweed was connected. See TEX. R. EVID. 404; Holmes v. State, 962 S.W.2d 663, 672 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d). Further, the officer’s testimony was relevant to explain that the complainant officer was discharging an official duty when Sweed injured him, which was an essential element of the charged offense and was a contested issue at trial. Accordingly, we overrule Sweed’s first issue. Closing Argument In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the State must prove that the officer’s bodily injury was caused specifically by Sweed’s hand or fist as alleged in the indictment. In his second issue, Sweed contends that the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection that this was a misstatement of the law and argues that the trial court’s restriction of his closing argument denied his rights to due process and to counsel. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. We disagree. A defendant forfeits his constitutional due process complaint if he fails to properly object at trial. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339-40. A defendant’s complaint that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel due to limitations imposed on closing argument is also a forfeitable right. See Gonzales v. State, 301 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. ref’d). Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 5 Here, defense counsel did not argue that the trial court’s ruling violated Sweed’s right to due process or his right to counsel. He simply noted that he was making a “reasonable deduction from the evidence” without mentioning Sweed’s constitutional rights. Further, where the record does not fully demonstrate what counsel would have argued but for the objection, the issue of whether a trial court improperly denied the defendant’s right to make a closing argument in violation of the constitutional right to counsel is not preserved for our review. Price v. State, 870 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994), aff’d, 887 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The record contains no such evidence. Sweed failed to preserve his constitutional complaints for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. We note that even if Sweed had preserved these complaints for our review, any error in sustaining the State’s objection was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Regarding the cause of the complainant officer’s injury, defense counsel’s argument centered on the idea that there were multiple individuals, including other officers, involved in the struggle. He asked the jury to consider whether there was “actual contact that would have caused that pain, or was he contacted at some other point.” It was in this context that defense counsel argued that “if he got hit or bumped any other way and if he got a mark any other way that’s not by the hand or fist, then it doesn’t meet Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 6 the criteria of the indictment.” After sustaining the State’s objection to this statement as a misstatement of the law, the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the argument. See Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 903 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Defense counsel then continued to argue that the State failed to meet its burden of proof regarding whether Sweed caused the injury to the complainant officer. Furthermore, the jury charge authorized Sweed’s conviction only if the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Sweed caused the complainant officer’s bodily injury “by striking him with his hand.” Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, we would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Sweed was not harmed by the ruling, as defense counsel communicated his argument to the jury, the jury was not instructed to disregard the objected-to statement, and the jury charge only authorized conviction if the jury found that Sweed caused the injury by the specific manner and means his defense counsel argued was required. Accordingly, we overrule Sweed’s second issue. Conclusion Having overruled both of Sweed’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 7 ANDREA WESTERFELD OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed Do Not Publish CR25 Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 8