Full Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN NO. 03-24-00342-CR Charles Lee Tillman, Jr., Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee FROM THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT OF FAYETTE COUNTY NO. 2021R-220, THE HONORABLE JEFF R. STEINHAUSER, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Appellant Charles Lee Tillman of murder, found the enhancement paragraphs true, and assessed punishment at life in prison. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.42(c)(1), 19.02(b)–(c). In his sole issue on appeal, Tillman contends that the trial court erred when it declined to include a circumstantial evidence instruction in the court’s charge. Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals abolished the circumstantial evidence charge requirement and declared the instruction improper, see Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (op. on reh’g), we overrule his sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. During the charge conference, defense counsel requested that the trial court include an instruction “regarding direct versus circumstantial evidence and how the jurors may consider that,” but acknowledged that it had not provided the trial court with language for that requested instruction. The State argued that it would be an improper commentary on the evidence and should not be included. The trial court denied Tillman’s requested instruction. Jury-charge-error claims are reviewed under a two-pronged test in which the appellate court must determine: (1) whether the charge was erroneous, and (2) if there was an error, whether the error was harmful to the defendant. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 143–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g). Here, Tillman contends that the trial court erred when it refused to include a circumstantial evidence instruction in the court’s charge. He contends that although “[a] jury charge instruction on circumstantial evidence generally is not required since Hankins,” our opinion in Moone v. State, 802 S.W.2d 101, 104 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, pet. ref’d), carved out an exception within which his case falls. Prior to 1981, it was error for a trial court to deny a defendant’s requested circumstantial evidence instruction in certain circumstances. See Moone, 802 S.W.2d at 102–03 (explaining that “[f]or over one hundred years, Texas criminal law required that a cautionary charge be given the jury in circumstantial evidence cases”). However, “[i]n Hankins, . . . the Court of Criminal Appeals abolished the requirement of a circumstantial evidence charge, reasoning that it rested on the untenable proposition that circumstantial evidence was less trustworthy than direct evidence.” Id. at 103; see also Hankins, 646 S.W.2d at 197 (“The arguments in favor of abolishing the requirement of a circumstantial evidence charge are meritorious and we now hold that such a charge is improper”). This Court’s holding in Moone did not purport to create an exception to the abolishment of this requirement. Rather, the section that Tillman cites analyzes the effect of the holding in Hankins on the proper sufficiency of the 2 evidence analysis in circumstantial evidence cases at that time, which is not relevant to our analysis here. See Moone, 802 S.W.2d at 103–04. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the request for a circumstantial evidence instruction. Therefore, we will not analyze harm regarding this issue. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Sakil v. State, 287 S.W.3d 23, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“If there was no error, we need not pursue a harm analysis.”). We overrule Tillman’s sole issue. CONCLUSION Having overruled Tillman’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction. __________________________________________ Gisela D. Triana, Justice Before Justices Triana, Theofanis, and Crump Affirmed Filed: September 24, 2026 Do Not Publish 3