Christopher Donte Loud v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket10-25-00141-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00141-CR
Christopher Donte Loud,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
66th District Court of Hill County, Texas
Judge Dibrell (Dib) W. Waldrip, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. F332-23
JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a jury trial, Christopher Dante Loud was convicted of burglary
of a habitation. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(3). The jury also found
that Loud used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the
offense. See id. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). The jury found one felony enhancement
allegation to be true and assessed Loud’s punishment at sixty years in the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. Loud presents
two issues on appeal, alleging jury charge error and challenging the trial
court’s restitution order. We affirm.
Jury Charge Error
In his first issue, Loud alleges that he was egregiously harmed by jury
charge error that authorized his burglary of a habitation conviction on an
unpled theory of liability. We disagree.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RELEVANT LAW
We review alleged jury charge error by considering two questions: (1)
whether error existed in the charge; and, if so, (2) whether sufficient harm
resulted from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If there is error but the appellant failed to object, the
error in the charge is reviewed only for egregious harm. Id. at 743-44.
Egregious harm means that the error affects the very basis of the case,
deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.
Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A defendant must
have suffered actual harm, not theoretical harm. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d
767, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The Court of Criminal Appeals outlined four factors that reviewing
courts should consider when determining whether a jury charge error resulted
in egregious harm: “1) the charge itself; 2) the state of the evidence including
Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 2
contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; 3) arguments of
counsel; and 4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of the
trial as a whole.” Olivas, 202 S.W.3d at 144.
ANALYSIS
Loud was charged by indictment with burglary of a habitation, alleging
that he
did then and there intentionally or knowingly enter a habitation,
without the effective consent of Bobbie Jo Loud, the owner thereof,
and attempted to commit or committed assault against Bobbie Jo
Loud and/or committed or attempted to commit an assault against
Audrey Johnson and/or committed or attempted to commit theft of
a vehicle key and/or of a vehicle owned by Bobbie Jo Loud.
In the abstract section of the jury charge, the trial court defined “assault” to
mean “the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury
to another.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). The trial court also
included the Penal Code definition for recklessness. See id. § 6.03(c). Loud did
not object at trial to the inclusion of these definitions.
On appeal, Loud contends that the abstract definition for assault
improperly included the reckless mens rea because the indictment alleged only
an intentional or knowing mens rea. This, he argues, should have limited the
State’s theory of liability to intentional or knowing conduct for both the entry
element and the underlying assault. Thus, Loud asserts that the jury was
improperly authorized to convict him for reckless conduct.
Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 3
Loud was charged with burglary of a habitation under subsection (a)(3).
See id. § 30.02(a)(3). “[W]hen a defendant is charged under subsection (a)(3)
[…] [t]he State must simply prove that the defendant intentionally or
knowingly entered the building or habitation without the owner’s consent and
while inside committed or attempted to commit a felony or theft [or an
assault].”1 Espinoza v. State, 955 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet.
ref’d). The intentional or knowing mens rea applies only to the entry element
of the burglary of a habitation. See DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 64 n. 3
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The State must then prove all of the elements of the
specified felony, theft, or assault, including the applicable mental state. See
Langs v. State, 183 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Assault is properly
charged as intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to
another. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). Therefore, it was proper for
the trial court to include the reckless mens rea in the definition of assault, as
well as the Penal Code definition of recklessness, so that the jury could
determine whether Loud committed or attempted to commit an assault. The
trial court did not err by including the reckless mental state in the jury charge.
Furthermore, even if we were to find error, we would conclude it was
harmless. Loud concedes that the egregious harm standard applies because
1 Section 30.02(a)(3) was amended to add “or an assault” in 1999, after the Espinoza case was decided.
See Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 727, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.
Christopher Donte Loud v. The State of Texas Page 4
he did not object at trial. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743-44. The jury heard
evidence that Loud’s then-87-year-old grandmother, Bobbie Jo Loud, became
afraid of him and had him criminally trespassed from her property. Days later,
Loud defied the criminal trespass warning and went over to his grandmother’s
residence. She contacted law enforcement and filled out the necessary forms
with the responding officer to pursue criminal charges against Loud. During
that time, Audrey Johnson, the grandmother’s neighbor, came over to the
grandmother’s home to warn her that Loud was seen in the area. Shortly after
the officer left the residence, Loud returned, “busted in the door,” and pushed
the neighbor into a refrigerator. This caused the neighbor to feel pain. Loud
then repeatedly punched his grandmother in the head and face, even after she
fell from her chair onto the floor. In his closing argument, defense counsel
conceded “there is an assault” as to the grandmother. Loud also concedes on
appeal that “the evidence likely established intentional conduct[.]”
Considering the foregoing, we cannot say that Loud was egregiously harmed
by the error, if any, in including the reckless mental state in the charge.
Accordingly, Loud’s first issue is overruled.
Restitution
In his second issue, Loud asserts that the trial court’s restitution order
in the amount of $18,178 is void because there is no evidence in the record to
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support the amount awarded. He cites to Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002), to support his argument that he was not required to preserve
this alleged error by objection at trial. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently
abrogated Idowu, holding that all “[c]hallenges to restitution orders must be
raised in the trial court to preserve them for appellate review[.]” Garcia v.
State, 663 S.W.3d 92, 96-97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Here, the trial court orally
ordered restitution in the amount of $18,178 during sentencing. Loud did not
object to the trial court’s restitution order at trial and did not file a motion for
new trial raising the issue. Therefore, Loud’s challenge to the restitution order
is not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Garcia, 663
S.W.3d at 96-97.
Accordingly, we overrule Loud’s second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Loud’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
ANDREA WESTERFELD
Justice
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OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Westerfeld, and
Senior Chief Justice Rose2
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM
2 The Honorable Jeff Rose, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Third Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas.
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