Samuel Wade Henderson v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket14-26-00056-CR
JudgeChristopher
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 17, 2026.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
NO. 14-26-00056-CR
NO. 14-26-00057-CR
SAMUEL WADE HENDERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 228th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 1315584 & 1315585
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a non-favorable finding in a Chapter 64 proceeding.
We conclude that the new test results do not change the evidentiary landscape and
that there is no reasonable probability that appellant would not have been convicted
if those test results had been available at the time of trial. We therefore affirm the
convicting court’s finding.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Offenses and Investigation
This case arises out of three separate home invasions and sexual assaults,
which occurred over the span of several months, all within the same neighborhood.
The First Victim (identified in the briefing as “L.H.”) came home after a night
at the bar, removed her contact lenses, and climbed into bed. She began to use a
vibrator until she heard a strange noise in her living room, which she recognized as
the blinds rattling over her patio door. An assailant then rushed into her bedroom
and pinned her down. She tried to offer him money to leave, but he forcibly raped
her. The assailant was much larger than her, and she did not get a good look at his
face.
The Second Victim (identified in the briefing as “S.L.”) woke up early one
morning to study for class and later heard movement around her window blinds.
When she got up to inspect, she saw a tall man with a strong build wearing pantyhose
over his face. She screamed, and he attacked her. He shoved her against the door,
punched her in the face, choked her, and threatened to kill her. He digitally
penetrated her vagina and sucked her breast. She never got a look at his face.
The Third Victim (identified in the briefing as “L.B.”) was getting ready for
work one morning, and because the weather outside was nice, she opened her doors,
believing that a screen door was still locked. She later heard a loud noise, and when
she went downstairs to inspect, she found a tall, muscular man in her home. The man
turned to hide his face, but then he rushed towards her when she tried to run away.
He hit her in the face and knocked off her glasses. He put her in a chokehold and
threatened that he would kill her if she tried to look at him. He took her upstairs,
threw her on the bed, and laid on top of her, but he could not become erect. He
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digitally penetrated her vagina and then engaged in a “bizarre” conversation with
her about wood. Before leaving, he took her underwear as a trophy.
Each victim went to the hospital immediately after her assault, where evidence
was collected in a rape kit.
Authorities came to believe that a single assailant was responsible for all three
assaults. They pursued multiple leads but did not get a break in the case until a
CODIS hit identified appellant as a likely suspect.
Police brought appellant into custody, and he agreed to give a videotaped
statement, where he confessed to all three assaults. He also provided corroborating
information in that confession. For example, he mentioned that the First Victim had
been using a vibrator, and that she had offered him money to leave. He mentioned
that the Second Victim had been doing work on her bed, and that he encountered her
after coming through a patio door. And he mentioned that the Third Victim had stairs
in her home, that he was unable to achieve an erection, that he had a “casual”
conversation with her, and that he took her underwear.
Police compiled a photospread, which was shown to the First Victim, and she
positively identified appellant as her assailant.
Police also conducted a search of appellant’s vehicle, which contained a
stocking similar to pantyhose and a toolbox with many hand tools.
B. The Trial and Appeal
Appellant was charged with three counts of burglary of a habitation with intent
to commit sexual assault. He pleaded not guilty, and his case proceeded to a trial by
jury.
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All three victims testified, but none of them was able to make an in-court
identification of her assailant—not even the First Victim, despite her earlier
identification of appellant in the photospread.
There was some DNA evidence produced at trial, but it did not always connect
appellant to the sexual assaults.
As to the First Victim, the evidence showed that a vaginal swab tested positive
for the presence of semen. That sample was divided into two parts and then tested
with the goal of separating any sperm cells from any epithelial cells, but both
resulting samples yielded DNA profiles that were consistent with the First Victim.
Appellant was excluded as a source of those DNA profiles.
As to the Second Victim, the evidence showed that a breast swab contained
the DNA profile of a male, and further testing showed that appellant could not be
excluded as a contributor of that DNA. The probability that an unrelated person of
the same race contributed that DNA profile was 1 in 9.6 million, which indicated
“very strong support” that appellant was the source of that DNA.
As to the Third Victim, the evidence showed that a vaginal swab tested
positive for the presence of semen, but negative for the presence of sperm. An anal
swab tested “slightly positive” for the presence of semen (indicating a “very weak”
result), and negative for the presence of sperm. Additional testing of the vaginal
swab yielded a full single-source female DNA profile consistent with the Third
Victim. No male DNA was ever detected, and appellant was excluded as a source of
the DNA that had been detected.
Appellant testified in his own defense and denied all of the allegations against
him. He claimed that his videotaped confession was coerced by his interrogating
officers, whom he alleged had made threatening statements against his family. He
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also explained that the corroborating information that he mentioned in his confession
had been conveyed to him by those same officers in an earlier, unrecorded interview.
He said that he told the officers what they wanted to hear and that he expected that
he would eventually get a chance to tell his own side of the story.
Appellant testified that he carried the hand tools in his vehicle because he does
mechanical work, not because he used them for breaking and entering. He testified
that the stocking, or “sock” as he called it, was used to manage his high blood
pressure, and in a live demonstration, he showed that the stocking would not fit over
his head. And he outright dismissed the DNA evidence connecting him to the Second
Victim, insisting—inaccurately—that the testing had excluded him as a possible
contributor of that DNA profile.
The jury rejected appellant’s story and found him guilty of all three offenses.
For each offense, the jury sentenced appellant to life in prison. The trial court stacked
those life sentences.
On appeal to this court, appellant argued in two issues that the judgments
should be reversed because his trial counsel had been ineffective by referring to two
extraneous offenses, and because his trial counsel had also been suspended from the
practice of law for some period of time during the pendency of his case. We
overruled each of those issues, but we sustained a separate third issue about the
cumulation orders, which both sides agreed were erroneous. We deleted the
cumulation orders and otherwise affirmed the trial court’s judgments. See
Henderson v. State, Nos. 14-11-00727-CR, 14-11-00728-CR, & 14-11-00729-CR,
2012 WL 6218078, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2012, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).
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C. The Chapter 64 Proceeding
Years later, appellant filed a petition in the convicting court for forensic DNA
testing under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The convicting
court entered an agreed order for additional testing in the two cause numbers relating
to the First Victim and the Third Victim. No additional testing was ordered in the
remaining cause number for the Second Victim.
For the evidence involving the First Victim, the new testing focused on a fitted
bedsheet and on vaginal swabs. Semen was detected on the bedsheet, and a single-
source male DNA profile was obtained from the sample, but appellant was excluded
as a possible contributor of that DNA profile. As for the vaginal swabs, a mixture
that included a male DNA profile was obtained, and appellant could not be excluded
as a contributor of that DNA profile. Testing showed that the chances were 4,390
times more likely that the mixture came from the First Victim and appellant than
from the First Victim and an unknown, unrelated individual. That statistic was
described as providing “moderate support” that appellant contributed the DNA
profile.
For the evidence involving the Third Victim, the new testing focused on a t-
shirt that the Third Victim had been wearing at the time of the assault. Male DNA
was found on the t-shirt, but appellant was excluded as a possible contributor of the
DNA profile.
After all of this testing was concluded, the convicting court held a brief
hearing, where only appellant presented arguments.
Appellant referred to the new evidence that detected semen on the First
Victim’s bedsheet. Appellant asserted that this evidence was exculpatory because
the testing excluded him as a contributor of the semen. Appellant acknowledged that
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the First Victim had a consensual sexual partner who could have been the
contributor, but appellant pointed to two items of evidence suggesting otherwise.
The first item was a sexual examination report form, in which the First Victim stated
that her partner had used a condom during her most recent sexual encounter. The
report reflects that the First Victim “couldn’t give [an] exact date” for that encounter,
but she indicated that it had occurred less than two weeks before the assault. The
second item was an affidavit from an investigator, who said that she spoke with the
First Victim roughly ten years after the trial and the First Victim “does not recall any
reason for a man’s DNA to be on her sheets who was not the assailant.”
Appellant also acknowledged that the new testing of the vaginal swabs
provided “moderate support” that he was the contributor of a DNA profile, but he
seemed to suggest that this new evidence did not foreclose a favorability finding
under Chapter 64 because the testing that had been conducted before trial had already
excluded him as a contributor.
As for the Third Victim, appellant emphasized that there was no DNA
evidence connecting appellant to the assault. In fact, all of the testing affirmatively
excluded him as a contributor.
Appellant then addressed certain evidence regarding a stocking. During the
underlying trial, the prosecution elicited testimony that the DNA profile of the Third
Victim had been detected on a stocking. But according to appellant, the prosecution
never mentioned that this stocking had been collected from the Third Victim’s home,
where the presence of her DNA would be expected. Appellant argued that the
prosecution had misled the jury because the evidence at trial improperly suggested
that the Third Victim’s DNA was found on the separate stocking collected in the
later search of appellant’s vehicle.
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For all of these reasons, appellant argued that there was a reasonable
probability that, if the new evidence had been available at the time of trial, then he
would not have been found guilty of the offenses involving the First Victim and the
Third Victim. Continuing with that premise, appellant argued that if he had been
found not guilty of those two offenses, then there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have been sentenced to life imprisonment for the offense involving the
Second Victim.
In its findings of fact, the convicting court determined that the new forensic
evidence was not favorable—i.e., that appellant had not shown a reasonable
probability that he would not have been convicted had those test results been
available at the time of his trial. The court also explained that it was not persuaded
by the investigator’s affidavit because it contained inadmissible hearsay and because
there were no particular facts that called into doubt either the videotaped confession
or the DNA test results of the First Victim’s vaginal swabs.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
In a proceeding under Chapter 64, the convicted person has the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability
that he would not have been convicted had the results of the new forensic testing
been available during the trial of the underlying offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
art. 64.04; Skinner v. State, 665 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). This standard
does not require the convicted person to prove that he is actually innocent. See Ex
parte Kussmaul, 548 S.W.3d 606, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (granting habeas
relief following a Chapter 64 proceeding, despite concluding that actual innocence
had not been proven). Instead, the convicted person must demonstrate that the
inculpatory evidence “is so undermined by the test results that it is reasonably
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probable that a fact finder would not have convicted [him] had the tests been
available at trial despite the inculpatory evidence.” See Dunning v. State, 572 S.W.3d
685, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). This standard is not satisfied if the test results
“merely muddy the waters.” See Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002).
The convicting court in this case found that appellant had failed to satisfy his
burden, and that finding was made after a hearing where no new witness testimony
was heard. That hearing consisted of just legal arguments and the admission of
various exhibits, such as the underlying trial record and the results of the post-
conviction testing. Because the convicting court was in no better position than this
court to evaluate that body of evidence, our review of its ruling is de novo. See Smith
v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
B. The First Victim
The forensic evidence in the underlying trial showed that semen was detected
on a vaginal swab. Yet despite the presence of semen, the only DNA profile obtained
from the vaginal swab was shown to have been sourced from the First Victim, who
is female. There was no DNA evidence from the vaginal swab connecting appellant
or any other male to the offense.
Notwithstanding the absence of such proof, there was still other evidence that
inculpated appellant. The First Victim positively identified appellant as her assailant
in a photospread. There was also a video confession in which appellant admitted to
raping the First Victim.
Since the trial, additional testing was ordered as part of this Chapter 64
proceeding. That testing obtained a male DNA profile from a vaginal swab, and
appellant could not be excluded as the source of that profile. The level of confidence
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was not as great as with the breast swab from the Second Victim—there was
“moderate support” that appellant was the source of the DNA in the vaginal swab,
as opposed to “very strong support” in that other sample—but even so, the test result
does not undermine the inculpatory evidence from the trial. Quite the opposite, the
test result strengthens the conviction by providing a DNA link between appellant
and the assault where none had previously been shown to exist.
Appellant asserts that the new test result does not preclude a finding in his
favor because the earlier testing had already excluded him. To the extent he suggests
that the earlier exclusion operated as affirmative proof that he was not the assailant,
that suggestion is unfounded. The reason for the earlier exclusion was that only a
single DNA profile was obtained, and it was traceable back to the First Victim, rather
than an unidentified male. Correspondence from the crime lab, which was not
admitted as evidence in the underlying trial but has since been provided in this
Chapter 64 proceeding, explained that earlier testing as follows: “A very low number
of sperm were observed on this sample, and no DNA foreign to the complainant (i.e.,
no male DNA) was obtained.” Because no other DNA was obtained, the earlier
testing was neither inculpatory nor exculpatory. However, the new testing is clearly
inculpatory because it obtained a male DNA profile from which appellant could not
be excluded.
The new testing also detected semen on a bedsheet, from which a male DNA
profile was likewise obtained. But unlike with the vaginal swab, appellant was
excluded as a contributor of that DNA profile.
Appellant contends that this new test result is “powerfully exculpatory,” but
we disagree for three reasons. First, the prosecution did not rely on any testing from
the bedsheet to secure a conviction in the underlying trial. Second, there was no
evidence showing that the First Victim’s assailant had deposited the semen that was
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collected from the bedsheet. And third, there was evidence affirmatively showing
that the First Victim had a consensual sexual partner. In light of such evidence, the
existence of a male DNA profile on the bedsheet does not cast doubt on the
conviction. It just muddies the waters. See Hall v. State, 569 S.W.3d 646, 658 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2019) (“The significant possibility of DNA being deposited by an
innocent person reduces the probative value of any exculpatory DNA test result.”).
Appellant discounts the evidence of the consensual sexual partner. He points
out that there was never any proof that a consensual encounter occurred on the
bedsheet, or even in the First Victim’s apartment. He also points out that the
consensual partner had supposedly used a condom, which would have reduced the
potential that the partner might have left behind a semen stain. And he points out
that the First Victim told an investigator that she did not recall any reason for a man’s
DNA to be on the bedsheet if it did not originate from her assailant.
These points do not move the needle. When viewed in isolation, the presence
of a third party’s DNA on the bedsheet might raise a theoretical possibility of an
assailant other than appellant. But when that same evidence is added to the mix of
evidence that was already available at the time of trial, along with the new evidence
that has since been developed in the course of this Chapter 64 proceeding, it does
not change the landscape—there is still a mountain of compelling evidence that
appellant was the assailant. See Holberg v. State, 425 S.W.3d 282, 285 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014) (explaining that the objective in a Chapter 64 proceeding is to determine
whether, and to what extent, any new DNA testing would alter the evidentiary
landscape at the time of trial). That evidence includes the confession and the new
test result showing that appellant could not be excluded from a DNA profile obtained
from the vaginal swab. Cf. State v. Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d 32, 38–39 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014) (“We are not persuaded that results showing the presence of another
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DNA donor in the fingernail scrapings would overcome the mountain of evidence
of the appellee’s guilt. Primarily, this is because the victim’s having encountered
another person would not factually exclude the appellee from having killed her.”);
see also Irvan v. State, No. AP-77,125, 2026 WL 388613, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App.
Feb. 12, 2026) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) (“The fact that someone
else’s DNA is found at a crime scene does not necessarily establish favorability when
there is substantial evidence of guilt.”).
Appellant argues that his confession should weigh less in the analysis because
the new exclusion corroborates his claim that his statements were false. We disagree
again. The confession was already corroborated by the old test results that connected
his DNA to the Second Victim. And now the confession is further corroborated by
the new test results that have connected his DNA to the First Victim.
Appellant makes some additional points about identity. He emphasizes that
none of the witnesses made an in-court identification. And he emphasizes that,
before her positive identification in the photospread, the First Victim had made a
tentative identification of a third party in a live lineup. These points fare no better.
Despite these indications of uncertainty, the jury still convicted appellant after
considering all of the incriminating evidence against him. The new test result from
the bedsheet does not affirmatively cast doubt on that conviction.
Appellant finally draws our attention to the actions of two lawyers.
The first lawyer is his own trial counsel, whom he unsuccessfully challenged
in the previous appeal for being ineffective. Appellant contends that the new test
result from the bedsheet “compounds the prejudice” from trial counsel’s alleged
ineffectiveness.
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The second lawyer is an assistant district attorney who was briefly involved
in this Chapter 64 proceeding. That assistant district attorney submitted a filing
stating that the prosecution did not oppose appellant’s proposed findings of fact,
effectively agreeing that there was a reasonable probability that appellant would not
have been convicted had the new test results been available in the underlying trial.
That assistant district attorney subsequently withdrew from the case, supposedly
because he had once represented appellant. Substitute counsel for the prosecution
then submitted a different and opposing set of proposed findings of fact, which the
convicting court ultimately adopted. Appellant now contends that there was no
actual conflict of interest or reason for the assistant district attorney to withdraw, and
that the attorney’s initial concession underscores the strength of the new exculpatory
evidence.
These points are totally irrelevant. The actions of both lawyers are simply not
part of the evidentiary landscape that defines our scope of review.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we agree with the convicting court that
appellant failed to satisfy his burden of showing a reasonable probability that he
would not have been convicted had the new test results been available at the time of
trial.
C. The Third Victim
The forensic evidence in the underlying trial showed that semen was detected
on a vaginal swab collected from the Third Victim, just like with the First Victim.
However, sperm was not detected, and no male DNA profile was ever obtained.
Thus, the jury did not hear of any DNA evidence that connected appellant to the
Third Victim. Nevertheless, the jury still convicted appellant of assaulting the Third
Victim, apparently due to the videotaped confession.
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New testing was ordered in the Chapter 64 proceeding, but unlike with the
First Victim, the new test results did not establish any sort of connection between
appellant and the Third Victim. These new test results showed that the DNA profile
of a male was obtained from the Third Victim’s t-shirt, and that appellant was
excluded as a contributor of that DNA profile.
That exclusion does not cast affirmative doubt on the conviction. The
prosecution did not rely on the t-shirt in the underlying trial. There was no evidence
regarding the manner in which the foreign DNA was transferred to the t-shirt, such
as through a bodily fluid or through touching. And while there was proof of a
struggle between the Third Victim and her assailant, with the assailant even lying on
top of her at one point, there was no evidence that the assailant would have
necessarily transferred any of his own DNA to her t-shirt, especially if he were
clothed. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the new test merely muddies the
waters. See Dunning v. State, 572 S.W.3d 685, 693–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
(indicating that touch DNA can easily and innocently be transferred to items of
clothing, and holding that a convicted person had not carried his burden under
Chapter 64 by establishing that he was excluded as a contributor from such DNA
profiles).
Appellant responds that the exclusionary result does not muddy the waters,
citing Ex parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). But that case
involved a denial of additional testing under Article 64.03, not a post-testing
determination under Article 64.04. Appellant does not explain how that case
supports his position.
Appellant suggests that the new test result is favorable because there was no
DNA evidence connecting him to the Third Victim and because the Third Victim
never identified him in court as her assailant. But the jury already knew both of those
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points and it convicted him, apparently on the basis of the videotaped confession.
The new test result does nothing to overcome the strength of that confession.
Appellant lastly contends that the stocking evidence was misleading in the
underlying trial. Appellant does not purport to collaterally attack the judgment. See
Raby v. State, No. AP-76,970, 2015 WL 1874540, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 22,
2015) (not designated for publication) (stating that a Chapter 64 proceeding is not a
retrial of the case). But he refers to the stocking evidence to show that the evidence
of identity was thin in the underlying trial, which is relevant insofar as this court
must consider the evidentiary landscape in an analysis under Article 64.04.
The problem with this argument is that the prosecution never misled the jury
by claiming that the stocking that contained the Third Victim’s DNA was the same
stocking that was recovered from appellant’s vehicle. There is also no reason to
believe that the jury would have thought otherwise. In closing statements, the
defense expressly (and accurately) asserted that there was no DNA evidence
connecting appellant to either the First Victim or the Third Victim. The prosecution
never challenged that assertion in rebuttal. In fact, the prosecution acknowledged
that the DNA evidence only connected appellant to the Second Victim. That was the
evidentiary landscape. The new test result from the t-shirt does not alter it.
As with the other case involving the First Victim, we conclude that the
convicting court correctly determined that there is no reasonable probability that
appellant would not have been convicted if the new test results had been available at
the time of his trial.
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CONCLUSION
The convicting court’s finding is affirmed.
/s/ Tracy Christopher
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Bridges and Boatman.
Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
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