Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 25, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-26-00593-CR ——————————— CHRISTOPHER KEVENWA LECOMPTE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 482nd District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1866765 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant attempts to appeal the trial court’s May 7, 2026 judgment adjudicating him guilty of assault of a family or household member and sentencing him to two years’ confinement. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because appellant waived his right to appeal. On July 30, 2024, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the third-degree felony offense of assault against a family or household member with a previous conviction, indicted as an adult. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). The trial court accepted the plea, deferred entering an adjudication of guilt, and placed appellant on community supervision for two years. Then, on April 9, 2026, the State moved to adjudicate appellant’s guilt on the underlying offense, alleging that he had violated the terms of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded “true” to the allegations in the State’s motion. The trial court found that appellant had violated the conditions of his community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and assessed punishment at two years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division on May 7, 2026. The trial court’s certification states that this is a “plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal[.]” Appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 1, 2026. In his notice of appeal, appellant “acknowledges that the plea” was entered and that “the punishment assessed does not exceed that recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his/her attorney.” The notice of appeal requests a shorter sentence based on “ineffective assistance of legal counsel/not right mind” without further elaboration and contains a prompt to input a reason justifying the appeal, such as a pretrial motion decided prior to trial, but no actual reason presented. 2 Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) restricts a defendant’s right to appeal in a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 44.02. But that rule does not restrict a defendant’s right to appeal from a proceeding adjudicating guilt following deferred-adjudication community supervision. See Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This case involves a separate agreement in which appellant expressly waived his right to appeal in exchange for separate consideration from the State at the revocation hearing. Courts have enforced such waivers under ordinary waiver principles. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, No. 01-14-00358-CR, 2015 WL 1778605, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Nickerson v. State, No. 01-14-00683-CR, 2015 WL 1407855, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Mendez v. State, 558 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Radford v. State, No. 05-18-00764-CR, 2018 WL 6616896, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 18, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). When a defendant waives the right to appeal in exchange for consideration from the State, and the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant 3 may not appeal. See Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The record reflects that appellant entered an agreement with the State in which he waived, among other rights, his right to appeal in exchange for a sentencing recommendation. The clerk’s record1 contains a written stipulation of evidence in which appellant acknowledged that he violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision and that the allegations in the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt were true. The stipulation reflects that appellant understood the punishment range was two to twenty years’ confinement and that the State would recommend two years’ confinement, with no fine or restitution, which was the sentence imposed. As part of this agreement, appellant also expressly waived his right to appeal. The stipulation is signed by appellant, his trial counsel, the district attorney, and the trial judge. Appellant initialed each line of the stipulation. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). Any pending motions are dismissed as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Rivas-Molloy and Guiney. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). 1 Appellant waived a court reporter’s record of the revocation hearing in the same stipulation. See Satterfield v. State, 367 S.W.3d 868, 870 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). 4