Richard Eric Leal v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket05-24-00446-CR
JudgeLee
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed November 17, 2026
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-24-00446-CR
RICHARD ERIC LEAL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F23-52514
OPINION ON REHEARING
Before Justices Smith, Clinton, and Lee
Opinion by Justice Lee
We grant the State’s motion for rehearing. We vacate our prior judgment dated
November 18, 2025. We issue this opinion on rehearing this appeal.
Appellant Richard Eric Leal appeals his conviction for possessing and
intending to distribute between four and 200 grams of fentanyl enhanced by a prior
felony conviction. Leal was sentenced by a jury to thirty years’ imprisonment.
Leal raises three issues on appeal: (1) the district court erred in instructing the
jury that, if there was an outstanding warrant for Leal’s arrest, the evidence found as
a result of an unconstitutional traffic stop was legally obtained; (2) the district court
erred by proceeding to trial with eleven jurors; and (3) the district court abused its
discretion in overruling Leal’s objection to a police officer’s testimony that
“everybody” knows blue pills marked with “M-30” are counterfeit.
The State presents two cross-issues to reform the judgment to reflect the
appropriate statute and reflect Leal’s plea of “Not True” to the enhancement
paragraph.
We modify the judgment. We affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
While undercover Dallas police officers were looking for Leal’s brother, the
officers observed two vehicles depart from a home in southeast Dallas. Officers in a
marked car followed one of the cars for ten or fifteen minutes before it allegedly
made a right turn without signaling and turned into the middle or left lane instead of
the far right.1
After initiating a traffic stop, Leal was found in the front passenger seat with
two other individuals in the vehicle. Upon smelling marijuana and observing a half-
full bottle of liquor in the back, all individuals were ordered out of the car and told
to leave their belongings. Upon identifying Leal, the officers found a warrant for his
arrest from Tarrant County and confirmed its validity.
In searching Leal’s bag, officers discovered cocaine, alprazolam, loose .22
caliber ammunition, and multiple bags of pills, including thirty-eight blue pills
1
The officer’s dash camera was not activated.
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marked “M-30.” A .22 caliber handgun was found in the front passenger-side glove
compartment. After Leal was arrested, he admitted the bag’s contents belonged to
him. He explained that he was a drug user, not a dealer, but boasted about having
access to large quantities of narcotics. Leal stated the pills were “samples to give to
his people.”
Another passenger was found with a .40 caliber handgun with two magazines,
a scale, suspected cocaine, suspected marijuana, and bottles of alprazolam.
At the conclusion of voir dire, the court read out the names of the jurors. The
reporter’s record only shows eleven jurors named to sit as the jury for the trial. At
no time during the trial did any person suggest there were only eleven jurors present
or object to the absence of a twelfth juror.
At trial, a DEA chemist testified the pills contained fentanyl. Leal testified the
vehicle did not commit any traffic infractions, he did not have a warrant, he did not
know the pills contained a controlled substance, and he did not intend to distribute
the pills. Leal maintained he believed the pills to be similar to “BlueChews,” a
chewable form of Viagra. A State expert testified, “everybody knows these specific
pills are counterfeit” and that “almost everyone knows pills are fentanyl.”
The jury charge included a section titled “DISREGARD EVIDENCE IF
UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED – 38.23 CCP.” The jury was instructed to disregard
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any evidence if unlawfully obtained and return a verdict of acquital.2 However, if
the jury found the officer had a reasonable suspicion to believe Leal (1) was in a
vehicle that failed to signal, (2) was in a vehicle that failed to turn as close as practical
to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway immediately prior to the stop, or (3)
had a warrant for his arrest, then the jury could consider the evidence obtained by
the officer as a result of detention.
Leal was convicted of possession and intent to distribute between four and
200 grams of fentanyl. He was also found to have had a prior aggravated robbery
conviction. He was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment and timely filed a notice
of appeal.
DISCUSSION
JURY INSTRUCTION ON TRAFFIC STOP LEGALITY
Leal contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that evidence
obtained during the traffic stop was admissible if the officers discovered that he had
an outstanding warrant. He argues the instruction improperly removed from the jury
the question whether the warrant was actually discovered and whether its discovery
attenuated any illegality in the initial stop. He asserts the court’s instruction to
2
The instruction read, “Therefore, bearing in mind these instructions, if you find from the evidence
that, on the occasion in question, Officer Osario did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe that Richard
Eric Leal was occupying a vehicle that failed to signal a tum, or failed to tum as closely as practicable to
the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway immediately prior to the stop, or had a warrant for his arrest, if
you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will disregard any and all evidence obtained as a result of Richard
Eric Leal' s detention by the officer and you will not consider such evidence for any purpose whatsoever.
If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the Defendant, and so
say by your verdict of "not guilty”.
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consider evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop if Leal had a warrant for his
arrest was improper as it was not material to the lawfulness of the officers’ search of
the car and its contents.
The State contends the instruction was proper because Leal’s testimony that
the driver did not commit the two alleged traffic violations and that he did not have
a valid arrest warrant raised three contested fact issues material to the lawfulness of
the stop and search of the car. However, after discovering Leal’s warrant, any taint
was attenuated from the allegedly unlawful stop.
Applicable Law
When a defendant raises a claim of jury-charge error, we first review whether
error exists, and, if so, determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to
require reversal. Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Ngo
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743-44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review a trial court’s
decision to submit an Article 38.23 instruction for an abuse of discretion. See
Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Article 38.23(a)
requires a jury instruction when the evidence raises a disputed issue of historical fact
that is material to the legality of the challenged police conduct. Id. at 510; Chambers
v. State, 580 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A dispute concerning the
legal significance of undisputed facts, however, does not require a jury instruction.
See Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 511.
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Whether evidence is sufficiently attenuated from an unlawful detention is a
question of law for the trial court. See, e.g., Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 580–
81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
Article 36.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a
judgment shall not be reversed for charge error unless the error appearing from the
record was “calculated to injure the rights of defendant” or “it appears from the
record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.”
Our analysis involves two steps: First, we determine whether the charge is
erroneous. If it is, then we must decide whether the appellant was harmed by the
erroneous charge. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).
If a defendant timely objects to alleged jury charge error, the record need only
show “some harm” to obtain reversal. Id. Harm is assessed “in light of the entire jury
charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of the
probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information
revealed by the record of the trial as a whole. Id.
Analysis
An officer testified that he observed the driver of the vehicle failed to use its
turn signal and did not turn to the lane nearest the curb. Upon stopping the vehicle,
Leal’s information was put into the system and it was found he had an outstanding
warrant in Tarrant County. The officer—after smelling marijuana, noticing
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marijuana residue and an open, half-empty liquor bottle in the backseat—asked the
car’s occupants to exit the vehicle and leave their belongings inside.
The record does not raise a contested historical fact regarding the discovery
of the warrant. Officer Osario testified that dispatch located and confirmed an active
Tarrant County warrant for Leal before the search, and the defense presented no
evidence that the warrant did not exist or was not discovered during the stop. Thus,
the legal significance of the warrant's discovery, including attenuation, presented a
question of law for the court rather than a fact issue for the jury. See Madden, 242
S.W.3d at 511; Weems, 493 S.W.3d at 580-81.
Nor did the charge submit attenuation to the jury. The charge instructed jurors
to disregard unlawfully obtained evidence and allowed them to determine whether
the officers had reasonable suspicion based on the alleged traffic violations. It did
not ask the jury to decide whether discovery of the warrant attenuated any taint from
an unlawful stop.
Even if inclusion of the warrant language was erroneous, Leal has not shown
some harm. The charge otherwise properly submitted the disputed traffic-stop issues,
and the record contains evidence supporting the legality of the stop and the officers'
subsequent actions. Considering the charge as a whole, the evidence, and the
arguments of counsel, we conclude any error did not affect Leal's rights. We overrule
issue one.
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NUMBER OF JURORS
Leal contends that the judgment must be reversed because the appellate record
reflects that only eleven jurors were identified when the jury was sworn. He argues
that a felony defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to a twelve-person
jury and that the record's failure to show that a twelfth juror served constitutes
structural error requiring a new trial.
The State responds that the record, as supplemented following abatement,
establishes that twelve jurors were selected, sworn, and served throughout trial. The
omission of one juror's name from the reporter's transcription of the jury call was
merely a recordkeeping error and does not demonstrate that fewer than twelve jurors
participated in the proceedings. Accordingly, the State argues that a constitutionally
composed twelve-person jury tried Leal and that no reversible error occurred.
Applicable Law
Texas law imposes a firm constitutional and statutory requirement that felony
criminal juries in district courts be composed of twelve persons.3 TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 13. Article 33.01(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure echoes this requirement,
providing that in district court the jury shall consist of twelve qualified jurors.
3
While the right to a twelve-member jury in criminal cases carves out certain exceptions for the death
or disability of a juror, neither of those exceptions are present here. There was also no consent from Leal
to proceed with less than the required number.
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Under Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(c)(2), an appellate court must
presume the jury was properly empaneled and sworn unless the matter was disputed
in the trial court or the record affirmatively shows the contrary.
Analysis
Following our initial opinion and judgment, in which we concluded the record
affirmatively showed the presence of only eleven jurors, the State moved for
rehearing. We abated the proceeding with instructions to the trial court to determine
whether records exist providing the number of jurors who considered the evidence
and rendered the verdict in this matter. The trial court did so and filed a record of the
hearing with supplemental records. We reinstated the case, invited additional
briefing, and heard additional oral argument focused on appellant’s second appellate
issue. We now conclude that the record does not affirmatively show the presence of
fewer than twelve jurors.
Per our instructions, the trial court admitted the Judge's Jury List and heard
testimony from Dallas County Jury Services establishing that twelve jurors were
selected, seated, and sworn. The trial court found that the twelfth juror's name was
omitted from the oral call of the panel, but the juror nonetheless served throughout
trial.
Appellant argues that the supplemented record is not a proper part of the
appellate record, because it is neither the reporter’s record or the clerk’s record, and
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appellant objects to our consideration of the supplemental record. Rule 2 of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure permits us to suspend a rule’s operation for good cause.
We find the existence of good cause, namely the interests of justice, for the
suspension of Rule 34.1, regarding the contents of the appellate record. As we
observed in our original opinion, it defied logic that a felony case could be tried with
only eleven jurors without anyone in the courtroom ever commenting that there were
only eleven jurors. The supplemental record, although neither a reporter’s record nor
a clerk’s record in the formal sense, shows there were twelve jurors who considered
Leal’s guilt or innocence. We therefore suspend Rule 34.1 and consider the
supplemental record.
The supplemented record supports the trial court’s findings that twelve jurors
heard this case. The signed Judge's Jury List identifies twelve jurors, and the totality
of evidence does not suggest that fewer than twelve jurors considered the evidence
or rendered the verdict. We therefore conclude that a constitutionally composed
twelve-person jury tried Leal. We overrule Leal’s second issue.
OBJECTION TO POLICE TESTIMONY
In his third issue, Leal contends the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling his objection to Det. Hilton's testimony that "everybody knows" blue M-
30 pills are counterfeit fentanyl pills. He argues the statement was speculative,
improperly implied that he knew the pills contained fentanyl, and prejudiced him on
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the disputed element of knowledge, particularly because the State emphasized the
testimony in closing.
The State responds that Hilton offered admissible expert testimony about the
common recognition of counterfeit M-30 pills as circumstantial evidence of
knowledge, not an opinion on Leal’s mental state. The State also argues that Leal
waived his complaint by eliciting similar testimony on cross-examination and that
any error was harmless given the other evidence of knowledge.
Applicable Law
While we ordinarily review the trial court’s determination regarding the
admission of testimony under an abuse of discretion standard of review, we can
resolve this issue by a harm analysis. Finding our harm analysis dispositive, we need
not address whether the trial court erred in admitting the officer’s testimony. See
Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.4
Non-constitutional errors require reversal only if they affect an appellant’s
substantial rights, i.e., when they have a substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Taylor v. State, 268
S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In making this determination, the
following nonexclusive factors are considered: the character of the alleged error and
4
“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses
every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”
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how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; the nature of the
evidence supporting the verdict; the existence and degree of additional evidence
indicating guilt; whether the State emphasized the complained-of error; the trial
court’s instructions; the theory of the case; and, relevant voir dire. Motilla v. State,
78 S.W.3d 352, 356-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Schutz v. State, 63 S.W.3d 442,
444-45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Analysis
Assuming without deciding that Leal preserved his complaint and that the trial
court erred, any error was harmless. The remaining evidence independently allowed
a rational factfinder to establish knowing possession and intent to distribute.
During his testimony, Det. Hilton responded to the question, “Do people know
they’re fentanyl pills or are they being passed as something else?” After Leal’s
speculation objection was overruled, Hilton answered, “I will say, with certainty,
everybody knows these specific pills are counterfeit.”
Although the State argued that Leal knew the pills were fentanyl, its argument
rested not only on Hilton’s challenged testimony but also on Leal’s own admissions
and the circumstances surrounding his possession of the pills.
Even if the initial “everybody knows” statement was inadmissible, similar
testimony was later admitted without objection. Accordingly, the jury heard
essentially the same information from Hilton elsewhere in the record:
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Q: Would you expect someone who has intimate knowledge of the
narcotics game to understand that?
A: Yes.
…
Q: And you described that everyone knows pills are counterfeit. Is that
fair to say?
A: Yes.
…
Q: So in essence, an individual may or may not know they are fentanyl;
fair to say?
A: I think almost everyone knows pills are fentanyl.
In his own testimony, Leal admitted that a bag containing cocaine, Xanax,
loose ammunition, and multiple bags of pills—later determined to contain
fentanyl—belonged to him. He also described these pills as “samples” for his people
and claimed access to large quantities of narcotics. Upon cross-examination, Leal
stated he did not know if the M-30 pills were legal or illegal, but he never mentioned
BlueChews or Viagra to the investigating officers. Further, the evidence showed
Leal obtained the pills from an individual involved in trafficking illegal narcotics.
The scale, packaging materials, and quantities supported an inference that Leal
possessed the drugs for redistribution rather than personal use. Additionally, his
admitted association with a narcotics dealer, his possession of other illegal drugs,
and his characterization of the pills as “samples” supported an inference that he knew
the pills were contraband. See Johnson v. State, No. 05-24-01019-CR, 2026 WL
508801, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2026, pet. ref’d) (“[A] knowledge
requirement may be met by showing that the defendant knew he possessed a
substance listed on the schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was.”)
–13–
In the State’s closing statements Leal’s personal knowledge of the fentanyl
pills was explored:
Yesterday when [Leal] took the stand, he wanted to try and say, well,
these blue pills…I thought these were blue chew. That is just not
true…There is no reason for him to buy actual packages of blue chew
and then believe that you have got separate packages here that that is
blue chew. He knew these were Fentanyl pills. And again, the law
doesn’t require us to prove that he knew it was Fentanyl. But he knew
it was Fentanyl anyway. He definitely knew it was illegal contraband,
right…You are not just going to go to somebody to get hundreds of
these blue pills. He’s not talking about blue chew, right. He’s talking
about getting hundreds of these pills, getting bricks of other drugs. He’s
talking about the Fentanyl.
Although the State referenced Hilton’s testimony during closing, the prosecutor also
relied on numerous facts independent of the challenged testimony to argue
knowledge.
Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred in overruling Leal’s
objection, we conclude any error did not affect Leal’s substantial rights. Although
the challenged testimony bore on the disputed issue of knowledge and the State
referenced that testimony during closing argument, similar testimony was later
admitted without objection, and independent evidence undermined Leal’s claim that
he believed the pills were lawful BlueChew tablets. The jury was free to reject Leal’s
explanation in light of his possession of other illegal narcotics, his characterization
of the pills as “samples,” his access to narcotics suppliers, and the quantity and
packaging of the drugs recovered. See Moore v. State, 717 S.W.3d 660, 665 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2025, no pet.) (“the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility
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and the weight assigned to their testimony.”). Viewed in the context of the entire
record, the complained-of testimony did not have a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the jury’s verdict.
Leal’s third issue is overruled.
MODIFICATION
The trial court’s judgment reflects that Leal was convicted under “481.112(c)
Health and Safety Code.” However, the correct statute is 481.112(d) of the Health
and Safety Code.
This Court has the power to correct and reform a trial court judgment to make
the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so,
or make any appropriate order as the law and nature of the case may require. Asberry
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).
CONCLUSION
We grant the State’s motion for rehearing. We vacate our judgment dated
November 13, 2025, though we do not withdraw the opinion of the same date. We
modify the judgment to reflect the appropriate statute under which Leal was
convicted. We then affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
/Mike Lee/
MIKE LEE
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2
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