Matthew James Mixon v. the State of Texas
CourtTexas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)
Date FiledSeptember 10, 2026
Docket11-25-00108-CR
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Opinion filed September 10, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-25-00108-CR
__________
MATTHEW JAMES MIXON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 213th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 1597864, 1814834, & 1839232
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N1
The trial court sentenced Appellant, Matthew James Mixon, to concurrent
terms of imprisonment for a series of felony offenses he committed that involved
theft, fraud, and money laundering. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends
1
Pursuant to Misc. Docket Order No. 25-9016 issued by the Texas Supreme Court on April 2, 2025,
this appeal was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. Therefore, as the transferee court, we
must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals
if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated when
the trial court considered a presentence investigation report (PSI) during the
punishment phase of the proceedings. We affirm.
I. Factual Background
Appellant entered open pleas of guilty to all counts alleged in the indictments
in trial court cause nos. 1839232 and 1814834 and pled “true” to the allegations in
the State’s motion to adjudicate in trial court cause no. 1597864.2
At the consolidated punishment hearing, the PSI was offered and admitted
without objection. Before pronouncing Appellant’s sentences, the trial court read
portions of the PSI aloud. The trial court found Appellant guilty on all counts in
trial court cause nos. 1839232 and 1814834 and adjudicated his guilt in trial court
cause no. 1597864. The trial court then: (1) sentenced Appellant to twenty-five
years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ) for each count in trial court cause no. 1839232; (2)
sentenced Appellant to ten years’ imprisonment in TDCJ for each count in trial court
cause no. 1814834; and (3) found that Appellant had violated certain terms and
conditions of his community supervision in trial court cause no. 1597864, revoked
his community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment in TDCJ.3
The trial court ordered that all sentences imposed be served concurrently.
2
Specifically, Appellant pled guilty to the offenses of misapplication of fiduciary property valued
at $300,000 or more and theft of property valued at $300,000 or more, first-degree felonies, in trial court
cause no. 1839232. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03(e)(7), 32.45(c)(7) (West Supp. 2025). He pled guilty
to misapplication of fiduciary property valued at $30,000 or more but less than $150,000, theft of property
valued at $30,000 or more but less than $150,000, and money laundering of funds valued at $30,000 or
more but less than $150,000, third-degree felonies, in trial court cause no. 1814834. PENAL §§ 31.03(e)(5),
32.45(c)(5), 34.02(e)(2) (West 2016). In trial court cause no. 1597864, Appellant was placed on deferred
adjudication community supervision for the offense of making a false statement to obtain property or credit
valued at $30,000 or more but less than $150,000, a third-degree felony. PENAL § 32.32(c)(5).
3
Appellant has appealed from each judgment of conviction, and they were originally docketed in
our court as three separate appeals. However, based on our inquiry, and pursuant to Appellant’s request,
2
II. Analysis
Appellant contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation when it considered the PSI during the consolidated punishment
proceeding. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Yet, Appellant acknowledges that the
Court of Criminal Appeals has addressed and squarely rejected this same argument
on the merits, 4 and that he failed to preserve this complaint by not objecting to the
PSI’s admission. However, citing to Ex parte Hathorn, 296 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009), and Ex parte Turner, 542 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex. Crim. App.
1976), he nonetheless contends that he was not required to preserve his
Confrontation Clause complaint because “the Court of Criminal Appeals has held
that under circumstances where the law is well-settled to the point where any
objection in the trial court would be futile, the claim will not be considered forfeited
for later review.” Appellant is mistaken.
We note that the Second Court of Appeals, whose precedent we must follow,
has considered and expressly rejected this precise argument. See Hubbard v. State,
No. 02-23-00067-CR, 2023 WL 7399135, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 9,
2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).5 As the court stated in
our Cause Nos. 11-25-00109-CR and 11-25-00110-CR were consolidated into Cause No. 11-25-00108-CR
for purposes of appeal.
4
See Stringer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 42, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“When the sentence is
determined by the [trial court in a non-capital case], the information in a PSI is not subject to the
Confrontation Clause.”). Thus, in such circumstances, the right of confrontation does not apply. Id. The
court’s holding in Stringer has not been abandoned and has been followed by the Second Court of Appeals
and several of our other sister courts. See, e.g., Sell v. State, 488 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, pet. ref’d); Ferguson v. State, No. 07-25-00049-CR, 2025 WL 2301302, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo Aug. 8, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Mendoza v. State, No. 06-18-
00137-CR, 2019 WL 208629, at *1 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 16, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Degraffinried v. State, No. 05-16-01359-CR, 2018 WL 3598953, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Dallas July 27, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Today, we join them.
Appellant and his counsel should be aware of Hubbard and its holding, and other precedent from
5
the Second Court of Appeals to which we have cited, considering that an attorney in the same firm as
3
Hubbard: “Hathorn and Turner are both postconviction writ cases in which the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that, in that context, preservation at trial was not
required to argue for reversal of a conviction based on a higher-court change in the
law that occurred after the trial.” Id. (emphasis added). Here, Appellant was
convicted and adjudicated of non-capital offenses and the trial court, pursuant to his
election, assessed his punishment for each offense. Further, these cases are not in a
postconviction-writ posture, nor has Appellant identified any change in the law since
he was sentenced of which he now seeks to take advantage. See id.
On direct appeal, the Rules of Appellate Procedure and Court of Criminal
Appeals precedent require that Confrontation Clause complaints be preserved at trial
or they are forfeited. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Davis v. State, 313
S.W.3d 317, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Confrontation Clause claims are subject
to [the] preservation requirement[s].”). Thus, because Appellant did not assert an
objection to the PSI’s admission, he did not preserve his complaint for our review.
See Hubbard, 2023 WL 7399135, at *2 (citing Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 347); see also
Serrano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 717, 720–21 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. ref’d);
Sell, 488 S.W.3d at 398–99; Jones v. State, No. 02-17-00332-CR, 2018
WL 2992591, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 14, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication); Lewis v. State, No. 02-18-00149-CR, 2018
WL 2248501, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 17, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication). Nevertheless, even if Appellant had preserved his
complaint, the trial court did not err when it considered the PSI because, in this
circumstance, its admission does not violate an accused’s right to confrontation. See
Stringer, 309 S.W.3d at 48; Sell, 488 S.W.3d at 399; Degraffinried, 2018
Appellant’s counsel represented the appellant in Hubbard and advanced the same rejected argument that
Appellant asserts here.
4
WL 3598953, at *4; Durant v. State, No. 06-16-00211-CR, 2017 WL 1245430, at
*1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 5, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
September 10, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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