Full Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION Nos. 04-25-00177-CR & 04-25-00178-CR Jose David DIAZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 2024CR1766 & 2024CR1767 Honorable Jefferson Moore, 1 Judge Presiding Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice Velia J. Meza, Justice Delivered and Filed: October 14, 2026 AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED Jose David Diaz was charged by separate indictments with committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against Juan Delgado and Claudia Trevino. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2). Each indictment alleged that Diaz had previously been convicted of two felony offenses, which, if found true, increased his punishment range to imprisonment for 25 to 99 years The Honorable Catherine Torres-Stahl is the presiding judge of the 175th District Court. The Honorable Jefferson 1 Moore, sitting by assignment, presided over Diaz’s trial and signed the judgments of conviction. 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR or life. See id. § 12.42(d). After the jury found him guilty in each cause, he was sentenced by the trial court as a habitual offender to serve concurrent 50-year terms of imprisonment. In four issues on appeal, Diaz contends that the trial court erroneously: (1) failed to conduct an informal competency hearing; (2) reviewed testimonial evidence at the sentencing hearing; (3) failed to instruct the jury on self-defense against multiple assailants; and (4) failed to instruct the jury on defense of third persons. We modify the judgments of the trial court to correct clerical errors therein and affirm as modified. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On November 13, 2023, Juan Delgado attended a party at Claudia Trevino’s home. Diaz, Trevino’s next-door neighbor, spent the evening in his yard antagonizing partygoers over street parking. Trevino and her family had lived next to Diaz for nearly a decade, and Diaz had become increasingly hostile. Diaz was still standing in his yard around midnight as Delgado was leaving. The two men argued from the neighboring properties, and occupants of both homes emerged to intervene. While Trevino, her pregnant daughter, and Delgado’s girlfriend attempted to remove Delgado from the area, Diaz brandished a shotgun. Witnesses recalled Diaz firing twice: one “warning shot” into the air, and another at Delgado and those around him. The shotgun blast struck Delgado in the shoulder and torso, and hit Trevino in the leg. Delgado collapsed, and Diaz fled into his home before police arrived. Responding officers with the San Antonio Police Department observed Delgado in critical condition. He and Trevino were transported to the hospital while other officers persuaded Diaz to exit his home and voluntarily surrender. During Diaz’s custodial interview, he initially denied possessing or shooting a firearm, then claimed that he was defending himself. -2- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR Diaz was ultimately convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as alleged in both indictments. The evidence presented at the sentencing hearing established that Diaz’s criminal conduct began in 1991, and he was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 2000 and 2015. The trial court found the enhancement allegations true and imposed concurrent 50-year terms of imprisonment for each conviction. This appeal followed. COMPETENCY Diaz contends in his first issue that the trial court erroneously failed to conduct an informal inquiry into his competency to stand trial. As a matter of constitutional due process, a person who is incompetent may not stand trial. Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a). A trial court employs a two-step procedure for making competency determinations: (1) an informal inquiry; and (2) a formal competency trial. Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563. The trial court must conduct an informal inquiry “upon a ‘suggestion’ from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent.” Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004(a), (c), (c-1). A suggestion of incompetency may be based on the trial court’s observations related to the defendant’s capacity to: (1) rationally understand the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (3) engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior; and (6) testify. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024(1); see Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), -3- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR superseded by statute, TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.004, as stated in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 692 & n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Because the trial court is “in a better position to determine whether [the defendant] was presently competent,” we review the decision not to conduct an informal competency inquiry for an abuse of discretion. Babyak v. State, No. 04-21- 00216-CR, 2022 WL 2334549, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 426); Geer v. State, 722 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d). The record shows that Diaz understood the proceedings against him and assisted his attorney in preparing his defense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(b). During a pretrial hearing on February 11, 2025, the trial court admonished Diaz as to the potential consequences of pleading not guilty and exercising his right to a jury trial. Diaz confirmed that he understood the punishment ranges, parole eligibility, and his election of punishment upon a guilty verdict. Following the admonishments and discussion of pro se motions, Diaz attempted to speak directly to the judge. He then apologized for doing so, thereby exhibiting his awareness of appropriate courtroom behavior. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.024(1)(E). Diaz argues that his pro se motion for a competency hearing filed in April 2024 amounts to a “suggestion” of incompetency that triggered the trial court’s duty to conduct an informal inquiry. While Diaz was represented by counsel, he filed numerous handwritten pro se motions, including a motion for a competency hearing. Trial counsel provided Diaz’s pro se motions to the trial court clerk “for any future appellate record,” but neither urged nor adopted them. The trial court informed Diaz and his trial counsel that the handwritten motions would not be considered: “You have a lawyer. I do not look at pro se motions when there’s a lawyer. It will be put in the file, but I’m not going to look at them or rule on them.” -4- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR As the State correctly observes, a defendant has no right to hybrid representation. Bluntson v. State, 728 S.W.3d 87, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). Therefore, a trial court is free to disregard any pro se motions presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel. Id. A trial court’s decision not to rule on a pro se motion is not subject to appellate review. Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Here, because Diaz was represented by counsel, and counsel did not adopt or urge Diaz’s pro se motion to evaluate his competency, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider Diaz’s pro se motion. See Bluntson, 728 S.W.3d at 135. It necessarily follows that, under the foregoing circumstances, a matter not considered by the trial court cannot suggest incompetency. Even so, Diaz’s handwritten pro se motions undermine his contention rather than support it. In addition to his request for a competency evaluation, Diaz drafted a motion to suppress evidence and a request for jury instructions, which demonstrates his understanding of the proceedings and ability to assist counsel. See Montoya, 291 S.W.3d at 425-26; Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Having found no suggestion elsewhere in the record that Diaz was incompetent to stand trial, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to sua sponte conduct an informal competency inquiry. See State v. Lerma, 639 S.W.3d 63, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Accordingly, we overrule Diaz’s first issue. PUNISHMENT EVIDENCE In Diaz’s second issue, he asserts that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by considering testimonial evidence in assessing punishment. During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced nineteen exhibits chronicling Diaz’s criminal history beginning in 1991. Then, without objection, the trial court agreed to review “the certified stip[ulation]s of the two prior individual enhancement allegations”—i.e., the factual bases of -5- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR Diaz’s 2000 and 2015 aggravated assault convictions. Diaz now contends that the trial court’s review of those certified documents violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and cross-examination. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI. In other words, criminal defendants retain the right to physically face witnesses and conduct cross-examination. See Woodall v. State, 336 S.W.3d 634, 641-42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242- 43 (1895)). A defendant’s complaint that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated must be preserved for appellate review. See Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that defendant failed to preserve Confrontation Clause complaint for appellate review when defendant, in his trial objection, “‘did not clearly articulate’ that the Confrontation Clause demanded admission of the evidence”). The failure to object at trial waives a Confrontation Clause complaint on appeal. See Paredes v. State, 129 S.W.3d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that defendant failed to preserve Confrontation Clause complaint for appellate review when trial objection was solely on hearsay grounds). When the State offered the challenged evidence in this case, Diaz’s attorney responded that he had “no objection.” He therefore waived any claim on appeal that the trial court violated Diaz’s rights under the Confrontation Clause by reviewing that evidence. See Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We overrule Diaz’s second issue. JURY CHARGE In Diaz’s third and fourth issues, he challenges the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the law of multiple assailants and defense of a third person. -6- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR The trial court must provide the jury with “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14; see Bell v. State, 635 S.W.3d 641, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). However, “[a]n unrequested defensive issue is not the law applicable to the case.” Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Vega v. State, 394 S.W.3d 514, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“A defendant cannot complain on appeal about the trial judge’s failure to include a defensive instruction that he did not preserve by request or objection: he has procedurally defaulted any such complaint.”). Trial courts are thus not required to sua sponte instruct the jury on unrequested defensive issues. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)); Roby v. State, 647 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.). While no magic words are required, a defendant must convey a requested instruction with sufficient specificity to bring it to the trial court’s attention. See Bennett v. State, 235 S.W.3d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“We do not require a trial judge to mull over all the evidence introduced at trial in order to determine whether a defendant’s request for a jury instruction means more than it says.”). At trial, Diaz did not dispute that he fired his shotgun in the direction of Delgado and Trevino. However, he argued that his conduct was justified to defend himself, and the jury was instructed on the law of self-defense at the conclusion of the guilt phase. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.31(a). Although Diaz neither objected to the charge nor requested additional defensive instructions, he contends on appeal that the absence thereof resulted in egregious harm. Relevant here, section 9.31 of the Penal Code provides that a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. See TEX. PENAL -7- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR CODE § 9.31(a). Equally permissible is a person’s use of force to protect a third person under similar circumstances. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.33. The justified use of force is not limited to a single aggressor—if “the evidence viewed from the defendant’s standpoint shows an attack or threatened attack by more than one assailant,” a defendant is entitled to a multiple-assailants instruction. Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Because self-defense and defense of a third person are separate defenses in different sections of the Penal Code, “[a] request with respect to the former does not by itself alert the trial judge with respect to the latter.” Bennett, 235 S.W.3d at 243; see TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 9.31(a), 9.33. The same holds true for an instruction on self-defense against multiple assailants. See Jordan, 593 S.W.3d at 347 (holding appellant preserved error regarding the inclusion of a multiple- assailants instruction in both the self-defense charge and the defense-of-a-third-person charge because the record reflected that the trial court understood the defense’s “request to apply to both self-defense and defense of a third person”). Here, Diaz neither objected to the charge nor requested additional instructions, thereby forfeiting appellate review of his complaints in that regard. See Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62; Jackson v. State, 288 S.W.3d 60, 63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (“A defendant preserves error if the requested charge is specific enough to put the trial court on notice of the omission or error in the charge, and the requested charge need not be ‘in perfect form’ but only sufficient enough to bring the request to the trial court’s attention.”) (quoting Chapman v. State, 921 S.W.2d 694, 695 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Accordingly, we overrule Diaz’s third and fourth issues. CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE JUDGMENT Though not reversible error, the judgments incorrectly list “N/A” for Diaz’s pleas of “not true” to the enhancement paragraphs and the trial court’s findings of true. See TEX. R. APP. P. -8- 04-25-00177-CR, 04-25-00178-CR 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure authorize courts of appeals to reform judgments when the information necessary to do so is available). We therefore reform the judgments to accurately reflect Diaz’s pleas and the trial court’s findings. CONCLUSION We modify the judgments of the trial court and affirm the judgments as modified. Adrian A. Spears II, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH -9-