Full Opinion

Opinion filed October 29, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________ No. 11-26-00137-CR ___________ LATERRANCE CHARLES BROOKS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas1 Trial Court Cause No. 1873104 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, LaTerrance Charles Brooks, pled guilty to injury to a child with intent to cause bodily injury, a third-degree felony, and the trial court assessed his punishment at imprisonment for eight years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(f) (West Supp. 2026). We dismiss the appeal pursuant to Appellant’s motion. 1 This appeal was transferred to this court from the Second Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket equalization order issued by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West Supp. 2026). Therefore, as the transferee court, we must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. On July 1, 2026, Appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a motion to abate in this court because Appellant indicated that he did not wish to proceed with this appeal. Counsel requested an evidentiary hearing on “whether Appellant knowingly waives his right to appeal.” We granted the motion and abated the appeal, requesting that the trial court determine whether Appellant desired to prosecute the appeal and directing counsel to further investigate the matter. At the hearing, Appellant confirmed under oath that he has “elected not to proceed with an appeal,” that he is “giv[ing] up [his] right to appeal,” and that he is “looking to serve [his] time and then return to the community.” On August 24, the trial court signed an order finding that Appellant “wants to voluntarily dismiss his appeal.” We reinstated the appeal. On October 15, Appellant’s counsel filed the instant motion to dismiss the appeal. Although he was directed by this court and the trial court to file a motion that complies with Rule 42.2(a), counsel’s motion lacks Appellant’s signature on the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). Nevertheless, consistent with the practice of the Second Court of Appeals, we conclude that good cause exists to suspend the signature requirement in Rule 42.2(a) because Appellant unequivocally stated under oath that he did not wish to pursue the appeal. See, e.g., Tinsley v. State, No. 02-19-00350-CR, 2020 WL 1646748, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing the appeal following an abatement hearing despite counsel’s failure to file the motion to dismiss); Lawson v. State, No. 02-06-00204- CR, 2007 WL 495165, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 15, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing the appeal following an abatement hearing where counsel’s motion to dismiss was not signed by the appellant as required by Rule 42.2(a)); see TEX. R. APP. P. 2 (an appellate court may, on its own initiative, suspend a rule’s operation for good cause in a particular case). 2 Given Appellant’s statements under oath and the trial court’s order, we conclude that good cause exists to suspend the operation of the signature requirement in Rule 42.2(a). See TEX. R. APP. P. 2, 42.2(a); Lawson, 2007 WL 495165, at *1. Accordingly, we grant Appellant’s motion and dismiss this appeal. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE October 29, 2026 Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 3