Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00141-CR Christopher Donte Loud, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 66th District Court of Hill County, Texas Judge Dibrell (Dib) W. Waldrip, presiding Trial Court Cause No. F332-23 JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Following a jury trial, Christopher Dante Loud was convicted of burglary of a habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3). The jury also found that Loud used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. See id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). The jury found one felony enhancement allegation to be true and assessed Loud’s punishment at sixty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. Loud presents two issues on appeal, alleging jury charge error and challenging the trial court’s restitution order. We affirm. Jury Charge Error In his first issue, Loud alleges that he was egregiously harmed by jury charge error that authorized his burglary of a habitation conviction on an unpled theory of liability. We disagree. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT LAW We review alleged jury charge error by considering two questions: (1) whether error existed in the charge; and, if so, (2) whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If there is error but the appellant failed to object, the error in the charge is reviewed only for egregious harm. Id. at 743-44. Egregious harm means that the error affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant must have suffered actual harm, not theoretical harm. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The Court of Criminal Appeals outlined four factors that reviewing courts should consider when determining whether a jury charge error resulted in egregious harm: “1) the charge itself; 2) the state of the evidence including Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 2 contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; 3) arguments of counsel; and 4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144. ANALYSIS Loud was charged by indictment with burglary of a habitation, alleging that he did then and there intentionally or knowingly enter a habitation, without the effective consent of Bobbie Jo Loud, the owner thereof, and attempted to commit or committed assault against Bobbie Jo Loud and/or committed or attempted to commit an assault against Audrey Johnson and/or committed or attempted to commit theft of a vehicle key and/or of a vehicle owned by Bobbie Jo Loud. In the abstract section of the jury charge, the trial court defined “assault” to mean “the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). The trial court also included the Penal Code definition for recklessness. See id. § 6.03(c). Loud did not object at trial to the inclusion of these definitions. On appeal, Loud contends that the abstract definition for assault improperly included the reckless mens rea because the indictment alleged only an intentional or knowing mens rea. This, he argues, should have limited the State’s theory of liability to intentional or knowing conduct for both the entry element and the underlying assault. Thus, Loud asserts that the jury was improperly authorized to convict him for reckless conduct. Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 3 Loud was charged with burglary of a habitation under subsection (a)(3). See id. § 30.02(a)(3). “[W]hen a defendant is charged under subsection (a)(3) […] [t]he State must simply prove that the defendant intentionally or knowingly entered the building or habitation without the owner’s consent and while inside committed or attempted to commit a felony or theft [or an assault].”1 Espinoza v. State, 955 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. ref’d). The intentional or knowing mens rea applies only to the entry element of the burglary of a habitation. See DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 64 n. 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The State must then prove all of the elements of the specified felony, theft, or assault, including the applicable mental state. See Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Assault is properly charged as intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). Therefore, it was proper for the trial court to include the reckless mens rea in the definition of assault, as well as the Penal Code definition of recklessness, so that the jury could determine whether Loud committed or attempted to commit an assault. The trial court did not err by including the reckless mental state in the jury charge. Furthermore, even if we were to find error, we would conclude it was harmless. Loud concedes that the egregious harm standard applies because 1 Section 30.02(a)(3) was amended to add “or an assault” in 1999, after the Espinoza case was decided. See Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 727, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999. Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 4 he did not object at trial. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44. The jury heard evidence that Loud’s then-87-year-old grandmother, Bobbie Jo Loud, became afraid of him and had him criminally trespassed from her property. Days later, Loud defied the criminal trespass warning and went over to his grandmother’s residence. She contacted law enforcement and filled out the necessary forms with the responding officer to pursue criminal charges against Loud. During that time, Audrey Johnson, the grandmother’s neighbor, came over to the grandmother’s home to warn her that Loud was seen in the area. Shortly after the officer left the residence, Loud returned, “busted in the door,” and pushed the neighbor into a refrigerator. This caused the neighbor to feel pain. Loud then repeatedly punched his grandmother in the head and face, even after she fell from her chair onto the floor. In his closing argument, defense counsel conceded “there is an assault” as to the grandmother. Loud also concedes on appeal that “the evidence likely established intentional conduct[.]” Considering the foregoing, we cannot say that Loud was egregiously harmed by the error, if any, in including the reckless mental state in the charge. Accordingly, Loud’s first issue is overruled. Restitution In his second issue, Loud asserts that the trial court’s restitution order in the amount of $18,178 is void because there is no evidence in the record to Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 5 support the amount awarded. He cites to Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), to support his argument that he was not required to preserve this alleged error by objection at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently abrogated Idowu, holding that all “[c]hallenges to restitution orders must be raised in the trial court to preserve them for appellate review[.]” Garcia v. State, 663 S.W.3d 92, 96-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Here, the trial court orally ordered restitution in the amount of $18,178 during sentencing. Loud did not object to the trial court’s restitution order at trial and did not file a motion for new trial raising the issue. Therefore, Loud’s challenge to the restitution order is not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Garcia, 663 S.W.3d at 96-97. Accordingly, we overrule Loud’s second issue. Conclusion Having overruled all of Loud’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ANDREA WESTERFELD Justice Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 6 OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Westerfeld, and Senior Chief Justice Rose2 Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM 2 The Honorable Jeff Rose, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas. Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 7