Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ________________ NO. 09-24-00383-CR ________________ JERRIAN JAMIL ELAM JR., Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the Criminal District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. F21-37141 ________________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION On May 16, 2022, Appellant, Jerrian Jamil Elam Jr., pled guilty to the first- degree felony offense of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the plea-bargain agreement, he was ordered to pay $2,059.00 in restitution and placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for ten years. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03. On August 31, 2023, the State moved to revoke Elam’s unadjudicated community supervision, alleging Elam violated the Deferred Adjudication Order by, among other things: committing the offense of Aggravated Robbery on or about May 1 1, 2023, in Jefferson County, Texas, in violation of Condition (1) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication Order; failing to report to the Jefferson County Community Supervision and Corrections Department for the month(s) of April, 2023 and May, 2023, in violation of Condition (4) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication Order; and failing to provide verification of performing the community service hours required, in violation of Condition (17) of Defendant’s Deferred Adjudication Order. 1 Elam pleaded “not true” to the State’s allegations. At the motion to revoke hearing, the State introduced evidence regarding counts one, four and five, including the testimony of four witnesses, witness identification from a police lineup, and several photos of the aftermath of the robbery that occurred on May 1, 2023. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found counts one, four and five true. The trial court then revoked Elam’s unadjudicated probation and found Elam guilty of the original offense of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to fifty years in prison. Elam’s first three issues on appeal challenge the trial court’s finding that Elam violated the first condition of his community supervision by committing aggravated robbery while on probation. The State responds that it is unnecessary for this Court to address Elam’s first three issues because the trial court also found paragraphs four and five of the revocation motion to be true, findings which Elam has not challenged The State abandoned the other allegations in its Motion to Revoke 1 Unadjudicated Probation at the motion to revoke hearing. 2 on appeal, either of which is sufficient to support the revocation order. Elam acknowledges this principle but argues this case is different because “[b]ut for the consideration of the aggravated robbery allegation, the administrative violations could not conceivably have warranted such a harsh sentence, even if the court still decided to revoke appellant’s probation.” We agree with the State. At a revocation hearing, the State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has violated a condition of his community supervision. See Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Staten v. State, 328 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). “We review a trial court’s order revoking a defendant’s placement on community supervision for abuse of discretion.” Staten, 328 S.W.3d at 904-05 (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “[P]roof of a single violation will support revocation.” Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Moore v. State, 605 S.W.3d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). “Courts may revoke community supervision for a violation of any condition, including violations of any single ‘technical’ condition.” Nurridin v. State, 154 S.W.3d 920, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citations omitted). “Technical” violations are typically those that involve the probationer’s failure to report to the probation officer as directed by the trial court, pay various community supervision fees, perform community service at the specified rate, or obey other conditions that have nothing to do with obeying “the laws of this State or of any other State or of the United States.” 3 Coffel v. State, 242 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (citing former Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12; repealed and recodified as id. art. 42A.001). When community supervision is revoked as a result of a revocation hearing, the judge may “proceed to dispose of the case as if there had been no community supervision[.]” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.751(d). “After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of community supervision, and defendant’s appeal, continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.” Id. art. 42A.110(a). When the trial court sentenced Elam to 50 years’ confinement, it did so for the original offense of aggravated robbery to which Elam had already pleaded guilty, not for violations of his community supervision, whether characterized as administrative, technical or otherwise. Aggravated robbery is a first-degree felony for which Elam could be imprisoned for life or for any term between 5 and 99 years, and his 50-year sentence falls within the statutory range. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 29.03; 12.32(a). Even if Elam were correct that the trial court erred in finding that Elam violated the first condition of his community supervision by committing aggravated robbery while on probation as alleged in paragraph one of the revocation motion, the trial court was nevertheless within its discretion to revoke Elam’s community supervision and adjudicate him guilty of the original aggravated robbery offense, 4 because it also found paragraphs four and five to be “true,” both of which are unchallenged on appeal and either of which is sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation order. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. And having revoked community supervision, the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing Elam for a term within the statutory range. We, therefore, conclude that we need not address Elam’s first three issues, because any error with respect to the trial court’s first finding is harmless in light of the trial court’s findings of “true” to paragraphs four and five, which Elam does not challenge on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b), 47.1. In his final issue, Elam argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it participated in punishment negotiations and then imposed a “harsh” sentence of 50 years after Elam apparently refused an offer of 30 years. The following exchange occurred during the revocation hearing: THE COURT: Let me see the lawyers up here for just a second, please. Stand down, the ruling. (BENCH DISCUSSION AS FOLLOWS:) THE COURT: All right. Have y’all talked about if he is revoked, what y’all might be able to work? I know what you’ve asked for. Is there any type of agreement that’s been attempted? [THE STATE]: Before this started, I offered him 25; and he turned it down. And I’m not going to offer less because this guy got shot up and -- THE COURT: Sure. That would only be right. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct. 5 [THE STATE]: Since I had to have the hearing -- we know the price paid for not coming up and admitting what you did -- it’s got to be a little bit more. So, he can take 30 if he wants to agree to it. You can ask him. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I mean, I’ll take that to him, certainly will, Judge. THE COURT: Why don’t y’all talk and see what he wants to do. See what he wants to do, if y’all can resolve it. (END OF BENCH DISCUSSION.) The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has generally discouraged judicial involvement in plea negotiations. See Ex parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 773, 777 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Ex parte Shuflin, 528 S.W.2d 610, 617 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)); State ex rel. Bryan v. McDonald, 662 S.W.2d 5, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Although Texas trial judges are not expressly prohibited by statute or any rule of law from participating in a plea bargaining session, this Court has nevertheless stated that a trial judge should not participate in any plea bargain agreement discussions until an agreement has been reached between the prosecutor and the defendant. The reason for this suggestion is that the trial judge should always avoid the appearance of any judicial coercion or prejudgment of the defendant since such influence might affect the voluntariness of the defendant’s plea. Perkins v. Ct. of Appeals for the Third Sup. Jud. Dist. of Tex., 738 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding) (internal citations omitted). That said, Elam did not object to the trial court’s comments, either at the time that they were made or later when the trial court adjudicated Elam guilty of the 6 original offense and sentenced him to 50 years’ confinement. “Preservation of error is a systemic requirement of every appeal.” Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329, 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Before a complaint may be made on appeal, our rules of procedure generally require that the complaining party must have first made the complaint to the trial court by a timely and specific objection, request or motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. “The error at issue is not systemic and may not be brought for the first time on appeal.” Id.; see also Hallmark v. State, 541 S.W.3d 167, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“[A] defendant forfeits error if he fails to object to a trial judge’s improper participation in plea negotiations.”). Because Elam did not object, he failed to preserve error for review on appeal. We overrule Elam’s final issue. We note that the written Judgment Adjudicating Guilt in this case contains non-reversible clerical errors because it incorrectly states that Elam pleaded “True to count(s): 1” and that the trial court found that Elam violated the conditions of his community supervision as alleged in paragraph 1 of the State’s revocation motion. The reporter’s record shows Elam pleaded “untrue” to the allegations in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 and that the trial court found the allegations in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 to be “true.” This Court has the authority to modify the trial court’s judgment to correct clerical errors. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b) (providing that the court of appeals may “modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified[]”); Provost v. State, Nos. 09-20-00210-CR, 09-20-00211-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 1302, at *2-3 7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 24, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that the court of appeals has the power to reform judgments to correct clerical errors). Accordingly, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Elam’s “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” was “Untrue to count(s): 1, 4 and 5” and that the trial court found, “While on deferred adjudication community supervision, Defendant violated the conditions of community supervision, as set out in the State’s Motion to Adjudicate Guilt, as follows: 1, 4 and 5.” We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. KENT CHAMBERS Justice Submitted on June 29, 2026 Opinion Delivered November 4, 2026 Do Not Publish Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ. 8