Jenner Ramirez v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 3rd District (Austin)
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket03-25-00910-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-25-00910-CR
Jenner Ramirez, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 331ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-DC-25-904083, THE HONORABLE CHANTAL ELDRIDGE, JUDGE PRESIDING
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM
Jenner Ramirez was charged with one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child,
one count of super aggravated sexual assault of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual assault
of a child, and two counts of indecency with a child by contact. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.02,
.11, 22.021. The State abandoned the first two counts after presenting its evidence. At the end
of the guilt-innocence phase, the jury found Ramirez guilty of the two counts of aggravated
sexual assault and of one of the counts of indecency with a child. During the punishment
hearing, the jury assessed his punishment at 99 years’ imprisonment for the two counts of
aggravated sexual assault and at 15 years’ imprisonment for the indecency count. After the trial
court read the jury’s verdicts, it informed the jury that their service was concluded and released
the jury. Although the trial court later entered written judgment of conviction sentencing
Ramirez consistent with the jury’s verdicts, the trial court never formally orally pronounced
sentence. Ramirez appealed his convictions. In his brief, he argues that the case should be
remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to orally pronounce sentence. Subsequently,
the State filed a motion to abate and remand the appeal for the same reason. We agree with
Ramirez and the State.
Although there is similarity between the two acts, the legislature codified two
requirements that must be performed in the presence of the defendant at the end of a jury trial:
(1) reading a punishment verdict and (2) pronouncing sentence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts.
37.04, .06, 42.03, .14. After a jury assesses a defendant’s sentence, the trial court imposes the
sentence. See id. arts. 37.01 (explaining that verdict is written declaration by jury of its
decision), 42.01, § 1 (stating that judgment is written declaration by trial court showing
conviction or acquittal of defendant and that sentence will be based on information in judgment),
.02 (noting that sentence is part of judgment ordering punishment to be carried into execution).
Additionally, with certain statutory exceptions, courts must orally pronounce the sentence in the
defendant’s presence. See id. arts. 42.03, § 1(a), .14; Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.04 (noting that jury verdict may be “read aloud by the judge, the
foreman, or the clerk”).
A trial court’s reading of the jury’s sentencing verdict does not satisfy the
requirement that a defendant’s sentence be pronounced by the trial court. See Ette v. State,
559 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (distinguishing between trial court’s reading of
jury’s verdict and its later oral pronouncement of judgment); see also Bradshaw v. State, Nos.
03-24-00091—00093-CR, 2024 WL 3470638, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2024,
order) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (explaining that reading jury’s punishment
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verdicts in open court with defendant present and stating that it “accept the jury’s verdict[s]”
“does not qualify as a pronouncement of sentence”); Edic v. State, Nos. 03-17-00788—00789-
CR, 2018 WL 2123465, at *1–2 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin May 8, 2018, order) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (finding that trial court’s using similar language “failed to orally
pronounce [defendant]’s sentences in his presence”); Frias v. State, No. 03-12-00463-CR,
2014 WL 1362639, at *1-2 & n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 4, 2014, order) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (abating appeal for oral pronouncement where trial court read jury’s
verdict but did not pronounce sentence).
“[I]t is the pronouncement of sentence that is the appealable event, and the written
sentence or order simply memorializes it and should comport therewith.” Coffey v. State,
979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The judgment, including the sentence assessed, is
merely a written manifestation of that oral pronouncement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.
42.01, § 1; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500; Madding, 70 S.W.3d at 135. If no sentence was ever
rendered, there is no valid judgment. See Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003); see also Ex parte Kopecky, 821 S.W.2d 957, 960 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (noting
that “[p]unishment and sentence are incorporated in the judgment” and that “‘sentence is a
necessary component of a “judgment of conviction”’” (quoting Ball v. United States, 470 U.S.
856, 862 (1985))). Without a valid judgment, there is no “conviction” for a defendant to appeal.
See Thompson, 108 S.W.3d at 290.
In this case, because the trial court failed to orally pronounce Ramirez’s sentence
in his presence, no valid judgment yet exists, and accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over his
appeal. See Keys v. State, 340 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)
(concluding that trial court’s failure to orally pronounce defendant’s sentence deprived court of
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appeals of jurisdiction); Meachum v. State, 273 S.W.3d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (same); see also State v. Roberts, 940 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996) (explaining that jurisdiction is threshold issue and may not be ignored), overruled on other
ground by State v. Medrano, 67 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Atlhough this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal, that does not require us to
dismiss the appeal in these circumstances. The Rules of Appellate Procedure require that we not
dismiss an appeal if the trial court’s omission can be corrected. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.4. Here,
the trial court’s omission can be corrected by allowing the trial court to orally pronounce
Ramirez’s sentence with him present. Accordingly, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to
the trial court for the trial court to orally pronounce the jury’s sentence in open court with
Ramirez present. See id.; see also Keys, 340 S.W.3d at 529 (abating appeal and remanding cause
to trial court to orally pronounce sentence assessed by jury in defendant’s presence); Meachum,
273 S.W.3d at 806 (same).
On remand, the trial court is directed to cause notice of a hearing to be given and,
thereafter, formally orally pronounce the sentence assessed by the jury in Ramirez’s presence.
The new sentencing hearing is to be held within 30 days of the date of this memorandum
opinion. A supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing shall be prepared and filed in the
appellate record in this case along with a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s
new judgment of conviction. These supplemental records are to be filed in this Court within
45 days of the date of this memorandum opinion. The appeal will be reinstated when the
supplemental records are filed. Ramirez will have thirty days from reinstatment to file a
supplemental appellant’s brief, and the State will have thirty days from the date Ramirez files his
supplemental brief, if any, to file its appellee’s brief.
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It is ordered on November 2, 2026.
Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis
Abated and Remanded
Filed: November 2, 2026
Do Not Publish
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