Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00520-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG TAYLOR ALLAN DUNN A/K/A TAYLOR ALLEN DUNN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. ON APPEAL FROM THE 117TH DISTRICT COURT OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca Memorandum Opinion by Justice Fonseca Appellant Taylor Allan Dunn a/k/a Taylor Allen Dunn pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03(a)(2), 29.03(b). The trial court accepted his plea and deferred adjudication of his guilt, placing him on community supervision for ten years. 1 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.053(a). Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision multiple times, resulting in the trial court sanctioning him on different occasions, including by ordering him to serve time in intermediate sanction facilities, but continuing his community supervision. The State again filed a motion to revoke in 2025, and on October 2, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, appellant pleaded true to all allegations of his violating conditions of community supervision. Following testimony, the trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to twenty years’ imprisonment. Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We affirm. I. ANDERS BRIEF Counsel states in her brief that she has diligently reviewed the entire record and that there are no non-frivolous issues to be raised on appeal. See id.; High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a thorough, professional evaluation showing why there are no arguable grounds for advancing an appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 1 The trial court also dismissed a count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2). 2 In compliance with Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that she has: (1) notified appellant that she has filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of these pleadings; (3) informed appellant of his right to file a pro se response, 2 to review the record prior to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires appellant’s signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319–20. Appellant did not file a motion seeking pro se access to the appellate record and did not file a pro se response. II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we have found no arguable reversible error. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion it considered the issues raised in the brief and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. 2 An appellant’s pro se response following the filing of an Anders brief “need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered[; r]ather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 3 III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW In accordance with Anders, appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.” (citations omitted)). We grant the motion to withdraw. Counsel is ordered to send a copy of this memorandum opinion and its accompanying judgment to appellant, and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review, within five days of the date of this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). On August 17, 2026, appellant filed a motion to substitute his current court- appointed appellate counsel for new counsel. However, appellant is not entitled to a second court-appointed counsel, and no substitute counsel will be appointed. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17; see also Burris v. State, No. 13-25-00058-CR, 2025 WL 3030602, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg Oct. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We accordingly deny his motion. Should appellant wish to seek further review by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or 4 the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3(a), and must comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. IV. CONCLUSION The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. YSMAEL D. FONSECA Justice Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed on the 22nd day of October, 2026. 5