Roberto Cisneros v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 10, 2026
Docket05-25-00355-CR
JudgeBreedlove
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Opinion Filed November 10, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-25-00355-CR
No. 05-25-00356-CR
ROBERTO CISNEROS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. F17-54178, F17-54179
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Miskel, Breedlove, and Jackson
Opinion by Justice Breedlove
Appellant Roberto Cisneros plead guilty and was convicted of Intoxication
Manslaughter (Count 1) and Accident Involving Death/Failure to Stop and Render
Aid (Count 2) and sentenced by jury to 10 years in prison in each case, to run
concurrently. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08(a); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 550.021. In four issues, appellant argues that his waiver of the right to appeal was
not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made; and that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 We conclude appellant did not waive his right to appeal and
that that the record does not support a conclusion of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
We draw the following facts from the evidence presented at trial.
A. Evidence and Trial on Punishment
In 2017, appellant was involved in a motor vehicle collision that resulted in
the death of Tommy Gaines. Prior to the accident, appellant was driving
approximately 69 mph in a 35 mph zone when he ran a red light and struck the
driver’s side of the victim’s vehicle. Appellant’s blood alcohol concentration was
approximately .166. Although appellant sustained injuries in the collision, including
a broken leg and wrist, he left the scene of the accident and walked to a nearby gas
station without identifying himself to responding officers or calling emergency
services.
Appellant was indicted for Intoxication Manslaughter with a Deadly Weapon
and Accident Involving Death. Before trial, the State offered appellant a plea
agreement providing for concurrent ten-year sentences. Appellant rejected the offer
1
Appellant subsequently filed a supplemental brief raising additional substantive issues after
the deadline for filing his brief and without obtaining leave of Court. Because the supplemental
brief was untimely filed without leave, we do not consider the supplemental brief or the issues
raised therein. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(A), (d); 38.7; see also Garrett v. State, 220 S.W.3d 926,
928–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (appellate court is not required to address new issues raised in
supplemental briefing).
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and instead elected to plead guilty to both offenses and have a jury determine
punishment. Defense counsel informed the trial court that appellant was seeking
community supervision.
Appellant pleaded guilty to both offenses, pleaded true to the deadly-weapon
allegation, and executed judicial confessions. The trial proceeded before a jury
solely on punishment. The jury assessed punishment at ten years’ confinement in
each case, to run concurrently.
B. Proceedings Regarding Appellant’s Right to Appeal
The trial court’s October 3, 2024 docket entries contain handwritten notations
indicating that appellant waived his right to appeal. However, the reporter’s record
contains no such waiver, and appellant did not execute a written waiver of his
appellate rights. Appellant filed his notices of appeal on October 23, 2024.
Following appellant’s notices of appeal, questions arose concerning the trial
court’s certifications of his right to appeal. The record contains conflicting
certifications dated June 11, 2025. One version indicates that the cases were not plea-
bargain cases and appellant retained the right to appeal. Another version, modified
by trial counsel, indicates that appellant waived his right to appeal on the court’s
record.
At a June 12, 2025, hearing, appellant’s trial counsel, Colleen Dunbar,
represented that appellant had verbally waived his appellate rights in open court
following the jury’s punishment verdict. Counsel explained that she had modified
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the certifications because appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses and she believed
his guilty pleas prevented him from appealing.
Following orders from this Court, the trial court conducted an additional
hearing on July 11, 2025, at which appellant and trial counsel testified.
Appellant testified that he had not signed a written waiver of appeal and did
not recall verbally waiving his appellate rights. He further testified that he did not
recall discussing the consequences of waiving appeal with trial counsel.
Trial counsel testified that, following the jury’s punishment verdict, the trial
court asked appellant whether he waived his right to appeal and appellant responded
affirmatively. She also testified that she had advised appellant throughout her
representation that pleading guilty waived his appellate rights. When questioned
about her understanding of appellant’s appellate rights, trial counsel acknowledged
uncertainty concerning whether appellant could appeal his sentence and explained
that she did not practice appellate law.2
2
Dunbar testified that she does not practice appellate law; that does not relieve her of the
obligation to understand and accurately advise a defendant concerning the effect of a guilty plea
on the defendant’s appellate rights. See Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988) (recognizing trial counsel’s duty to advise a defendant concerning the right to appeal, the
steps necessary to pursue an appeal, and the advantages and disadvantages of appellate review);
Jones v. State, 98 S.W.3d 700, 702–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (reaffirming trial counsel’s
continuing obligations regarding a defendant’s appellate rights); see also Ex parte Hampton, 688
S.W.3d 912, 913–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (Slaughter, J., concurring) (emphasizing trial
counsel’s continuing responsibility to advise defendants concerning their appellate rights and
citing the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function, Standard 4-9.1, which
addresses counsel’s obligations to advise clients regarding appeals and take appropriate steps to
preserve those rights). Indeed, an attorney’s professional obligations include providing competent
representation and explaining matters sufficiently to permit the client to make informed decisions
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated that it recalled appellant
waiving his right to appeal in open court following sentencing. The court further
noted that the waiver was not transcribed because the court reporter was not present.
On September 26, 2025, the trial court entered findings of fact addressing
appellant’s purported waiver. The trial court found that appellant had not executed
a written waiver and that the court had not orally admonished appellant concerning
his appellate rights or the effect of a waiver at the conclusion of trial. The court also
found that appellant had received no consideration from the State in exchange for
waiving his right to appeal.
Nevertheless, relying on its recollection, its docket entries, and trial counsel’s
testimony, the trial court found that appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived
his appellate rights and entered certifications reflecting that waiver.
This Court deferred consideration of the certifications and its jurisdiction to
the submissions panel and directed the parties to address these matters in their briefs.
RIGHT TO APPEAL
In his first three issues, appellant challenges the validity of the trial court’s
certifications and contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waive his appellate rights. Specifically, appellant argues that his purported waiver
concerning the representation. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.01(a),
1.03(b), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G., app. A. Although we conclude that
appellant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel, we emphasize that a trial attorney’s
lack of specialization in appellate practice does not excuse a failure to ascertain the applicable law
before advising a client to relinquish a substantive right.
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was invalid because it was not recorded, occurred after sentencing without
consideration from the State, and was not preceded by adequate admonishments
concerning his appellate rights.
The State does not oppose this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, acknowledging
that appellant’s purported waivers were likely invalid because trial counsel
repeatedly advised appellant that his guilty pleas eliminated his right to appeal.
Applicable Law
A criminal defendant has a statutory right to appeal a conviction. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02. Although a defendant may waive this right, the waiver
must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Ex parte Delaney, 207 S.W.3d 794,
796–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The validity of a waiver of appeal depends, in part,
on whether the defendant understood the consequences of relinquishing the right.
Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 492–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
A defendant may validly waive appellate rights before sentencing when the
waiver is supported by appropriate bargained-for consideration. Ex parte Broadway,
301 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant may also waive appellate
rights after sentencing without receiving consideration from the State because, at
that point, the defendant knows the punishment assessed and can evaluate the
consequences of foregoing an appeal. Moreno v. State, 327 S.W.3d 267, 268–69
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.).
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The absence of a written waiver does not necessarily render an otherwise valid
oral waiver ineffective. Id. Nevertheless, the record must establish that the defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquished the right. Under Texas Rule
of Appellate Procedure 25.2(d), a defendant’s appeal must be dismissed if the record
does not contain a certification showing the defendant’s right of appeal. However,
an appellate court is not bound by an inaccurate certification and must independently
examine the record to determine whether the defendant possesses the right to appeal.
Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Analysis
Here, appellant entered open guilty pleas to both offenses without a negotiated
agreement concerning punishment. The record establishes that appellant rejected the
State’s plea offer and elected to have a jury assess punishment in the hope of
receiving community supervision. Accordingly, appellant’s guilty pleas did not, by
themselves, eliminate his right to appeal.
Although the trial court found that appellant orally waived his appellate rights
following sentencing, the circumstances surrounding that purported waiver raise
substantial questions concerning whether appellant understood the rights he was
relinquishing. The trial court expressly found that appellant was not admonished
concerning his appellate rights or the consequences of waiver at the conclusion of
trial. Moreover, trial counsel’s testimony establishes that she repeatedly advised
appellant that pleading guilty waived his appellate rights. That advice failed to
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distinguish between negotiated guilty pleas restricting appellate review and open
guilty pleas that do not carry the same restrictions.
Indeed, trial counsel’s testimony suggests that she believed appellant’s guilty
pleas themselves foreclosed appellate review. At the June 12 hearing, she explained
that she modified the certifications because appellant had pleaded guilty to the jury.
At the July 11 hearing, she again testified that she advised appellant that pleading
guilty waived his right to appeal. Consequently, even assuming appellant orally
indicated that he wished to waive his appellate rights following sentencing, the
record does not establish that he understood he otherwise retained those rights.
We recognize that the trial court expressly found appellant’s waiver to have
been knowing and voluntary. However, that finding does not resolve whether
appellant understood the legal consequences of his purported waiver. The court’s
recollection and docket entries support its determination that appellant made an oral
statement waiving appeal, but they do not establish that appellant understood the
rights he was relinquishing. Under these circumstances, we conclude that appellant’s
purported waivers were not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. See
Carson, 559 S.W.3d at 492; Delaney, 207 S.W.3d at 796–97. Accordingly, the trial
court’s certifications do not accurately reflect appellant’s right to appeal, and we
conclude that we have jurisdiction over these appeals. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at
614–15. We sustain appellant’s first three issues to the extent they challenge the
validity of his purported appellate waivers.
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In his fourth issue, appellant contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to protect his appellate rights. Specifically, appellant argues that
counsel failed to secure a written waiver of appeal, ensure that any oral waiver was
recorded, properly advise appellant concerning the consequences of waiver, and
preserve an accurate certification of his appellate rights. The State acknowledges
that counsel’s testimony raises concerns regarding her understanding of appellant’s
appellate rights but argues that appellant has not established ineffective assistance
of counsel.
Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section
10 of the Texas Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10. To prevail
on an ineffective-assistance claim, an appellant must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984); Bone v.
State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). An appellant’s failure to
establish either prong defeats the ineffective-assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 697.
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Our review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential, and we indulge a
strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id. at 689. An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel
must be firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate
the alleged ineffectiveness. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012). Ordinarily the record on direct appeal is insufficient to establish
ineffective assistance because counsel has not had an opportunity to explain the
reasons for the challenged conduct. Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 833–34.
Analysis
Trial counsel has a duty to advise a defendant concerning the judgment, the
right to appeal, and the steps necessary to pursue appellate review. Jones v. State, 98
S.W.3d 700, 702–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369, 374
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Here, trial counsel’s testimony suggests that she incorrectly
advised appellant that pleading guilty necessarily waived his appellate rights. She
further acknowledged uncertainty concerning the scope of appellant’s appellate
rights following his open guilty pleas.
However, the record does not establish the full extent of counsel’s advice to
appellant concerning his appellate rights. Although trial counsel testified at the
hearings on remand, those proceedings primarily concerned the validity of
appellant’s purported waiver rather than counsel’s effectiveness. Her testimony
regarding her advice to appellant was general, and the record does not fully develop
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the circumstances surrounding her communications with appellant or her reasons for
the challenged conduct. Moreover, we have concluded that appellant’s purported
waivers were invalid and that he retained the right to appeal both convictions.
Appellant timely filed notices of appeal, and we have considered the issues raised in
his brief. Thus, even assuming counsel’s advice concerning appellant’s appellate
rights fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, appellant has not
demonstrated that the alleged deficiencies deprived him of appellate review or
otherwise prejudiced his appeals.
Appellant’s asserted prejudice rests principally on the contention that
counsel’s conduct prevented him from exercising his appellate rights. Because
appellant has exercised those rights and obtained appellate review, the record does
not establish the prejudice necessary to sustain his ineffective-assistance claim on
that basis. Accordingly, appellant has not established ineffective assistance arising
from counsel’s handling of his appellate rights. We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that this Court has jurisdiction over these appeals. We affirm the
trial court’s judgments.
/Maricela Breedlove/
MARICELA BREEDLOVE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
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