Bobby Crawford McNair v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket07-25-00364-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-25-00364-CR
BOBBY CRAWFORD MCNAIR, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 97th District Court
Archer County, Texas 1
Trial Court No. 2021-0029A-CR, Honorable Trish C. Byars, Presiding
November 18, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.
A jury found Appellant, Bobby Crawford McNair, guilty of one count of aggravated
sexual assault of a child 2 and five counts of indecency with a child by contact. 3 That
same jury recommended Appellant be sentenced to 60 years’ incarceration for the
aggravated sexual assault conviction and 20 years for each of the indecency convictions.
1 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by
the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket-equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. In
the event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a).
3 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11.
The trial court accepted the jury’s verdicts and entered judgment, which also ordered the
sentences to run consecutively. Appellant appeals this judgment. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May of 2021, S.T., Appellant’s niece, told her grandmother that Appellant
touches her vagina and makes her take her clothes off. S.T.’s grandmother then informed
S.T.’s mother of the allegations. S.T. told her mother that Appellant started touching her
when she was in kindergarten and he put his finger inside her and made her touch his
penis. S.T. repeated her claims during a forensic interview and to a CPS investigator.
Soon after S.T. made her outcry, A.M., Appellant’s daughter, told her mother that
Appellant had touched her. During a subsequent forensic interview, A.M. specified that
Appellant touched her vagina with his penis. Appellant was indicted for one count of
aggravated sexual assault and five counts of indecency with a child.
During trial, S.T. and A.M. testified. Also, members of their family testified as did
people involved in the investigation of the allegations made by S.T. and A.M. Over
Appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted forensic interview videos of both S.T. and
A.M. After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellant guilty of all
six counts. From this conviction and the subsequent sentences, Appellant timely
appealed.
By his appeal, Appellant presents four issues. Appellant contends, in his first
issue, that the evidence is insufficient to support more than one conviction for indecency
with a child against A.M. Relatedly, by his second issue, Appellant contends that his
punishment for three counts of indecency with a child against A.M. violated his double
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jeopardy rights. Appellant contends, in his last two issues, that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the forensic interviews of S.T. and A.M. as prior consistent
statements.
EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY
By his first issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support
more than one conviction for indecency with a child against A.M. Appellant bases his
contention on the testimony of A.M., which expressly identified only one incident. The
State contends that consideration of all evidence establishes that Appellant committed
three instances of indecency with a child against A.M.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 318–19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Dunham v. State, 666 S.W.3d 477,
482 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). We must consider all evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763,
767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences
in favor of the verdict and we defer to such resolutions. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446,
448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). A jury is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the
evidence presented. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In the present case, Appellant was charged with three counts of indecency with a
child against A.M. A person commits indecency with a child when he “engages in sexual
conduct with [a] child” who is younger than 17 years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE §
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21.11(a)(1). Sexual conduct includes “any touching by a person, including touching
through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child[,]” if the touching
is “committed with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]” Id. §
21.11(c)(1). A child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
indecency with a child. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07; Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d
214, 226 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d).
Each count of indecency with a child committed against A.M. alleged that it was
committed by Appellant touching A.M.’s genitals. 4 Thus, there must be evidence which
would allow a rational jury to have found that Appellant touched A.M.’s genitals on at least
three separate occasions. Appellant acknowledges that A.M. expressly testified to one
incident in which Appellant touched her genitals with his genitals and poured “milk” on
her. While A.M. described only one instance through her testimony, she indicated that
she could not remember whether Appellant touched her genitals on other occasions but
testified that it might have happened twice. S.T. testified that, when A.M. was three, she
saw Appellant lick A.M.’s genitals. S.T. also testified that she saw Appellant put his
fingers inside A.M.’s genitals “a lot” of times. 5 Since each of these incidents involve
4 Appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support count three, which Appellant
states alleges that he caused A.M. to touch his genitals. However, count three, which does allege that
Appellant caused the victim to touch his genitals, relates to S.T. and not A.M.
5 Appellant cites Goodman v. State, 665 S.W.2d 788, 792 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc), in
support of his argument that S.T.’s testimony was admitted to impeach A.M.’s testimony and, as such, “is
without probative value and cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the conviction.” However, Goodman addresses testimony that is admitted only for impeachment purposes.
Id. In the present case, S.T. was another victim named in the indictment and her testimony concerning
incidents she witnessed was not offered to impeach A.M.’s testimony since A.M. did not testify about these
incidents. Rather, A.M. testified that she could not remember whether Appellant committed other incidents
of indecency with her. Additionally, Appellant did not object to S.T.’s testimony as impeachment of the
State’s own witness and has failed to preserve this objection for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1;
Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
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different means of Appellant touching A.M.’s genitals, a reasonable jury could find
Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three separate offenses of indecency
with a child relating to his touching of A.M.’s genitals.
Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for the
three indecency with a child offenses relating to A.M. as charged, we overrule Appellant’s
first issue.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION
By his second issue, Appellant contends that the three convictions for indecency
with a child against A.M. and their resulting punishments violate his rights against double
jeopardy. As we determined above, there was evidence before the jury that would allow
it to find Appellant guilty of three separate offenses of indecency with a child against A.M.
Consequently, we cannot conclude that Appellant was convicted or is being punished
multiple times for the same offense. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. 6
ADMISSION OF FORENSIC INTERVIEWS
By his third and fourth issues, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the forensic interviews of S.T. and A.M. into evidence as prior
consistent statements. We will assume, without deciding, that the trial court erred in
admitting the forensic interviews but determine that their admission was harmless.
6 In addition, we agree with the State that Appellant failed to preserve his claimed double jeopardy
violation by raising the same in the trial court. Honeycutt v. State, 82 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d). Considering our resolution of Appellant’s first issue, we do not find that a double
jeopardy violation is “clearly apparent on the face of the record.” Gonzalez v. State, 8 S.W.3d 640, 643
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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When an appellant makes a claim of nonconstitutional error, 7 the reviewing court
must disregard the error if it does not affect the appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(b). “A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non[]constitutional
error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that
the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967
S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
Improper admission of evidence is not reversible error if the same or similar
evidence is admitted without objection at another point in the trial. Chamberlain v. State,
998 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Admission of recordings of a child’s
statements concerning a sexual crime is harmless when other, unobjected-to evidence
proves the same facts. Stephens v. State, Nos. 02-15-00046-CR, 02-15-00047-CR, 2016
Tex. App. LEXIS 4790, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 5, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (citing additional cases supporting proposition); see
Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d)
(admission of recording harmless where child’s testimony was substantially similar to
recording); Matz v. State, 21 S.W.3d 911, 912–13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d)
(op. on remand) (admission of recording harmless where consistent with child’s
testimony).
Here, the admission of the forensic interviews was cumulative of evidence of the
offenses for which Appellant was charged. S.T.’s trial testimony was consistent with what
she said in the forensic interview and was admitted without objection. Further, testimony
7 Appellant concedes that his claim of error regarding admission of the forensic interviews is a claim
of nonconstitutional error.
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from S.T.’s grandmother, S.T.’s mother, and a CPS investigator corroborated S.T.’s
account contained in her forensic interview. Likewise, A.M.’s statements made in her
forensic interview were also established by other evidence which was admitted without
objection. Testimony from A.M., A.M.’s grandmother, S.T., a sheriff’s investigator, and
the forensic interviewer corroborated the statements made by A.M. in the forensic
interview. Finally, when we consider the admission of the forensic interviews in light of
the record as a whole, we conclude that the record contains overwhelming evidence of
Appellant’s guilt even were we not to consider the forensic interviews at all. See Motilla
v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 358 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (overwhelming evidence of guilt is
factor to be considered in harm analysis).
Determining that the admission of S.T. and A.M.’s forensic interviews is harmless,
we overrule Appellant’s third and fourth issues.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled each of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Judy C. Parker
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
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