Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00050-CR JUAN MARQUIS COUNCIL, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 6th District Court Lamar County, Texas Trial Court No. 31573 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION A Lamar County jury convicted Juan Marquis Council of possession of a controlled substance of one gram or more but less than four grams, a third-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (Supp.). The State filed a notice of intention to seek enhanced punishment due to Council’s prior convictions. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Supp.). The jury found both enhancement allegations true, and the trial court sentenced Council to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Council appeals. Appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on appeal, stating that he fully examined the record and reviewed the relevant law, but he found no meritorious issues for appeal. Appellate counsel also filed an Anders brief in support of his motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743–44 (1967). In the Anders brief, appellate counsel set out the procedural history of the case and provided a review of Council’s pleas of true to the State’s allegations, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the legality of the sentence imposed, with citations to the record and applicable authority. Appellate counsel concluded there was no non- frivolous argument to be raised with respect to any of these issues. Appellate counsel certified that he sent a letter to Council providing him with a copy of the motion and brief, informing him of his rights to review the record and file a brief or response on his own behalf, informing him of the right to appeal, and explaining the meaning and effect of an Anders brief. Appellate counsel also sent a copy of the record to Council. On August 11, 2026, we informed Council that his pro se response was due on or before September 10. Council filed a response arguing that: (1) since the margin of error was within 2 the lower classification (less than one gram), he could only be convicted of a state-jail felony; the trial court erroneously denied his request to quash the indictment because he told the trial court that he had never been convicted of a prior felony conviction; (2) his bond was excessive; (3) the use of his prior federal conviction from federal court violates the double-jeopardy clause; (4) abuse of power by the trial court and the members of the district attorney’s office placed an illegal firearm charge, which his civil action against them is based; (5) an illegal indictment violates his civil liberties that led to the illegal arrest and his restraint; (6) his due process rights were violated because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by waiving his arraignment; (7) his Sixth Amendment1 rights were violated based on systemic exclusion of a particular class from grand jury; (8) the trial court erroneously denied his request for an evidentiary hearing to be heard on a mistake of fact of the weight of the controlled substance; (9) the trial court improperly ignored his objection to an inaccurate enhancement paragraph in the indictment; (10) his sentence was improperly enhanced to a minimum of twenty-five years where his underlying offense was only a state-jail felony; (11) the trial court erred by using his prior conviction to prove an essential element of an offense which bars the subsequent use of that prior conviction in the same indictment for enhancement purposes; and (12) the State vindictively charged a more serious crime and sought a more severe penalty than is proper in retaliation for his lawful exercise of a constitutional right and failed to show the police recording as an attempt to avoid required disclosure or to persuade the jury to wrongly convict a defendant or an unjustified punishment. 1 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 3 Appellate counsel’s actions comply with an appointed counsel’s responsibilities when filing an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw in accordance with Kelly v. State. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Appellate counsel’s professional evaluation of the record demonstrates why there are no arguable grounds to be raised on appeal and meets the requirements of Anders. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–20. After our independent review of the entire appellate record, we have independently determined “that there are no non-frivolous grounds for appeal.” See Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318 n.16. In the Anders context, once we determine that the appeal is without merit, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.2 Charles van Cleef Justice Date Submitted: September 22, 2026 Date Decided: September 29, 2026 Do Not Publish 2 Since we agree that this case presents no non-frivolous grounds for appeal, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant appellate counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of Appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should Appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 4