Full Opinion

Opinion issued November 13, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00998-CR ——————————— TYRIK RASHAD HAMPTON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 21-DCR-094604 OPINION The appellant was indicted for murder. He testified at trial and claimed self- defense. A jury found him guilty as charged and assessed punishment at fifty years’ confinement. He raises one point of error complaining about the State’s jury argument. We affirm. Background The appellant, of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, had a romantic relationship with Karenna Antwine, of Richmond, Texas. The appellant made plans to move to Texas and get an apartment with Karenna. Roughly a week before the appellant was scheduled to move, Karenna went to a party without telling the appellant and posted about it on social media. The appellant saw the posts and began making angry phone calls to Karenna. He sent her harassing and insulting text messages, causing her to block his number. The appellant drove from Hattiesburg to Richmond the next day to confront Karenna. When he arrived at her house, her stepfather, Simon Simmonds, opened the door. The appellant was angry and wanted Karenna to come with him. Karenna’s mother, Krashaun Simmonds, went upstairs to get Karenna. Karenna started down the stairs but when she saw the appellant she went back up. Simon told the appellant he needed to leave, and the appellant and Simon went outside. Simon came back inside and got a phone. He called his brother-in-law; then he and Krashaun went outside. While still on the phone, Simon waved at his neighbor, a state trooper, who was driving by. As soon as Simon waved, the appellant shot him. The appellant then shot Krashaun. 2 The trooper heard the shots and saw Simon fall. The trooper followed the appellant into the house, where the appellant dropped his gun and surrendered. Krashaun survived. The appellant testified the shooting was in self-defense. The appellant testified that he was angry when he arrived at Karenna’s house but he just wanted to talk with her. He testified that he called out to Karenna from the doorway but she ran back upstairs. According to the appellant, Simon got angry and pushed him outside. According to the appellant, Simon said, “I got something for you” and went back inside the house. While Simon was inside, the appellant went to his car but, rather than leave, got a pistol and waited. The appellant testified that when Simon came back out he went to the appellant and said, “I told you[,] you on my property. You know what I do to you.” The appellant said he panicked, was in fear for his life, and “had to shoot [Simon] to live.” The appellant did not testify to a particular action by Simon indicating violence was imminent. The Appellant’s Point of Error The appellant claims the State’s jury argument misstated the law of self- defense. Argument that misstates the law or conflicts with the law given in the jury charge is improper, and a trial court errs by overruling an objection to improper argument. Whiting v. State, 797 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). An accurate 3 description of the law is not improper simply because the particular point of law was not included in the jury charge. State v. Renteria, 977 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). A trial court’s ruling on an improper-argument objection is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, meaning we resolve any ambiguities in the argument in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling. Randolph v. State, 353 S.W.3d 887, 895– 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The jury charge included language from Penal Code sections 9.31 (self- defense) and 9.32 (deadly force in self-defense). It told the jury to acquit if it found, or had a reasonable doubt, that “as viewed from the standpoint of the [appellant] at the time, [the appellant] reasonably believed that such deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against [Simon’s] use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force . . . .” The charge gave the Penal Code’s definition of “reasonable belief”: “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the defendant.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(42). The charge did not contain instructions on other matters sometimes seen in self-defense instructions, such as provocation, the law of retreat, or the presumption of reasonableness. In its opening jury argument the State talked, inter alia, about the definition of “reasonable belief.” The State emphasized that “reasonable belief” was an 4 objective standard about what an ordinary and prudent person would believe, not what the defendant subjectively believed: [O]rdinary and prudent person just means a reasonable person. But more than that, in the same circumstances as the Defendant. Now I’m not talking about the Defendant that you saw send those threatening text messages [the day before the shooting]. And I’m not talking about the hot head that drove all the way from Hattiesburg, Mississippi down here to Fort Bend County, Texas onto someone’s property. The State argued that nothing Simon did would cause an ordinary and prudent person to believe that shooting Simon was immediately necessary. The State characterized the appellant as a “trespasser” who had been asked to leave. The defense’s jury argument addressed the reasonable belief standard several times. Defense counsel told the jury that it was “a reasonable person in the actor’s shoes. So, you have to ask yourself each and every one of you, what would you have done.” The State objected that it was improper to ask the jurors to put themselves in the defendant’s shoes, but the trial court did not rule on this objection. The rest of the defense’s argument focused on the circumstances of the shooting. The State’s closing argument spent a fair amount of time on the notion of “reasonable belief.” The State again described the appellant as a “hot head” and asked the jury to apply the reasonable belief standard rather than ascribing reasonableness to what the appellant said he subjectively believed: “A reasonable person in the [appellant’s] shoes. Not that hot head who drives from Hattiesburg, 5 Mississippi, to Houston any time his girlfriend goes to a party or posts a video or does something he doesn’t like.” The State continued with the following argument (the appellant’s complaint is about the bolded part): You have to believe a reasonable person in the [appellant’s] shoes would have done what he did. An ordinary and prudent person as viewed from the [appellant’s] circumstance. Okay? Not a hot head. And let’s think about this: You don’t get to start the problem, you don’t get to come here from six hours away, show up uninvited, get on somebody’s property, demand to see their daughter and then not leave; and not just not leave, but go get a gun and come sit on their property and then say I had to kill somebody in self-defense. That cannot be. Defense counsel objected “that’s a misstatement of law. I’m going to object to [the State] making that phraseology that he can’t infer self-defense because of those circumstances.” The trial court overruled the objection. The appellant makes three arguments to show that the State’s argument was improper. First the appellant claims the State’s argument “replaced the objective reasonableness standard with a character judgment.” The appellant claims the State’s argument turned the issue of self-defense into “whether [the appellant] was the kind of person who overreacts, rather than whether a reasonable person in his position would have perceived a deadly threat.” We do not read the State’s argument to say that. The State’s argument emphasized that the appellant’s reactions to events were those of a “hot head,” not 6 of an ordinary and prudent person. That is a valid argument in a self-defense case because the jury is faced with a defendant’s claim that he believed the use of force was immediately necessary, but the jury must analyze whether an ordinary and prudent person in the same situation would have held such a belief. Arguing that the defendant’s actions surrounding the purported self-defense were those of a “hot head” is an argument that the defendant’s actions were not those of an ordinary and prudent person, which is an implicit argument his stated beliefs were not what an ordinary and prudent person would have believed. See Turner v. State, 87 S.W.3d 111, 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (prosecutor’s argument contrasting reasonable person with defendant who was “psychopath” and “sociopath” was permissible because it “informed the jury that the law required it to consider [the defendant’s] self-defense claim from the standpoint of an ‘ordinary and prudent person’ and not from the standpoint of a ‘psychopath or a sociopath.’”). The appellant’s second argument is that the State invoked the provoking-the- difficulty doctrine in a way that “reduced [it] to a blamelessness requirement that Texas law does not impose.” Penal Code section 9.31(b)(4) states that conduct is not justified as self- defense if “the actor provoked the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful 7 force . . . .”1 TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(b)(4). The Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted this as a codification of the common-law doctrine of “provoking the difficulty.” Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 513–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Under this doctrine, to raise the issue of provocation the evidence must show: (1) the defendant did some act or used some words that provoked the attack; (2) the words or acts were reasonably calculated to provoke the attack; and (3) the defendant used the words or committed the act with the intent to create a pretext for self-defense. Id. at 513. Even if the State’s argument invoked the provoking-the-difficulty doctrine, it did so in a way that was, at worst, incomplete, not incorrect or misleading. While the law is clear that parties may reference law outside the charge, the appellant does not cite authority showing that a party referencing outside-the-charge law must explain every contour of it.2 See Renteria, 977 S.W.2d, at 608; Mauldin v. State, 628 1 The provision goes on to have some exceptions that we need not discuss here. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(b)(4)(A), (B). 2 Indeed, even if the jury was charged on provocation the law is not clear it would be proper to include Smith’s common law rule as an instruction. Smith addressed only what evidence was needed to warrant an instruction, not what the instruction should say. Ordinarily it is error to instruct a jury using non-statutory definitions of statutory terms. Beltran De La Torre v. State, 583 S.W.3d 613, 618 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). There is a rare exception when statutorily undefined terms “have a known and established legal meaning, or which have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, as where the words used have a well-known common law meaning.” Id. (cleaned up). As best we can tell, only one case has ever held the Smith definition was appropriate in a jury charge. See Ballester v. State, No. 03-23-00456-CR, 2025 WL 2471787, at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 28, 8 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“Error in argument does not lie in going beyond the court’s charge, but lies in stating law contrary to the same.”) (quoting Singleton v. State, 479 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. Crim. App.1952). But we do not read the State’s argument to necessarily refer to the provoking- the-difficulty doctrine. The Penal Code also uses the word “provoke” in the context of the law of retreat, and we read the prosecutor’s argument as a proper reference to that. Section 9.31(e)—commonly called the “stand your ground” law—states that a factfinder may not consider a defendant’s failure to retreat if several conditions are true. TEX. PEN. CODE § 9.31(e). Two of those conditions are that the defendant “ha[d] a right to be present at the location where the force [was] used,” and “ha[d] not provoked the person against whom the force [was] used.” Id. While Texas law never requires an individual to attempt to retreat before resorting to self-defense, if the conditions in Section 9.31(e) are not true for a particular case, the jury can consider the defendant’s failure to retreat when assessing whether his belief that the use of force was immediately necessary was a reasonable belief. Morales v. State, 357 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When assessing the propriety of an argument, we analyze it in context. Stout v. State, 426 S.W.3d 214, 223 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). A trial 2025, pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The Court of Criminal Appeals has granted review of that holding. 9 court does not abuse its discretion in overruling an objection to argument unless the argument was clearly improper. Id. Here, the complained-of statement came in a section of the State’s argument claiming the defendant was a “hot head” and his supposed defensive belief was not that of an ordinary and prudent person. It came shortly after the State called the appellant a “trespasser.” Immediately after the complained-of statement, the State emphasized that the appellant had “provoke[d]” Simon and had been told to leave the property. In that section of the argument the State repeatedly pointed out that the appellant could have left but did not do so. In context, the complained-of statement was not, as the appellant argues on appeal, that there was a legal bar to the appellant claiming self-defense—i.e., the provoking the difficulty doctrine—but that an ordinary and prudent person who had provoked Simon and been told to leave the property would not have believed the use of deadly force was immediately necessary because he could have just driven away rather than arming himself and waiting for Simon to return. Under the facts of this case, that was a proper argument even if the law of retreat was not included in the jury charge. The appellant’s third and final argument is that the State’s argument “invented two categorical rules that Texas law does not recognize: that trespass forfeits self- defense, and that retrieving a firearm forfeits self-defense.” But as we explained 10 above the appellant’s categorical reading of the State’s argument is not the only reading, nor is it the reading that makes the most sense in context. The complained- of statement came in the context of discussing factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of the appellant’s supposed defensive belief. In that context, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the appellant’s objection. Conclusion We overrule the appellant’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. Clint Morgan Justice Panel consists of Justices Caughey, Morgan, and Dokupil. Publish. 11