Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 3, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00245-CR EX PARTE OTHA GARY WASHINGTON On Appeal from the 179th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1952604 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from the trial court’s order denying appellant bail pursuant to Article I, Section 11(d) of the Texas Constitution. Appellant contends that there was legally insufficient evidence to justify the trial court’s decision to deny bail. As this is an appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny habeas relief, our analysis focuses on whether it abused its discretion when concluding that sufficient evidence was previously presented to support the decision to deny bail. As we find no such abuse of discretion, we affirm. BACKGROUND Early in the morning of January 31, 2026, officers of the Houston Police Department responded to reports of a shooting in progress at an apartment building on Brant Rock Drive. The report included a description of the suspected shooter as a black male in a gray shirt with blue pants. Entering the apartment where the shooting occurred, they found appellant, who matched the description provided in the initial report, in a bedroom and took him into custody. In the apartment’s bathroom, they found a shooting victim with a gunshot wound in both of her shins. She was subsequently transported to a hospital for medical treatment. At the hospital, two police officers met with the victim to gather information about the incident. During their meeting, the victim indicated she was afraid of being retaliated against and killed by “Gary,” whom she referred to as her “boyfriend.” Shortly after the shooting, appellant was charged with aggravated assault of a family member. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b). On February 6, 2026, the State filed a motion for the trial court to hold a hearing to deny appellant bail pursuant to Article 1, Section 11d of the Texas Constitution. The trial court held a hearing regarding the State’s request that same day. Among the evidence presented at the hearing were prior judgments of conviction for appellant, one of which was for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon contemporaneously found to be a firearm, and the other of which was for aggravated assault of a family member with a firearm. Those convictions were each for second-degree felony offenses occurring on or about April 8, 2017, and the associated judgments were both signed on June 6, 2018. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied bail to appellant and found by clear and convincing evidence that “the granting of bail will be insufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of the community, law enforcement, and the victim of the alleged offense.” On February 12, 2026, appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that his state and federal constitutional rights had been violated 2 due to no bond being set. The trial court held a hearing on appellant’s application on March 5, 2026. During the hearing, the trial court granted the State’s unopposed request to incorporate the evidence that had been submitted at the prior bond hearing. At the conclusion of this hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s application while acknowledging that it continued to find “that [appellant] has been charged with the felony offense of aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury or by using a firearm,” and it further found “by clear and convincing evidence the granting of bail will be insufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of the community, law enforcement, and the victim of the alleged offense.” This appeal followed. ANALYSIS In his sole issue on appeal, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion as the State’s evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he posed a danger to the community, law enforcement, or the shooting victim. Evaluating this issue is made slightly more challenging by the fact that Article I, Section 11d of the Texas Constitution is a very new provision, having become effective in November 2025. There has been very little caselaw evaluating trial court decisions made pursuant to Section 11d.1 Even so, our state’s habeas corpus jurisprudence allows appellant’s issue to be readily analyzed. In an appeal from the trial court’s denial of habeas corpus relief, we are to review the trial court’s habeas decision for an abuse of discretion. See Ex parte Segovia, 690 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2024, no pet.). This standard 1 The sole appellate opinion involving Section 11d as of the date of this opinion appears to be In re Hardin, which assessed whether mandamus relief was warranted in association with the trial court declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the denial of bail pursuant to Section 11d. See No. 09-26-00321-CR, 2026 WL 2416260, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 19, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (per curiam). As the trial court here held a hearing both in association with denying bail and in considering appellant’s request for habeas relief, that decision cannot shed light on this appeal. 3 requires us to determine whether the trial court’s ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable. Ex parte Allen, 619 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). In so doing, we are to examine the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s habeas decision. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Section 11d applies to persons committing one of several enumerated offenses. As appellant is charged with aggravated assault that involved the use of a firearm during the commission of the assault, appellant is within the provision’s scope. See Tex. Const. art. I § 11d(a)(3)(B). Persons charged with one of the enumerated offenses are to be denied bail pending trial if the State proves: “(1) by a preponderance of the evidence after a hearing that the granting of bail is insufficient to reasonably prevent the person’s wil[l]ful nonappearance in court; or (2) by clear and convincing evidence after a hearing that the granting of bail is insufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of the community, law enforcement, and the victim of the alleged offense.” Tex. Const. art. I § 11d(b). The constitutional provision lists four factors that judges and magistrates shall consider in deciding whether the State has proven either of those two facts by the applicable evidentiary standard: (1) the likelihood of the person’s wil[l]ful nonappearance in court; (2) the nature and circumstances of the alleged offense; (3) the safety of the community, law enforcement, and the victim of the alleged offense; and (4) the criminal history of the person.2 As noted above, the trial court made the second of the two alternative findings required to deny bail under Section 11d, which underlay its subsequently 2 We acknowledge here that appellant has structured his argument on the assumption that all four factors are relevant to assessing safety for purposes of Section 11d, while the State’s brief is ambiguous as to whether it is assuming the first factor, the likelihood of a defendant’s willful nonappearance in court, is relevant for that purpose. As this discrepancy has no bearing on the outcome of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that, indeed, all four factors are relevant for assessing safety for Section 11d purposes. 4 denying appellant’s habeas corpus application. We will examine each of the four factors listed in the provision in turn to determine whether and how they supported the trial court’s decision to deny bail, which consequently impacts whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying habeas relief. The willful-nonappearance factor was not emphasized by either side during either the bail hearing or the habeas hearing, and there is no indication the trial court factored that issue into its decision to deny appellant bail. Our own review of the record indicates that there was no evidence provided that appellant had a risk of nonappearance in court; the only testimony given on the subject was given by a police officer who acknowledged his own interactions with appellant did not include appellant “say[ing] anything to the effect of not coming to court.” So the first factor did not support the trial court’s decision to deny bail. The nature and circumstances of the alleged offense, however, indeed support the trial court’s bail decision. The State has alleged appellant shot his girlfriend twice, an especially vicious and harmful set of acts that undoubtedly bear on appellant’s risk to safety. Regarding the third factor, at minimum the record indicates that ensuring the safety of the victim favored denying appellant bail. There was evidence the victim was afraid of being retaliated against and killed by her boyfriend named “Gary,” and the trial court could have reasonably construed that as a reference to appellant’s middle name. The apparent concerns about the victim’s safety supported the trial court’s decision to deny appellant bail. Finally, the appellant’s prior criminal convictions for aggravated assault mean that the criminal- history factor favored the trial court’s decision to deny appellant bail. A trial court faced with evidence that a defendant presently charged with aggravated assault has previously been convicted of aggravated assault could reasonably view them as at risk of committing aggravated assault if they were not in custody. See Ex parte 5 Nimnicht, 467 S.W.3d 64, 69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.) (noting that the criminal history of a defendant accused of assault of a family member, which included a prior conviction for the same offense, “indicates [he] presents a danger to the community[] . . . and shows a propensity for recidivism”). To summarize the four factors, only the willful-nonappearance factor did not favor the trial court’s decision to deny bail; the remaining three factors favored that decision. Under that state of play we cannot say that the trial court, when subsequently evaluating appellant’s request for habeas relief, acted unreasonably in denying that request. It could have reasonably concluded following the habeas hearing that when the State’s prior request to deny appellant bail was considered, clear and convincing evidence had been presented that the granting of bail was insufficient to reasonably ensure the safety of, if no one else, the victim of the alleged offense. Accordingly, we cannot find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of habeas relief. That is enough to resolve appellant’s sole issue on appeal, and we thus overrule it. CONCLUSION As appellant has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in denying his application for a writ of habeas corpus, we affirm the trial court’s habeas judgment. /s/ Randy Wilson Justice Panel consists of Justices Wise, Wilson, and Antú. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). 6