Full Opinion

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed November 20, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-01506-CR DEGARIUS RAYSHUNN CURRY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F23-70298 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Goldstein, Garcia, and Barbare Opinion by Justice Garcia This appeal arises out of the trial court’s adjudication of guilt after the State moved to revoke appellant’s community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the State’s motion and the trial court adjudicated him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and assessed punishment at fifteen years in prison. Appellant now argues the court violated his rights to due process and due course of law by abandoning its role as a neutral adjudicator, abused its discretion in considering evidence outside the record to determine his sentence, and violated Rule 605 by testifying as a witness in the case. Concluding appellant’s arguments are without merit, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. BACKGROUND In the underlying case, appellant entered an open plea of guilty to a Dallas County indictment for the second-degree felony of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court accepted appellant’s plea, deferred a finding of guilt, and placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for four years. The State subsequently filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt alleging (1) appellant committed a new offense of assault family violence in Denton County (the “Denton County Offense”) and (2) failed to participate in the felony domestic violence course required as a condition of probation. Appellant entered an open plea of true to the allegations. During the hearing, appellant confirmed that he pleaded guilty to the Dallas County offense which alleged that he pointed a rifle at his girlfriend’s head and said, “Bitch, I will kill you. You know what I do when women try to leave me. I break their mother f––– jaw, but I’m gonna kill you.” But when he testified, appellant claimed the witness to that offense coerced his girlfriend into making that statement. He admitted that he never made it out of phase one of the domestic violence course. Appellant also admitted that he was on probation for the new Denton County Offense which involved punching his pregnant girlfriend in the stomach. During direct examination he admitted that his attorney advised that the only way he was likely to be continued on probation in Dallas County was if the Denton County case had been dismissed or a jury found him not guilty. Appellant said he accepted the –2– State’s offer of four years deferred adjudication in Denton County because his attorney did not want to take the case to trial. Appellant also confirmed that he had rejected the State’s offer of ten years in the underlying case and wanted the judge to determine his sentence. The trial judge advised that appellant could be sentenced to two to twenty years in prison. But appellant insisted he was not interested in the State’s plea offer and requested that the court continue his probation in Dallas County. The court admitted appellant’s signed, written, and voluntary plea of true and stipulation of evidence. The court also took judicial notice of the contents of the court’s file and the Dallas County probation file. When the hearing concluded, the trial judge adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed punishment at fifteen years in prison. This appeal followed. II. ANALYSIS A. Judicial Bias Appellant’s first three issues argue that the trial court violated his due process rights under the Federal and Texas Constitutions by abandoning its role as a neutral arbitrator and considered evidence outside the record to determine his sentence. Specifically, he complains that the judge’s comments, questions, and reliance on a probable cause affidavit demonstrate partiality, bias, and improper consideration of matters outside the record. –3– We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Clerkley v. State, 515 S.W.3d 331, 332 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.). The fundamental fairness principles contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the due process principles contained in the Texas Constitution each apply to community supervision revocation hearings. See Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“The central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion in a community supervision case is whether the defendant was afforded due process of law.”). Despite a judge’s wide discretion in determining the appropriate punishment in a community supervision revocation hearing, due process requires the right to a hearing before a neutral and detached body. Grado v. State, 445 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). It is undisputed that appellant’s trial counsel did not object to the trial judge’s questions, comments, or reference to the probable cause affidavit or file a motion for new trial. The State argues that as a result, the issues were not preserved for our review. The Court of Criminal Appeals has not specifically addressed whether an objection is necessary to preserve a constitutional claim of judicial bias. See Brumit v. State, 206 S.W.3d 639, 644–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“We need not decide today whether an objection below is required to preserve an error [of judicial bias] on appeal because the record here does not reflect partiality of the trial court[.]”). –4– And when presented with this question, other courts of appeal have defaulted to assuming without deciding that the issue could be raised on appeal for the first time instead of addressing whether preservation was actually required. See, e.g., Decker v. State, No. 05-18-01259-CR, 2020 WL 614100, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Debord v. State, No. 13- 21-00280-CR, 2023 WL 8642236, at *21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Dec. 14, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Richey v. State, No. 06-25-00111-CR, 2026 WL 366454, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. 10, 2026 no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We follow these decisions here, and assume, without deciding, that the failure to preserve the issues in the court below does not foreclose our review. Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer. See Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 905 (1997)). A neutral and detached judge, however, is not synonymous with a silent observer . Anguiano v. State, No. 05-21-00685-CV, 2022 WL 2914024, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “Absent a clear showing of bias, a trial court’s actions will be presumed to have been correct.” Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645 (internal citation omitted). When a claim of judicial bias is raised, we review the entire record to determine if it shows the judge’s bias or prejudice denied the defendant due process. –5– See Dockstader v. State, 233 S.W.3d 98, 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). “Judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.” Id. Indeed, judicial rulings alone almost never serve as a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion and a trial court’s opinion does not constitute bias unless it derives from an extrajudicial source or reveals such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Avilez, 333 S.W.3d at 675 (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 Ct. (1994)). During the hearing, the court took judicial notice of the court’s file and the probation file without objection. When appellant testified, he confirmed that he pleaded guilty to the underlying offense, which alleged that he pointed a rifle to the head of his girlfriend, who he dated for less than a year, and threatened to kill her. But he then denied that he committed the offense. On cross-examination, the prosecutor also questioned appellant about the details of the Denton County Offense as reflected in the Denton police officer’s probable cause affidavit. Trial counsel did not object to the court or counsel referring to the affidavit. The following exchange occurred: STATE: Okay. All right. And so knowing the medical things she’s been through, that she possibly was having triplets and only having one baby, you felt it was then appropriate to punch her in the stomach? APPELLANT: I never -- so the police report was filed by her sister that was in Plano -- –6– STATE: Okay. APPELLANT: that’s who called the police and made the -- a report. I never knew -- THE COURT: Mr. Curry -- APPELLANT. -- any of this. THE COURT: -- stop right there -- APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: -- because I read that probable cause affidavit for your Denton case. That’s not what happened. APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: That police officer gave an affidavit that your baby’s mother flagged them down after you had assaulted her, and she fled with her five-year-old son. APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: You’re not responsible for anything. APPELLANT: I am. THE COURT: Because you started out with this case right here denying that there was a witness there who interceded in this offense and begged you not to kill this girl. Now you want to tell me that this Denton County victim, her sister, who lives in Plano, is the one who called the police and made the police report. That’s not at all what the officer signed off on. APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: He was flagged down and had to take your pregnant girlfriend to the hospital. APPELLANT: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Where she was bleeding. –7– Later, the court said, “You got a history of family violence,” and asked “How are you gonna be successful on probation when, number one, you never done anything wrong?” Appellant argues that the court’s reliance on an outside affidavit to contradict him “aligned the court with the prosecution’s theory.” He further argues that suggesting that he was lying, together with categorical characterizations of his history and character reflect the court’s view of the merits. We disagree. Appellant offers no support for his assertion that the Denton County probable cause affidavit constitutes extrajudicial information. Although the affidavit is not part of our record, the court took judicial notice of the court file and the probation file without objection. Appellant testified that he delivered the documentation from the Denton County case to his Dallas probation officer, so it is reasonable to presume that information was included in the probation file. Appellant admitted that he pleaded guilty to the Denton County Offense and that offense was one of the two probation violations the court was considering. The affidavit was referenced by the prosecutor and the court without objection. There is nothing to establish that the judge obtained “knowledge that the subject ought not to possess.” See McDaniel v. State, No. 05-15-01086-CR, 2016 WL 7473902, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 29, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op. not designated for publication). Thus, there is no basis to characterize the affidavit as extrajudicial information. –8– Moreover, the Denton County Offense was relevant to sentencing. The Code of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that, regardless of the plea and whether punishment is assessed by the judge or a jury, “evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 3. Such evidence may include a defendant’s prior record, his general reputation, his character, opinions as to his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and extraneous offenses that are shown to be committed by him. Id. In the punishment phase of a trial, determining what is relevant “should be a question of what is helpful to the [factfinder] in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case.” Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Whether appellant violated the conditions of probation by committing the Denton County offense was relevant to determining his sentence. Likewise, the judge’s comments and questions do not support a claim of bias. A trial judge is permitted to question a witness, including a defendant, to seek information, clarify a point, or to obtain a clearer idea of the merits of the case. Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Moreno v. State, 900 S.W.2d 357, 359 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, no pet.); White v. State, No. 05-17- 00397-CR, 2018 WL 1940515, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 25, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In a bench trial, a judge may go beyond –9– asking for mere clarification and ask questions that an advocate might ask in order to assist the fact-finding process. Moreno, 900 S.W.2d at 359–60. Although appellant pleaded true to the allegations in the motion to revoke, he then denied committing the Denton County Offense. The court’s questioning was relevant to whether the court accepted appellant’s plea of true. The information was also relevant to the court’s assessment of appellant’s credibility and whether to grant appellant’s request that his probation be continued. The record reflects that the judge’s comments and opinions formed were based on facts and events occurring during the proceeding. There is no suggestion of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. See Crowe v. State, No. 05-18-01544-CR, 2021 WL 2410681, at *8 (Tex. App.— Dallas June 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Finally, there is no indication that the judge did not consider the full range of punishment. The court advised appellant of the punishment range when the hearing began and did not suggest that she had predetermined appellant’s sentence. Instead, the judge heard all the evidence before making a decision. Absent of any indication the court did not consider the full range of punishment, we must presume the court was fair and impartial. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645. Appellant’s first three issues are overruled. –10– B. Rule 605 Appellant’s fourth issue argues the trial court violated TEX. R. EVID. 605 by testifying as a witness in the case. Appellant generally complains that “the majority of the court’s comments either established new facts or barraged appellant with contempt.” He specifically points to the judge’s question about whether the Denton County victim had to flag down an officer and be taken to the hospital. Rule 605 provides that “[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point.” TEX. R. EVID. 605. In reviewing whether the trial court violated Rule 605, the question is whether the judge’s statements of fact are essential to its judicial function or are the functional equivalent of witness testimony. Hammond v. State, 799 S.W.2d 741, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see also Lawrence v. State, No. 05-10-00083-CR, 2011 WL 1494035, *3–6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 20, 2011, pet. ref’d (mem. op., not designated for publication). Statements related to the court’s judicial function do not violate Rule 605. See, e.g., Hammond, 799 S.W.2d at 946–47; Lawrence, 2011 WL 1494035 at *3–4. Judicial rulings and explanations of judicial rulings do not constitute testimony. Id. at *4. In the present case, we cannot conclude the judge’s questions and comments fell outside the court’s judicial function in violation of Rule 605. The judge was charged with developing facts to inform her exercise of discretion. See Hill v. State, No. 05-10445-CR, 2016 WL 1554932, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14, 2016 –11– no pet.). The contents of the affidavit that formed the basis for the judge’s questions were relevant to the adjudication and whether the court accepted appellant’s plea. The judge’s comment questioning appellant’s credibility was also within her purview as the fact finder. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555. The court’s question about appellant’s likelihood of success on probation was also not the functional equivalent of witness testimony. Rather, it explained the court’s reasoning for appellant’s sentence. See Hill, 2016 WL 1554932, at *7–8. Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s questions and comments during the revocation hearing overcame the presumption that she acted as a neutral and detached hearing officer. See Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645. Appellant’s fourth issue is overruled. III. CONCLUSION Having resolved appellant’s four issues against him, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. /Dennise Garcia/ DENNISE GARCIA JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) –12–