Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-25-00177-CR MATTHEW JOSEPH KINNEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 5th District Court Cass County, Texas Trial Court No. 2024F00153 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION A Cass County jury found Matthew Joseph Kinney guilty of failing to comply with sex offender-registration requirements, a third-degree felony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(b)(2) (Supp.). The State’s punishment enhancement alleged that Kinney had already been convicted of another offense for failing to comply with sex offender-registration requirements. After finding the punishment-enhancement allegation true, the jury assessed Kinney’s sentence at twenty years’ imprisonment. In his sole point of error on appeal, Kinney argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of guilt because he “was not properly advised of the requirements.” Because we find that legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of guilt, we overrule Kinney’s sole point of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding of Guilt A. Standard of Review “In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Our rigorous [legal sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and 2 to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not required that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). The jury, as “the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony[, could] ‘believe all of [the] witnesses’ testimony, portions of it, or none of it.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). “We give ‘almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility.’” Id. (quoting Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). “Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of 3 proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). B. The Evidence at Trial At trial, Kinney stipulated that he [wa]s a person with a reportable conviction for Sexual Assault of a Child, and [wa]s required to comply with the registration requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Program, Chapter 62, of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and ha[d] a duty to verify registration annually for life with the local law enforcement authority. Amy Vallery, an investigator and sex offender registrar with the Cass County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO), testified that she reviewed Kinney’s sex offender-registration paperwork with Kinney. Kinney’s notification of registration duties, which was admitted into evidence, shows that he was aware that the CCSO was the local law enforcement agency where he was required to report. Vallery’s testimony shows that she provided Kinney’s written requirements to him, and that Kinney signed his initials next to the section labeled “Change in Online Identifiers,” acknowledging that he understood the following statement: “I shall report any changes to online identifiers, including establishing any new online identifier not already included on my registration form, to my primary registration authority . . . no later than the [seventh] day after the change.” Vallery testified that she explained to Kinney that his failure to comply with the requirements could lead to criminal penalties and asked Kinney if he had any questions about the requirements. According to Vallery, Kinney had no questions about his registration requirements, including the duty to report online identifiers. 4 Vallery testified that she next assisted Kinney with filling out his registration form, in which he reported an email address, but no online identifiers. Vallery said that she specifically asked Kinney if he had any Facebook or social media accounts, and that Kinney stated that he did not. Vallery testified that she learned on March 11, 2024, that Kinney had a Facebook account after a person named Emory Harris1 reported that Kinney sent her “uncomfortable” messages through Facebook Messenger.2 Harris provided Vallery with a screenshot of Kinney’s message, which was introduced into evidence. Vallery then discovered two Facebook accounts used by Kinney and, by looking at posts, learned that Kinney had one Facebook account as early as February 4, 2024, and had created another on March 10. Screenshots of the two account profile photographs were introduced into evidence. Vallery testified that, after Kinney was arrested on March 20, he admitted that he had the two Facebook accounts but said that “he attempted to delete one.” Vallery’s body-camera footage of Kinney’s statement was admitted into evidence and shows his awareness of his Facebook accounts. Vallery also said that Kinney had failed to report his car, a new cellphone, and his employment. After hearing that evidence, the jury found Kinney guilty of failing to comply with sex offender-registration requirements. 1 We use a pseudonym for the adult complainant in this case out of respect for her privacy. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting a “crime victim . . . the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); Reed v. State, 680 S.W.3d 620, 622 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (adult victim identified by pseudonym); Kingsbury v. State, 625 S.W.3d 686, 689 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (“We use a pseudonym to protect the complainant’s privacy.”); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 58.101(1), 58.102(a) (Supp.) (victim of a reportable offense may elect to use a pseudonym by completing a prescribed pseudonym form). 2 Harris testified about the unwanted contact from Kinney. 5 C. Analysis At a minimum, to prove failure to comply with sex offender-registration requirements, the State must prove that Kinney “(1) had a reportable conviction or adjudication, (2) was required to register, (3) failed to comply with that requirement, and that (4) his duty to register had not expired.” Caudill v. State, 693 S.W.3d 865, 870 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2024, no pet.) (quoting Hall v. State, 440 S.W.3d 690, 691 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d), disagreed with on other grounds by Ex parte Lane, 670 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (orig. proceeding)). But these elements are altered by the indictment. See id. at 872–73. Here, the State alleged in its indictment that Kinney, while having an annual duty to register for life, “did intentionally or knowingly fail to inform the local law enforcement authority[, the CCSO,] of the existence of an online identifier not previously included on defendant’s registration form no later than seven days after the establishment of the online identifier.” The State alleged in its indictment a third-degree felony under Article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because “the actor is a person whose duty to register expires under Article 62.101(a) [of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] and who is required to verify registration once each year under Article 62.058” of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.102(b)(2) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 62.058, 62.101(a)). The State also alleged that Kinney failed to report an online identifier, which is an offense under Article 62.0551 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.0551. As a result, the State was required to prove the following elements 6 beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Kinney had a reportable conviction; (2) that Kinney had an annual duty to register; (3) that Kinney was required to register with the CCSO; (4) that Kinney’s duty to register was for life, (5) that Kinney established a “new online identifier not already included on the person’s registration form,” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.0551(a); and (6) that Kinney failed to “report the . . . establishment” of the online identifier to the CCSO no later than seven days after the establishment of the online identifier, id. See Caudill, 693 S.W.3d at 872–73. Further, there is no requirement to prove an additional mental state where “the evidence was sufficient to establish [Kinney’s] awareness of the registration requirements.” Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Kinney stipulated to the first four elements that the State was required to prove. Vallery testified that Kinney reviewed his written registration requirements and the evidence shows that he wrote his initials next to the requirement to report his online identifiers. Vallery also testified that she explained the phrase “online identifiers” by asking Kinney if he had any social media or Facebook accounts, but he did not report any. The video-recorded footage of Kinney’s admission to Vallery that he was aware of his Facebook accounts, and his statement that he had tried to delete one, was evidence from which the jury could determine Kinney’s awareness of his requirement to report his accounts. Further, the jury heard that Kinney also failed to report his car, cellphone, and employment, which could have contributed to the jury’s assessment of Kinney’s mental state. Testimony from Vallery and Harris, and admission of Kinney’s Facebook accounts, shows that Kinney had established a “new online identifier not already included on [his] registration form” on March 10. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7 62.0551. By the time of his arrest on March 20, Kinney had not yet reported his Facebook accounts. As a result, the evidence shows that Kinney failed to “report the . . . establishment” of the online identifier to the CCSO no later than seven days after it was created. See id. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we find that a rational jury could have found that the State established all of the elements of Kinney’s offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, we overrule Kinney’s sole point of error. II. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Scott E. Stevens Chief Justice Date Submitted: October 5, 2026 Date Decided: November 16, 2026 Do Not Publish 8