Full Opinion

Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-25-00355-CR No. 05-25-00356-CR ROBERTO CISNEROS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F17-54178, F17-54179 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Miskel, Breedlove, and Jackson Opinion by Justice Breedlove Appellant Roberto Cisneros plead guilty and was convicted of Intoxication Manslaughter (Count 1) and Accident Involving Death/Failure to Stop and Render Aid (Count 2) and sentenced by jury to 10 years in prison in each case, to run concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(a); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.021. In four issues, appellant argues that his waiver of the right to appeal was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.1 We conclude appellant did not waive his right to appeal and that that the record does not support a conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. BACKGROUND We draw the following facts from the evidence presented at trial. A. Evidence and Trial on Punishment In 2017, appellant was involved in a motor vehicle collision that resulted in the death of Tommy Gaines. Prior to the accident, appellant was driving approximately 69 mph in a 35 mph zone when he ran a red light and struck the driver’s side of the victim’s vehicle. Appellant’s blood alcohol concentration was approximately .166. Although appellant sustained injuries in the collision, including a broken leg and wrist, he left the scene of the accident and walked to a nearby gas station without identifying himself to responding officers or calling emergency services. Appellant was indicted for Intoxication Manslaughter with a Deadly Weapon and Accident Involving Death. Before trial, the State offered appellant a plea agreement providing for concurrent ten-year sentences. Appellant rejected the offer 1 Appellant subsequently filed a supplemental brief raising additional substantive issues after the deadline for filing his brief and without obtaining leave of Court. Because the supplemental brief was untimely filed without leave, we do not consider the supplemental brief or the issues raised therein. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(A), (d); 38.7; see also Garrett v. State, 220 S.W.3d 926, 928–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (appellate court is not required to address new issues raised in supplemental briefing). –2– and instead elected to plead guilty to both offenses and have a jury determine punishment. Defense counsel informed the trial court that appellant was seeking community supervision. Appellant pleaded guilty to both offenses, pleaded true to the deadly-weapon allegation, and executed judicial confessions. The trial proceeded before a jury solely on punishment. The jury assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement in each case, to run concurrently. B. Proceedings Regarding Appellant’s Right to Appeal The trial court’s October 3, 2024 docket entries contain handwritten notations indicating that appellant waived his right to appeal. However, the reporter’s record contains no such waiver, and appellant did not execute a written waiver of his appellate rights. Appellant filed his notices of appeal on October 23, 2024. Following appellant’s notices of appeal, questions arose concerning the trial court’s certifications of his right to appeal. The record contains conflicting certifications dated June 11, 2025. One version indicates that the cases were not plea- bargain cases and appellant retained the right to appeal. Another version, modified by trial counsel, indicates that appellant waived his right to appeal on the court’s record. At a June 12, 2025, hearing, appellant’s trial counsel, Colleen Dunbar, represented that appellant had verbally waived his appellate rights in open court following the jury’s punishment verdict. Counsel explained that she had modified –3– the certifications because appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses and she believed his guilty pleas prevented him from appealing. Following orders from this Court, the trial court conducted an additional hearing on July 11, 2025, at which appellant and trial counsel testified. Appellant testified that he had not signed a written waiver of appeal and did not recall verbally waiving his appellate rights. He further testified that he did not recall discussing the consequences of waiving appeal with trial counsel. Trial counsel testified that, following the jury’s punishment verdict, the trial court asked appellant whether he waived his right to appeal and appellant responded affirmatively. She also testified that she had advised appellant throughout her representation that pleading guilty waived his appellate rights. When questioned about her understanding of appellant’s appellate rights, trial counsel acknowledged uncertainty concerning whether appellant could appeal his sentence and explained that she did not practice appellate law.2 2 Dunbar testified that she does not practice appellate law; that does not relieve her of the obligation to understand and accurately advise a defendant concerning the effect of a guilty plea on the defendant’s appellate rights. See Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (recognizing trial counsel’s duty to advise a defendant concerning the right to appeal, the steps necessary to pursue an appeal, and the advantages and disadvantages of appellate review); Jones v. State, 98 S.W.3d 700, 702–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (reaffirming trial counsel’s continuing obligations regarding a defendant’s appellate rights); see also Ex parte Hampton, 688 S.W.3d 912, 913–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (Slaughter, J., concurring) (emphasizing trial counsel’s continuing responsibility to advise defendants concerning their appellate rights and citing the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function, Standard 4-9.1, which addresses counsel’s obligations to advise clients regarding appeals and take appropriate steps to preserve those rights). Indeed, an attorney’s professional obligations include providing competent representation and explaining matters sufficiently to permit the client to make informed decisions –4– At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it recalled appellant waiving his right to appeal in open court following sentencing. The court further noted that the waiver was not transcribed because the court reporter was not present. On September 26, 2025, the trial court entered findings of fact addressing appellant’s purported waiver. The trial court found that appellant had not executed a written waiver and that the court had not orally admonished appellant concerning his appellate rights or the effect of a waiver at the conclusion of trial. The court also found that appellant had received no consideration from the State in exchange for waiving his right to appeal. Nevertheless, relying on its recollection, its docket entries, and trial counsel’s testimony, the trial court found that appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights and entered certifications reflecting that waiver. This Court deferred consideration of the certifications and its jurisdiction to the submissions panel and directed the parties to address these matters in their briefs. RIGHT TO APPEAL In his first three issues, appellant challenges the validity of the trial court’s certifications and contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his appellate rights. Specifically, appellant argues that his purported waiver concerning the representation. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01(a), 1.03(b), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G., app. A. Although we conclude that appellant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel, we emphasize that a trial attorney’s lack of specialization in appellate practice does not excuse a failure to ascertain the applicable law before advising a client to relinquish a substantive right. –5– was invalid because it was not recorded, occurred after sentencing without consideration from the State, and was not preceded by adequate admonishments concerning his appellate rights. The State does not oppose this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, acknowledging that appellant’s purported waivers were likely invalid because trial counsel repeatedly advised appellant that his guilty pleas eliminated his right to appeal. Applicable Law A criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal a conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02. Although a defendant may waive this right, the waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794, 796–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The validity of a waiver of appeal depends, in part, on whether the defendant understood the consequences of relinquishing the right. Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 492–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). A defendant may validly waive appellate rights before sentencing when the waiver is supported by appropriate bargained-for consideration. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant may also waive appellate rights after sentencing without receiving consideration from the State because, at that point, the defendant knows the punishment assessed and can evaluate the consequences of foregoing an appeal. Moreno v. State, 327 S.W.3d 267, 268–69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.). –6– The absence of a written waiver does not necessarily render an otherwise valid oral waiver ineffective. Id. Nevertheless, the record must establish that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquished the right. Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), a defendant’s appeal must be dismissed if the record does not contain a certification showing the defendant’s right of appeal. However, an appellate court is not bound by an inaccurate certification and must independently examine the record to determine whether the defendant possesses the right to appeal. Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Analysis Here, appellant entered open guilty pleas to both offenses without a negotiated agreement concerning punishment. The record establishes that appellant rejected the State’s plea offer and elected to have a jury assess punishment in the hope of receiving community supervision. Accordingly, appellant’s guilty pleas did not, by themselves, eliminate his right to appeal. Although the trial court found that appellant orally waived his appellate rights following sentencing, the circumstances surrounding that purported waiver raise substantial questions concerning whether appellant understood the rights he was relinquishing. The trial court expressly found that appellant was not admonished concerning his appellate rights or the consequences of waiver at the conclusion of trial. Moreover, trial counsel’s testimony establishes that she repeatedly advised appellant that pleading guilty waived his appellate rights. That advice failed to –7– distinguish between negotiated guilty pleas restricting appellate review and open guilty pleas that do not carry the same restrictions. Indeed, trial counsel’s testimony suggests that she believed appellant’s guilty pleas themselves foreclosed appellate review. At the June 12 hearing, she explained that she modified the certifications because appellant had pleaded guilty to the jury. At the July 11 hearing, she again testified that she advised appellant that pleading guilty waived his right to appeal. Consequently, even assuming appellant orally indicated that he wished to waive his appellate rights following sentencing, the record does not establish that he understood he otherwise retained those rights. We recognize that the trial court expressly found appellant’s waiver to have been knowing and voluntary. However, that finding does not resolve whether appellant understood the legal consequences of his purported waiver. The court’s recollection and docket entries support its determination that appellant made an oral statement waiving appeal, but they do not establish that appellant understood the rights he was relinquishing. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant’s purported waivers were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. See Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 492; Delaney, 207 S.W.3d at 796–97. Accordingly, the trial court’s certifications do not accurately reflect appellant’s right to appeal, and we conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 614–15. We sustain appellant’s first three issues to the extent they challenge the validity of his purported appellate waivers. –8– INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL In his fourth issue, appellant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to protect his appellate rights. Specifically, appellant argues that counsel failed to secure a written waiver of appeal, ensure that any oral waiver was recorded, properly advise appellant concerning the consequences of waiver, and preserve an accurate certification of his appellate rights. The State acknowledges that counsel’s testimony raises concerns regarding her understanding of appellant’s appellate rights but argues that appellant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel. Standard of Review The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, an appellant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). An appellant’s failure to establish either prong defeats the ineffective-assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. –9– Our review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential, and we indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Ordinarily the record on direct appeal is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance because counsel has not had an opportunity to explain the reasons for the challenged conduct. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833–34. Analysis Trial counsel has a duty to advise a defendant concerning the judgment, the right to appeal, and the steps necessary to pursue appellate review. Jones v. State, 98 S.W.3d 700, 702–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Here, trial counsel’s testimony suggests that she incorrectly advised appellant that pleading guilty necessarily waived his appellate rights. She further acknowledged uncertainty concerning the scope of appellant’s appellate rights following his open guilty pleas. However, the record does not establish the full extent of counsel’s advice to appellant concerning his appellate rights. Although trial counsel testified at the hearings on remand, those proceedings primarily concerned the validity of appellant’s purported waiver rather than counsel’s effectiveness. Her testimony regarding her advice to appellant was general, and the record does not fully develop –10– the circumstances surrounding her communications with appellant or her reasons for the challenged conduct. Moreover, we have concluded that appellant’s purported waivers were invalid and that he retained the right to appeal both convictions. Appellant timely filed notices of appeal, and we have considered the issues raised in his brief. Thus, even assuming counsel’s advice concerning appellant’s appellate rights fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, appellant has not demonstrated that the alleged deficiencies deprived him of appellate review or otherwise prejudiced his appeals. Appellant’s asserted prejudice rests principally on the contention that counsel’s conduct prevented him from exercising his appellate rights. Because appellant has exercised those rights and obtained appellate review, the record does not establish the prejudice necessary to sustain his ineffective-assistance claim on that basis. Accordingly, appellant has not established ineffective assistance arising from counsel’s handling of his appellate rights. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue. CONCLUSION We conclude that this Court has jurisdiction over these appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgments. /Maricela Breedlove/ MARICELA BREEDLOVE JUSTICE Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) –11–