Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-25-00430-CR Christian Michael Chortanoff, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee On appeal from the 12th District Court of Walker County, Texas Judge David W. Moorman, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 32214 JUSTICE WESTERFELD delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury found Christian Michael Chortanoff guilty of aggravated assault against a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). Chortanoff pled “True” to two felony enhancement allegations, and the trial court sentenced him to fifty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. In two issues on appeal, Chortanoff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea element of his conviction and the deadly weapon finding. We affirm. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of sufficiency issues as follows: When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 2 all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665. Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). BACKGROUND Chortanoff called 9-1-1 out of concern that a man was going to assault him in retaliation for Chortanoff assaulting the man’s mother. When the responding officer arrived, Chortanoff was in the front yard with several other people. Chortanoff was “extremely agitated” and “obviously inebriated.” He began cussing at the officer and told the officer to leave the property. At some point, the objective of law enforcement’s presence changed from investigating a domestic disturbance to conducting a civil standby to allow a female to safely remove her belongings from the residence. Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 3 Another officer, Sergeant Blair, arrived on scene and spoke with Chortanoff, who was still angry, as they walked inside of the residence. Chortanoff entered a bedroom, shut the door, and turned on loud music. Sergeant Blair was watching the female occupant gather her belongings when “glass flew all over” him. Sergeant Blair drew his weapon and turned around to find Chortanoff approximately three feet away and holding an aluminum baseball bat, which he had used to smash dishes and other items in the kitchen. Chortanoff had the baseball bat raised up overhead and “was making it quite clear what he meant to do with the bat.” Sergeant Blair characterized the encounter as Chortanoff “confront[ing] me with the bat,” and testified that he felt threatened. When Sergeant Blair asked Chortanoff to put the bat down, Chortanoff did not comply. Sergeant Blair closed the distance between himself and Chortanoff, grabbed the bat with his left hand, and holstered his weapon. Sergeant Blair used the bat to shove Chortanoff backward onto the floor, tossed the bat aside, and attempted to handcuff Chortanoff. As Chortanoff was continuing to be uncooperative and noncompliant, the initial responding officer assisted Sergeant Blair with restraining Chortanoff and walking him to the patrol car. Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 4 ANALYSIS Chortanoff was charged with aggravated assault against a public servant by intentionally or knowingly threatening a law enforcement officer with imminent bodily injury by swinging a baseball bat. In his first issue, Chortanoff challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he intentionally or knowingly threatened the officer. In his second issue, he argues there is insufficient evidence that he used or exhibited the baseball bat as a deadly weapon. In both issues, Chortanoff emphasizes that he was initially not close enough to hit the officer with the baseball bat, he did not move toward the officer, and he did not verbally threaten the officer in any way. Mens Rea The mens rea element in an assault by threat prosecution focuses on the defendant’s intentional or knowing act of making a threat, not on any resulting harm. See Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence sufficient to support the mens rea element. Threats may be communicated by the defendant’s actions or conduct. McGowan v. State, 664 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Chortanoff was described as extremely agitated and angry on scene. He was aware that the officer was inside of the home performing a civil standby when he swung the baseball bat Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 5 with enough force to cause glass from shattered objects to hit the officer. When Chortanoff raised the bat again, a juror could reasonably determine that his refusal to comply with the officer’s command to drop the bat was evidence that he was intentionally or knowingly threatening the officer. In coming to its conclusion about Chortanoff’s intent, the jury could also have reasonably considered that Sergeant Blair had to wrestle the bat away from Chortanoff after he knocked Chortanoff to the floor. Accordingly, we overrule Chortanoff’s first issue. Deadly Weapon A deadly weapon is defined as anything that in its manner of use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(B). Non-exclusive factors that may guide our analysis include words and other threatening actions by the defendant, the defendant’s proximity to the victim, the alleged weapon’s physical characteristics indicative of its ability to inflict serious bodily injury or death, and the manner in which the defendant used the weapon. See Johnson v. State, 509 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We may also consider testimony by the victim that he feared death or serious bodily injury. Hopper v. State, 483 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d). Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 6 The trial court admitted into evidence a photograph of the aluminum baseball bat. The jury heard testimony about the significant injuries a person could sustain if struck by a baseball bat, such as broken bones, facial fractures, cracked skulls, and temporary blindness. Sergeant Blair testified that he felt threatened by Chortanoff’s actions with the baseball bat and was concerned for his safety as well as the female’s safety. An object may qualify as a deadly weapon if it is “displayed in a manner conveying an express or implied threat that serious bodily injury or death will result if the aggressor is not satisfied.” Hammons v. State, 856 S.W.2d 797, 800-01 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1993, pet. ref’d). Chortanoff had already expressed frustration with law enforcement’s presence at his property. Aware that Sergeant Blair came into the residence to conduct the civil standby, Chortanoff brought the baseball bat into the general area where the female was collecting her property and began smashing objects with it. Immediately after using the baseball bat to smash the objects, Chortanoff held up the bat over his head as if preparing to swing it again. He was approximately three feet away from Sergeant Blair and continued to hold the bat up above his head despite Sergeant Blair’s commands to disarm himself. The jury was entitled to credit Sergeant Blair’s testimony that Chortanoff “confronted” him with the baseball bat and could reasonably determine that Chortanoff displayed the Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 7 baseball bat in a manner conveying an implied threat that serious bodily injury or death would result. Considering the foregoing in the appropriate light, we find the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s deadly weapon finding and overrule Chortanoff’s second issue. Conclusion Having overruled both of Chortanoff’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. ANDREA WESTERFELD Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 19, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Harris, and Justice Westerfeld Affirmed Do Not Publish CRPM Christian Michael Chortanoff v. The State of Texas Page 8