Joseph Owens Sweed v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket10-25-00409-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00409-CR
Joseph Owens Sweed,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas
Judge John L. Brick, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 24-01868-CRF-272
JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Joseph Owens Sweed guilty of the offense of assault on a
public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). The trial court
sentenced him to ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice –
Institutional Division. In two issues on appeal, Sweed alleges that the trial
court reversibly erred in admitting extraneous-offense evidence and argues
that the trial court violated his rights to due process and to assistance of
counsel by restricting defense counsel’s closing argument. We affirm.
Extraneous Offense Testimony
In his first issue, Sweed argues that the trial court reversibly erred by
overruling his objection to Corporal Carswell’s testimony that inmates in
Sweed’s housing section “are mostly disciplinary inmates who have committed
some form of offense against the detention center’s rules.”
We find that Sweed failed to preserve this issue for review. The trial
court granted Sweed’s motion in limine, which required the State to approach
the bench prior to soliciting evidence related to any “alleged violations of the
law.” At trial, immediately following the complained-of testimony, defense
counsel requested a mistrial and objected that “this officer has violated the
motion in limine. He said the inmate would have committed some sort of
offense, which [sic] criminal action. That violates the motion in limine.” On
appeal, however, Sweed contends that the testimony was inadmissible because
the evidence was irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and improper
character propensity evidence in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 401, 402,
403, and 404. See TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403, 404.
At trial, Sweed objected solely that the testimony violated his motion in
limine, which is insufficient to preserve error for appeal. See Harnett v. State,
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 2
38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d). He did not object at
trial that the testimony was irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, or
improper character propensity evidence. If a party’s argument on appeal does
not comport with his objection at trial, nothing is preserved for our review. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
We find that Sweed failed to preserve his complaint.
Furthermore, even if Sweed had preserved this issue for review,
"overruling an objection to evidence will not result in reversal when other such
evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-
of ruling." Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). Sergeant Jones was the State’s first witness at trial. He testified
without objection that the Special Housing Unit was a designated separate
housing area “designed to hold all the offenders that are breaking the rules or
that have medical or mental health needs that are going to make them contrary
to general population.” Therefore, any error as to the complained-of testimony
was cured because the same or similar evidence was admitted elsewhere
without objection.
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 3
Moreover, we do not agree with Sweed’s characterization of the
testimony as irrelevant evidence of an extraneous offense or bad act by Sweed.1
According to the record, officers were attempting to transport Sweed to a
different housing unit. Proper protocol involved placing the inmate in
restraints before opening the cell door. In this case, the officer permitted
Sweed to walk freely out of the cell door before attempting to handcuff him.
The assault occurred when Sweed’s verbal refusal to be handcuffed escalated
to physically “actively resisting” being handcuffed. The objected-to testimony
was in response to the State’s line of questioning about the reasons that the
officer chose to continue to try to handcuff Sweed despite his refusal to comply.
The officer agreed that he would be concerned that “inmates in the Special
Housing Unit would see a defendant defy officer instructions” without
consequences to the offender, explaining generally that such concern would
arise from the fact that the inmates in that unit were “mostly” inmates with
disciplinary issues.
The officer did not identify Sweed as one of the inmates housed in the
Special Housing Unit due to a disciplinary infraction or commission of an
offense. We agree with the State that Rule 404 was not implicated by this
1 We do not address Sweed’s statement that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under
Rule 403, as this issue was inadequately briefed. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896-97 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011).
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 4
testimony, as it did not allege an extraneous crime or bad act to which Sweed
was connected. See TEX. R. EVID. 404; Holmes v. State, 962 S.W.2d 663, 672
(Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d). Further, the officer’s testimony was
relevant to explain that the complainant officer was discharging an official
duty when Sweed injured him, which was an essential element of the charged
offense and was a contested issue at trial.
Accordingly, we overrule Sweed’s first issue.
Closing Argument
In his closing argument, defense counsel asserted that the State must
prove that the officer’s bodily injury was caused specifically by Sweed’s hand
or fist as alleged in the indictment. In his second issue, Sweed contends that
the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s objection that this was a
misstatement of the law and argues that the trial court’s restriction of his
closing argument denied his rights to due process and to counsel. See U.S.
CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. We disagree.
A defendant forfeits his constitutional due process complaint if he fails
to properly object at trial. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d at 339-40. A defendant’s
complaint that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel due to
limitations imposed on closing argument is also a forfeitable right. See
Gonzales v. State, 301 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. ref’d).
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 5
Here, defense counsel did not argue that the trial court’s ruling violated
Sweed’s right to due process or his right to counsel. He simply noted that he
was making a “reasonable deduction from the evidence” without mentioning
Sweed’s constitutional rights. Further, where the record does not fully
demonstrate what counsel would have argued but for the objection, the issue
of whether a trial court improperly denied the defendant’s right to make a
closing argument in violation of the constitutional right to counsel is not
preserved for our review. Price v. State, 870 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1994), aff’d, 887 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The record contains
no such evidence. Sweed failed to preserve his constitutional complaints for
review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
We note that even if Sweed had preserved these complaints for our
review, any error in sustaining the State’s objection was harmless. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Regarding the cause of the complainant officer’s injury,
defense counsel’s argument centered on the idea that there were multiple
individuals, including other officers, involved in the struggle. He asked the
jury to consider whether there was “actual contact that would have caused that
pain, or was he contacted at some other point.” It was in this context that
defense counsel argued that “if he got hit or bumped any other way and if he
got a mark any other way that’s not by the hand or fist, then it doesn’t meet
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 6
the criteria of the indictment.” After sustaining the State’s objection to this
statement as a misstatement of the law, the trial court did not instruct the jury
to disregard the argument. See Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 903 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Defense counsel then continued to
argue that the State failed to meet its burden of proof regarding whether
Sweed caused the injury to the complainant officer. Furthermore, the jury
charge authorized Sweed’s conviction only if the jury found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Sweed caused the complainant officer’s bodily injury “by
striking him with his hand.” Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s
ruling was erroneous, we would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Sweed was not harmed by the ruling, as defense counsel communicated his
argument to the jury, the jury was not instructed to disregard the objected-to
statement, and the jury charge only authorized conviction if the jury found that
Sweed caused the injury by the specific manner and means his defense counsel
argued was required.
Accordingly, we overrule Sweed’s second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of Sweed’s issues on appeal, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
Joseph Owens Sweed v. The State of Texas Page 7
ANDREA WESTERFELD
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Harris, and
Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CR25
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