Full Opinion

Opinion issued August 27, 2026 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-23-00542-CR ——————————— BYRON LLOYD COLLINS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 174th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 1799146 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Byron Lloyd Collins of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the trial court automatically assessed punishment at imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Collins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the offense of capital murder, arguing that the State failed to prove the underlying predicate felony of aggravated sexual assault. In two related issues, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his involuntary statement and then erred by failing to instruct the jury on the law concerning the voluntariness of statements. Collins also raises three evidentiary issues. In these issues, he first argues that the State sponsored perjury because a detective’s trial testimony concerning Collins’s arrest differed from his testimony at the suppression hearing. He then argues that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence that the complainant had worked as an escort and evidence that challenged the credibility of an alternate suspect, and the exclusion of this evidence violated his right to present a defense.1 We modify the judgment of conviction and affirm as modified. Background Nataliya Shal was born in Ukraine. In the 2000s, she lived and worked in Prague, where she met David Englerth, an American servicemember stationed in Germany and vacationing in the city while on leave. They began dating and married 1 Collins also raised a seventh issue concerning the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the voluntariness of his oral statement. This Court abated the appeal and ordered the trial court to make findings and conclusions on this issue, and the trial court did so. We therefore do not address Collins’s seventh issue in this opinion. 2 several years later. Nataliya did not immediately move to the United States, even after Englerth was discharged from the Army. Following his discharge, Englerth began a trucking business and worked as a long-haul trucker. Nataliya and Englerth maintained an apartment in Prague, where Nataliya still lived, and in Baytown, where Englerth lived when he was not on the road. Nataliya would occasionally visit. Nataliya finally attained U.S. citizenship and moved here permanently around January 2016. Initially, Nataliya went on the road with Englerth in his truck, but the lifestyle was too much for her, so she remained in Baytown while Englerth worked. Englerth estimated that he was home “for a couple of days about two to three times a month,” and the rest of the time he was on the road. Despite the physical separation, he and Nataliya remained close, and they spoke on the phone every day, usually around early evening after Englerth got off the road. Englerth described Nataliya as a very friendly person who “never met a stranger.” She enjoyed sitting on their front porch and speaking with fellow residents. She tended to leave their front door unlocked, and she also tended to leave the front door slightly open in nice weather so their adopted cat could come and go when it pleased. Both habits concerned Englerth. Worried about Nataliya’s safety, he installed a camera in a corner of their living room. The camera showed their living room and, if the door was open, a portion of their bedroom near the foot of the bed. 3 He could view a live feed from this camera on his phone, but he had not paid for recording capabilities. As an additional security measure, the front door had a sensor that indicated when the door was opened and closed. On May 8, 2016, Englerth was in the Los Angeles area preparing to deliver a load the next morning. He had not heard from Nataliya that day, which he believed might be due to the time difference between Baytown and Los Angeles, so he decided to call her. He called over half a dozen times, but Nataliya never answered. Englerth then checked the live feed from the living room camera. He could not see Nataliya. However, the bedroom door was open, and he could see that “the bed was all messed up.” This was out-of-character for Nataliya, who made the bed everyday “without fail.” Now deeply concerned, Englerth called local police in California and asked them to contact the Baytown Police Department for a welfare check on Nataliya. Around 10:00 p.m., a patrol officer arrived at the apartment and knocked several times, but no one answered. While the officer was at the front door, Nataliya’s cat climbed onto the windowsill of an adjacent window and sat between the window and the blinds. Due to the space created by the cat, the officer could see through a gap in the blinds and into the bedroom, where he saw Nataliya, bloodied and lying motionless on the floor. Nataliya did not respond to the officer knocking on the window, so he radioed for EMS and kicked the front door in. A blanket was 4 covering her, and when the officer removed it, he saw Nataliya lying face down, wearing only a dress pushed up around her chest, and with puncture wounds in her back “and a bunch of blood around her.” The autopsy later revealed that Nataliya had been stabbed thirty times,2 with stab wounds on her head, face, neck, left arm, abdomen, and back. The apartment was mostly tidy, but the bedroom was in disarray with signs of a struggle: the bedding was falling off the bed, some bloodstains were on the wall, and random items (including a pair of glasses and a pair of headphones) were lying on or near Nataliya’s body. Officers collected the items and the bedding for further fingerprint and DNA analysis. Given the placement of Nataliya’s body and her mostly unclothed state, detectives believed she may have been sexually assaulted, and they requested that the medical examiner conduct a sexual assault exam during the autopsy. An analyst also swabbed various places on Nataliya’s body in hopes of recovering trace DNA evidence. With no readily apparent suspects,3 officers canvassed the apartment complex to gather more information. They spoke with Nataliya’s upstairs neighbor, who 2 The lead detective and the crime scene detective documenting the scene with photographs both noted that knives were missing from the set in the kitchen. The knives were never recovered. 3 Upon learning of Nataliya’s murder, Englerth was able to arrange for another truck driver to make the delivery that he was in California to make. He put his truck in 5 reported that around 3:00 p.m. on the afternoon of the murder, she was leaving the complex and saw Nataliya sitting outside on her front porch with a man the neighbor had never seen before. The neighbor testified that while Nataliya was “usually super friendly,” on this occasion she “just was very quiet,” and the neighbor “had this very eerie feeling—this overwhelming feeling that something is off.” The neighbor provided a description of the man she saw sitting with Nataliya: young, African American, very skinny, very large and “very open” eyes, and a very small chin. Officers showed the neighbor two photo arrays shortly after the murder. The neighbor did not identify anyone in the first array, and she identified someone with 30 percent certainty in the second array. Neither photo array contained a picture of Collins. The neighbor later met with a police sketch artist who created a sketch based on the neighbor’s description. Detectives initially spoke with several persons of interest—such as the apartment complex maintenance man and another man who was arrested shortly after the murder while covered in blood and with cuts on his hands—who provided DNA samples. None of these samples matched any of the samples collected from the apartment or Nataliya’s body. long-term storage and flew back to Houston the day after the murder. Englerth cooperated with the officers and their investigation. 6 With no fresh leads, detectives took an unknown DNA profile generated during the investigation and uploaded it to CODIS to see if that profile would match the DNA profile of someone already in the system. That did not yield a match. In 2017, months after the murder, detectives learned about familial DNA. The Department of Public Safety took the unknown DNA profile and ran it through its system, not looking for an exact match but for a link with a close relative. This search did yield a result: Travis Collins. From that name, detectives learned that Travis Collins had a living father and a brother, Byron Collins. Collins’s mother lived in the same apartment complex as Nataliya and Englerth. Detectives quickly ruled out Collins’s father as a suspect based on the age description that Nataliya’s neighbor had provided. But detectives noticed similarities when comparing a photo of Collins to the sketch made by the sketch artist. A detective drove by the apartment rented by Collins’s mother and saw Collins sitting on the front porch and smoking. When Collins went inside the apartment, the detective walked past and collected several cigarette butts. Based on the comparison of the DNA profile from the cigarette butt to the unknown DNA profile, Collins could not be excluded as a suspect in the murder. In December 2017, more than eighteen months after the murder, the detective prepared a third photo array to show Nataliya’s neighbor, and this time the array included a picture of Collins. The neighbor identified Collins with “55 percent” certainty. 7 The detective obtained a search warrant for Collins’s DNA and an arrest warrant. As Collins was leaving the apartment, detectives confronted him and requested that he accompany them to the police station for questioning. Collins moved to suppress the resulting statement on the ground that the statement was not voluntary, specifically, because the detectives improperly induced him to give a statement by lying and telling him that they wanted to speak with him to help clear his name while they knew he was their lead suspect and they had evidence that incriminated him. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the statement. At the beginning of the interview, the detectives let Collins read a copy of the search warrant for his DNA and then took a DNA sample. The detectives read the Miranda warnings, and Collins indicated that he understood each right, asking to clarify whether terminate the interview “really means” he could go home. A detective told Collins that his name “came up in stuff” and asked where he was on the date of the murder. Collins answered that he had been having suicidal thoughts (primarily due to some ongoing familial strife and pain from a tooth he needed pulled), and he unsuccessfully tried to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital on the day of the murder but was able to get in the following day.4 4 The trial court admitted Collins’s medical records from this hospitalization. The records reflect that Collins was admitted on May 9, 2016, and discharged on May 13, 2016. At the time of his admission, he had cuts on his left arm and right hand. 8 Collins repeatedly denied seeing Nataliya at the apartment complex, speaking with her, being in her apartment, or having a romantic or sexual relationship with her. After being informed that he was a suspect in Nataliya’s murder, he repeatedly denied killing her. The closest Collins came to admitting any kind of involvement in the murder was informing the detectives that he had been taking pills and drinking around that time, and he “probably blacked out if I’ve been there.” Following the interview, the detectives arrested Collins, and he was charged with capital murder for killing Nataliya while sexually assaulting her. Subsequent analysis of Collins’s DNA profile revealed that he could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA or the DNA mixture present on several items of evidence, including: the cord of the headphones found lying on Nataliya’s body, swabs taken from her face, swabs from under her fingernails, the sperm fraction from the swab of her vagina, and the sperm fractions found on both bedsheets. The frequency of the profile found on the vaginal swab was approximately 1 in 2 billion individuals, and the frequency of the profile found on the bedsheets was approximately 1 in 102 sextillion individuals.5 The records described the cuts as superficial and stated that they were “bleeding controlled.” During his interview, Collins explained that both cuts were the result of a suicide attempt. 5 After the initial DNA analysis was performed, the Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences began using a new measure to express the frequency that a DNA profile might reoccur: the likelihood ratio. Likelihood ratios greater than a million 9 The jury found Collins guilty of capital murder. Because the State did not seek the death penalty, the court automatically assessed punishment at confinement for life without the possibility of parole. This appeal followed. Sufficiency of Evidence In his fifth issue, Collins argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the underlying predicate felony of aggravated sexual assault, and therefore the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for capital murder. We address this issue first. A. Standard of Review When assessing sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hernandez v. State, 727 S.W.3d 83, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and provide “very strong support” that the profile originated from a particular person as opposed to an unknown individual. The DNA analyst performed this analysis on the DNA samples involved in this case and concluded that the likelihood ratios for Collins as the source of the DNA profile or contributor to a DNA mixture were 108 million for a cutting from the headphones cord, 3 billion for the fingernail clippings on Nataliya’s right hand, 17 billion for the swabs from the left side of her face, 231 million for the swabs from her left ankle, 220 trillion for the sperm fraction of the vaginal swab, and 245 trillion for the sperm fraction of the cuttings taken from the bedsheets. 10 credibility of the evidence. Hernandez, 727 S.W.3d at 87. We also may not “engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy” but must instead “consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.” Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. Hernandez, 727 S.W.3d at 87. The jury may use common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from life when drawing inferences. Id. But the jury may not “come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence and can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). B. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence that Collins Killed Nataliya in the Course of Committing or Attempting to Commit Aggravated Sexual Assault To convict Collins of capital murder, the State was required to prove that Collins, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the aggravated sexual assault of Nataliya, intentionally caused her death by stabbing her with a knife or an unknown sharp object. The charge listed multiple manners and means of committing aggravated sexual assault, including if the person “causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person’s consent,” and the person causes serious bodily injury or 11 attempts to cause the death of the victim in the course of the same criminal episode or uses or exhibits a deadly weapon in the course of the same criminal episode. The charge further instructed that aggravated sexual assault “is without the consent of the other person if the defendant compels the other person to submit or participate by the use of physical force or violence.” In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed or attempted to commit aggravated sexual assault of Nataliya, Collins focuses on the medical examiner’s testimony that Nataliya’s autopsy revealed no evidence of force or injury to her genitalia. Lack of genital trauma, however, does not necessarily mean there is insufficient evidence of aggravated sexual assault. See Borrego v. State, 966 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d). The medical examiner testified that “[t]here was no obvious injury [to Nataliya’s vagina] visible with the naked eye.” But she also testified that she did not find this strange, noting that she had had “several cases involving sexual assault where there are no visible injuries.” She would not expect to find visible injury in every sexual assault case. In both her own professional experience with known sexual assault cases and in reviewing the relevant literature, “maybe 40 percent or less have visible injuries.” The medical examiner also clarified that in an autopsy setting, she does not look “microscopically,” and therefore an autopsy would not uncover microscopic tears to the genitalia. 12 Collins further argues that no evidence supports “the idea that if there was sexual contact between Collins and the complainant, it was contemporaneous with her killing.” We disagree and conclude that the jury could draw a reasonable inference from all the surrounding circumstances that the sexual encounter between Collins and Nataliya was not consensual. Around 3:00 p.m. on the day of the murder,6 Nataliya’s neighbor saw Nataliya and a man she later identified through a photo-array with 55% certainty as Collins sitting on Nataliya’s front porch. Nataliya was not her usual “super friendly” self, and the neighbor had an “eerie” and “overwhelming” feeling that “something is off.” When the responding officer discovered Nataliya’s body several hours later, she was lying facedown on the floor next to the bed. Although the other rooms of the apartment were neat and orderly, the bedroom was in disarray, with bloodstains on the carpet and walls, the bedclothes falling off the bed, a blanket covering Nataliya, and random items lying on or near her body. Nataliya’s legs were spread, she was wearing a sundress that was pushed up around her chest, and she was unclothed from the waist down. Two knives were missing from the set in the kitchen, 6 A record of the front door sensor showed that the front door to Nataliya’s apartment closed at 2:52 p.m., opened and closed at 3:50 p.m., opened and closed at 4:19 p.m., and then did not open again until 9:55 p.m., which corresponds to the time the officer performing the welfare check saw Nataliya’s body through the bedroom window and kicked in the front door. 13 and Nataliya had been stabbed 30 times over various parts of her body. She also had wounds on her hands that were consistent with defensive wounds. Collins could not be excluded as the contributor of a DNA profile found on swabs taken from Nataliya’s vagina and from underneath her fingernails. He also could not be excluded as the contributor of DNA found on the sheets of Nataliya’s bed. Furthermore, medical records revealed that when Collins checked himself into a hospital the day after the murder, he had superficial cuts to his left arm and right hand. Officers agreed that when a suspect cuts or stabs someone with a knife, it is common for the suspect using the knife “to cut up their hands.” When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and considering “the cumulative force” of the evidence, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins killed Nataliya during the course of committing or attempting to commit aggravated sexual assault. We therefore hold that sufficient evidence supports the conviction. We overrule Collins’s fifth issue. Voluntariness of Statement In his first issue, Collins argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statement made during his interview with detectives because it was involuntary. He primarily argues that the detectives improperly induced him to make a statement by lying to him that they were trying to clear his name when they knew 14 that his DNA was present at the scene and they intended to arrest him regardless of what he said during the interview. He also argues that the detectives improperly continued questioning him after he requested termination of the interview and a court-appointed lawyer. A. Standard of Review and Law on Voluntariness We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, affording the court almost complete deference in determining historical facts that depend on credibility and demeanor, but reviewing the determination of legal questions de novo. Igboji v. State, 666 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); State v. Lujan, 634 S.W.3d 862, 865–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (applying almost total deference to trial court rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions that depend on credibility and demeanor). The trial court is the sole factfinder during a suppression hearing and may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Determining whether the requirements of Article 38.22 were met is an application-of-law-to-fact question that commands a view of the evidence that is most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 866. Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 governs when a defendant’s written and oral custodial statements may be used. The statute mandates that the defendant receive a warning of certain rights: 15 (1) he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial; (2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court; (3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning; (4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and (5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a). For an oral statement to be admissible, there must be an electronic recording of the statement and “prior to the statement but during the recording,” officers must give the defendant the above warning, and the defendant must “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive[] any rights set out in the warning.” Id. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(1)–(2). A confession must be voluntary to be admissible. Lopez v. State, 610 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.21 (“A statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion, under the rules hereafter prescribed.”); id. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2) (requiring accused to “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waive certain rights for statement to be admissible). We examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement to determine voluntariness. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 494. 16 A statement may be involuntary under the due process clause, Miranda v. Arizona as expanded by article 38.22, or “general voluntariness” under article 38.22. Id.; Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Under the due process clause, a defendant must show that (1) the police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) the statement is causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) the coercion overbore the defendant’s will. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 494; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 169 (“A confession may be involuntary under the Due Process Clause only when there is police overreaching.”). “Coercive government misconduct renders a confession involuntary if the defendant’s ‘will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’” Contreras v. State, 312 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973)). An officer’s use of deception during an investigation does not automatically render a suspect’s statement involuntary. State v. McDonald, — S.W.3d —, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 16, 2026). Coercion, threats, or promises might undermine the voluntariness of a confession, but trickery or deception “does not make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.” Id. (quoting Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The “mere use of investigative strategy,” which might involve misrepresentations about facts or evidence, “does not 17 itself rise to the level of constitutional coercion” and may be used without invalidating an otherwise voluntary statement. Id.; but see Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 462–64 (manufacturing physical evidence and fabricating documents runs afoul of article 38.23’s exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence obtained in violation of penal statutes relating to acquisition of evidence). “The question is whether law enforcement employed tactics that were so coercive as to overbear the suspect’s will or were designed to elicit a false confession.” McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6. If an officer makes remarks during an interrogation that might lead a defendant to believe that a confession could help him, the remarks “might be a circumstance which bear on the voluntariness of the [defendant’s] statement, but they would not necessarily render the statement inadmissible.” Creager, 952 S.W.2d at 855. Instead, the totality of the circumstances must be considered when determining voluntariness. Id.; McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6 (“[T]he voluntariness inquiry turns on the totality of the circumstances.”). A detective can permissibly use “psychological tactics” such as “play[ing] on a suspect’s sympathies” or “explain[ing] that honesty might be the best policy for a criminal who hopes for leniency,” but a detective may not obtain a confession “by any direct or implied promises, however slight.” Mason v. State, 116 S.W.3d 248, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); see Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (officer’s “general, non- 18 specific statement” that defendant “could help herself” did not make statement involuntary). Article 38.22’s protection is broader and “protects suspects from themselves, not only police overreach.” Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 495; Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 173. As an example, confessions “given under the duress of hallucinations, illness, medications, or even a private threat” can be involuntary under article 38.22. Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 495 (quoting Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 172). B. Considering the Totality of the Circumstances, the Trial Court Properly Concluded Collins’s Statement was Voluntary We assume for the purpose of this analysis that Collins was in custody at the time he made his statement to detectives. But that is not the end of the inquiry because custodial statements can be admissible if certain procedural safeguards are followed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 § 3(a) (“No oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless . . . .”) (emphasis added); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“The warnings required by Miranda and article 38.22 are intended to safeguard a person’s privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation.”). Baytown Police Department Detective C. Green was the primary investigator of Nataliya’s murder, and he took the lead in conducting Collins’s interview. He began the interview by stating that Collins mentioned “out there” that he wanted to 19 give a sample of his DNA. Collins responded, “If it’ll help clear my name.” Detective Green informed Collins that he had a search warrant to obtain a DNA sample, and Collins asked to see the warrant. While Collins was reading the warrant, Green said, “That’s based on information we’ve learned, and that’s why we need to clear your name, well, try to attempt to clear your name.” Green later assured Collins that he was not mad Collins was reviewing the warrant, stating that he had a right to read it and he would give Collins a copy. He then said, “I’m not here to hurt you, bro.” After another officer collected Collins’s DNA sample and Collins finished reading the warrant, Green told Collins that he did not want Collins to think that officers were lying to him or fabricating evidence. Before any substantive questioning about the offense began, Green read the Miranda warnings to Collins. Green read the warnings exactly as they appear in article 38.22. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22, § 2(a). After each warning, Green asked Collins if he understood the warning, and Green responded that he did. Collins asked what it “really means” to “terminate the interview,” such as whether it meant he could “go home.” Green replied, “Well, that’s a question I can’t answer right now.” Both Green and Collins laughed, and Collins said, “We all want that.” Green then shifted to asking for some “basic information.” He told Collins, “We’re here to try to exclude you more than convict you.” He then asked Collins about his living arrangements. After about ten minutes, Green then began discussing 20 the investigation, stating, “I’ll be honest with you, your name came up in stuff, but I just want to be able to try to rule you out of this situation.” Collins told the detectives that he was trying to check himself into a psychiatric hospital on the day of the murder because he was having suicidal thoughts, he did not know anyone who lived in Nataliya’s building, he did not know anything about Nataliya’s murder, and he did not know Nataliya. After Collins denied knowing Nataliya, Green said, “Don’t think I’m accusing you of anything,” and asked if he had ever been inside any apartment in Nataliya’s building. Collins responded that he had not. Later in the interview, Green stated, “We know you were there,” but Collins still denied being at the apartment complex on the day of the murder, and he denied murdering Nataliya. Green told Collins that the detectives had DNA evidence and said, “I can prove that you was there.” In response to this statement, and after saying earlier that he had been drinking and taking medication during this time period, Collins said, “I probably blacked out if I’ve been there.” This statement is the closest Collins comes to admitting that he knew Nataliya or admitting any kind of involvement in her murder. Throughout the interview, even after the detectives confronted him with DNA evidence, Collins consistently denied knowing Nataliya, having a sexual relationship with her, or killing her. 21 The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the voluntariness of the statement. Among other findings and conclusions, the trial court: • Found that Detective Green’s testimony at the suppression hearing was credible; • Found that officers spoke with Collins at the scene of his detention (the apartment complex), and he agreed to go to the station with them voluntarily; • Found that detectives properly admonished Collins and administered the statutory warnings prior to beginning any substantive interrogation; • Found that Collins knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights and engaged in the interview; • Found that none of the detectives’ statements during the interview were intended to induce Collins into making a confession; • Found that Collins made no statements consistent with his will being overborne by any of the detectives’ statements; • Concluded that Collins was properly advised of his rights, which he knowingly and effectively waived; • Concluded that none of the detectives’ statements amounted to improper inducement and none of Collins’s statements were made as a result of promises or statements by the detectives; • Concluded that Collins’s will was not overborne by any circumstances of the interview or statements by the detectives; and • Concluded that Collins made his statement knowingly and voluntarily. Collins challenges these findings and conclusions on appeal. When considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Collins’s detention and interview, we conclude that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his 22 Miranda rights and his statement was voluntary under both the due process clause and article 38.22. Although Collins was in custody at the Baytown Police Department, the atmosphere during the beginning of the interview when Detective Green read him the Miranda warnings was relaxed and amiable. Collins asked questions of the detectives, including whether he could see the search warrant and a question about what it “really means” to terminate the interview. Collins makes much of the fact that when he asked whether it meant he could go home, Green laughed and responded, “Well, that’s a question I can’t answer right now,” but Collins also laughed and replied, “We all want that.” Collins also focuses on the fact that the Miranda warnings were not read until over twelve minutes into the interview, but for the first five minutes of the recording, Collins was alone in the interview room. Over the next seven minutes, he read the search warrant, and an officer obtained his DNA sample. Detective Green did not ask Collins any questions about his background or the murder until after he read the warnings.7 Collins further argues that he was in pain from a tooth that needed to be pulled and under mental distress at the time of the interview, pointing to discussions during 7 Collins argues that Green questioned him at the scene, which was reflected on the video recording when Green referenced a prior conversation about Collins wanting to give a sample of his DNA. The State did not seek to introduce any statement from Collins other than the statement made in the interview room. 23 the interview about his history with suicidal ideation. Collins mentioned struggling with both issues during the month leading up to Nataliya’s murder and his hospitalization for suicidal thoughts that occurred the day after the murder. He specifically mentioned severe tooth pain as a factor contributing to his suicidal thoughts. Collins was reluctant to talk about his mental health, but when asked how often he had suicidal thoughts, he responded, “Once in a while.” Although there is evidence that he was suffering from severe tooth pain and suicidal ideation at the time of the murder in May 2016, there is little evidence that he was still struggling with both issues nineteen months later in December 2017, when the interview occurred. And that is the relevant time period for determining whether the tooth pain and mental distress impacted the voluntariness of his statement under article 38.22. See Lopez, 610 S.W.3d at 495 (noting that mental health concerns, illnesses, and medications are relevant to assessing voluntariness under article 38.22, which is broader than due process clause and encompasses considerations beyond police overreach). The crux of Collins’s appellate complaint about voluntariness is the statements made by Detective Green relating to attempting to clear his name and exclude or rule him out as a suspect. Collins argues that Green was lying when he made these statements because he had DNA evidence placing Collins at the scene of the murder, and Green planned to arrest Collins regardless of what he said during 24 the interview. Even if that were the case, we see no indication that these statements overpowered Collins’s will. Collins acknowledges that officers may permissibly use “trickery or deception” during an interrogation. Such tactics do not “make a statement involuntary unless the method was calculated to produce an untruthful confession or was offensive to due process.” See McDonald, 2026 WL 1025753, at *6 (concluding that officers’ statement that defendant “was ‘not in trouble’ does not transform an otherwise voluntary conversation into an unconstitutional interrogation tactic”). Green made no specific promises