Randall Lynn Bivins v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket07-25-00263-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00263-CR
No. 07-25-00264-CR
RANDALL LYNN BIVINS, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 320th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 084819-D-CR & 084764-D-CR, Honorable Steven Denny, Presiding
November 18, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
Appellant, Randall Lynn Bivins, appeals the trial court’s judgments convicting him
of kidnapping and family violence assault by impeding breath. 1 A jury found him guilty of
both offenses and assessed his punishment at 35 years’ imprisonment on each charge.
Appellant raises five issues on appeal. We affirm as modified.
1 See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 20.03; 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(B).
BACKGROUND
Appellant and the complainant, M.R., 2 married in January of 2023 after a year-long
courtship conducted largely via Facebook. M.R. and her two youngest children moved
from Houston to Amarillo to live with Appellant. The relationship began to deteriorate
after a few months. Evidence indicated that the couple argued about Appellant’s
spending time and money at casinos. Appellant became violent toward M.R.,
occasionally hitting her, pushing her, or pulling her hair.
On October 10, 2023, as Appellant and M.R. drove to a bank to deposit her
paycheck, they began to argue. Appellant slapped M.R., busting her lip. As Appellant
drove, he yelled at M.R. and hit her three more times. M.R. concealed her cell phone and
called 911 four times, but she was unable to talk to the operator. When Appellant
discovered that M.R. had called, he took her phone. Appellant then choked M.R., and
she passed out. When she awoke, M.R. was “out of it,” and did not know where she was.
Appellant told her they were going to take a drive so she could relax. He drove for more
than seven hours, going north to Cactus, filling up with gas, then driving in circles. He
drove back to Amarillo and continued southward to Canyon. He took M.R. to a motel and
pushed her into a room. M.R. testified that she “kept begging” to return to their apartment,
where her children were. Appellant eventually agreed to take M.R. to a supermarket in
Amarillo, where her oldest son picked her up. Upon seeing his mother, M.R.’s son called
the police. M.R. later went to the hospital.
2 We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (granting crime
victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect to the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout
the criminal justice process”).
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Appellant was charged with assault on a family member by impeding breath
(occlusion assault) and kidnapping. Both third-degree felony offenses were enhanced by
two prior felony convictions. When the case proceeded to trial in August of 2025,
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The jury found Appellant guilty as alleged.
Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law.
ANALYSIS
Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing on
his motion for new trial, erred in prohibiting a line of cross-examination, erred by failing to
provide the jury with lesser-included offense instructions, and erred by allowing testimony
regarding Appellant’s prior felony convictions. Appellant further argues that the provision
for prospective attorney’s fees in the bill of cost should be deleted.
Motion for New Trial
In his verified motion for new trial, Appellant raised two issues on which he sought
to develop a record. First, he alleged that counsel had “received information from a
credible source that [M.R.] may have committed aggravated perjury,” and second, he
alleged that Appellant “may have received ineffective assistance of counsel related to
specific objections lodged at trial as well as the timing and preservation of error related to
such objections.” Appellant’s appeal addresses only the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. We review a trial court’s denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse
of discretion. Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
“The right to a hearing on a motion for new trial is not absolute.” Rozell v. State,
176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A motion for new trial must be accompanied
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by an affidavit that sets out the factual basis for the claims raised and specifically shows
the truth of the grounds of attack. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 569 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (en banc); see also Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 200 & n.32 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009) (verification acceptable in lieu of separate affidavit in context of motion for new
trial). A hearing is mandatory only when the trial court determines the motion for new trial
and accompanying affidavit(s) raise matters that are both not determinable from the
record and reasonable, meaning they could potentially entitle the defendant to relief.
Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Wallace v. State, 106
S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). When a motion for new trial relies on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, to be entitled to a hearing the appellant “must allege
sufficient facts from which a trial court could reasonably conclude both that counsel failed
to act as a reasonably competent attorney and that, but for counsel’s failure, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Smith, 286
S.W.3d at 341. “Bare assertions, without supporting factual allegations, are not sufficient
to entitle a party to a hearing, and a trial court is not required to hold a hearing to conduct
a ‘fishing expedition.’” Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
The State alleges that the allegations in Appellant’s motion for new trial are
conclusory, providing no specific instances of when trial counsel may have been
ineffective. We agree with the State. Appellant has neither identified which trial
objections were problematic nor explained how handling these objections differently
would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Because Appellant failed to allege
sufficient facts from which the trial court could reasonably have concluded that there is a
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for
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counsel’s ineffective assistance, Appellant’s allegations were not sufficient to mandate a
hearing on his motion for new trial. The trial court acted within its discretion in denying a
hearing on Appellant’s motion. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Cross-Examination
Appellant claims the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to permit trial
counsel to pursue cross-examination regarding alleged deficiencies in the law
enforcement investigation and probing M.R.’s motive to fabricate allegations to gain an
advantage in her divorce from him. He asserts that in restricting these areas of inquiry,
the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense.
At trial, Appellant’s counsel did not assert that these limitations on his cross-
examination amounted to a violation of his constitutional right to present his defense.
Because Appellant failed to object to the exclusion of this testimony based on his
constitutional right to present a defense, we conclude he has failed to preserve this
complaint for appellate review. See Broxton v. State, 909 S.W.2d 912, 918 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1995) (en banc) (appellant waived federal due process rights when he failed to make
objection at trial); Wright v. State, 374 S.W.3d 564, 575–76 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (appellant did not preserve issue when she failed to specifically
assert trial court’s evidentiary rulings violated her constitutional right to present defense).
To the extent that Appellant’s issue encompasses the propriety of the trial court’s
ruling on relevancy grounds, we review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
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evidence for an abuse of discretion. 3 Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that M.R.’s
property claims in her pending divorce from Appellant do not tend to make any element
of the alleged offenses more or less probable. See TEX. R. EVID. 401. The evidence was
properly excluded as not relevant.
Appellant also claims that he was improperly prohibited from developing his theory
that he had been “prematurely charged” after a “rush to judgment.” The complained-of
limits on cross-examination related to specific documentary evidence, objected to on the
basis of relevance and hearsay, that Appellant contends would have supported this
theory. 4 The fact that investigators acted swiftly and perhaps imperfectly has no tendency
to make it more or less probable that Appellant in fact kidnapped and assaulted M.R.,
particularly considering that Appellant’s identity was not at issue. We conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.
Lesser-Included Offenses
By his third issue, Appellant contends the trial court reversibly erred by denying his
request to provide the jury with a lesser-included-offense instruction for unlawful restraint
in the kidnapping case and family violence assault in the occlusion assault case. We
review a trial court’s refusal to include a lesser-included offense instruction in the court’s
charge for an abuse of discretion. Chavez v. State, 666 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. Crim.
3 At trial, the State objected to these lines of questioning on relevance grounds.
4 The record reflects that Appellant’s trial counsel vigorously challenged the quality of the
investigation, eliciting testimony indicating the case was submitted to the district attorney quickly and that
investigators sought a “rush warrant.”
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App. 2023). Whether a defendant is entitled to a requested lesser-included offense
instruction requires a two-step analysis. Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d 443, 446 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011) (citing Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). First,
courts compare the statutory elements of the alleged lesser offense with the statutory
elements of the greater offense as stated in the charging instrument to determine whether
the lesser offense is included within proof of the greater offense. Chavez, 666 S.W.3d at
776. If it is, the lesser-included offense must be submitted if some evidence in the record
would permit a rational jury to find that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the
lesser-included offense. Id. This requirement is met if there is affirmative evidence that
raises the lesser offense and rebuts or negates other evidence establishing the greater
offense. Id. The evidence must present the lesser-included offense as a valid, rational
alternative to the greater offense. Id. at 777. However, if the defendant presents evidence
that he committed no offense at all, a charge on a lesser offense is not required. Aguilar
v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that bodily-injury assault is not a lesser-
included offense of occlusion assault. “[B]odily-injury assault is not a lesser-included
offense of occlusion assault when the disputed element is the injury because the
statutorily specified injury of impeding normal breathing or blood circulation is exclusive
of other bodily injuries.” Ortiz v. State, 623 S.W.3d 804, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).
Here, the indictment charged Appellant only with occlusion assault, alleging that Appellant
“did intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly impede the normal breathing or circulation of
the blood of [M.R.] by applying pressure to the throat or neck of [M.R.].” Because the
charged offense of occlusion assault specifies impeding and is exclusive of proof of other
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bodily injuries, family violence assault is not within the proof necessary to establish the
charged offense. 5 See id. at 806–09; McCall v. State, 635 S.W.3d 261, 267–71 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2021, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). Therefore, the trial court properly denied
Appellant’s request to include family violence assault in its charge to the jury.
As for unlawful restraint, there is no dispute that it has been held to be a lesser-
included offense of kidnapping. Molinar v. State, 735 S.W.3d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2026, pet. ref’d) (citing Schweinle v. State, 915 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex. Crim. App.
1996), discussing false imprisonment, now known as unlawful restraint). Kidnapping, as
alleged in this case, required the State to prove that Appellant intentionally or knowingly
abducted M.R. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 20.03. “Abduct” means to restrain a person with
intent to prevent her liberation by (1) secreting or holding her in a place where she is not
likely to be found or (2) using or threatening to use deadly force. See id. § 20.01(2).
Unlawful restraint would require proof that Appellant intentionally or knowingly restrained
M.R. See id. § 20.02(a). We must consider whether some record evidence would allow
a rational jury to determine that, if Appellant is guilty, he is guilty only of unlawful restraint.
The defendant must identify evidence that negates the greater offense and
supports the lesser offense. Green v. State, 713 S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).
The element that separates kidnapping from unlawful restraint is abduction, i.e.,
restraining the victim with the intention to prevent her liberation by secreting or holding
her in a place where she is not likely to be found. See Megas v. State, 68 S.W.3d 234,
5 Although Appellant acknowledged that he struck M.R., possibly on her neck, he denied choking
her and testified that her breathing was fine both before and after he “lashed out.” Occlusion assault
“forecloses an instruction on an assault that results in a different injury.” Ortiz, 623 S.W.3d at 810.
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240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (“Once restraint has been proven,
the offense of kidnapping is complete when the actor evidences a specific intent to
prevent liberation.”); Romero v. State, 34 S.W.3d 323, 325 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2000, pet. ref’d) (“Kidnapping is accomplished by abduction, which includes restraint, but
unlawful restraint is committed by restraint only.”). Thus, to be entitled to an instruction
on unlawful restraint, Appellant must point to evidence that created an issue about
whether he restrained M.R. but did not intend to prevent her liberation by secreting or
holding her in a place where she was not likely to be found.
Appellant points to his testimony that at various times he prevented M.R. from
getting out of his car as evidence showing he restrained M.R. However, Appellant does
not direct us to evidence negating or refuting the finding that he intended to prevent M.R.’s
liberation, and after reviewing the entire record, we have found no such evidence. We
conclude there was no evidence that affirmatively raised the lesser-included offense of
unlawful restraint. We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
Prior Convictions
Appellant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the
State to elicit testimony about his prior felony convictions before he testified. He argues
that the evidence was admitted in violation of the Rules of Evidence and his constitutional
rights to due process and a fair trial. As previously identified, we review the trial court’s
decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Torres, 71 S.W.3d at
760. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence as long as the
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decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396,
427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).
This issue arises from Appellant’s counsel’s cross-examination of an investigating
officer, who testified that investigators run criminal histories on every victim or suspect in
their cases, so he was sure he ran M.R.’s criminal history. The State later argued to the
trial court that this line of questioning “potentially left the jury with the misimpression that
the victim has a criminal history, which isn’t true[.]” The State further asserted that
Appellant’s prior convictions became admissible because, by asking about the victim’s
criminal history, Appellant had made the criminal history of the witnesses part of the
determination of their credibility. The trial judge allowed the State to ask the investigator
whether he ran a criminal history of Appellant and a follow-up question asking whether
the history showed Appellant had prior felony convictions.
After the investigator responded affirmatively to the State’s question asking
whether he ran and reviewed a criminal history for Appellant, the State then asked, “Does
[Appellant] have multiple prior felony convictions?” The officer answered, “Yes, he does.”
Appellant’s counsel objected to the question and moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
Later in the trial, Appellant testified and his trial counsel questioned him about the felony
offenses he had been convicted of in the past ten years.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
State to elicit testimony regarding Appellant’s criminal history, we conclude that its
admission was rendered harmless by Appellant’s subsequent testimony on the same
issue. The rule in Texas is that “[e]vidence prematurely admitted in error may become
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admissible or be rendered harmless by subsequent evidence.” James v. State, 102
S.W.3d 162, 175 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d); see Romo v. State, 700 S.W.2d
633, 634 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no pet.) (“A conviction will not be
reversed for error in receiving evidence that was not admissible when received but that
became admissible at a subsequent stage.”). The questions asked of Appellant by his
counsel produced answers which rendered the allegedly erroneously admitted evidence
admissible. Moreover, once Appellant took the stand, the State could have impeached
his testimony under Texas Rule of Evidence 609 by introducing evidence of the prior
convictions. TEX. R. EVID. 609. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
Attorney’s Fees
In his final issue, Appellant contends that this Court should modify the bill of cost
to remove the entry related to court-appointed attorney’s fees. The State does not oppose
the requested relief.
The bill of cost associated with Cause Number 07-25-00264-CR contains a charge
of $7,050 for attorney’s fees and reflects a credit for the same amount. 6 The bill of cost
also states, “Attorney fees are not collected until the court finds the defendant able to pay,
pursuant to TXCCP Art. 26.05 section (g).” A trial court errs if it orders the reimbursement
of court-appointed attorney’s fees in the absence of record evidence demonstrating a
defendant’s financial resources to offset the costs of legal services. Mayer v. State, 309
6 The bill of cost for Cause Number 07-25-00263-CR reflects no assessment of attorney’s fees and
needs no modification.
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S.W.3d 552, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Appellant was found to be indigent and there
is no record evidence showing a material change in Appellant’s financial circumstances.
To accurately reflect Appellant’s indigent status and avoid future confusion, the
reference to an assessment of attorney’s fees should be deleted. See Fugett v. State,
721 S.W.3d 120, 122–23 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2025, no pet.) (reforming judgment under
similar circumstances for accuracy). Appellant’s fifth issue is sustained.
CONCLUSION
The bill of cost generated for Cause Number 07-25-00264-CR is modified to delete
the assessment and credit of $7,050 for attorney’s fees. In all other respects, the
judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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