Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00035-CR BRYAN DEE SPOONEMORE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 8th District Court Hopkins County, Texas Trial Court No. 2530956 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION A Hopkins County jury found Bryan Dee Spoonemore guilty of possession of methamphetamine in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (Supp.). After Spoonemore pled true to the State’s habitual-offender punishment-enhancement allegation, the trial court sentenced him to fifty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Supp.). In his sole point of error on appeal, Spoonemore argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained after a search of his person. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that Spoonemore consented to the search of his person, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. Standard of Review “Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a search conducted without a warrant based on probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). “One of those exceptions is a search conducted with the person’s voluntary consent.” Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219). “When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standard of review.” Ochoa v. State, 707 S.W.3d 344, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). “The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility and weight to be afforded their testimony.” Id. “Accordingly, we defer almost totally to a trial court’s determinations of 2 historical fact, so long as such determinations are supported by the record, as well as to its rulings on mixed questions of law and fact that hinge on credibility and demeanor.” Id. “We, however, review de novo the trial court’s rulings on pure questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact that do not hinge on credibility or demeanor.” Id. “The evidence and all reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and the trial court’s ruling must be upheld if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under a theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. (quoting State v. Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023)). “The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). “The validity of a consent to search is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.” Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 458 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226–27). “A person’s consent to search can be communicated to law enforcement in a variety of ways, including by words, action, or circumstantial evidence showing implied consent.” Id. “But the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 458–59 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228). “The Supreme Court has explained[] that ‘the standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?’” Id. at 459 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). “In other words, courts review the totality of the circumstances of a particular police-citizen interaction from the 3 point of view of the objectively reasonable person, without regard for the subjective thoughts or intents of either the officer or the citizen.” Id. “The ultimate question is whether the person’s ‘“will ha[s] been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,’” such that his consent to search must have been involuntary.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976)). Where, as here, “there are no written findings explaining the factual basis for the trial judge’s decision, we imply findings of fact that support his ruling so long as the evidence supports those implied findings.” Id. at 460. II. The Evidence Before trial, the trial court denied Spoonemore’s written suppression motion without a full evidentiary hearing.1 Rather, the trial judge reviewed the body-camera footage, which shows that an officer stopped a vehicle, later determined to be driven by Spoonemore, in the dark because its “third brake light [was] out” and the driver did not signal 100 feet before turning. The officer, Corporal Dustin Green of the Sulphur Springs Police Department, then asked Spoonemore for his driver’s license and insurance card. Spoonemore was not able to present his insurance card, which required Green to walk back to his patrol unit to confirm whether the vehicle was insured. Green asked Spoonemore to step out of his vehicle while the officer performed his investigation, and Spoonemore complied after he confirmed that he had no weapons in the vehicle. 1 In Spoonemore’s case, “the trial court did not conduct a formal hearing on the motion to suppress, and the suppression issue was not re-litigated at trial. Therefore, we will only consider the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling on the motion to suppress.” Oringderff v. State, 528 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23). 4 While Spoonemore was standing outside his vehicle, Green asked Spoonemore if he still lived at the address on his driver’s license, but Spoonemore said that he moved seven years ago and had not yet changed the address on his license. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.054 (Supp.) (requiring notification of a change of address within thirty days). Green asked Spoonemore if he had anything illegal on his person or in his vehicle, and Spoonemore replied that he did not. When Green asked Spoonemore if he minded emptying out his pockets, Spoonemore replied, “Yeah,” and began turning out his pockets. The body-camera footage shows that Spoonemore, who was speaking to Green, did not notice the presence of a second backup officer in the distance until after he had reached into his pockets. When Spoonemore presented the contents of his pockets, Green asked him, “[a]re you alright if I check your pockets?” Spoonemore quickly responded, “Go ahead,” lifted his shirt up to expose his pockets, and turned from one side to the other to assist Green with the search. Green retrieved a digital scale with “drug paraphernalia on it.” Green then searched Spoonemore’s vehicle and located a bag of methamphetamine inside the steering wheel cover. Spoonemore’s written suppression motion presented the following version of the facts: This defendant was requested by police if he “minded” the police reviewing his pocket- and this defendant responded “yea” he minded being searched but after this comment law enforcement agent proceeded to check defendant’s pocket where in [sic] law enforcement recovered a set of scales in defendant’s pocket. This recovery was objected to by the defendant stating he “minded” being searched. Defendant’s Counsel contends that this response was made without the defendant’s genuine consent, despite his statement of “go ahead[.]” 5 Based on this characterization of the facts, the motion to suppress argued that Spoonemore’s “response was not voluntary but emotionally coursed [sic] by law [e]nforcement agent of Sulphur Springs Police Department.” In overruling the suppression motion, the trial court said, [Spoonemore] had pulled out some things in his pocket. He was holding some things. Another officer said, “Well, you’ve got a knife there.” So the officer said, “Do you mind if I go in your pockets?” [Spoonemore] said, “Yeah, go ahead.” And his tone of voice, the words that he said and his body language show that he had zero objection to him going into [his] pockets. And when the scales were found in [his] pockets it, of course, went south from there. III. There Was No Abuse of Discretion in the Denial of the Suppression Motion Here, Spoonemore does not challenge the initial stop of his vehicle due to “equipment and traffic violations.” Instead, he argues that Spoonemore’s consent to search his person was involuntary because he was “cornered by two officers.” He further argues that Green did not have probable cause to search his vehicle. On both counts, we disagree. Trial courts may consider numerous factors in determining the factual question of voluntary consent, including “physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, threats of violence, promises or inducements, deception or trickery, and the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defendant,” among other things. Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 460 n.26 (quoting United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1367 (10th Cir. 1998)); see Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Some relevant factors the Supreme Court has taken into consideration in past cases are: the youth of the accused, the education of the accused, the 6 intelligence of the accused, the constitutional advice given to the accused, the length of the detention, the repetitiveness of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment.”). Here, the body-camera footage shows that Spoonemore was not cornered by two officers. Instead, the footage shows that Green was the only officer who calmly spoke with Spoonemore to explain his traffic violations and that Spoonemore agreed to stand outside of his vehicle while Green checked on Spoonemore’s insurance. The body-camera footage then shows that Spoonemore voluntarily answered Green’s questions, began removing objects from his pockets, and said, “Go ahead,” when Green asked if he could search Spoonemore’s pockets. At all times, the second officer remained in the distance. The body-camera footage shows no physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, lengthy detention, or repetitive questioning. Spoonemore, who appeared to be middle-aged and coherent, showed no signs of lack of education or intelligence. Simply put, nothing shows that Spoonemore’s will was overborne or that his capacity for self-determination was impaired. Instead, Spoonemore said, “Go ahead,” when Green asked if he could search his pockets, and his body language, which included lifting his shirt and turning so Green could easily access Spoonemore’s pockets, supports the trial court’s finding that Spoonemore’s consent was voluntary. See Meekins, 340 S.W.3d 462–63. Viewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the trial judge’s ruling, we conclude that he did not abuse his discretion by finding that Spoonemore voluntarily consented to a search of his person. 7 Further, possession of drug paraphernalia is a crime. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.125(a) (Supp.). As a result, Green’s discovery of the digital scale with “drug paraphernalia on it” provided probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained drugs and justified a search incident to arrest. See State v. Sanchez, 538 S.W.3d 545, 549–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (finding that when drugs are located on a person after a valid traffic stop, a search incident to arrest of a vehicle is permitted since “it [i]s reasonable for the officer to believe that ‘further contraband or similar evidence relevant to the crime . . . might be found in the vehicle from which he had just alighted’” (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also State v. Danley, No. 11-20-00232-CR, 2022 WL 2975984, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he discovery of drug paraphernalia on the person of the driver of a vehicle gives officers probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence related to that offense.” (citing Daves v. State, 327 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, no pet.); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297–98 (1999) (“holding that hypodermic syringe found in driver’s pocket gave police officers probable cause to search the driver’s vehicle for contraband”))). We find that the trial court’s denial of Spoonemore’s suppression motion was not an abuse of discretion. As a result, we overrule Spoonemore’s sole point of error. 8 IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Charles van Cleef Justice Date Submitted: September 11, 2026 Date Decided: November 18, 2026 Do Not Publish 9