Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-26-00240-CR CALVIN WAYNE TODD, JR., APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 30th District Court Wichita County, Texas1 Trial Court No. DC89-CR2025-0771, Honorable David Hagerman, Presiding November 2, 2026 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ. Appellant, Calvin Wayne Todd, Jr., appeals from his conviction for “sexual assault bigamy”2 and the resulting sentence of 30 years of imprisonment. He challenges his conviction through three issues. We affirm. 1 This cause was originally filed in the Second Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court. In the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2). This offense was enhanced under section 22.011(f)(1)(A). TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(f)(1)(A). That provision provides that an offense under section 22.011 is a felony of BACKGROUND In February 2021, Appellant and his wife, Ashley, stayed at Jimmy and Crystal Mitchell’s family home in Wichita Falls while assisting with renovations. Ashley was Crystal’s cousin. On the day of the incident that led to the present conviction, Appellant consumed whiskey and cokes throughout the day and took a THC edible for back pain. That night, complainant K.M., the Mitchells’ minor daughter, fell asleep after watching television between Appellant and Ashley. K.M. testified she awoke to Appellant digitally penetrating her sexual organ, moved away, but he pulled her back and continued. She later awoke to Appellant doing the same thing to her a second time. She disclosed the assault to her parents the next morning. When confronted, Appellant first claimed the incident did not happen and then said he thought it was his wife he penetrated with his finger, not K.M. He also said it occurred because he had been drinking and had taken a THC gummy. Appellant subsequently voluntarily provided a statement to police claiming no conscious recollection of the conduct. A SANE examination showed a fresh abrasion on K.M.’s labia minora and yielded DNA evidence that could not exclude Appellant as a contributor. Following presentation of the evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged and assessed punishment as noted. the second degree except that it is a felony of the first degree if the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under section 25.01 of the Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.01 (describing the offense of bigamy). 2 ANALYSIS Issue One—Involuntary Conduct Instruction By his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to submit a jury instruction on involuntary conduct under Texas Penal Code Section 6.01(a). Appellant testified he was unconscious and unaware of his actions, presenting evidence of involuntary conduct. Accordingly, Appellant argues, the court’s refusal deprived the jury of the only vehicle to acquit based on Appellant’s defense theory. We resolve the issue against Appellant. Appellate courts review a trial court’s decision to deny a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is “so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable people might disagree.” Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Review of an alleged jury-charge error involves two steps: (1) the reviewing court must determine whether the charge is erroneous; and (2) if it is erroneous, the appellate court must decide whether the erroneous charge harmed the appellant. Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). Accordingly, our first duty is to determine whether jury charge error exists; if there is none, the inquiry ends. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). If we find error, then we must decide whether the appellant was harmed by the erroneous charge. Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165 (citing Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 744). 3 There are two standards of review for jury-charge-error claims. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g). If a defendant timely objects to alleged jury-charge error, the record need only show “some harm” to obtain relief. Id. If there was not a timely objection, the record must show “egregious harm.” Id. See also Forrest v. State, No. 07-26-00184-CR, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS 7736, at *7 (Tex. App.— Amarillo Aug. 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Harm is assessed “in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of [the] probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Neither party bears the burden to show harm. Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165 (citing Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 842–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a defensive issue if the issue is raised by the evidence, without regard to the strength or credibility of that evidence. Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A defense is supported or raised if there is some evidence, on each element of the defense, that would support a rational inference that the element is true. Shaw v. State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Courts must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. at 662. The issue of involuntary conduct stems from the requirement that for a criminal offense to occur, the defendant must have voluntarily engaged in conduct.3 Rouchon v. 3 Voluntariness is a low threshold.Rodriguez v. State, 629 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Even accidental or unintentional movements and actions are voluntary. Id. (citing Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 638–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (interpreting “voluntary” under Texas Penal Code Section 4 State, No. 04-99-00951-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 7118, at *11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 24, 2001, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.01(a)). When a person claims the involuntary-act defense, he is conceding that his own body made the motion but denies responsibility for it. Rogers v. State, 105 S.W.3d 630, 639 n.30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “[A]n instruction on voluntariness is necessary only if the defendant admits committing the act charged and seeks to absolve himself from criminal responsibility for engaging in the conduct.” Trujillo v. State, 227 S.W.3d 164, 169 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). A defendant relying on an involuntary conduct defense must admit the offense was committed; Appellant did not do so here. He stated alternatively that the offense did not happen and/or that he was asleep or unaware of the conduct. Because Appellant did not admit to committing the act charged, he was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary conduct. Id. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for the instruction and we overrule his first issue. Issue Two—Admission of Testimony Concerning Prior Sexual Assault Through his second issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting testimony about a supposed prior sexual assault of his ex-wife, Angel, in 2002 when she was allegedly 15 years old. Appellant argues the State failed to prove Angel’s actual birth date or that any criminal offense occurred, violating Texas Rule of Evidence 403 and Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Further, he claims, the evidence 6.01 versus “nonvolitional”)). “Only if an outside force directly causes the movement, or if the movement is the result of truly nonvolitional action such as a muscle spasm, will an action be deemed involuntary.” Id. 5 was remote, materially different, and consumed significant trial time without establishing criminality. We overrule the issue. We review the trial court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Although evidence of extraneous offenses is generally inadmissible to show character conformity, Article 38.37 permits the admission of such evidence as proof of the defendant’s character and propensity to act in conformity with such character when the charged offense concerns the sexual abuse of a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37. However, such evidence is subject to exclusion under Rule 403 if a proper objection or request is presented to the trial court. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b); see Rodriguez v. State, 689 S.W.3d 386, 395 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg 2024, pet. ref’d); Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 228 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d); see also TEX. R. EVID. 403. Erroneous admission of evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. Cook v. State, 665 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). Non-constitutional error warrants reversal only if it had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury’s verdict. Id. See also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Patterson v. State, 508 S.W.3d 432, 440 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (non-constitutional error requires reversal only if it affects an appellant’s substantial rights). In making this determination, we consider the following non-exclusive factors: the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence; the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict; the existence and degree of additional evidence indicating guilt; whether the State 6 emphasized the complained-of error; the trial court’s instructions; the theory of the case; and relevant voir dire. Cook, 665 S.W.3d at 599. Assuming, without deciding, the admission of the evidence was erroneous, we find the error had slight, if any, influence on the jury’s verdict. The jury had before it ample evidence supporting K.M.’s allegations, including physical evidence in the form of a fresh abrasion on K.M.’s sexual organ that was “most likely from a fingernail” and scientific DNA evidence that pointed to Appellant’s guilt. K.M. also testified that Appellant digitally penetrated her twice. The extraneous evidence presented was brief in comparison to the rest of the trial. See Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (finding evidence brief when compared to the other evidence presented when the complained-of testimony took only five pages of the State’s 32-page cross-examination of the defendant). While the prosecutor did mention the extraneous evidence in closing, it was a minor part of the overall argument. See White v. State, No. 02-16-00207-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4799, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (error harmless when evidence supporting guilt was strong and State did not emphasize the testimony). Given the foregoing, we cannot conclude Appellant was harmed by the trial court’s admission of the challenged testimony. Issue Three—Enhancement under Section 22.011(f)(1)(A) In his last issue, Appellant asserts Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f)(1)(A), which enhances sexual assault from second to first-degree felony based on marital impediment, is facially unconstitutional. He claims as support that it lacks a rational basis 7 and violates equal protection. In making his argument, Appellant acknowledges preservation issues under Karenev v. State, but argues the preservation requirement should not apply to facial challenges of substantive penal statutes. Appellant acknowledges he did not preserve this challenge below and that case law dictates that such a challenge may not be raised for the first time on appeal. He also acknowledges this Court is bound by precedent so holding. See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 433 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). See also Baptiste v. State, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. PD-0449-25, 2026 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 371, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2026); Ibenyenwa v. State, 367 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d). He nevertheless seeks reconsideration of those holdings. We decline to reconsider. We further note the Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted section 22.011(f) as “essentially requiring proof that the defendant committed sexual assault and that, if he were to marry or claim to marry his victim, or to live with the victim under the appearance of being married, then he would be guilty of bigamy.” Estes v. State, 546 S.W.3d 691, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). In State v. Rosseau, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected a facial challenge to the constitutionality of section 22.011(f), noting that “it has at least one valid application: the punishment of bigamists who sexually assault their purported spouses.” Id. We overrule Appellant’s final issue. 8 CONCLUSION Having overruled each of Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Alex Yarbrough Justice Do not publish. 9