Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-25-00910-CR Jenner Ramirez, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-DC-25-904083, THE HONORABLE CHANTAL ELDRIDGE, JUDGE PRESIDING ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM Jenner Ramirez was charged with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child, one count of super aggravated sexual assault of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and two counts of indecency with a child by contact. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.02, .11, 22.021. The State abandoned the first two counts after presenting its evidence. At the end of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found Ramirez guilty of the two counts of aggravated sexual assault and of one of the counts of indecency with a child. During the punishment hearing, the jury assessed his punishment at 99 years’ imprisonment for the two counts of aggravated sexual assault and at 15 years’ imprisonment for the indecency count. After the trial court read the jury’s verdicts, it informed the jury that their service was concluded and released the jury. Although the trial court later entered written judgment of conviction sentencing Ramirez consistent with the jury’s verdicts, the trial court never formally orally pronounced sentence. Ramirez appealed his convictions. In his brief, he argues that the case should be remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to orally pronounce sentence. Subsequently, the State filed a motion to abate and remand the appeal for the same reason. We agree with Ramirez and the State. Although there is similarity between the two acts, the legislature codified two requirements that must be performed in the presence of the defendant at the end of a jury trial: (1) reading a punishment verdict and (2) pronouncing sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 37.04, .06, 42.03, .14. After a jury assesses a defendant’s sentence, the trial court imposes the sentence. See id. arts. 37.01 (explaining that verdict is written declaration by jury of its decision), 42.01, § 1 (stating that judgment is written declaration by trial court showing conviction or acquittal of defendant and that sentence will be based on information in judgment), .02 (noting that sentence is part of judgment ordering punishment to be carried into execution). Additionally, with certain statutory exceptions, courts must orally pronounce the sentence in the defendant’s presence. See id. arts. 42.03, § 1(a), .14; Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.04 (noting that jury verdict may be “read aloud by the judge, the foreman, or the clerk”). A trial court’s reading of the jury’s sentencing verdict does not satisfy the requirement that a defendant’s sentence be pronounced by the trial court. See Ette v. State, 559 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (distinguishing between trial court’s reading of jury’s verdict and its later oral pronouncement of judgment); see also Bradshaw v. State, Nos. 03-24-00091—00093-CR, 2024 WL 3470638, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2024, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that reading jury’s punishment 2 verdicts in open court with defendant present and stating that it “accept the jury’s verdict[s]” “does not qualify as a pronouncement of sentence”); Edic v. State, Nos. 03-17-00788—00789- CR, 2018 WL 2123465, at *1–2 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2018, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding that trial court’s using similar language “failed to orally pronounce [defendant]’s sentences in his presence”); Frias v. State, No. 03-12-00463-CR, 2014 WL 1362639, at *1-2 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 4, 2014, order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (abating appeal for oral pronouncement where trial court read jury’s verdict but did not pronounce sentence). “[I]t is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable event, and the written sentence or order simply memorializes it and should comport therewith.” Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is merely a written manifestation of that oral pronouncement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.01, § 1; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135. If no sentence was ever rendered, there is no valid judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting that “[p]unishment and sentence are incorporated in the judgment” and that “‘sentence is a necessary component of a “judgment of conviction”’” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 862 (1985))). Without a valid judgment, there is no “conviction” for a defendant to appeal. See Thompson, 108 S.W.3d at 290. In this case, because the trial court failed to orally pronounce Ramirez’s sentence in his presence, no valid judgment yet exists, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over his appeal. See Keys v. State, 340 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (concluding that trial court’s failure to orally pronounce defendant’s sentence deprived court of 3 appeals of jurisdiction); Meachum v. State, 273 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (same); see also State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (explaining that jurisdiction is threshold issue and may not be ignored), overruled on other ground by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Atlhough this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, that does not require us to dismiss the appeal in these circumstances. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that we not dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s omission can be corrected. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.4. Here, the trial court’s omission can be corrected by allowing the trial court to orally pronounce Ramirez’s sentence with him present. Accordingly, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for the trial court to orally pronounce the jury’s sentence in open court with Ramirez present. See id.; see also Keys, 340 S.W.3d at 529 (abating appeal and remanding cause to trial court to orally pronounce sentence assessed by jury in defendant’s presence); Meachum, 273 S.W.3d at 806 (same). On remand, the trial court is directed to cause notice of a hearing to be given and, thereafter, formally orally pronounce the sentence assessed by the jury in Ramirez’s presence. The new sentencing hearing is to be held within 30 days of the date of this memorandum opinion. A supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing shall be prepared and filed in the appellate record in this case along with a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s new judgment of conviction. These supplemental records are to be filed in this Court within 45 days of the date of this memorandum opinion. The appeal will be reinstated when the supplemental records are filed. Ramirez will have thirty days from reinstatment to file a supplemental appellant’s brief, and the State will have thirty days from the date Ramirez files his supplemental brief, if any, to file its appellee’s brief. 4 It is ordered on November 2, 2026. Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Abated and Remanded Filed: November 2, 2026 Do Not Publish 5