Full Opinion

Opinion issued October 30, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00873-CR ——————————— BLAIN BRADLEY TALASEK, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 412th District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 103841-CR MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Blain Bradley Talasek appeals from the judgment of the trial court convicting him of an enhanced third-degree felony charge of assault family violence choking and sentencing him to forty-five years in prison. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Discussion A defendant in any criminal case has a right of appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.02; TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). When the defendant is the appellant in a criminal case, “the record must include the trial court’s certification of the defendant’s right of appeal . . . .” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) provides that “[i]n a plea bargain case- -that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty . . . and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant--a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); Olvera v. State, No. 01-22-00726-CR, 2023 WL 4629145, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 20, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss a prohibited appeal without further action . . . .” Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Talasek pleaded guilty to the enhanced third-degree felony offense of assault family violence choking with an agreed recommendation on punishment, and the court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. The trial court’s “Certification of 2 Defendant’s Right of Appeal,” attached to Talasek’s notice of appeal, states that Talasek’s case was “a plea-bargain case,” he “has NO right to appeal,” and he “waived the right of appeal.” The Brazoria County Clerk’s website reflects that Talasek signed a “Plea Agreement” stating that his guilty plea involved a “family violence finding” and that he “waive[d] appeal.” Talasek also signed a document titled, “Admonitions, Waivers, Judicial Confessions, Statements, Plea, Probation and Appeal-Felony Less Than Capital” stating that “[t]he State and [Talasek] mutually recommend[e]d to the [c]ourt [that] the punishment in this case be assessed at: [f]orty-[f]ive (45) [y]ears TDCJ-Institutional Division.” Talasek was advised that “[w]here [his] plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) is voluntarily and understandingly entered with a plea bargain agreement and the punishment assessed does not exceed the agreement between [him] and the prosecutor, the Court must give permission before [he] can appeal on any matter in the case except for those matters raised by written motion filed and ruled on prior to trial.”1 1 Appellate courts may take judicial notice of facts outside the record when necessary to determine jurisdiction. See generally TEX. R. EVID. 201(d); see also In re Lombana, 542 S.W.3d 699, 701 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding) (taking judicial notice of order publicly available on district clerk’s website). 3 The record thus supports the trial court’s “Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal” stating that Talasek accepted a plea bargain and “has NO right to appeal.” Talasek was sentenced pursuant to the agreed terms of a plea bargain and the sentence imposed did not exceed the terms of the recommended sentence by the State. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Because Talasek did not receive permission to appeal from the trial court and he does not meet any of Rule 25.2(a)(2)’s other exceptions, he has no right of appeal. Chavez, 183 S.W.3d at 680 (holding that “appellant had no right of appeal because he was sentenced pursuant to the agreed terms of a plea bargain and did not satisfy either of the exceptions stated in Rule 25.2(a)(2)”); see also Olvera, 2023 WL 4629145, at *3 (dismissing appeal from guilty plea where no exceptions of Rule 25.2(a)(2) applied). To the extent that Talasek seeks to appeal his conviction and sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds—as he argued in his motion for new trial—such grounds can be raised only if the defendant has a right of appeal. When, as here, the defendant does not have a right of appeal, an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (“A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised on direct appeal, assuming the right to such appeal otherwise exists.”); see also State v. Webb, 244 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (A “record on direct appeal is generally 4 inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objectively reasonable standard of performance, and the better course is to pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.”) (quoting Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Guerra, and Gunn. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 5