Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-25-00418-CR ___________________________ MOISES DEPAZROBLES, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1850669 Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach MEMORANDUM OPINION I. Introduction Despite his “not guilty” plea, a jury found Appellant Moises Depazrobles guilty of one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen and two counts of indecency with a child by contact and assessed his sentences at life in prison for the continuous-sexual-abuse count and 20 years’ confinement for each indecency count. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 21.02(b), (h), 21.11(a)(1), (d). The trial court set his sentences to run concurrently. Depazrobles does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.1 In a single point, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by overruling his objection “as to hearsay by the police officer as to information relayed to him by [an English-to-Spanish] translator,” that there was no evidence that the translator had the proper foundation to accurately translate, and that he did not authorize the translator to translate for him or to act as his agent. Because the record reflects otherwise, we will affirm. II. Discussion The Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the issue of whether an interpreter’s translation adds a layer of hearsay in Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 347–49 (Tex. Because Depazrobles does not raise this challenge, we summarize only the facts 1 necessary for disposition in our analysis below. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 2 Crim. App. 2009). In that case, the court stated that if the proponent of an out-of-court translation of a party’s out-of-court statement “can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court that the party authorized the interpreter to speak for him on the particular occasion, or otherwise adopted the interpreter as his agent for purposes of translating the particular statement,” then the out-of-court interpretation may properly be admitted under Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) or (D).2 Id. at 349. In determining whether to admit the statement, the trial court must take into account (1) who supplied the interpreter; (2) whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort; (3) the interpreter’s qualifications and language skills; and (4) whether actions taken subsequent to the translated statement were consistent with the statement as translated. Id. at 348–49. In addition to showing whether the interpreter was acting as a person’s agent, these factors relate to the “ultimate reliability of the proffered evidence.” Id. at 349. As with all questions of evidentiary admissibility, we review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. Rule 801(e)(2)(C) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is offered against 2 an opposing party and “was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(C). Rule 801(e)(2)(D) provides the same if it is offered against an opposing party and “was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.” Tex. R. Evid. 801(e)(2)(D). 3 A. Background G.M. was twelve years old when she outcried about sexual abuse by Depazrobles to her school counselor, triggering an investigation by the Fort Worth Police Department (FWPD) and the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS). The school counselor, a DFPS investigator, and Detective Thomas Vlk transported G.M. that day to a hospital for an examination by a sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE), and then to a forensic interview at the Alliance for Children. Based on G.M.’s forensic interview, Detective Vlk searched Depazrobles’s home pursuant to a search warrant; Depazrobles and an interpreter were present during the search. Later that day, Depazrobles voluntarily went to Detective Vlk’s office and gave a non-custodial video-recorded interview to him through a Spanish-language interpreter provided by FWPD, and then conversed through the same interpreter with the DFPS investigator. After initially denying G.M.’s allegations during his interview with Detective Vlk, Depazrobles ultimately admitted to having engaged in sexual relations with G.M. “two to three times the past week. And then two or three times in the year 2023.” The DFPS investigator testified that the interview interpreter, Espinoza,3 was an administrative assistant for the FWPD’s Crimes-Against-Children Unit. Detective Vlk The DFPS investigator identified the interview interpreter as Araceli Espinoza, 3 while Detective Vlk identified her as Erisola Espinoza. As noted by the State, the court reporter also sometimes spelled her last name as Espinosa. However, it is clear from 4 testified that Espinoza was a certified interpreter with the FWPD and had translated for him many times. Detective Vlk testified that Depazrobles “specified that his wife spoke a very similar [Spanish], so he could understand [Espinoza] well.” Detective Vlk also opined that Depazrobles had “some limited understanding of English” and had appeared to understand the interpreter’s explanation of the search warrant that day and had not indicated that he was unable to understand what was happening. After excusing the jury and viewing the recording, the trial court overruled Depazrobles’s objections, stating, [T]he Court is satisfied that this is an admissible piece of evidence. First, the defendant did come to the appropriate place on his own, according to the evidence. After, I guess, being spoken to within translation when the interview starts near the beginning, he acknowledged the understanding of the interpreter that was relaying Spanish to him. And he did relay to her or suggest that she was similar to that of his American wife and her Spanish was similar in that he did understand.[4] Throughout the interview, the actions of the defendant were consistent with hi[s] understanding and adopting this interpreter, context that all these references are to the same person. It is unclear whether Espinoza was the same interpreter during the search warrant’s execution. 4 At the video’s beginning, Detective Vlk introduced himself and told Depazrobles that he was not detained or under arrest and was free to leave at any time, and Espinoza translated this into Spanish. Detective Vlk then asked Depazrobles how the interpretation was, Espinoza translated the question into Spanish, and Depazrobles stated that it was good. Espinoza also told Depazrobles in English and in Spanish that she spoke Mexican Spanish and to let her know if she used a word that was unclear to him. Depazrobles indicated that because she spoke like his American wife, he understood her well. 5 including shaking his head, laughing in certain instances,[5] becoming somber when the . . . conversation turned serious, including when he said he was screwed. After what I’m assuming was an investigative technique, the detective basically told him that there was DNA on the victim and his reaction was very consistent with someone that understood what he was being told. And his somber statements after that are consistent with him understanding what was going on and adopting that translator as his conduit.[6] The trial court admitted the video and allowed its publication. After the video’s admission, G.M. testified, confirming the nickname Depazrobles had used for her 5 At the interview’s beginning, Depazrobles first attempted to give his date of birth in English and then handed his identification to Detective Vlk to clarify. When Detective Vlk commented in English that Depazrobles’s hair was longer in the identification photo, Depazrobles laughed and touched the end of his hair in response to the comment. He also gave his phone number partially in Spanish and partially in English and stated that he had moved from El Salvador to the United States in 2004, twenty years before the interview in November 2024. 6 Depazrobles voluntarily gave a DNA buccal sample to Detective Vlk. He subsequently looked concerned and serious after Detective Vlk briefly explained how DNA evidence worked and when the detective asked Depazrobles if there was a reason why his DNA would be on G.M.’s breasts. Depazrobles shook his head to indicate “no” and said he would be surprised. He gave a similar response when Detective Vlk asked if there was a reason why his DNA would be inside or around G.M.’s vagina. When Detective Vlk asked, “Why is your DNA inside her vagina?” Depazrobles made the statement that Espinoza translated as “we’re screwed.” After the video’s admission, a forensic biologist testified that she detected male DNA on G.M.’s vaginal swab but in an insufficient quantity or quality to compare to Depazrobles’s DNA profile from his buccal sample. G.M. testified that after the last vaginal penetration immediately before her outcry, Depazrobles, who had worn a condom on that occasion, had wiped her vaginal area with a paper towel and then she had showered. 6 during his interview and describing in detail about his having sexually abused her since she was a third or fourth grader. During closing arguments, defense counsel used the interview to attack the State’s case, arguing to the jurors that they had not heard Depazrobles himself but rather had heard Espinoza tell Detective Vlk what Depazrobles had said, like a “game of telephone,” that the State could have but did not bring Espinoza to testify and to be cross-examined, and that although the State could have translated and transcribed Depazrobles’s statement, it had not. B. Analysis Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Regarding the first Saavedra factor, the State provided the interpreter. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of exclusion. See 297 S.W.3d at 348; see also Zurita v. State, No. 02-19-00046-CR, 2020 WL 4689841, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 13, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (addressing same issue and collecting cases); cf. Sanchez v. State, No. 10-25-00090-CR, 2026 WL 1180218, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 30, 2026, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“When neither party supplied the interpreter, the first factor is neutral.”); Guillen-Hernandez v. State, Nos. 01-18-00461-CR, 01-18-00462-CR, 2019 WL 2750597, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding first factor was neutral when CPS caseworker translated the defendant’s confession to law enforcement). 7 However, regarding the second Saavedra factor, nothing in the record shows that Espinoza had a motive to mislead or to distort Depazrobles’s answers when—other than by virtue of her employment with FWPD—she was not otherwise involved in investigating G.M.’s outcry or in subsequently making Depazrobles’s arrest. See 297 S.W.3d at 348; see also Zurita, 2020 WL 4689841, at *4. Nothing in the record shows that Espinoza was motivated to provide anything but an accurate translation. See Guillen-Hernandez, 2019 WL 2750597, at *5 (collecting cases). This factor is neutral. See Saavedra v. State, No. 05-06-01450-CR, 2010 WL 2028111, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2010, no pet.) (op. on remand, not designated for publication) (“While we could infer that by working for the State [the police department records clerk who translated] had an interest in the State prosecuting appellant and might be inclined to mislead or distort his translations, we decline to make this inference. Thus, we conclude this factor is neutral . . . .”). Regarding the third Saavedra factor, the testimony about Espinoza’s qualifications was sparse but established that she was a certified interpreter with the FWPD and had translated for Detective Vlk many times. See 297 S.W.3d at 348. This factor thus supports the trial court’s admissibility determination. Cf. Guillen-Hernandez, 2019 WL 2750597, at *5 (concluding that the lack of evidence regarding the interpreter’s identity, qualifications, or language skills weighed against admissibility); Han Ok Song v. State, No. 08-13-00059-CR, 2015 WL 631163, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 13, 2015, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“The complete lack of evidence 8 regarding the interpreter’s qualifications and skills cuts against a finding of reliability.”); Moland v. State, No. 01-10-00869-CR, 2012 WL 403885, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 9, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (stating similar conclusion). And regarding the fourth Saavedra factor, the video itself showed Depazrobles’s reactions that supported the accuracy of each translation of the questions and his responses. See 297 S.W.3d at 348. Nothing in the video indicates that Depazrobles suffered any confusion during the interview. To the contrary, as noted by the trial court before admitting the recording, Depazrobles’s reactions and responses to Espinoza’s interpretation of the detective’s questions were consistent with Depazrobles’s understanding her interpretations and adopting her translations of his responses as his conduit. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of admissibility. Finally, before the trial court allowed the recording’s publication, G.M.’s school counselor testified about the sexual-abuse outcry, and the SANE nurse testified about G.M.’s descriptions of sexual abuse by Depazrobles and when, where, and for how long the abuse had occurred. After the publication of Depazrobles’s interview, G.M. testified about the sexual abuse. All the sexual-abuse testimony—before and after the video’s publication—was consistent with Depazrobles’s confession except for his attempts at minimizing how long he had been sexually abusing G.M., indicating that his translated statements were reliable. See Zurita, 2020 WL 4689841, at *5. 9 Because two of the four Saavedra factors weigh in favor of the statements’ reliability and admissibility, particularly in light of the surrounding record indicating their reliability, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably found that Espinoza was acting as Depazrobles’s agent or language conduit during the interview. See Saavedra, 297 S.W.3d at 348–49; Zurita, 2020 WL 4689841, at *5. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video or testimony about the translated confession, and we overrule Depazrobles’s sole point. III. Conclusion Having overruled Depazrobles’s sole point, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. /s/ Mike Wallach Mike Wallach Justice Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered: August 27, 2026 10