Christian Michael Chortanoff v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket10-25-00430-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00430-CR
Christian Michael Chortanoff,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
12th District Court of Walker County, Texas
Judge David W. Moorman, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 32214
JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Christian Michael Chortanoff guilty of aggravated assault
against a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B).
Chortanoff pled “True” to two felony enhancement allegations, and the trial
court sentenced him to fifty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
– Institutional Division. In two issues on appeal, Chortanoff challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea element of his conviction
and the deadly weapon finding. We affirm.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of
sufficiency issues as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review
must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must
consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of
facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable
inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 2
all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the
offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified
by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
BACKGROUND
Chortanoff called 9-1-1 out of concern that a man was going to assault
him in retaliation for Chortanoff assaulting the man’s mother. When the
responding officer arrived, Chortanoff was in the front yard with several other
people. Chortanoff was “extremely agitated” and “obviously inebriated.” He
began cussing at the officer and told the officer to leave the property. At some
point, the objective of law enforcement’s presence changed from investigating
a domestic disturbance to conducting a civil standby to allow a female to safely
remove her belongings from the residence.
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 3
Another officer, Sergeant Blair, arrived on scene and spoke with
Chortanoff, who was still angry, as they walked inside of the residence.
Chortanoff entered a bedroom, shut the door, and turned on loud music.
Sergeant Blair was watching the female occupant gather her belongings when
“glass flew all over” him. Sergeant Blair drew his weapon and turned around
to find Chortanoff approximately three feet away and holding an aluminum
baseball bat, which he had used to smash dishes and other items in the kitchen.
Chortanoff had the baseball bat raised up overhead and “was making it quite
clear what he meant to do with the bat.” Sergeant Blair characterized the
encounter as Chortanoff “confront[ing] me with the bat,” and testified that he
felt threatened. When Sergeant Blair asked Chortanoff to put the bat down,
Chortanoff did not comply. Sergeant Blair closed the distance between himself
and Chortanoff, grabbed the bat with his left hand, and holstered his weapon.
Sergeant Blair used the bat to shove Chortanoff backward onto the floor, tossed
the bat aside, and attempted to handcuff Chortanoff. As Chortanoff was
continuing to be uncooperative and noncompliant, the initial responding officer
assisted Sergeant Blair with restraining Chortanoff and walking him to the
patrol car.
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 4
ANALYSIS
Chortanoff was charged with aggravated assault against a public
servant by intentionally or knowingly threatening a law enforcement officer
with imminent bodily injury by swinging a baseball bat. In his first issue,
Chortanoff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he intentionally or
knowingly threatened the officer. In his second issue, he argues there is
insufficient evidence that he used or exhibited the baseball bat as a deadly
weapon. In both issues, Chortanoff emphasizes that he was initially not close
enough to hit the officer with the baseball bat, he did not move toward the
officer, and he did not verbally threaten the officer in any way.
Mens Rea
The mens rea element in an assault by threat prosecution focuses on the
defendant’s intentional or knowing act of making a threat, not on any resulting
harm. See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the
evidence sufficient to support the mens rea element. Threats may be
communicated by the defendant’s actions or conduct. McGowan v. State, 664
S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Chortanoff was described as
extremely agitated and angry on scene. He was aware that the officer was
inside of the home performing a civil standby when he swung the baseball bat
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 5
with enough force to cause glass from shattered objects to hit the officer. When
Chortanoff raised the bat again, a juror could reasonably determine that his
refusal to comply with the officer’s command to drop the bat was evidence that
he was intentionally or knowingly threatening the officer. In coming to its
conclusion about Chortanoff’s intent, the jury could also have reasonably
considered that Sergeant Blair had to wrestle the bat away from Chortanoff
after he knocked Chortanoff to the floor. Accordingly, we overrule Chortanoff’s
first issue.
Deadly Weapon
A deadly weapon is defined as anything that in its manner of use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). Non-exclusive factors that may guide our analysis
include words and other threatening actions by the defendant, the defendant’s
proximity to the victim, the alleged weapon’s physical characteristics
indicative of its ability to inflict serious bodily injury or death, and the manner
in which the defendant used the weapon. See Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d
320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We may also consider testimony by the victim
that he feared death or serious bodily injury. Hopper v. State, 483 S.W.3d 235,
239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d).
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 6
The trial court admitted into evidence a photograph of the aluminum
baseball bat. The jury heard testimony about the significant injuries a person
could sustain if struck by a baseball bat, such as broken bones, facial fractures,
cracked skulls, and temporary blindness. Sergeant Blair testified that he felt
threatened by Chortanoff’s actions with the baseball bat and was concerned for
his safety as well as the female’s safety.
An object may qualify as a deadly weapon if it is “displayed in a manner
conveying an express or implied threat that serious bodily injury or death will
result if the aggressor is not satisfied.” Hammons v. State, 856 S.W.2d 797,
800-01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d). Chortanoff had already
expressed frustration with law enforcement’s presence at his property. Aware
that Sergeant Blair came into the residence to conduct the civil standby,
Chortanoff brought the baseball bat into the general area where the female
was collecting her property and began smashing objects with it. Immediately
after using the baseball bat to smash the objects, Chortanoff held up the bat
over his head as if preparing to swing it again. He was approximately three
feet away from Sergeant Blair and continued to hold the bat up above his head
despite Sergeant Blair’s commands to disarm himself. The jury was entitled
to credit Sergeant Blair’s testimony that Chortanoff “confronted” him with the
baseball bat and could reasonably determine that Chortanoff displayed the
Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 7
baseball bat in a manner conveying an implied threat that serious bodily injury
or death would result. Considering the foregoing in the appropriate light, we
find the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding and
overrule Chortanoff’s second issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled both of Chortanoff’s issues on appeal, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
ANDREA WESTERFELD
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Harris, and
Justice Westerfeld
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM
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