Full Opinion

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-26-00056-CR NO. 14-26-00057-CR SAMUEL WADE HENDERSON, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. 1315584 & 1315585 MEMORANDUM OPINION This is an appeal from a non-favorable finding in a Chapter 64 proceeding. We conclude that the new test results do not change the evidentiary landscape and that there is no reasonable probability that appellant would not have been convicted if those test results had been available at the time of trial. We therefore affirm the convicting court’s finding. I. BACKGROUND A. The Underlying Offenses and Investigation This case arises out of three separate home invasions and sexual assaults, which occurred over the span of several months, all within the same neighborhood. The First Victim (identified in the briefing as “L.H.”) came home after a night at the bar, removed her contact lenses, and climbed into bed. She began to use a vibrator until she heard a strange noise in her living room, which she recognized as the blinds rattling over her patio door. An assailant then rushed into her bedroom and pinned her down. She tried to offer him money to leave, but he forcibly raped her. The assailant was much larger than her, and she did not get a good look at his face. The Second Victim (identified in the briefing as “S.L.”) woke up early one morning to study for class and later heard movement around her window blinds. When she got up to inspect, she saw a tall man with a strong build wearing pantyhose over his face. She screamed, and he attacked her. He shoved her against the door, punched her in the face, choked her, and threatened to kill her. He digitally penetrated her vagina and sucked her breast. She never got a look at his face. The Third Victim (identified in the briefing as “L.B.”) was getting ready for work one morning, and because the weather outside was nice, she opened her doors, believing that a screen door was still locked. She later heard a loud noise, and when she went downstairs to inspect, she found a tall, muscular man in her home. The man turned to hide his face, but then he rushed towards her when she tried to run away. He hit her in the face and knocked off her glasses. He put her in a chokehold and threatened that he would kill her if she tried to look at him. He took her upstairs, threw her on the bed, and laid on top of her, but he could not become erect. He 2 digitally penetrated her vagina and then engaged in a “bizarre” conversation with her about wood. Before leaving, he took her underwear as a trophy. Each victim went to the hospital immediately after her assault, where evidence was collected in a rape kit. Authorities came to believe that a single assailant was responsible for all three assaults. They pursued multiple leads but did not get a break in the case until a CODIS hit identified appellant as a likely suspect. Police brought appellant into custody, and he agreed to give a videotaped statement, where he confessed to all three assaults. He also provided corroborating information in that confession. For example, he mentioned that the First Victim had been using a vibrator, and that she had offered him money to leave. He mentioned that the Second Victim had been doing work on her bed, and that he encountered her after coming through a patio door. And he mentioned that the Third Victim had stairs in her home, that he was unable to achieve an erection, that he had a “casual” conversation with her, and that he took her underwear. Police compiled a photospread, which was shown to the First Victim, and she positively identified appellant as her assailant. Police also conducted a search of appellant’s vehicle, which contained a stocking similar to pantyhose and a toolbox with many hand tools. B. The Trial and Appeal Appellant was charged with three counts of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. He pleaded not guilty, and his case proceeded to a trial by jury. 3 All three victims testified, but none of them was able to make an in-court identification of her assailant—not even the First Victim, despite her earlier identification of appellant in the photospread. There was some DNA evidence produced at trial, but it did not always connect appellant to the sexual assaults. As to the First Victim, the evidence showed that a vaginal swab tested positive for the presence of semen. That sample was divided into two parts and then tested with the goal of separating any sperm cells from any epithelial cells, but both resulting samples yielded DNA profiles that were consistent with the First Victim. Appellant was excluded as a source of those DNA profiles. As to the Second Victim, the evidence showed that a breast swab contained the DNA profile of a male, and further testing showed that appellant could not be excluded as a contributor of that DNA. The probability that an unrelated person of the same race contributed that DNA profile was 1 in 9.6 million, which indicated “very strong support” that appellant was the source of that DNA. As to the Third Victim, the evidence showed that a vaginal swab tested positive for the presence of semen, but negative for the presence of sperm. An anal swab tested “slightly positive” for the presence of semen (indicating a “very weak” result), and negative for the presence of sperm. Additional testing of the vaginal swab yielded a full single-source female DNA profile consistent with the Third Victim. No male DNA was ever detected, and appellant was excluded as a source of the DNA that had been detected. Appellant testified in his own defense and denied all of the allegations against him. He claimed that his videotaped confession was coerced by his interrogating officers, whom he alleged had made threatening statements against his family. He 4 also explained that the corroborating information that he mentioned in his confession had been conveyed to him by those same officers in an earlier, unrecorded interview. He said that he told the officers what they wanted to hear and that he expected that he would eventually get a chance to tell his own side of the story. Appellant testified that he carried the hand tools in his vehicle because he does mechanical work, not because he used them for breaking and entering. He testified that the stocking, or “sock” as he called it, was used to manage his high blood pressure, and in a live demonstration, he showed that the stocking would not fit over his head. And he outright dismissed the DNA evidence connecting him to the Second Victim, insisting—inaccurately—that the testing had excluded him as a possible contributor of that DNA profile. The jury rejected appellant’s story and found him guilty of all three offenses. For each offense, the jury sentenced appellant to life in prison. The trial court stacked those life sentences. On appeal to this court, appellant argued in two issues that the judgments should be reversed because his trial counsel had been ineffective by referring to two extraneous offenses, and because his trial counsel had also been suspended from the practice of law for some period of time during the pendency of his case. We overruled each of those issues, but we sustained a separate third issue about the cumulation orders, which both sides agreed were erroneous. We deleted the cumulation orders and otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See Henderson v. State, Nos. 14-11-00727-CR, 14-11-00728-CR, & 14-11-00729-CR, 2012 WL 6218078, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 5 C. The Chapter 64 Proceeding Years later, appellant filed a petition in the convicting court for forensic DNA testing under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The convicting court entered an agreed order for additional testing in the two cause numbers relating to the First Victim and the Third Victim. No additional testing was ordered in the remaining cause number for the Second Victim. For the evidence involving the First Victim, the new testing focused on a fitted bedsheet and on vaginal swabs. Semen was detected on the bedsheet, and a single- source male DNA profile was obtained from the sample, but appellant was excluded as a possible contributor of that DNA profile. As for the vaginal swabs, a mixture that included a male DNA profile was obtained, and appellant could not be excluded as a contributor of that DNA profile. Testing showed that the chances were 4,390 times more likely that the mixture came from the First Victim and appellant than from the First Victim and an unknown, unrelated individual. That statistic was described as providing “moderate support” that appellant contributed the DNA profile. For the evidence involving the Third Victim, the new testing focused on a t- shirt that the Third Victim had been wearing at the time of the assault. Male DNA was found on the t-shirt, but appellant was excluded as a possible contributor of the DNA profile. After all of this testing was concluded, the convicting court held a brief hearing, where only appellant presented arguments. Appellant referred to the new evidence that detected semen on the First Victim’s bedsheet. Appellant asserted that this evidence was exculpatory because the testing excluded him as a contributor of the semen. Appellant acknowledged that 6 the First Victim had a consensual sexual partner who could have been the contributor, but appellant pointed to two items of evidence suggesting otherwise. The first item was a sexual examination report form, in which the First Victim stated that her partner had used a condom during her most recent sexual encounter. The report reflects that the First Victim “couldn’t give [an] exact date” for that encounter, but she indicated that it had occurred less than two weeks before the assault. The second item was an affidavit from an investigator, who said that she spoke with the First Victim roughly ten years after the trial and the First Victim “does not recall any reason for a man’s DNA to be on her sheets who was not the assailant.” Appellant also acknowledged that the new testing of the vaginal swabs provided “moderate support” that he was the contributor of a DNA profile, but he seemed to suggest that this new evidence did not foreclose a favorability finding under Chapter 64 because the testing that had been conducted before trial had already excluded him as a contributor. As for the Third Victim, appellant emphasized that there was no DNA evidence connecting appellant to the assault. In fact, all of the testing affirmatively excluded him as a contributor. Appellant then addressed certain evidence regarding a stocking. During the underlying trial, the prosecution elicited testimony that the DNA profile of the Third Victim had been detected on a stocking. But according to appellant, the prosecution never mentioned that this stocking had been collected from the Third Victim’s home, where the presence of her DNA would be expected. Appellant argued that the prosecution had misled the jury because the evidence at trial improperly suggested that the Third Victim’s DNA was found on the separate stocking collected in the later search of appellant’s vehicle. 7 For all of these reasons, appellant argued that there was a reasonable probability that, if the new evidence had been available at the time of trial, then he would not have been found guilty of the offenses involving the First Victim and the Third Victim. Continuing with that premise, appellant argued that if he had been found not guilty of those two offenses, then there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been sentenced to life imprisonment for the offense involving the Second Victim. In its findings of fact, the convicting court determined that the new forensic evidence was not favorable—i.e., that appellant had not shown a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted had those test results been available at the time of his trial. The court also explained that it was not persuaded by the investigator’s affidavit because it contained inadmissible hearsay and because there were no particular facts that called into doubt either the videotaped confession or the DNA test results of the First Victim’s vaginal swabs. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review In a proceeding under Chapter 64, the convicted person has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted had the results of the new forensic testing been available during the trial of the underlying offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.04; Skinner v. State, 665 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). This standard does not require the convicted person to prove that he is actually innocent. See Ex parte Kussmaul, 548 S.W.3d 606, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (granting habeas relief following a Chapter 64 proceeding, despite concluding that actual innocence had not been proven). Instead, the convicted person must demonstrate that the inculpatory evidence “is so undermined by the test results that it is reasonably 8 probable that a fact finder would not have convicted [him] had the tests been available at trial despite the inculpatory evidence.” See Dunning v. State, 572 S.W.3d 685, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). This standard is not satisfied if the test results “merely muddy the waters.” See Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The convicting court in this case found that appellant had failed to satisfy his burden, and that finding was made after a hearing where no new witness testimony was heard. That hearing consisted of just legal arguments and the admission of various exhibits, such as the underlying trial record and the results of the post- conviction testing. Because the convicting court was in no better position than this court to evaluate that body of evidence, our review of its ruling is de novo. See Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). B. The First Victim The forensic evidence in the underlying trial showed that semen was detected on a vaginal swab. Yet despite the presence of semen, the only DNA profile obtained from the vaginal swab was shown to have been sourced from the First Victim, who is female. There was no DNA evidence from the vaginal swab connecting appellant or any other male to the offense. Notwithstanding the absence of such proof, there was still other evidence that inculpated appellant. The First Victim positively identified appellant as her assailant in a photospread. There was also a video confession in which appellant admitted to raping the First Victim. Since the trial, additional testing was ordered as part of this Chapter 64 proceeding. That testing obtained a male DNA profile from a vaginal swab, and appellant could not be excluded as the source of that profile. The level of confidence 9 was not as great as with the breast swab from the Second Victim—there was “moderate support” that appellant was the source of the DNA in the vaginal swab, as opposed to “very strong support” in that other sample—but even so, the test result does not undermine the inculpatory evidence from the trial. Quite the opposite, the test result strengthens the conviction by providing a DNA link between appellant and the assault where none had previously been shown to exist. Appellant asserts that the new test result does not preclude a finding in his favor because the earlier testing had already excluded him. To the extent he suggests that the earlier exclusion operated as affirmative proof that he was not the assailant, that suggestion is unfounded. The reason for the earlier exclusion was that only a single DNA profile was obtained, and it was traceable back to the First Victim, rather than an unidentified male. Correspondence from the crime lab, which was not admitted as evidence in the underlying trial but has since been provided in this Chapter 64 proceeding, explained that earlier testing as follows: “A very low number of sperm were observed on this sample, and no DNA foreign to the complainant (i.e., no male DNA) was obtained.” Because no other DNA was obtained, the earlier testing was neither inculpatory nor exculpatory. However, the new testing is clearly inculpatory because it obtained a male DNA profile from which appellant could not be excluded. The new testing also detected semen on a bedsheet, from which a male DNA profile was likewise obtained. But unlike with the vaginal swab, appellant was excluded as a contributor of that DNA profile. Appellant contends that this new test result is “powerfully exculpatory,” but we disagree for three reasons. First, the prosecution did not rely on any testing from the bedsheet to secure a conviction in the underlying trial. Second, there was no evidence showing that the First Victim’s assailant had deposited the semen that was 10 collected from the bedsheet. And third, there was evidence affirmatively showing that the First Victim had a consensual sexual partner. In light of such evidence, the existence of a male DNA profile on the bedsheet does not cast doubt on the conviction. It just muddies the waters. See Hall v. State, 569 S.W.3d 646, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (“The significant possibility of DNA being deposited by an innocent person reduces the probative value of any exculpatory DNA test result.”). Appellant discounts the evidence of the consensual sexual partner. He points out that there was never any proof that a consensual encounter occurred on the bedsheet, or even in the First Victim’s apartment. He also points out that the consensual partner had supposedly used a condom, which would have reduced the potential that the partner might have left behind a semen stain. And he points out that the First Victim told an investigator that she did not recall any reason for a man’s DNA to be on the bedsheet if it did not originate from her assailant. These points do not move the needle. When viewed in isolation, the presence of a third party’s DNA on the bedsheet might raise a theoretical possibility of an assailant other than appellant. But when that same evidence is added to the mix of evidence that was already available at the time of trial, along with the new evidence that has since been developed in the course of this Chapter 64 proceeding, it does not change the landscape—there is still a mountain of compelling evidence that appellant was the assailant. See Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (explaining that the objective in a Chapter 64 proceeding is to determine whether, and to what extent, any new DNA testing would alter the evidentiary landscape at the time of trial). That evidence includes the confession and the new test result showing that appellant could not be excluded from a DNA profile obtained from the vaginal swab. Cf. State v. Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d 32, 38–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We are not persuaded that results showing the presence of another 11 DNA donor in the fingernail scrapings would overcome the mountain of evidence of the appellee’s guilt. Primarily, this is because the victim’s having encountered another person would not factually exclude the appellee from having killed her.”); see also Irvan v. State, No. AP-77,125, 2026 WL 388613, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (“The fact that someone else’s DNA is found at a crime scene does not necessarily establish favorability when there is substantial evidence of guilt.”). Appellant argues that his confession should weigh less in the analysis because the new exclusion corroborates his claim that his statements were false. We disagree again. The confession was already corroborated by the old test results that connected his DNA to the Second Victim. And now the confession is further corroborated by the new test results that have connected his DNA to the First Victim. Appellant makes some additional points about identity. He emphasizes that none of the witnesses made an in-court identification. And he emphasizes that, before her positive identification in the photospread, the First Victim had made a tentative identification of a third party in a live lineup. These points fare no better. Despite these indications of uncertainty, the jury still convicted appellant after considering all of the incriminating evidence against him. The new test result from the bedsheet does not affirmatively cast doubt on that conviction. Appellant finally draws our attention to the actions of two lawyers. The first lawyer is his own trial counsel, whom he unsuccessfully challenged in the previous appeal for being ineffective. Appellant contends that the new test result from the bedsheet “compounds the prejudice” from trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. 12 The second lawyer is an assistant district attorney who was briefly involved in this Chapter 64 proceeding. That assistant district attorney submitted a filing stating that the prosecution did not oppose appellant’s proposed findings of fact, effectively agreeing that there was a reasonable probability that appellant would not have been convicted had the new test results been available in the underlying trial. That assistant district attorney subsequently withdrew from the case, supposedly because he had once represented appellant. Substitute counsel for the prosecution then submitted a different and opposing set of proposed findings of fact, which the convicting court ultimately adopted. Appellant now contends that there was no actual conflict of interest or reason for the assistant district attorney to withdraw, and that the attorney’s initial concession underscores the strength of the new exculpatory evidence. These points are totally irrelevant. The actions of both lawyers are simply not part of the evidentiary landscape that defines our scope of review. For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the convicting court that appellant failed to satisfy his burden of showing a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted had the new test results been available at the time of trial. C. The Third Victim The forensic evidence in the underlying trial showed that semen was detected on a vaginal swab collected from the Third Victim, just like with the First Victim. However, sperm was not detected, and no male DNA profile was ever obtained. Thus, the jury did not hear of any DNA evidence that connected appellant to the Third Victim. Nevertheless, the jury still convicted appellant of assaulting the Third Victim, apparently due to the videotaped confession. 13 New testing was ordered in the Chapter 64 proceeding, but unlike with the First Victim, the new test results did not establish any sort of connection between appellant and the Third Victim. These new test results showed that the DNA profile of a male was obtained from the Third Victim’s t-shirt, and that appellant was excluded as a contributor of that DNA profile. That exclusion does not cast affirmative doubt on the conviction. The prosecution did not rely on the t-shirt in the underlying trial. There was no evidence regarding the manner in which the foreign DNA was transferred to the t-shirt, such as through a bodily fluid or through touching. And while there was proof of a struggle between the Third Victim and her assailant, with the assailant even lying on top of her at one point, there was no evidence that the assailant would have necessarily transferred any of his own DNA to her t-shirt, especially if he were clothed. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the new test merely muddies the waters. See Dunning v. State, 572 S.W.3d 685, 693–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). (indicating that touch DNA can easily and innocently be transferred to items of clothing, and holding that a convicted person had not carried his burden under Chapter 64 by establishing that he was excluded as a contributor from such DNA profiles). Appellant responds that the exclusionary result does not muddy the waters, citing Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But that case involved a denial of additional testing under Article 64.03, not a post-testing determination under Article 64.04. Appellant does not explain how that case supports his position. Appellant suggests that the new test result is favorable because there was no DNA evidence connecting him to the Third Victim and because the Third Victim never identified him in court as her assailant. But the jury already knew both of those 14 points and it convicted him, apparently on the basis of the videotaped confession. The new test result does nothing to overcome the strength of that confession. Appellant lastly contends that the stocking evidence was misleading in the underlying trial. Appellant does not purport to collaterally attack the judgment. See Raby v. State, No. AP-76,970, 2015 WL 1874540, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (not designated for publication) (stating that a Chapter 64 proceeding is not a retrial of the case). But he refers to the stocking evidence to show that the evidence of identity was thin in the underlying trial, which is relevant insofar as this court must consider the evidentiary landscape in an analysis under Article 64.04. The problem with this argument is that the prosecution never misled the jury by claiming that the stocking that contained the Third Victim’s DNA was the same stocking that was recovered from appellant’s vehicle. There is also no reason to believe that the jury would have thought otherwise. In closing statements, the defense expressly (and accurately) asserted that there was no DNA evidence connecting appellant to either the First Victim or the Third Victim. The prosecution never challenged that assertion in rebuttal. In fact, the prosecution acknowledged that the DNA evidence only connected appellant to the Second Victim. That was the evidentiary landscape. The new test result from the t-shirt does not alter it. As with the other case involving the First Victim, we conclude that the convicting court correctly determined that there is no reasonable probability that appellant would not have been convicted if the new test results had been available at the time of his trial. 15 CONCLUSION The convicting court’s finding is affirmed. /s/ Tracy Christopher Chief Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bridges and Boatman. Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). 16